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Abstract 
In the Swiss construction industry, industrial relations are embedded in an 
institutional arrangement of “social partnership”. Yet despite these institutionalized 
relations, tensions have grown and new forms of precarious work are shaping the 
country’s construction sites. Reflecting greater upheavals unfolding throughout the 
Western world, structural changes born out of a duet of neoliberal offensives and 
economic uncertainty are not only altering the labor process, but have created an 
increasingly fragmented labor force. 
Embedded in an intense union campaign in 2015, this ethnography explores these 
changes and asks how the industry’s largest trade union is coping with these 
challenges and how it is seeking to enhance its capacity as a collective agent 
shaping industrial relations. Empirically, it becomes clear that the union is attempting 
to revitalize by developing more systematic mobilization strategies, but also by 
pursuing an emancipatory approach empowering workplace leaders themselves. 
While the two can go hand in hand, their relationship represents a complex and 
sometimes contradictory balancing act. Theoretically, it becomes apparent that we 
are dealing with a multilayered process of labor renewal where collective action is 
neither pessimistically improbable nor optimistically given. Instead, it must be 
constructed as a processual dialogue between a changing political economic 
environment, the historical development of industrial relations and the union’s own 
agency.
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Zusammenfassung 
Die industriellen Beziehungen der Schweizer Bauwirtschaft sind in einem komplexen 
institutionellen Arrangement der „Sozialpartnerschaft“ eingebettet. Doch trotz diesen 
institutionalisierten Verhältnissen haben Spannungen zugenommen und prekäre 
Arbeitsformen prägen zunehmend die Baustellen. Als Teil grösserer Umbrüche durch 
die westliche Welt haben strukturelle Veränderungen als duales Produkt neoliberaler 
Offensiven und ökonomischer Unsicherheit nicht nur den Arbeitsprozess verändert, 
sondern auch eine fragmentierte Arbeiterschaft entstehen lassen. 
Eingebettet in einer intensiven Gewerkschaftskampagne in 2015, erforscht diese 
Ethnografie jene Veränderungen und geht der Frage nach, wie die Gewerkschaft mit 
diesen Herausforderungen umgeht. Empirisch wird deutlich, dass die Gewerkschaft 
sich mittels systematischen Mobilisierungsstrategien, aber auch anhand eines 
emanzipatorischen Empowerment-Ansatzes zu erneuern versucht. Obwohl die 
beiden Ansätze sich ergänzen können, ist ihre Beziehung komplex und nicht immer 
ohne Widersprüche. Aus theoretischer Sicht geht hervor, dass wir es mit einem 
vielschichtigen Prozess der Gewerkschaftserneuerung zu tun haben, in dem 
kollektives Handeln weder per se unwahrscheinlich noch von Anfang an gegeben ist. 
Vielmehr muss es aktiv konstruiert werden als prozessualer Dialog zwischen einer 
sich verändernden politischen Ökonomie, der historischen Entwicklung der 
industriellen Beziehungen und der eigenen Handlungsfähigkeit der Gewerkschaft. 
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1. Introduction: Laboring for Anthropology 
The assembly took place in a large meeting hall adorned with bright red flags and 
streamers. It was lit with a dimly glowing red light and around four hundred people 
sat in neat rows. They listened to speaker after speaker on the stage up front. Some 
of the onlookers went up to the stage to speak themselves. The others diligently 
listened with headphones in their ears and professional interpreters steadily 
translating in little boxes from behind. The vast majority were men. And despite the 
high-tech lighting, rather lavish catering enjoyed during the lunch break and the 
presence of around ten professional translators for four different languages, the 
participants themselves did not give the impression that this was their daily routine. 
While some of them had even donned three piece suits and almost all were cleanly 
shaven with neatly combed hair, their weathered skin, especially that of the older 
ones, held more stories of decades of hard outdoor work than of catered conventions 
and flashy events. 
In what seemed to represent an intermission between the speeches, the participants 
got up and neatly dispersed into twenty different rooms. Animated by one or two 
designated coaches encouraging them and providing tips, the four hundred or so 
participants carried out role plays and practiced their communications skills. They 
then returned to the plenum. 
Later that afternoon everybody in the room suddenly got up, streamed through the 
now open doors and – despite rain pouring down and heavy winds – energetically 
took to the streets and fell in to form a neatly ordered structure. The newly formed 
procession, now carrying hundreds of red and white flags, then left the conference 
center behind them and proceeded to march down to the city center. Despite the 
smiles on their faces – the participants were clearly enjoying this – the words blasting 
out of the bullhorn held by one of the participants made it clear that this was no 
festive parade. 
The above participants were in fact Swiss construction workers who had just formally 
launched their 2015 union campaign aimed at renewing and improving their collective 
labor agreement, which is renegotiated every three years. While in the past decade, 
this contract-renewal ritual has repeatedly been accompanied by clashes between 
employers and the unions over their antagonistic interests and demands, something 
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far greater was at stake this year. The construction industry’s model for early 
retirement, enabling construction workers to retire five years earlier than the standard 
age, was in dire need of additional funding due to the generation of “baby-boomers” 
going into retirement within the next few years. While Unia, the largest union in the 
industry, proposed raising both employer and employee contributions to secure 
current benefits, the employers ridiculed this idea and – referring to wider debates on 
retirement – demanded that the pension age either be raised or workers’ pensions 
themselves reduced. 
Transcending a simple technical argument or even a question of “narrow” material 
interests, the employers’ nonchalant disregard for something the workers perceived 
as almost holy hit a raw nerve. In fact, the deep sentimental character of this issue 
thus had the potential for turning an otherwise perhaps ritualistic contract-renewal 
campaign into one perceived as more or less existential. And it was primarily this 
subject, next to demands for clearer rules on closing down sites during bad weather 
and sharper measures against so-called wage-dumping, that had visibly awoken the 
emotions of the workers who had travelled from all over Switzerland to take part in 
the gathering depicted above. Debating amongst themselves about the changing 
construction economy, the necessity of early retirement for men of hard labor and the 
injustice of even the suggestion that the latter might be called into question, a wide 
variety of languages could be detected: from German to French and Italian, but also 
Portuguese, Spanish and Albanian among others. The same debates would come to 
be heard on construction sites throughout the country in the months to come. 
With the kick-off rally above began a union campaign that would bring about the 
largest worker mobilizations of a single industry in the last decade of Switzerland’s 
history. It would become a campaign lived, seen, felt and whose fate would ultimately 
be decided on the construction sites throughout the country. It would furthermore 
reach thousands of otherwise uninvolved people at home through newspapers and 
television. For all of the participants directly involved though, whether construction 
workers, activists or union organizers, it would become a campaign alternately 
generating feelings of tension and relief, anger and happiness, frustration and 
satisfaction and also a proud awareness of both individual and collective agency. 
Thus also begins our ethnographic exploration of the subject, one looking at the 
changing environment of Swiss construction and the activities of Unia, the largest 
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and most active trade union therein. This ethnography is the study of how the labor 
process as well as the industrial relations of a key industry are changing and how the 
workers’ trade union is attempting to radically adapt to those changes. Bringing the 
two together, this ethnography aims to shed light not only on the union and on the 
actions of the thousands of people driving it forward, but also upon the changing and 
often challenging political economic and institutional context within which these 
actions are embedded. Diving deep into the greater processes of change unfolding 
both within the industry as well as within the union, this is an ethnography of 
economic and organizational change, individual and collective agency and the 
diverse actions of the actors involved in all of the above. 
From the perspective of economic anthropology, one can hardly imagine a more 
fascinating field. For we are provided with a unique gateway to study not only how 
coalitions of workers take action in pursuit of their collective interests, but also one 
enabling us to illuminate the everyday effects of greater economic upheavals on said 
collective action. Transcending the subject of (organized) labor, by exploring how, 
when and under what circumstances people cooperate in order to bring about greater 
institutional change, this ethnography has at its heart cardinal questions of the social 
sciences in general. 
This ethnography is, however, also embedded in a strong personal interest. Like 
countless other social scientists, in particular those studying questions of social 
conflict, my interest in the field of study goes beyond an exclusively academic and 
scientific one. I am a member of the trade union movement and have no qualms in 
admitting that I see it as one of the most important motors for positive change in 
today’s society. This is not an anthropological case of “going native”. My involvement 
in labor activism and social movements is older than my relationship to the discipline 
of social anthropology. For a number of years, however, these two passions have 
become deeply entwined in what I believe has led to a potentially fruitful alliance 
between the two – something into which I will go into more detail below.1 
Writing this thesis in 2017, we can no doubt claim to live in dynamic and uncertain 
times – be that in the changing Swiss construction industry or within the global arena 
                                               
1 As I have been studying questions of structural change in the Swiss construction industry for some 
time now and this thesis seeks to actively build on some of the theoretical as well as empirical insights 
gained in those efforts, some of the thoughts expressed in this thesis have, in far less depth, 
previously been discussed in Kelley 2012; 2014a; 2014b; 2017. 
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of neoliberal capitalism. While often worrying and depressing, turbulent and stormy, 
these times are also sprinkled with truly inspiring episodes. And from a social 
scientific perspective, they are absolutely gripping. Institutions, customs and rules 
that were over decades taken for granted are now actively and openly called into 
question by the various actors involved. People of various social backgrounds and 
even age groups have begun to take part in collective action aimed at changing 
society as they see fit – in many cases people who had previously remained passive 
when it came to “political” questions such as these. The consequences of all of these 
developments will no doubt be great, whether positive or negative remains to be 
seen. What is already clear, however, is that the political economic and cultural 
upheavals we are currently witnessing open up unique gateways of opportunity for 
the anthropologist willing to enter. Such a journey is not only an academic chance to 
illuminate the dramatic processes unfolding, but also represents a duty of the social 
sciences today – namely one developing a better understanding of our changing 
political economy, the affects these changes are having on the everyday lives of the 
actors within and also the consequences of their own actions on the world in which 
they live, work and dream. 
A Few Words to Begin: Labor Unions in Crisis and Renewal 
Before more closely defining the particular case study at hand and our research 
questions arising thereof, it makes sense to first discuss the greater and more global 
scope in which they are embedded. Since at least the 1990s, many if not most trade 
unions throughout the Western world, in the “societies of developed capitalism” 
(Urban 2008: 7), have found themselves in a deep and in some cases existential 
crisis. This has meanwhile been widely discussed in the social sciences from a 
variety of different perspectives and has involved both quantitative and qualitative 
approaches and methods (Bronfenbrenner et al. 1998; Oesch 2007; Brinkmann et al. 
2008; Crosby 2009; Dörre and Schmalz 2013).  
This crisis of organized labor is embodied by the fact that, with very few exceptions, 
ever-smaller proportions of the workforce are organized by these supposed 
“dinosaurs of the industrial age” ( Dörre and Schmalz 2013: 13). At the turn of the 
century, between 1993 and 2003, European trade unions had on average lost 15 
percent of their membership (Dörre et al. 2009: 33). Although this might at first be 
explained through shifts in the economy away from more traditional union heartlands 
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and towards the service sector, in many countries even the degree of organization in 
more classic bastions of organized labor is sinking. Directly connected to this loss in 
membership, unions in many countries have suffered a severe loss of financial 
resources, thus further limiting their opportunities and in some cases leading to a 
seemingly unbreakable vicious circle. 
Besides this loss of membership and political influence, however, many unions have 
also suffered a loss of agency or in other words a loss of the ability to mobilize even 
their still existing membership into industrial action when needed. At the same time 
unions’ membership statistics plummeted, the frequency, intensity and rate of 
participation in strike actions have also decreased in almost all capitalist countries 
(Deppe 2012: 55). It goes without saying that if a union without the ability to strike 
can only engage in “collective begging“ (Güntner 2015), this loss of mobilizing 
capacity has proven to be just as great a blow to organized labor as that of its 
membership losses. This is particularly the case today, as we can safely assume that 
at least in the Western world we are living in the most hostile atmosphere to 
organized labor in the post-war era. Both of these deterioration processes, that of 
membership loss and receding mobilization ability, have led to a severe decline of 
unions’ abilities to shape the political economy, thus also going hand in hand with an 
“erosion of institutional power” of the unions (Dörre et al. 2009: 43). Mildly put, 
organized labor, whose associations once prided themselves as being a pillar of 
workers’ lives, culture and everyday realities, is on the defensive. 
A wide variety of sometimes plausible, sometimes rather banal explanations have 
been developed to make sense of this process, which, if it continues, may lead to a 
“capitalism without unions” (Müller-Jentsch 2006). Most scholars would agree on two 
fundamental focal points in this debate. First of all, global economic processes 
intertwined with technological developments have unleashed deep structural 
changes in many western economies, thus leading to the loss or in many cases 
outsourcing of blue collar jobs to other parts of the world. Given the fact that these 
professions represented a large portion of hitherto union membership, this loss of 
jobs also translated into loss of union members. That being said, it simultaneously 
points to the glaringly decisive failure of trade unions in many countries to organize 
the growing service sector (Rieger et al. 2012). 
 - 15 - 
Second of all, and by no means separable from the economic shifts in global capital 
mentioned above, both a large number of employers as well as the increasingly 
neoliberally dominated state apparatuses of many countries have dealt systematic 
and significant blows to unions on both a company and industry level as well as on a 
political one. This has been expressed through the termination or dismantling of 
existing collective labor agreements, through the so-called “union-busting” of labor 
structures and the systematic dismissal of worker activists, yet also in the form of 
anti-union legislature making it more difficult to organize as well as strike (Kelly 1998; 
Bronfenbrenner et al. 1998; Durrenberger and Erem 2005; Durrenberger and 
Reichart (eds.) 2010). 
This complex process must thus be contextualized within the semi-global shift from 
“nationally organized welfare-state-capitalism“ (Urban 2008: 7) to the now dominant 
“transnational financial capitalism“ (ibid) with its neoliberal “market fundamentalism“ 
(Stiglitz 2009). It is the unleashing of the latter that has not only changed the lives of 
millions of people the unions represent, but has also put trade unions everywhere in 
an increasingly weak position to challenge the sweeping erosion of the hitherto stable 
post-war Keynesianist wage labor system, which guaranteed social welfare and 
provided secure, full-time job opportunities for large parts of the workforce (Wacquant 
2008; Pelizzari 2009; Mäder and Schmassmann 2013; Spyridakis 2013). 
In this neoliberal turn that has become increasingly powerful if not even semi-
hegemonial throughout the Western world (Harvey 2005), both formal and informal 
labor regulations and standards have either been reduced or even completely 
dismantled. These processes have been encouraged by and have themselves further 
encouraged the introduction of precarious forms of wage labor and led to the 
stagnation of the wages of countless workers (Mäder and Schmassmann 2013). A 
“destablization of the stable” (Castel in Flecker 2008: 81) had thus unfolded and, as 
Bourdieu  noted, precariousness was suddenly everywhere (1998). 
In the words of Lévesque and Murray: 
There are moments in organizational and institutional history when things are just up 
for grabs. As previous arrangements come unstuck, and union capacity weakens, 
union resources and capabilities come increasingly under the microscope. Some of the 
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old resources need to be reconfigured or invigorated; the capabilities do not seem to be 
calibrated to the new context. (2010: 346) 
This is one of those moments. 
While some of the unions facing this potentially fatal crisis have chosen to stand by 
and wait for better days in a desperate sense of hibernation (Lopez 2004), and others 
have even propagated appeasing capital by taking a more cooperative stance 
(Kochan and Osterman in Kelly 1998: 1), a third group has embraced a more active 
position. These latter unions share the belief that despite or even because of the 
currently hostile political economic atmosphere, unions can and in fact must make a 
strategic choice to change and revitalize (Bronfenbrenner et al. 1998; Voss and 
Sherman 2000; Durrenberger and Erem 2005; Brinkmann et al. 2008; Getman 2010; 
Schmalz and Dörre 2013). It is in the sense of this strategic choice that these unions 
have taken the decision to shed the shackles of the determinist and fatalistic “crisis-
paradigm“ (Urban 2008: 7) and instead devote their efforts, energy and resources 
towards radically altering the way they function in this new era of capitalism. 
This innovative push towards trade union revitalization has generally been articulated 
along broad ideas of perceiving organized labor more as a form social movement 
than as a representative service-provider and a deep, underlying belief that a 
successful, broad-based union movement can only come about through active 
member participation and mobilization (Lopez 2004). This approach has gone under 
a number of banners, such as social movement unionism, strategic unionism or 
simply: the organizing model. 
While large “varieties of unionism“ (Frege and Kelly 2004) exist, shaped by the 
surrounding political economic and institutional environment as well as the specific 
historical experiences and backgrounds of the organizations, and there is a heated 
debate as to what the organizing-model actually entails (Dörre et al. 2009), I will 
employ the following description: The organizing model can be seen as an approach 
using innovative and systematic methods and strategies with the goal of activating 
and empowering workers to participate in broad, comprehensive campaigns using 
unconventional and often disruptive methods with the long-term goal of shifting 
power relations in worker favor (derived from Bronfenbrenner et al. 1998, Voss and 
Sherman 2000, Dörre et al. 2009). 
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The main goal of this approach is thus to strengthen and build a union’s ability to 
empower workers to carry out collective action through “experimentation, innovation, 
and wide-ranging internal debate regarding strategic direction and tactical choice“ 
(Turner 2004: 6). While this approach places an obvious emphasis and priority on 
collective strength and worker mobilizations, it is not necessarily a dogmatic one and 
opportunities arising from relevant institutional arrangements, whether broader laws 
or collective labor agreements between employers and unions, can play an essential 
role in a union’s campaign. That being said, what the proponents of the above 
approach remind us of is that while institutional power can be useful, it must not go 
forgotten that institutions such as collective labor agreements and labor legislation 
often arise from social conflict and are thus by no means safe or indefinite 
(Brinkmann et al. 2008; Schmalz and Dörre 2013). It is in this sense that while 
institutional opportunities may indeed reinforce collective organization and action, 
they can never completely substitute it. This was a lesson that many of these unions 
in change had painfully learned just years before. 
Interestingly enough, this systematic process of labor renewal actually has its roots in 
the United States, whose trade unions were hitherto “looked upon rather pitifully” 
(Dörre et al. 2009) and were better known for their politically conservative stance and 
sluggish bureaucracy than for any progressive labor concepts (Voss and Sherman 
2000). While it may seem paradoxical at first that such a clear emphasis on 
movement-oriented unionism would come from the United States, this is upon 
second glance rather logical. Precisely because the unions in the US have come 
under such vicious attack by employers as well as by the state, they had little choice 
but to either wither away or let the crisis at hand push them into a new era. While the 
labor movement in the US continues to lose ground and under the new government 
of Donald Trump will probably come under even greater attack than before, unions 
embracing the organizing model have been able to boast tremendous successes, 
both in terms of membership growth and gaining concessions. 
As such, the experiences and innovative approaches developed by US unions have 
fallen on open ears in some Western European trade unions such as the service 
sector union Ver.di in Germany or its sister union IG Metall of the same country. 
Perceiving the ability to learn and adapt as a central skill to union revitalization 
(Lévesque and Murray 2010), Ver.di has worked with and brought in advisors from 
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American trade unions in order to enhance their organizing successes. This 
approach to learning and developing new skills for organizing, activating and 
empowering members has, however, not remained isolated to Germany. In fact, one 
of the unions that has begun to experiment with such ideas is the focus of our thesis, 
the multi-industry trade union Unia in Switzerland. 
Born in 2005 out of a marriage between the country’s two largest unions, the 
Construction and Industry Union and the Swiss Metal and Watchworkers Union, the 
dream was a large, multi-industry, social movement- and campaign-oriented union, 
that would, at least in the long term, go beyond simple questions of bread and butter 
and become powerful enough in the workplace as well as wider political sphere so as 
to shape what Wolf termed the political-economic “settings themselves” (1999: 5). 
This ambitious endeavor, especially in a historical era where most unions are losing 
and not gaining strength, not only meant regaining membership strength and 
mobilizing ability in already organized branches with collective labor agreements 
(CLAs), such as industrial manufacturing, but also organizing key branches of the 
hitherto “union-free” service sector. 
While Unia has managed to make headway in certain areas of the service sector, in 
particular in hotels and catering, retail and newly health care, the largest and one of 
the most active sectors, both in numbers and mobilization-ability, continues to be one 
of its historical bastions of strength: the main construction trades. An industry whose 
workers have since at least the end of the 19th century primarily been made up of 
immigrants, the industry has long carried a popular reputation of being kämpferisch 
(roughly translated to militant) and streikfreudig (ready to go on strike). The industry’s 
collective labor agreement, continuously negotiated between the unions and 
employers since 1938, reflects this high level of union activity and is, from a worker 
perspective, one of the most favorable CLAs of the country. 
That being said, a number of multilayered and interconnected processes within the 
construction industry as well as within its wider political economic surroundings have 
begun to challenge this hitherto seemingly undefeatable labor stronghold (Kelley 
2012; 2014a; 2014b; 2017). Gradually unfolding structural changes in the 
construction economy, creating a constantly intensifying vicious circle of labor 
precarization, subcontracting and temporary employment have not only threatened 
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workers’ salaries and job-security, but have also produced an increasingly 
fragmented workforce with different realities, hopes, dreams and problems. This, in 
turn, has made it substantially more difficult for the union to mobilize workers into a 
collective whole capable of concerted action (ibid).  
While there is no doubt a dose of historical nostalgia bestowed upon past 
generations of construction workers, portraying them as some kind of proletarian 
avant-garde eager to strike at any minute, the union’s experiences on the 
construction sites in the last number of years clearly suggest that the hurdles for 
concerted action have grown. “It has just gotten harder. They simply won’t be moved 
like they were in the past.”, was the somber comment of a former leading union 
officer of Unia’s construction sector who has been active in the union for around thirty 
years. Another union veteran noted in a similarly bleak mood that: “It’s like it’s a new 
generation of construction workers. It’s just not the same.” 
Given that the global shift to a more neoliberal and aggressive stance towards 
organized labor has not left Swiss construction untouched, thus producing an 
increasingly rough climate between the union and the construction employers 
association, the growing hurdles to collective action (and thus bargaining power) 
have become a growing headache for Unia. While a high degree of membership and 
thus representation may gain them a place at the negotiating table and a certain 
legitimacy in the public and political sphere, a large but inactive membership will not 
provide the union with the amount of bargaining power it needs in order to actually 
gain – or even defend – concessions. In 2011, during the last round of re-
negotiations of the collective labor agreement, the union came face to face with its 
own problems on the ground. Despite intense preparations for strikes in various 
cities, Unia’s construction leadership judged its ability to successfully carry out these 
strikes to be insufficient in order to actually produce enough pressure to push through 
their demands. The strikes were called off in the last minute and a compromise was 
grudgingly signed. 
While the union’s main demands were not reached in that particular round of contract 
renewal, the frustrating experiences arising therefrom did have a significant effect. As 
is often the case with trade unions in critical situations (Brinkmann et al. 2008), or 
troubled organizations in general for that matter, the stage was now set for a serious 
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and reflected debate about the future. While this was not a debate between a service 
model versus an organizing model, as the dominant discourse was already one of a 
campaign-oriented, organizing union, it was a debate concerning the particular micro-
mechanisms necessary to translate such a dream into reality and win back strength 
on the construction sites. In a situation like this, which is as Durrenberger points out 
an intertwining of social, political, cultural and economic phenomena (2007: 75), 
another scene is also set: that of the anthropologist. 
Research Objectives and Thesis Structure 
Despite my personal association with the Swiss labor movement, it must be 
emphasized that I am writing this thesis from the perspective of a social 
anthropologist interested in furthering social scientific knowledge on the wider subject 
of changing (organized) labor. The questions, findings and theoretical insights are 
thus encapsulated in social scientific debates and theory and I have neither the 
illusion nor the explicit goal that the thesis at hand will or even should become a 
“must-read” within the labor movement. I will illuminate, analyze and discuss the 
processes at hand from an anthropological point of view, even when such insights 
might seem uninteresting or even mundane from the more operative point of view of 
its protagonists, i.e. worker activists and organizers. 
At the same time, however, just as my personal history may have permeable 
boundaries when it comes to anthropology and the labor movement, it would be 
naïve to suggest that the boundaries between the latter two themselves are 
necessarily any less fluid. So, while I am explicitly writing this thesis from an 
anthropological perspective, the debates unfolding within it cannot remain completely 
restricted to the ivory tower of academia. In the spirit of the critical “public sociology” 
impassionedly encouraged by Michael Burawoy (2005a; 2005b), I see it as only 
fitting that this product should, whenever possible, be in touch with the public debates 
that are of concern to the actors and issues at hand. This does not and cannot mean 
ignoring the equally real differences of what it means to carry out research from a 
scientific in contrast to an organizational perspective, but it should, from time to time, 
mean being open to transcending boundaries and also daring to “see our discipline 
from the point of view of labor and ask how our work might be relevant for labor 
struggles throughout the world.“ (Kasmir 2009: 76).  
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By carrying out this ethnography of organized labor in Swiss construction, I wish to 
contribute to the growing anthropology of labor as well as to the wider and 
interdisciplinary labor revitalization studies. In previous ethnographic research carried 
out in 2011 and 2012 (Kelley 2012), I studied the deep structural upheavals unfolding 
in the construction industry mentioned above: new and precarious forms of labor and 
a growing fragmentation of the workforce. While highlighting some of the challenges 
arising for the union therefrom, I did not actually shed light on the agency of the union 
and union activists themselves. In other words, I  looked at a part of the problem, but 
stopped short of analyzing the agency of the union when it came to coping with these 
obstacles. 
In this doctoral thesis, I will take that next step. Yet instead of focusing on organized 
labor’s agency as something isolated from the world unfolding around it, I will explore 
the union’s strategies as embedded in the changing labor world and political 
economy within which it functions. This is, regretfully, something that has rarely been 
done. For while the growing labor revitalization studies have produced some 
excellent and in-depth studies of union strategies, rarely have they more deeply 
taken into account the labor world within which these strategies take place. This 
ethnography brings the two together and does just that. 
As such, the main research question guiding us is as follows: In the context of a 
changing and increasingly hostile Swiss construction industry, how is the largest 
trade union operating therein adapting so as to enhance its power as a collective 
agent shaping industrial relations? 
In other words, how is the union trying to defy the growing structural obstacles as 
well as the counter-agency of other actors acting against it when it comes to 
organizing collective action as a means to building bargaining power.  
Of course, collective action also encompasses the individual recruitment of “passive” 
union members. This aspect is undoubtedly important. That being said, we will 
concentrate our explorations on the union’s collective activation of workers in the 
sense of industrial action. For interestingly enough, the above noted threat to 
organized labor’s mobilization capacity in Swiss construction has so far not 
correlated with a decline in union membership itself. The main construction trades, 
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with around seventy percent of its workers organized in a union2, continues to be one 
of the most densely organized sectors of the Swiss economy. This can, as will 
become clear, at least partially be explained by the fact that since union members in 
the Swiss system of industrial relations are recruited on an individual basis, the 
emerging cracks in the workforce as a collective are less relevant thereto. 
Furthermore, especially in growingly precarious times such as these, individual 
reliance on the union for dealing with individual legal problems has, if anything, 
actually grown due to the higher number of labor malpractices. 
In order to pursue this question, the union’s 2015 contract-renewal campaign will be 
used as a platform providing us both with a fountain of empirical material as well as a 
space within which the social phenomenon of collective action itself most visibly 
unfolds. It is, however, important to emphasize that since the focus of this thesis is 
neither a chronological nor a historiographical one, but concentrated on the broader 
social scientific issues of organized labor and collective action, it will not represent a 
chronology of the campaign. Far more, this thesis seeks to use the empirical material 
collected in this campaign in order to gain insight on a far deeper level and to unearth 
patterns and complex social phenomena. 
Starting from the main research question and ambitions noted above, I have 
structured this thesis along four main parts made up of seven chapters: 
 This introductory chapter will continue by discussing the ethnographic 
methods used in the study as well as the unique opportunities and challenges 
born out of my situation as a particularly entwined participant observer. I will 
then conclude the chapter by providing the reader with a short overview of the 
growing literature on trade union renewal in times of crisis as well as the small 
but dynamic literature arising from anthropological studies of changing 
organized labor. 
 The second chapter of this thesis is dedicated to social scientific theory. I will 
begin by equipping myself first with a methodological approach emphasizing 
the necessity of bringing ethnographic methods into discussion with social 
scientific theory. Michael Burawoy’s thoughts on the extended case method 
                                               
2 While Unia is by far the largest union in construction, Syna, a smaller union with its historical roots in 
the Catholic labor tradition, also exists. 
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offer such an approach and help us to not only make sense of the often great 
mass of data collected, but also allow that data to contribute to the greater 
task of enhancing existing theory and thus contributing to science in general. 
With this in mind, we will proceed to assemble our own theoretical toolbox 
tailored to the study of union strategies embedded in their political economic 
and institutional context. Critically and selectively borrowing from various 
theoretical traditions touching the different issues of this study, ranging from 
Marxist political economy to theories focused on the micro-mechanisms of 
collective action, we will search for an appropriate explanatory model based 
on the idea of “theory networks“ (Bollig and Finke 2014). 
 In part two, we will enter the empirical part of our study and explore the dual 
transformations unfolding in the labor world of the Swiss construction industry 
and in its industrial relations. Our first destination here, discussed in chapter 
three, will be to critically dissect the voyage the Swiss labor movement has 
taken since its beginnings in the late 19th and early 20th century. This will not 
represent a historical overview for the sake of it, but one that is vital to 
revealing the complex social institutions that have arisen from labor and 
capital’s meanwhile chequered relationship of conflict and cooperation. It will 
also help us comprehend the position in which organized labor finds itself 
today. Looking back at our theory chapter, we are reminded that while social 
institutions may arise from social conflict between actors with different 
interests and asymmetrical power relations (Knight 1992), in the end they can 
have very ambiguous effects – both emancipating and constraining – on all 
actors involved. Furthermore, while power relations stemming from institutional 
arrangements can serve organized labor’s interests, these arrangements can 
and do change and as such can never be an exclusive substitute for the 
union’s collective or associational power that helped bring about those 
institutions in the first place. 
 Shifting our view to the economic functioning of the Swiss construction 
industry itself, chapter four is dedicated to unraveling the structures and inner 
workings of this dynamic economic sector. On the one hand, this means 
examining the political economic parameters of the industry as a whole as well 
as the profound role the collective labor agreement plays not only in protecting 
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workers’ wages and working conditions, but also in shaping the economy of 
the industry. On the other hand, this chapter will examine the transformational 
changes unfolding in the industry, changes born out of a duet of neoliberal 
offensives and economic uncertainty. Besides producing new and more 
precarious forms of employment threatening the individual interests of 
thousands of workers active in the industry, this upheaval is also changing the 
composition and social dynamics of the labor force as a whole. As can be 
imagined, the effects on a union attempting to mobilize a growingly 
fragmented workforce into a collective force capable of concerted action are 
dramatic. 
 After having painted a clearer picture of the dual transformations unfolding and 
the effects these have had on the collective agency of organized labor, part 
three of this thesis will shift our focus onto the agency of the union itself. 
Chapter five explores the frontline organizing efforts of the union’s “Mittelland” 
region, a regional unit that has made it a priority to develop a new and 
systematic approach enabling it to “organize in chaos”. This chapter not only 
studies the organizational changes this regional unit has introduced and the 
process-oriented model it has established, but also discusses the collective 
action frames union organizers create in order to not only justify collective 
action, but also to reveal its utility from a rational, calculated perspective. And 
finally, we will witness how organizers’ ideas are applied to – and sometimes 
collide with – the empirical reality of everyday life on the construction sites of 
the region. 
 As will become clear, while collective mobilizations during campaigns per se 
involve collective dynamics, they also rely on the specific efforts of active 
individuals. Next to the activities of staff organizers as described in the 
previous chapter, chapter six will shed light on the decisive activities of (often 
informal) workplace leaders. In fact, besides a greater political aspiration to 
empower workers to take over more responsibility in the sense of a 
grassroots- and social-movement-oriented union, labor leaders are convinced 
that in the long term such an approach is vital to organized labor’s survival. 
However, given the still lingering legacy of years of welfare capitalism and 
industrial peace, during which the union’s modus operandi took on a more 
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representative and staff-based approach, such a transformation towards a 
union truly driven by worker activists is far from a simple task. We will thus 
explore the concentrated efforts of the union in this realm, yet also debate the 
sometimes contradictory relationship these efforts have with the organizer-
driven efforts discussed in the previous chapter. 
 Having started this thesis with the aspiration of producing an in-depth 
ethnographic study of how the union is seeking to enhance its power as a 
collective agent in an increasingly hostile environment of labor and industrial 
relations, this thesis concludes with insights both on an empirical as well as on 
a theoretical level. From an empirical standpoint, it will become clear that the 
union is attempting to revitalize itself by developing new strategies of 
mobilization based on systematic methods and a creative model of collective 
action frames, but also by introducing a more emancipatory approach seeking 
to empower workplace activists themselves. While the two can go hand in 
hand, their relationship is not always harmonious, thus making it a complex 
and sometimes contradictory balancing act for the union. What will become 
clear from a theoretical standpoint is that we are dealing with a case where 
collective action is neither pessimistically improbable nor optimistically given, 
but arises as a product of a complex processual dialogue between a changing 
political economic and institutional environment, the historical development of 
industrial relations in the industry and the union’s own agency in the form of 
innovative strategies of union renewal. 
Ethnographic Depth: Participant Observation, its Opportunities and 
Challenges  
Besides shedding light on the macro-level political economic and social institutional 
jungle within which unions move, the case study at hand involves taking a look at the 
actions and interactions unfolding at the “front line”, i.e. in the union halls and on the 
construction sites themselves. This entails among other things looking at the formal 
and informal practices shaping the union, studying positive as well as negative 
interactions between union organizers and workers on the sites as well as during 
meetings and rallies, and also illuminating the massive and complex process of 
conceptualizing, planning and mobilizing before, during and after industrial action. All 
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of these phenomena are ultimately based upon deep and entangled interactions 
between various social actors, ones often pursuing different goals and interests. 
It goes without saying that such an endeavor demands us to approach the question 
of research methods both seriously and reflectively. As a social anthropologist, I have 
been trained to embrace the wide variety of methods provided by and continuously 
developed in the social sciences as a virtue, not a competition. Yet while supported 
by other quantitative and qualitative perspectives in certain aspects, the method most 
closely associated with social anthropology and ethnography is indeed the method 
that will prove most useful in the case study at hand: participant observation3. 
By taking this “royal path of doing anthropology“ (Bollig and Finke 2014: 43f.), we are 
able to immerse ourselves in the complex world we study. “Being ethnographic“ 
(Madden 2010) as a participant observer enables us to unearth and collect masses 
of data otherwise unavailable and to gain a potentially deep emic, i.e. inside, 
perspective. Thus, while we could and should measure the statistical intensity of 
strikes in the Swiss construction industry over the past decade, this would tell us little 
of the social interactions, tension and pressure of what actually goes on before, 
during and after such forms of contentious collective action. And while it may make 
sense to interview organizers and workers about their vast treasury of thoughts and 
experiences, an approach limited to interviews will miss key interactions or moments 
which for them may seem irrelevant or simply so glaringly obvious that they are not 
worth mentioning. Simply, yet decisively put, what participant observation allows us 
to do is to collect dynamic Handlungsdaten, or in other words not only static data on 
what people say they do or what has been recorded on a statistical level, but 
empirical data on what people actually do and how they interact with other social 
actors and institutions in pursuit of their interests, beliefs, hopes and dreams. 
                                               
3 While participant observation represents the main key of this ethnographic study of organized labor 
in a changing labor world, it was supplemented by other methods as well. Besides “extending” our 
study to “historical research“ (Burawoy 2009: 65), I have also used economic and statistical data 
collected and published by the Swiss Department of Statistics, the State Secretariat for Economic 
Affairs and the Swiss Construction Employers Association. I was further able to draw upon a daily 
compilation of all Swiss newspaper articles containing the word Unia and construction, a welcome 
instrument provided by an external media monitoring firm on behalf of the union. 
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Long looked down upon as supposedly unscientific by the defenders of a strict sense 
of positivism on the one hand and on the other criticized as representing a 
manipulative power instrument by intellectuals associated with the postmodernist 
tradition, the ethnographic method of participant observation is in fact now more 
popular than ever. As a result, it is no longer exclusively used in more classic 
anthropological settings such as the hills of Papa New Guinea, but has become 
understood as just as applicable to “one’s own social surroundings too“ (Atkinson 
and Hammersley 1994: 250), whether that is to study labor unions or even the 
“cockpits of capitalism” in the Swiss banking world (Leins 2015).   
The ethnographic method of participant observation has also long transcended the 
otherwise often cemented boundaries of the social sciences, being both 
experimented with and even further developed in a number of other disciplines of the 
wider social sciences (Atkinson and Hammersley 1994; Burawoy 2009). While both 
the accusations arising from the positivist camp (as unscientific) as well as those 
coming from the postmodern corner (as manipulative) are under circumstances valid 
and should be taken into consideration as legitimate warnings, it is the scientific duty 
and responsibility of the ethnographer to pursue a participant observation that is 
neither simply “anecdotal” nor lacking the “scientific description first outlined by 
Malinowski” (Durrenberger 2007: 81), but one that indeed aims to amass empirical 
data, which can then be analyzed with the goal of furthering the social sciences in 
general. 
While participant observation can be a useful tool in a number of fields, the strengths 
of such long term engagement with both individuals as well as organizations and 
communities and the “value of little formalized open-ended discussions“ (Bollig and 
Finke 2014: 41) are especially relevant in the more sensitive fields of conflict and 
shifting power relations. It goes without saying that in a field where workers have 
been threatened and even fired for taking part in union activities, giving a formal 
interview or filling out a written survey on precisely that subject, namely their 
individual and collective union activism, is far from given. Besides making it more 
difficult to gain access to data, exclusive reliance on interviews and surveys also 
bears the very real risk of collecting distorted data as one might only reach a 
particular group, either those not at risk of employer repression or those with nothing 
to lose. The benefits of participant observation versus simple interviews or surveys 
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are, however, just as much if not even perhaps more prevalent when it comes to the 
fulltime union staff and organizers themselves. 
If we heed Burawoy’s observation that the most seismic and difficult interventions 
during anthropological fieldwork are the researcher’s entry into and departure from 
the field (1998: 17), then this case study starts from a privileged position. As 
acknowledged above, while I write this thesis from a clear and critical anthropological 
position, I have been an active union member and union organizer for a number of 
years now. That being said, ethnographic research has also been a steady 
companion on this journey. Having gained my organizing experiences and know-how 
first as a volunteer activist and then as a full-time organizer in a local region of the 
union, I have conducted ethnographic research ever since (Kelley 2012; 2014a; 
2014b; 2017). Since 2014, coinciding with the start of my doctoral research, I have 
been part-time employed in Unia’s national construction department. This department 
coordinates the union’s activities in construction and is responsible for developing its 
national strategy in the main construction trades as well as organizing all national 
activities. It furthermore cooperates closely with the local regional units of the union, 
which are tasked with executing the national strategy. 
My work in the union during my research period primarily revolved around helping to 
coordinate and implement the 2015 campaign at the heart of this ethnography. This 
included taking an active role in national strategy discussions, conducting the internal 
communication thereof, writing and designing flyers and planning and coordinating 
mass events including a demonstration of 15’000 construction workers in June and 
three “protest days” in November involving a total of 10’000 construction workers 
laying down their tools. Furthermore, a key part of my job was to liaison with those 
who actually carried out the work auf dem Terrain (“on the ground”), namely the staff 
organizing teams and the worker activists in the local regions themselves. This 
meant among other things discussing the implementation of the national strategy in 
the regions with both organizing staff and worker activists, conducting training 
sessions on communications skills and building worker committees, and together 
with the local organizers planning assemblies, rallies and other activities.  
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In the second half of 2015, I also spent three days a week embedded in the 
construction organizing team of the local regional unit “Mittelland”4. Besides 
accompanying local construction organizers on their daily rounds on the sites, I also 
helped organize and carry out rallies, assemblies and protest actions. Unia is made 
up of 14 local regions, which are responsible for the union work “on the frontline” in 
their geographical area: organizing new workers, recruiting and training activists, 
providing services and carrying out local as well as national campaigns on a local 
level. Each region has a relatively high amount of autonomy, both concerning what 
they do and how they do it. 
The local region I spent time in, region Mittelland, is a region that has made the 
strategic decision to focus a large part of its activities on the construction sector. After 
colliding head on with the challenges facing the union in the last campaign in 2011, in 
particular those arising from the growing precarization of labor described above, this 
particular region invested time and resources aimed at developing a wide range of 
innovative and systematic tactics and techniques for better recruiting and mobilizing 
workers. Their successes at worker turnouts during mobilizations have spoken for 
themselves. Thus, the chance to participate at the frontline of their activities, in day to 
day interactions with the various players of the construction world, was a rare 
opportunity – both from a union perspective as well as that of the anthropologist. 
Furthermore, given that the region in question was a metropolitan center with 
hundreds of dense and large construction sites and thousands of workers, the 
fragmentation of labor arising from new forms of precarious employment was 
particularly acute. Besides that, this urban center also brought together a wide 
number of nationalities and thus languages. Since not even all of the workers 
understood each other, the development and testing of innovative mobilizing 
strategies was of particular relevance in this region. 
So, while I have included data from all aspects of my position within the union, the 
majority of ethnographic data concerning mobilizing efforts on the frontline was 
collected in region Mittelland, which must be kept in mind when analyzing our data. 
That being said, given the particular difficulties in this metropolitan center, stemming 
                                               
4 „Mittelland“ is a pseudonym I will use throughout this ethnography. In social anthropology, there is a 
long-held tradition of anonymity for certain places and social actors. This discretion serves on the one 
hand to allow informants to be as open and honest as possible and on the other hand emphasizes the 
priority of discussing the empirical data collected as expressions of underlying mechanisms and 
patterns of social processes. 
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from an especially high degree of precarious labor fragmentation as well as linguistic 
heterogeneity, yet also the region’s relative success in organizing and mobilizing, this 
is not only an ideal local case study, but the region’s systematic approach has in 
parts also been adopted by a number of other union regions as well. 
This diversified bundle of activities and interactions both on a coordinative national 
level as well as on a more frontline local level provided me with a rare and 
comprehensive perspective of the organizational and social processes unfolding 
within as well as around the union during its campaign of 2015. Besides simply 
providing optimal access to the field of study, however, this setting of being a 
recognized and active member of the community further provided me with three 
interlinked ethnographic opportunities. 
First of all, as hinted at above in reference to Burawoy (1998: 17), my position in the 
union allowed me to circumvent the sometimes dramatic, difficult and 
methodologically challenging phases of entry to and departure from the field. As both 
ruptures can have strong effects on the research process itself, the liquefying of 
those often quaky moments is a priceless asset. The second opportunity, and directly 
connected to the first, touches upon questions of identity and the relationship 
between researcher and informants. While it was open and common knowledge that I 
was simultaneously conducting research as a social anthropologist, my primary 
identity within the union was and is clearly shaped as that of an organizer and only 
on a secondary level as that of a researcher. The impact of this cognitive distinction 
was fundamental as social interactions were mutually carried out and expressed in a 
very different, less targeted way and are substantially more relaxed than otherwise 
might have been. Third of all, the large catalogue of my tasks on both a national as 
well as local level provided me with almost unlimited access to social scientific data 
that would otherwise simply not have been accessible. 
That being said, such opportunities rarely come free and this grand strength is 
indeed at the same time our potential Achilles’ heel. While I am far from the first 
anthropologist to be closely connected to his or her subject of study, especially when 
it comes to the ethnographic study of labor unions (Brodkin 1988; Burton 1991; 
Lopez 2004; Durrenberger and Erem 2005), there is no point in denying that such a 
dual role at best bears the risk of getting too “close as to miss the wood for the trees“ 
(Bate 1997: 1151) and at worst one compromising a critical, scientific stance in 
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general. While generally agreeing with Durrenberger that “the question of investigator 
objectivity arises only when scientific research lends credence to subordinate rather 
than more powerful groups“ (2007: 74), I am equally convinced that each researcher 
must nonetheless actively and critically reflect and remain constantly aware of the 
ways and the degree to which his or her study is shaped by such a hybrid role. 
For just as research conditions in general shape the ethnographies of all participant 
observers, if such a dual role is not reflected upon, it will not only influence the lens 
through which we view our empirical findings, but perhaps even the questions asked 
in the first place. At the end of the day, even if a researcher may openly and 
legitimately be connected to the topic or organization of research, neither science, 
the scientist, nor the organization of study is served by trading critical research and 
perhaps uneasy questions and answers for the comfortable, yet foggy or even false 
realm of ideology. 
That being said, we must treat this as what it is: a possible, potential trap of which we 
need to be aware and not a wounded Titanic destined to sink. It is in this sense that I 
am convinced, and similar research supports this (Brodkin 1988; Burton 1991; Lopez 
2004; Durrenberger 2007), that the above noted opportunities and advantages can 
be cultivated and the potential drawbacks held at bay given that the researcher 
involved takes the time, effort and in some cases maybe even the courage to 
critically reflect his or her role. 
Besides an intense and critical process of reflection, a further instrument that will help 
us when it comes to keeping ourselves on the ethnographic road of science is by 
“rooting ourselves in theory that guides our dialogue with participants.“ (Burawoy 
1998: 5). This “rationality of theory“ (Polanyi in Burawoy 1998: 5) is at the heart of 
what Burawoy calls “a reflexive model of science”, which “embraces not detachment 
but engagement as the road to knowledge“ (1998: 5). It is in this sense that by 
discarding both postmodernist nihilism and ultra-positivist naiveté, the industrial 
ethnographer Burawoy asserts that “Objectivity is not measured by procedures that 
assure an accurate mapping of the world but by the growth of knowledge […]“ (1998: 
5). Thus, this thesis is built on a strong and applicable theoretical pillar, which will be 
described in the following chapter. 
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So, instead of seeking to contain the “ethnographic condition of intense involvement, 
we seek to turn it to our advantage” (Burawoy 1998: 5) – while simultaneously 
remaining aware, critical and reflective of the risks involved. As to the morally laden 
question as to whether science should in fact even have such fluid borders to the 
political sphere or even see itself as being (potentially) in the service of one or the 
other political actor, the issue is hardly a new one (Deslippe et al. (eds.) 2016). It has 
indeed been discussed both in the more positivist-oriented camp, seeking to isolate 
science from politics completely, as well as in the meanwhile established tradition of 
applied anthropology and public sociology, calling for a more interventionist stance. 
Positioning himself along the lines of the latter and unveiling the social sciences, or 
any sciences for that matter, as “a field of power”, Burawoy used his 2004 
presidential address of the American Sociological Association to explicitly propose 
that:  
If the standpoint of economics is the market and its expansion, and the standpoint of 
political science is the state and the guarantee of political stability, then the standpoint 
of sociology is civil society and the defense of the social. In times of market tyranny 
and state despotism, sociology—and in particular its public face—defends the interests 
of humanity. (2005b: 24, italics in original) 
As can be imagined, when it comes to the growing number of anthropologists 
studying labor unions, there is a  high amount of passion and participation involved. 
In concluding her own call for a labor anthropology willing to debate how 
anthropological research might come to be relevant to organized labor, 
anthropologist Sharryn Kasmir goes so far as to state that: 
At a time when the US government is recruiting anthropologists to participate in Human 
Terrain Systems to help plot military practice, it is not too partisan to call on 
anthropologists studying kinship, religion, gender, racial formation, indigenity, identity, 
etc., in many parts of the world to make our work relevant to and part of an emerging 
international labor movement. (2009: 76) 
To sum up, while it is unnecessary and would even be delusional to ignore the 
various relationships between ethnography and practice, we must at the end of the 
day equally not forget that the primary goal of social scientific research is one of the 
“production of knowledge“ (Atkinson and Hammersley 1994: 254). The main goal at 
hand is thus one of furthering social scientific knowledge on the subject of organized 
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labor and not primarily one of directly enhancing the success of the latter. This is, 
obviously, not due to a lack of sympathy therefor, but simply because the questions 
at hand as well as the structure and character of the thesis as a whole are in this 
case more tailored to the academic needs of science and less to the perhaps related, 
yet separate needs of the labor movement. That being stated, if this thesis does, in 
the sense of a “public” sociology or anthropology, unleash a fruitful debate within the 
organization itself and plays a role in “[bolstering] the organs of civil society“ 
(Burawoy 2005a: 319), then that would, while not being an explicit goal in itself, no 
doubt represent a welcome concomitant. 
Revitalizing Organized Labor: Literary Overview 
To conclude this introductory chapter, I will now provide a brief overview of existing 
studies and literature on the subject of organized labor in a changing political 
economic world. Due to the vast amount of literature on the more general topic of 
unions themselves, this review focuses on the currently dominant studies of labor 
revitalization and labor renewal, to which this thesis counts itself. 
Social scientific studies of organized labor in the capitalist economy are far from a 
novel undertaking. Research projects on unions are nothing new and stretch far back 
to the beginning of these organizations as a recognized player in industrial relations 
as well as to the start of social scientific studies on industrial topics in general. That 
being said and reflecting the relatively strong position of trade unions following the 
collapse of fascism and their institutionalized position in post-war capitalism, union 
studies for long focused on the more representative role of unions as agents of 
collective bargaining and grievance management as well as their supposedly 
stabilizing function in the capitalist economy. In other words, negotiations on 
company and industry level as well as unions’ influence on wider legislature and the 
latter’s effects on the economy were the questions of the day (Slichter et al. 1960). 
As such, these more traditional industrial relations studies had a strong functionalist 
aspect to them. 
Needless to say, the political economic upheavals in the 1970s and 1980s and the 
drastic if not existential effects those had on industrial relations, namely the gradual 
erosion of the postwar institutions of so-called welfare capitalism, exposed the 
fundamental weaknesses of this genre of industrial relations studies. Precisely 
because of their rather ahistorical, functionalist approach, these studies told us lots 
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about how “the system” works in such times of stability, yet revealed little about “what 
to do when the system approaches collapse“ (Turner 2004: 3). Furthermore, and 
inseparable from this previous point, these studies remarkably enough more or less 
completely blended out questions of power (Kelly 1998: 9). This is, however, not 
necessarily surprising given the functionalist outlook of these scholars who focused 
more on what makes a supposedly homogeneous system as a whole function and 
less on the different social actors involved with their often opposing interests and 
power asymmetries. 
While these political economic changes of the times indeed discredited the 
functionalist approach of classic industrial relations studies and their ahistorical 
perspective towards trade unions, it did not at first lead to more fruitful studies of 
labor strategies. For the large part, the bleak reality of trade unions on the defensive 
either led many social scientists to generally lose interest in questions of organized 
labor or to assume and then reproduce an often rather deterministic discourse of 
organized labor’s demise (Disney 1990). Even in countries such as Germany, whose 
system of industrial relations still see unions carry a substantial amount of weight, 
questions of a “capitalism without trade unions?“ (Müller-Jentsch 2006), which in 
itself would have provoked a scandal in the era of Fordist welfare-state-capitalism, 
are indeed cautiously discussed.  
As noted by Turner, while the “transformation literature of the 1980s and 1990s” 
made welcome contributions to the subject matter by analyzing the erosion of 
organized labor, it neglected to acknowledge a strategic choice or agency of the 
unions themselves (2004: 3). Thus, according to this stance, unions must either 
surrender to being “overwhelmed by opposing forces […]” or they can “adapt – to the 
institutions or the transformation”, yet their agency for developing innovative 
strategies to themselves revitalize as organizations and shift existing power relations 
is neglected (ibid). So, while the functionalist studies of old told us there was nothing 
to worry about, the literature produced directly thereafter, during the 
hegemonialization of neoliberalism, took on a “crisis-paradigm“ (Urban 2008: 9) and 
seemed to suggest inevitable defeat. 
Yet just as the two paradigms above were significantly shaped by the empirical 
realities and changes surrounding them, the energizing labor renewal efforts arising 
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from the crisis of labor equally sent a wave of revitalization not only through the 
movements they were changing, but just as much through the social sciences 
studying these organizations. This upheaval within organized labor indeed shifted the 
dominant discourse of union research away from functionalist institutional 
arrangements as well as deterministic “crisis-paradigms“ (Urban 2008: 9) and 
towards the idea of studying innovative tactics, strategies and organizational shifts 
aimed at activating and empowering workers and potentially leading to a “trade union 
comeback“ (Schmalz and Dörre (eds.) 2013). Thus began the dawn of labor 
revitalization studies (Frege and Kelly 2004). 
Flowing from a key assumption of strategic choice, one of the main findings in these 
studies is that “union tactics matter“ (Bronfenbrenner and Juravich 1995). Or in other 
words, while superficial and non-personal tactics such as mass mailings of union 
cards and flyers may have worked in the heyday of welfare capitalism, today’s 
rougher labor world calls for a “rank-and-file intensive” grassroots approach where 
“movement unionists engage workers face to face” on the one hand and where 
industrial action goes beyond the traditional strike to include public protests and 
disruptive action on the other (Lopez 2004: 10). While the latter not only raises 
pressure upon employers to give concessions, it can also “build workers’ confidence 
and sense of collective power“ (ibid). Besides the development of such tactical 
innovations, labor revitalization scholars have also emphasized the decisiveness of 
going beyond simple bread-and-butter issues and communicating a larger vision of 
social justice (Bronfenbrenner et al. (eds.) 1998; Lopez 2004). 
Not surprisingly, yet an important factor thereof, many of the scholars involved in 
these studies, while being experienced academics, had themselves previously been 
(or still are) active in the labor movement, either as activists or even once as fulltime 
staff (Bronfenbrenner et al. (eds.) 1998; Durrenberger and Erem 2005; Hälker and 
Vellay (eds.) 2006; Bremme et al. 2007 (ed.); Oesch 2011; Dörre and Schmalz 2013; 
Nachtwey and Wolf 2013; Scholz 2013; McAlevey 2016). Others had not necessarily 
been active per se, yet were explicit sympathizers and embraced a kind of public 
sociology seeking to not only study the labor world in question, but to also carry out a 
debate with those seeking to change it (Turner and Hurd 2001; Milkman and Voss 
2004). In fact, some have even consciously called for a practice-oriented research 
approach in the spirit of Boltanski and Chiapello (2003). In this sense, the 
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development of social critique in the social sciences goes hand in hand with the 
practical rebuilding of the labor movement itself, while each clearly and necessarily 
maintain their respective autonomy in order to breath and prosper (Brinkmann et al. 
2008; Schmalz and Dörre 2013).  
The empirical research carried out by these labor revitalization studies has involved a 
wide variety of social scientific methods, ranging from quantitative statistical data 
analyzing the union’s strategic concepts in relation to their success rates 
(Bronfenbrenner et al. (eds.) 1998), yet also to more qualitative approaches 
consisting of in-depth interviews with union organizers and activists (Schmalz and 
Dörre (eds.) 2013). Every now and then participant observation will also be explicitly 
noted as a research method (Nachtwey and Wolf 2013). 
Like the initial changes occurring in the labor movement, the roots of these labor 
revitalization studies are to be found in the United States. In fact, sociologists and 
political scientists closely followed the shifts from bureaucratic service unionism to a 
more social-movement-oriented approach from the start (Brodkin 1988; 
Bronfenbrenner 1993; Bronfenbrenner et al. 1998; Voss and Sherman 2000; Turner 
and Hurd 2001). And like the above noted spread of innovative organizing strategies 
from there to other parts of the West, social scientific interest spread along with it. As 
a result, some of the scholars most actively and fruitfully debating these questions 
today are centered around the Friederich-Schiller-University in Jena, Germany. 
Besides conducting empirical research into new union strategies and organizational 
development, a further commendable strength of the latter’s approach is the 
presence of a fruitful dialectic relationship between research and theory 
development. While theoretical influences range from more classic thinkers such as 
Karl Marx, Max Weber, Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Polanyi, they also extend to Pierre 
Bourdieu as well as to analytical Marxists such as Erik O. Wright and Beverly Silver. 
It is here that the so-called Jena Power Resources Approach was developed, which 
will be thoroughly discussed in chapter two. 
Yet despite the analytically sharp elucidations of many of these labor revitalization 
studies and some no doubt very decisive findings, what often seems to go missing is 
a “thick description“ (Geertz 1973) and analysis of the formal and informal, collective 
and individual processes on the ground (with some noteworthy exceptions such as 
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Brodkin 1988; Lopez 2004; Ariovich 2010). In other words, there is a lot of “before” 
and “after”, depicting both organizational and institutional changes as well as the 
campaign’s achievements, yet often only a limited picture of what actually occurs on 
the road getting there. This is not to suggest that the actors themselves are not given 
a voice. Indeed, interviews play an important role in a number of these studies. 
However, only a modest number of case studies have used participant observation to 
accompany workers and organizers on their actual day to day activities. This is 
particularly important given that, as Lopez points out, “Social movement unionism is 
not simply a laundry list of tactics, it is a process of change within the labor 
movement itself“ (2004: 12). As such, next to more concept- and strategy-based 
studies, in-depth ethnographies depicting and explaining the numerous social 
phenomena unfolding in these processes are essential. 
This is where anthropology has stepped on to the stage. The greater concept of labor 
itself has long enjoyed an important place in anthropological thought and countless 
ethnographies have been written from a variety of theoretical and empirical 
perspectives on the subject. One does not have to be a Marxist to realize that “Labor 
is what humans do, across time and across space.“ (Malinowski in Durrenberger and 
Marti 2006: 1). Thus, labor is treated as a “window for understanding all of human 
behavior, thought, and organization from the most macro-level of a global political 
economy to the most micro-level of the individual worker […].“ (ibid). That being said, 
the collective organization of labor has, regretfully, long rested at the peripheries of 
the discipline. While trade unions have indeed surfaced every now and then as a 
supporting actor, there has been far too little research conducted by anthropologists 
specifically focusing on trade unions themselves, let alone on ones operating “at 
home” in the metropolises of capitalism. 
However, while taking slightly longer than the traditionally closer discipline of 
industrial sociology, around the turn of the millennium a growing number of 
anthropologists have begun to discover the great ethnographic potential of 
investigating the transformative changes unfolding in organizations previously 
perceived by many anthropologists to be little more than bureaucratic machines. 
Again initiated in the United States, this “anthropology of organized labor“ 
(Durrenberger 2007) employs ethnographic methods, in particular long-term 
participant observation, in order to assemble a deep, fine-grained and holistic picture 
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of the complex processes unfolding in the realm of renewing trade unions in a 
globally changing capitalism. By focusing not only on the beginnings and ends, 
successes and failures, but on the everyday process itself of organizing and 
activating workers to take part in collective action, this anthropological approach pays 
heed to the changing thoughts and concrete actions of the variety of actors involved. 
So, while some fine ethnographies of organized labor had previously been produced 
outside of the discipline (Brodkin 1988; Fantasia 1988; Lopez 2004; Ariovich 2010), 
this budding anthropology of organized labor has produced a growingly cohesive 
approach and network. Besides a growing number of ethnographic case studies 
(Durrenberger and Erem 2005; Zlolniski 2010), two noteworthy readers on the 
subject played an important role in consolidating the study of labor unions as a 
subfield of social anthropology: The Anthropology of Labor Unions, edited by E. Paul 
Durrenberger and Karaleah Reichart (2010) as well as Sharryn Kasmir and August 
Carbonella’s Blood and Fire. Toward a Global Anthropology of Labor. More recently, 
another collection edited by Durrenberger, Uncertain Times. Anthropological 
Appraoches to Labor in a Neoliberal World (2017), has also been published including 
my own contribution (Kelley 2017) on aspects discussed more thoroughly in the 
thesis at hand. 
And what’s in it for the wider discipline of anthropology? As Durrenberger points out, 
trade unions, as simultaneously social, political, cultural and economic phenomena, 
represent a  unique and fruitful field within which anthropologists may carry out 
research on subjects that are of great meaning to the entire discipline (2007: 75). 
What’s more, and counting for the social sciences in general, empirical research on 
this many-faced phenomenon provides us with a promising observation point from 
which to reflect upon and further develop existing theoretical bodies, especially those 
dealing with labor, collective action, political economy and the shaping of social 
institutions through shifting power asymmetries and social conflict. 
It is to this meanwhile established field of labor revitalization studies and a still 
blossoming anthropology of organized labor that this doctoral thesis aims to 
contribute. On the one hand, this ethnography of organized construction workers will 
represent a unique case study of a social group that is highly organized and has over 
time helped shape a dense jungle of social institutions, yet finds itself in a changing 
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political economy rocking the labor world within which it lives, breathes and acts. On 
the other hand, by studying the individual and collective agency of workers and union 
organizers and activists as well as embedding them in the political economic and 
institutional environment in which they move, we are equally provided with an 
empirical platform upon which to discuss a broad range of theoretical debates. As 
noted above, such a holistic fusion of an ethnographic study of changing labor and 
changing organized labor in a single ethnography is something that has so far only 
rarely been done. In this sense, I hope to contribute to filling this gap by offering just 
that. 
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2. Thinking and Rethinking Theory: Assembling our 
Toolbox 
As a contribution to labor revitalization studies and a budding anthropology of labor, 
the thesis at hand is an ethnography of organized labor seeking to renew itself in a 
changing and more hostile political economic environment and the complex 
interdependencies and fluid dynamics between the two. It goes without saying that 
the scientific exploration of this array of social phenomena is far from an easy or 
clear-cut task. Thus, by preparing an adequate methodological as well as theoretical 
framework, the present chapter serves as preparation for the journey that lies ahead. 
This chapter begins by establishing the general epistemological approach underlying 
the study as a whole. While theory may guide us on our travels, methodology is the 
base of the former, laying a sturdy groundwork upon which theory can stand. When 
studying social upheaval and change, no methodological stance captures the tension 
between empirical data and theory better than Michael Burawoy’s thoughts on the 
extended case method. Not only emphasizing the value of ethnographic case 
studies, Burawoy equally points to the decisiveness of bringing their results into 
systematic discussion with theory in order to achieve the ultimate goal: building social 
scientific knowledge. 
After arming ourselves with the guiding thoughts provided by Burawoy’s 
methodological approach, I will proceed to assemble the particular theoretical 
elements that will prove useful in our own research endeavor. Instead of rigidly 
clinging to one particular theoretical strand, I will assemble a wider theoretical toolbox 
as an explanatory model for the case study at hand. This does not and cannot mean 
that all assumptions of our chosen theories are arbitrarily thrown into one heap, but 
that the relevant elements of each are considered and, if proven useful, subsequently 
applied.  
As this study focuses on organized labor in a field of dynamic capitalism “on the 
move“ (Harvey 2010: 12), it is useful to begin with the political economy of Marxist 
theory. Considering that organized labor can only be understood from a viewpoint 
taking the functioning of the wider capitalist mode of production into its scope, our 
short overview of Marxist analysis is a necessary launch pad for both the rest of our 
theoretical body as well as for our empirical data later on. That being said, it is of no 
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secret that more classical Marxism paid little attention to the agency of acting 
collectives, let alone individuals. It is for this that we will then turn to the complex and 
further developed thoughts of later Marxists, especially those taking into account this 
missing individual agency and collective action: Analytical Marxism. In order to better 
explain their own logics and strengths on the one hand, yet also due to the direct 
relevance to the subject matter at hand, the latter’s thoughts are discussed and 
contrasted with the widely-debated assumptions of Mancur Olson concerning 
collective action. 
Moving on, if one of the key aims of this thesis is to study how unions shift power 
relations in pursuit of their collective interests, it seems only sensible to widen our 
theoretical framework to include an approach helping us to understand not only the 
institutional environment in which this is done, but also the institutions within which 
any bargaining results would be consolidated. This, as well as some of the other 
missing links in Marxist theory, can be found in Jack Knight’s distributive-approach to 
institutionalist theory. It is Knight himself who proclaims that his approach may and 
should be used as the missing micro-foundations for the macro-level accounts of 
Marxist theory (1992: 125; 211). In this sense, Knight invites us to consider social 
institutions as originating as a by-product of social conflict between various self-
interested social actors with different power asymmetries.  
Finally, the last layer of our theoretical toolbox will be added by integrating the 
thoughts of the Jena Power Approach, specifically developed to study the various, 
yet simultaneously interlinked elements of trade union renewal from a perspective of 
changing power relations. By differentiating, yet simultaneously highlighting the 
dynamic interactions between a standing pyramid of associational, structural, 
institutional and societal power resources, this approach provides us with a highly 
applicable theoretical instrument empowering us to dissect the various aspects and 
possibilities of union power. And while differentiating between the diverse power 
resources available, the model emphasizes the particular importance of associational 
power, i.e. the power stemming from the collective agency of organized workers. The 
Jena approach is, in fact, a particularly fitting end puzzle piece. For while it 
represents a distinct approach in itself, it is also one built upon thoughts reaching 
back to the other theories discussed in this thesis, in particular the thoughts of Erik 
Olin Wright, a leading Analytical Marxist. 
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In the end, we will have hopefully assembled a multifunctional, yet coherent 
theoretical toolbox based on the pragmatic, yet deeply reflected principles of Bollig 
and Finke’s theory networks (2014), a toolbox enabling us to not only understand the 
union as a strategic actor, but also the political economic and institutional 
environment within which it moves. 
Entwining Data and Theory: the Extended Case Method 
When searching for the intellectual origins of the extended case method, which will 
represent our broader methodological approach as it has already in previously 
conducted research (Kelley 2012), we are inevitably confronted with a far greater 
piece of anthropology’s own history and disciplinary development. In order to 
understand not only the history of said approach, but also what continues to remain 
in effect its essence and uniqueness, it helps us to look back at the context into 
which the extended case method was born. For like so many other scientific 
developments, this methodology was born out of the ashes of a crisis. 
Social anthropology has for a long time had a virtuous and proud tradition of 
producing fine-grained, in-depth and detailed accounts of the communities they 
studied. This is, of course, one of the key strengths of the discipline. This tradition 
took a momentous leap when Polish-British anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski 
played an important role in equipping these studies with the demands of scientific 
standards. Yet while having long produced strikingly in-depth depictions of the fields 
they studied and despite Malinowski’s scientific progress, three weaknesses 
hampered the discipline up until at least the mid-20th century.  
First of all, despite or perhaps even as a result of their in-depth explorations, 
anthropological studies were for long generally carried out from a rather isolationist 
perspective. The different places and people studied were to a large extent perceived 
as isolated islands with no connections to the outside world, let alone with any 
interdependencies, cooperation or conflict. As such, these in-depth investigations 
tended to be conducted not in concert with the greater structures surrounding the 
place or subject matter at hand, but at the cost of ignoring them.  
Second of all, theoretical approaches tended to be dominated by a relatively strong 
and harmony-based functionalist perspective. In this sense, anthropologists sought to 
locate structures, processes and mechanisms keeping society together as a 
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functioning whole. As a result, anthropologists often took a rather prescriptive 
approach, looking for what “natives ought to do” instead of what they actually did 
(Burawoy 2009: 22). Of course, as a further result thereof, antagonistic conflicts of 
interest between the different actors involved and their sometimes complex and 
contentious relations tended to be seen either as irrelevant or simply as temporary 
glitches in the system. 
Thirdly, and directly connected to both of these previous points, power asymmetries 
or even power itself were duly ignored. For if the key function of all social phenomena 
is supposedly a stabilizing one, then power relations and power asymmetries 
between social actors are then, of course, of little relevance. And if the local system 
is inherently built and structured so as to function as an organic whole, then power 
relations embedded therein must either be seen as a stabilizing factor or simply not 
be taken into account, as this would not only upset the system, but also the 
theoretical approach thereto. 
When the colonial world order vividly crumbled around and after the end of the 
Second World War, more and more anthropologists came to question the validity of 
such an isolationist and strictly functionalist view. One of the first steps in 
emancipating the discipline from the above weaknesses was articulated in a call for 
an “Anthropological-Turn to the Macro“ (Burawoy 1991: 276). Many of the scholars 
taking such an insurgent stance were those associated with South African-British 
anthropologist Max Gluckman’s Manchester School. Distancing themselves from the 
isolationist approaches that had long dominated the discipline, Gluckman and his 
colleagues began to see the communities they studied as embedded within the 
broader global context of the day as well as within the changing power relations this 
entailed. In other words, “Manchester anthropology began to restore African 
communities to their broader, world historical context.“ (Burawoy 2009: 22). In doing 
so, they not only departed from a more static, functionalist stance, but began to see 
the places, groups and social relations studied from a more processual perspective 
of being in a constant state of flux, development and upheaval. 
In the development of his methodological approach, Gluckman first took an angle 
reminding us of what would later become known as the interpretive case method, 
searching for how a greater, structural macro-level exhibited itself in daily routines. 
Gluckman soon changed this approach, however, towards one using participant 
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observation to unveil how the micro-level of everyday life was itself shaped and 
conditioned by the greater external forces of the macro-level – and to a certain extent 
vice-versa (Burawoy 2009). He did so, however, by paying particular attention to the 
specific historical and regional contexts in which both levels unfold. Thus, the 
extended case method slowly came to be born. In the context of a falling colonial 
system and the simultaneous crafting of a new world order, this was indeed a 
rewarding venture from a social scientific perspective and equally pointed to the fact 
that social structures best reveal their inner logics when confronted with change and 
pressure (Burawoy 1998: 17; Burawoy 2009: 245ff.). 
In a very different global political economic world as well as in a different intellectual 
one years later, industrial sociologist Michael Burawoy carried the extended case 
method “from Manchester to Berkeley“ (Burawoy 2009: 1). Using and evolving the 
approach within case studies from the copper mines of Zambia (2009) to 
manufacturing plants in the Midwestern United States (1979), Burawoy rediscovered 
the extended case method and began to refine and enhance it. Starting with 
participant observation as the key to unearthing dynamic social processes and 
moving on to existing theory before bringing both dialectically together, Burawoy 
places his approach in a reflexive model of science. This model, suggests Burawoy, 
“valorizes intervention, process, structuration, and theory reconstruction” and must 
be seen as “the Siamese twin of positive science that proscribes reactivity, but 
upholds reliability, replicability, and representativeness.“ (Burawoy 1998: 4). 
The principles of the extended case method are, according to Burawoy, “quite 
simple” (2009: 17). First of all, we start by immersing ourselves, as participant 
observers, within the fields we wish to study. We “[join] the participants in the rhythm 
of their life, in their space and their time.“ (Burawoy 2009: 17). We use not only our 
observations, but place these in dialogue with our own participation to gain access to 
data that would otherwise go unearthed. Thus, as a primary method of collecting 
data, Burawoy vigorously advocates the value of the ethnographic technique of in-
depth and long-term participant observation.   
The second principle flows from the literal extension of the first, namely that we do 
not simply dip our toes in the water to claim some symbolic presence or field 
credibility, but “[extend our] observations over time and space.“ (Burawoy 2009: 17). 
Through this long-term participant observation, we do justice to the aspiration of the 
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extended case method to unveil structures, social relations and the actors within 
them as processual. While there are hardly fixed guidelines for this, “it has to be long 
enough to discern the social processes that give integrity to the site” and allow ritual, 
yet also drama, struggle and contradictions to emerge (ibid). 
The third principle requires us, as hinted above, to bring the empirical data gathered 
into dialogue with the structures of the macro-level. It is this approach that enables us 
to simultaneously “[avoid] the pitfalls of relativism and universalism“ (Burawoy 1991: 
276). Like grounded theory, the extended case method begins with the assumption 
that it makes sense to start from the analytical categories of the micro- and macro-
level and that there is a direct interplay between the two (Burawoy 1991). It does not 
blend together or blur the micro- and macro-levels, as the interpretive case method 
would propose. And it also abandons the ethno-methodological view denying the 
existence of a macro-level as a sensible analytical category. That being said, unlike 
grounded theory, the extended case method contextualizes the characteristics of 
social phenomena and their embeddedness in their very particular historical as well 
as the geographic and social-economic local context. 
The fourth principal discussed leads us closer to the focus of this chapter, namely 
building a relationship between our empirical data and social scientific theory, thus 
ultimately contributing to the prime goal of “the extension of theory“ (Burawoy 2009: 
17). For, although the importance of in-depth case studies cannot be 
overemphasized, “single case studies may provide very interesting results […]”, yet 
“they provide no measure of their generalizability.“ (Burawoy 1991: 272) when taken 
for themselves. 
For Burawoy, theory takes on a many-faced role. First of all, it helps us to “keep 
ourselves steady“ (Burawoy 1998: 5) and acts as a kind of navigation system helping 
us to steer through the massive and sometimes choppy sea of data we encounter on 
our ethnographic odyssey. For given that long periods of in-depth participant 
observation can and will unearth massive pools of empirical data, theory can help us 
to make sense of these seemingly endless oceans of information. Furthermore, if we 
are to approach our empirical data as being embedded within greater and more 
global structures of political economy and power relations, theory also “permits us to 
identify relevant forces beyond our site.“ (Burawoy 2009: 17).  
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Second of all, and this lets us proceed to the extension of theory itself, theory takes 
the vital and overarching role of scientific guarantor in that the value of an 
ethnographic study does not remain confined to a simple exploration of the case 
study at hand, but is lifted into debate with other case studies. In other words, 
“Theory is the condensation of accumulated knowledge that joins sociologists to one 
another; it is what makes us a community of scientists. We are theory bound.“ 
(Burawoy 2009: 15).  
In a similar sense, Bollig and Finke suggest that we perceive the generalizations 
constructed through theorizing:  
[…] as a way of detecting causal linkages; one that at the same time gives attention to 
historical/regional particularities and processes, and also seriously addresses the 
epistemological challenges arising from the embeddedness of social science research 
in power relations, hegemonic ideologies and public discourses. (2014: 41) 
Theory is thus the common language of science, allowing case studies to debate with 
one another and pay tribute to the ambitious task of furthering social scientific 
knowledge in general. 
Once again in contrast to grounded theory, however, which seeks to build theory 
every time anew, Burawoy proposes to focus our efforts on improving existing theory 
by bringing our chosen theoretical school into debate with empirical data grounded in 
time and space: 
In this version of ethnography we don’t deliver our minds from preconception but clarify 
and problematize them; we don’t accumulate data day after day only finally to code it 
and thereby infer theory at the end, as though no one else had thought of these 
matters before, but we continually engage theory with data, and theory with other 
theories. (Burawoy 2009: 15) 
So, in the sense that “Science offers no final truth, no certainties, but exists in a state 
of continual revision.“ (Burawoy 1998: 16), we seek to participate in that process of 
revision, rethinking and enhancement. According to Burawoy, this aspect of the 
approach is the decisive point setting it apart from others: “Here lies the secret of the 
extended case method – theory is not discovered but revised, not induced but 
improved, not deconstructed but reconstructed.“ (2009: 13). 
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Thus, while research guided by the extended case method indeed dedicates itself to 
the particular case study at hand, instead of making arbitrary comparisons across 
social situations and “abstracting from time and place“ (Burawoy 1991: 280), it aims 
at producing generalizations through confirming, yet also contrasting or 
supplementing existing theory. It is in the latter sense that Burawoy refers to a 
“Kamikaze stance toward theory”, a stance having the insight as well as courage to 
not only stand up for, but also challenge our own theoretical convictions when our 
empirical data calls for it (Burawoy 1998: 20). 
The thoughts envisioned by Burawoy and described above will represent our 
methodological guidelines. This holistic, yet differentiated approach and its 
passionate will to bring single case studies into debate with the wider scientific 
community is invaluable. When it comes to our particular case, however, instead of 
clinging to one theoretical school as if “theoretical principles [were] competing and 
mutually exclusive“ (Bollig and Finke 2014: 48), this thesis draws upon the rich 
variety of social scientific theories as a strength in the quest towards building 
adequate explanatory models. For, while perhaps seemingly specific, the subject at 
hand, organized labor in a changing political economy, touches upon a broad range 
of social scientific phenomena. From collective action to shifting power relations 
between labor and capital, from social institutions to upheavals in the process of 
production, the questions at hand scatter at the thought of being explicable through 
one single theoretical tradition. 
While some might look down upon such an approach as arbitrary eclecticism, Bollig 
and Finke point out the fruitfulness of such a procedure. It is in this sense that we 
will, as described in the introduction to this chapter, construct a mosaic of theoretical 
elements that will not only guide us on our journey, but also enable us to enter into 
debate with the wider social scientific community as well. Thus, perceiving the 
theoretical arena as “an open space where ideas from different theoretical strands 
may be borrowed and combined in order to build up more elaborate and accurate 
models of social life“ (Bollig and Finke 2014: 48), we aim to build a theoretical toolbox 
or theory network (ibid) made up of elements taken from different schools of thought. 
The Marxist Approach to Political Economy 
The thesis at hand deals with trade unions and how one in a particular setting is 
currently attempting to revitalize itself in order to regain power and better shape the 
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structures, wages and working conditions of its industry. We are thus confronted with 
the essential question: What exactly is trade unionism and on what political economic 
basis do these organizations exist? E. Paul Durrenberger, one of today’s leading 
scholars carrying out anthropological research into labor unions, provides us with 
vital starting points through the following definition thereof:  
The chief goal of the union movement is to organize workers for concerted action in 
support of their interests to redress the power imbalance between those who provide 
labor and those who control the conditions of its use through their ownership or 
management of productive resources. Because workers and owners of capital do not 
share interests, this relationship is necessarily adversarial. (2007: 75) 
The main value of this apt description lies in the fact that it encourages us to widen 
our view from one focusing solely on the organizations themselves to a more holistic 
perspective encompassing first of all the particular environment in which both 
workers and unions move, yet second of all the very economic premise, the system 
of wage labor, from which the concept of labor unions can even be imagined. We are 
thus urged to widen our horizon and begin by theorizing how economies in certain 
times and places are organized and in what way they function. We are led to address 
the relationships between the different social groups involved as well as to face 
questions of who owns or controls the means of production. In particular, such a 
perspective allows us to begin to understand the very foundations of how and under 
what circumstances subaltern groups can act out agency in defense of their 
collective interests. For unions are “whether they like it or not – class organizations“ 
(Deppe 2012: 10). 
It is of no surprise that when dealing with such questions we find ourselves knocking 
at the doors of the greater theoretical entity known as Marxism. While not presuming 
that Marxist theory has all the answers, as will become clearly evident, it is 
nonetheless a fitting starting point for understanding the above questions, which are 
of course embedded in the “enigma of capital“ (Harvey 2011). That being said, as we 
are dealing with “an extremely rich and variegated intellectual tradition which [has] 
interacted with politics and political movements […]” throughout the last centuries 
(Gamble 1999: 3), it is neither my intention nor in the scope of this thesis to attempt 
to provide an even semi-complete picture of the theory or even to explore all of the 
important pillars thereof. I far more plan to use specific principal elements of Marxist 
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theory, in particular those concerning the political economic mechanisms behind the 
extraction of surplus value and how these lay the fundament for trade unionism, in 
order to elaborate on the necessity of a class analysis for the study of trade unions, 
as suggested above by Durrenberger (2007) as well as Deppe (2012). 
A main starting point for us to begin to understand Marx’s thoughts on class is 
provided by the meanwhile (in)famous assumption that “The history of all hitherto 
existing society is the history of class struggles.“ (1969). What Marx meant by this 
often misinterpreted conclusion is not that every occurrence in the history of mankind 
must be seen as class struggle in itself, but that the phenomenon of class is not 
simply a by-product of society, but the very structure upon which class societies 
themselves are based. As a result, the contradictions arising from the class-structure 
of society can be and often are a potentially important motor for social change. 
Neither Marx nor Engels invented the term class and this may explain the perhaps 
somewhat surprising fact that while both produced thousands of pages of complex 
analyses on the topic, they neglected to actually provide us with a precise definition 
thereof. Johnston and Dolowitz, however, summarize the Marxist concept of class as 
one seeking to capture the economic and social relationship between the different 
groups of human beings in a given society (1999: 134ff.). The axis of this relationship 
is the particular role each group plays in the economic process, specifically in the 
production of surplus value in that society.  
According to Marx, class structure in capitalist society is primarily shaped by the 
relationship between two main classes: the proletarian working class and the 
capitalist owner-class. While the former is defined by having nothing but the sale of 
their labor power to ensure its income, the latter is in direct or indirect possession of 
the material means of production and thus in a position to profit from the labor of the 
former. Arising from these characteristics is the fact that, although the working class 
tends to represent the numerical majority of capitalist societies and the group whose 
labor power produces the wealth accumulated in capitalist society, the members of 
this class find themselves in an asymmetrical relationship tilted against their own 
material benefit. 
For the working class is, in the terms of Marx (1990), free in a double sense: free 
from ownership of the means of production and free to offer their labor power for 
sale. So, while in the latter sense workers may be free of the shackles of slavery or 
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feudalism, thus allowing them to take up an available employment of their choice, 
they are in the first sense equally free of any means to independently produce and 
accumulate capital. As a result, workers – generally speaking – have nothing but 
their labor power to sell and are thus forced to enter into a contractual relationship of 
wage labor with the owners of the means of production. 
Proceeding from this asymmetrical relationship, an inherent logic of exploitation 
comes to determine the wage-labor-system. For in order for the capitalist to actually 
make a profit at all, his (or her) workers must be paid less than the value of what their 
labor actually produces. Thus, the capitalist will extract a difference between the 
actual value produced by the worker and the latter’s wages, known as surplus value.  
As becomes evident, from a Marxist perspective part of the worker’s labor is paid and 
another part is unpaid. What also becomes clear, especially when using the above 
variables, is that the more surplus value is extracted, the lower the wage of the 
worker. Or from the perspective of the capitalist employer, the lower the wages are, 
the higher is the amount of surplus value, i.e. profit, extracted. When additionally 
throwing the variable of working time into the equation, we can assume that: 
[…] the limits of the working day being given, the maximum of profit corresponds to the 
physical minimum of wages; and that wages being given, the maximum of profit 
corresponds to such a prolongation of the working day as is compatible with the 
physical forces of the labourer. The maximum of profit is therefore limited by the 
physical minimum of wages and the physical maximum of the working day. (Marx 
1969) 
While the accumulation of surplus by dominant classes was and is not an exclusive 
feature of the capitalist mode of production, in capitalism the processes thereof are 
not only more complex, but also more concealed. For in contrast to explicitly forced 
labor (slave societies) or the direct seizure or forced levy of material goods (feudal 
societies), “a web of mystification is spun around this mode of production, hindering a 
clear understanding of its true nature.“ (Gurley 1987: 284). It now also becomes clear 
as to why Marx spoke of workers selling their labor power and not simply selling what 
they actually produce or even the total amount of labor actually rendered: “[…] wages 
are not what they appear to be -- namely, the value, or price, of labor—but only a 
masked form for the value, or price, of labor power.“ (Marx 1970, italics in original). 
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A further unique characteristic of capitalism is that since production is set in a market 
logic shaped by the pressures of competition (Mandel 2008: 52), the owner class 
does not simply spend the extracted surplus on spoils and leisure. Far more, in order 
to grow his or her profits and conquer the largest portion of the market as possible, 
the individual capitalist or company uses previously accumulated capital to invest and 
thereby produce more with a higher efficiently and if possible at lower costs than the 
competition. Thus, widening our scope from the isolated factory to the greater 
market, it becomes clear that “[u]nder free competition, the immanent laws of 
capitalist production confront the individual capitalist as a coercive force external to 
him.“ (Marx paraphrased in Harvey 2010: 146). As such, it becomes equally clear 
that the question of exploitation is not necessarily one of “good- or bad-hearted 
[capitalists]“ (Harvey 2010: 146), but that the system itself draws individual capitalists 
and companies into an endless search for more surplus value in order to expand and 
survive the “coercive laws of competition“ (Harvey 2010: 145ff.), which would 
otherwise hurl them from the market.  
All this being said, the actual degree of surplus value extracted can and does vary – 
from geographical location to historical era, from individual position to company and 
economic sector. And while it is in the employer’s material interest to maximize his 
profits by paying lower wages and prolonging the working day, it is in the worker’s 
material interest to strive for higher wages and shorter working times. How wages are 
actually shaped, however, is determined by a wide number of factors and variables.  
On the one hand, what we must remember is that for Marx, labor power is a 
commodity that is to be bought and sold like any other (1969). As such, its market 
price is to a certain extent determined by the simple logic of supply and demand. 
That being said, despite the general commodity character of labor power, there are 
indeed particular “features, which distinguish the value of the laboring power” from 
that of other commodities (ibid). These features revolve around two basic levels 
determining wages: the “physical” and the “historical or social” (ibid).  
The first recognizes the fact that labor power’s value is determined primarily by “the 
values of the necessaries required its maintenance and reproduction.“ (ibid). In other 
words, a worker’s income can only be, generally speaking, so low as the minimum 
costs of his or her own physical existence and reproduction. Furthermore, despite the 
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length of a working day being rather flexible, it is nonetheless bound by an ultimate 
limit provided by the “physical force of the labouring man“ (ibid). 
Built upon this first and minimum element of the individual worker being able “to 
perpetuate its physical existence“ (ibid) is the second feature of “historical or social” 
wage-limits, or, as the anthropologist Roseberry points out in a broader sense, 
“cultural“ (1997: 36). For in every country, according to Marx, the value of labor is 
shaped by a “traditional standard of life”, which has in its center “the satisfaction of 
certain wants springing from the social conditions in which people are placed and 
reared up.“ (Marx 1969). As such, labor power can be of a highly “variable 
magnitude”, even when the value of all other commodities remains constant (ibid). 
However, when remembering that in the  determination of the amount of surplus 
value extracted, “the more the one gets the less will the other get“ (ibid), we must 
generally assume that one of the two involved parties, employer and employee, 
profits at the direct cost of the other. Thus, slowly but surely maneuvering us onto the 
level of the collective pursuit of interests, which is the main topic of this thesis, Marx 
states that:  
The fixation of its actual degree [degree of exploitation, i.e. height of wages] is only 
settled by the continuous struggle between capital and labour, the capitalist constantly 
tending to reduce wages to their physical minimum, and to extend the working day to 
its physical maximum, while the working man constantly presses in the opposite 
direction. (Marx 1969) 
Thus, “[t]he matter resolves itself into a question of the respective powers of the 
combatants.“ (ibid). 
That being said, despite the fact that the political economic structuration of capitalist 
society sets the material interests of the two classes in an antagonistic relationship to 
one another, this by no means automatically leads to open, continuous class 
struggle. For this to occur, the working class must, according to Marx, develop itself 
from an objectively, analytically distinguishable class-in-itself, “formed by the 
objective conditions of collective, alienated labor” to a class-for-itself, “cognizant of its 
mutual interests, poised for solidaric action, and strengthened in this struggle by 
shared culture and ritual.“ (Kasmir 2005: 79). In other words, while economic 
conditions may have created a working class as an objectively visible group, the 
latter must transform itself into a subjective force by becoming increasingly aware of 
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its collective class interests while at the same time simultaneously realizing its own 
capability to organize and act in defense of those interests, i.e. a sense of both 
collective interests and collective agency. 
While this step towards a conscious and active “class for itself” is, in the long term, 
seen as part of a far greater process of self-emancipation, in the end transcending 
capitalist boundaries (Smith 2011), it is in labor struggles within capitalism that “this 
mass becomes united, and constitutes itself as a class for itself.“ (Marx 1955). In this 
respect, trade unions, as the basic form of working class organization, provide in the 
eyes of Marx a primary vehicle for developing class consciousness and class 
agency. 
The logic of trade union power is, in theory if not necessarily in practice, simple: “[…] 
workers combine in order to achieve equality of a sort with the capitalist in their 
contract concerning the sale of their labour.“ (Marx in Lapides (ed.) 1990: 89). For if 
we assume that the process of production and thus the accumulation of surplus value 
is indeed in the end dependent on the labor power of the working class majority, then 
this group is, by their structural position in the process of production, in a (potentially) 
powerful position. In order to wield this power, however, i.e. in order to collectively 
refuse their labor power in order to raise the latter’s price as well as to improve the 
conditions of its sale, the working class must organize. They must organize into 
associations generally known today as trade unions. These associations provide not 
only the parameter to act collectively, they also play a part in suppressing or 
neutralizing the competition between workers themselves. Hence, “the accidental 
immediate neediness of a labourer should not compel him to make do with a smaller 
wage than supply and demand has already established”, thus depressing “the value 
of labour-power in a particular area below its customary level.“ (Marx in Lapides (ed.) 
1990: 89). 
All this being said, both Marx and Engels were far from giving any homogeneous 
praise for trade unions, which they saw as “embodying a combination of struggle 
against the rule of capital with submission to its dictates.“ (Barker 2013: 52, italics in 
original). For, as we can see, the very core of trade unionism rests upon acting within 
the logic of the wage-system or more specifically upon negotiating the prices of 
working people’s labor-power within the capitalist mode of production. From this 
perspective, trade unions operating in a capitalist economy can at best be seen as 
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organizations “absorbing the risks stemming from the commodity character of labor 
power” and by doing so attempting to “de-commodify” human labor power (Sauer in 
Deppe 2012: 10f.). At worst, however, and with a slightly more polemic undertone, it 
can even be said that in a strict Marxist sense the raison d’être of trade unions is to 
more-or-less “negotiate the terms of exploitation“ (Smith 2011) of the working class.  
Marx, in the end, arrives at the ambivalent conclusion that:  
Trades Unions work well as centers of resistance against the encroachments of capital. 
They fail partially from an injudicious use of their power. They fail generally from 
limiting themselves to a guerilla war against the effects of the existing system, instead 
of simultaneously trying to change it, instead of using their organized forces as a lever 
for the final emancipation of the working class that is to say the ultimate abolition of the 
wages system. (1969) 
Sharpening Our Tools: Marxist Theory, Agency and Collective Action 
The function of the above subsection has been to provide us with a first trail for the 
path we have chosen to travel upon, namely establishing a political economic 
analysis as a starting point for studying trade union renewal. We have thus 
constructed a material base as to why trade unions actually (can) work. Far from any 
moral or abstract pressure, we have seen that the production process in capitalism 
itself actually bestows its workers with a potentially high amount of structural power. 
That being said, what quickly becomes evident when looking at Marx’s work is that 
one vital perspective remains vividly missing. By rather clinically placing his focus on 
the underlying relations of production, which are no doubt important, Marx regretfully 
largely ignores the agency of the workers themselves, as well as that of employers 
for that matter, and both become “merely embodiments, personifications of [the 
relationship between] capital and wage-labour.“ (Marx 1959).  
Thus, when analyzed within the context of the greater debate of structure versus 
human agency (Ortner 1984), a clear and dominant focus is placed upon the former. 
Referring to questions and restraints of  human choice, individual and collective 
action and lack thereof, the latter debate circles around "the relationship(s) that 
obtain between human action, on the one hand, and some global entity which we 
may call “the system,” on the other. […] the impact of the system on practice, and the 
impact of practice on the system.“ (Ortner 1984: 148). And despite Marx’s well-known 
statement that “men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; 
they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances 
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existing already […]“ (1999), his emphasis was clearly placed upon said 
circumstances – instead of upon those making “their own history”. Far more, when 
workers actually did make history, this was largely attributed to the question of “the 
readiness of society’s structural development rather than one of individual choice.“ 
(Tarrow 2011: 17). 
This structural focus has, sometimes rightfully so, sometimes less so, led to vicious 
criticism of Marxist theory as being too deterministic; that social actors have no real 
part to play and no agency themselves. And indeed, even a deeper look at classical 
Marxism would reveal that despite offering solid analytical instruments for 
understanding the political economic base allowing for trade unionism in the wage-
labor-system to work, Marx indeed gives us little in the way of instruments to analyze 
the precise micro-mechanisms “[drawing] individuals into collective action.“ (Tarrow 
2011: 17). 
This being said, to view the Marxist approach (or any theoretical body for that matter) 
as some holy grail that dare not be questioned not only violates general scientific 
standards, but also the very thoughts Marx himself promoted (Eagleton 2011). It is in 
this sense that our methodological guide, Michael Burawoy, very clearly embraces an 
approach to Marxism as a “living tradition that enjoys renewal and reconstruction as 
the world it describes and seeks to transform undergoes change.“ (Burawoy 2014: 
35). We must thus, in his view, see and use Marxism as a “variegated theory”, 
constantly reshaping and enabling it to keep up with the changing times and places it 
describes (ibid). 
The quest for a theoretical revitalization and expansion of Marxist theory is, however, 
far from homogeneous and has led to a number of different paths being paved. Erik 
Olin Wright even goes so far as to plead for a view of today’s Marxism not as one 
“unified theory with well-defined boundaries,” but more as “a family of theories united 
by a common terrain of debate questions“ (1994: 178). From Wright’s perspective, 
while there has always existed “a plurality of Marxisms”, the final decades of the 20th 
century produced a new “degree of theoretical and methodological heterogeneity“ 
(ibid). 
While in some cases this urge to revitalize Marxist theory has taken a more 
postmodernist approach, often becoming absorbed and lost in semantic drills as an 
end to itself, it has also taken a direction aimed at incorporating concepts and micro-
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mechanisms of individual and collective agency. Due to the essence of this thesis, 
the focus will be on the latter direction. Given the profound depth of the now 
extensive school of so-called “non-dogmatic Marxism“ (Roemer 1986a: 4), I will draw 
upon specific currents of this renewal which will later be of use to the particular 
research question at hand. Specifically speaking, I will turn to approaches that have 
attempted to fuse Marxist theory with other, more agency-oriented theoretical 
streams. 
Paradoxically, elements from neoclassic economic theory play a central role therein. 
The goal of this perhaps curious alliance was and continues to be to enhance Marxist 
theory so as to widen its range of application to micro-level phenomena “on the shop 
floor“ (Burawoy 1979). For despite its subversive potential and active role in a 
countless number of social movements, it is the paradox contradiction of orthodox 
Marxist theory that it has itself paid surprisingly little attention to worker agency and 
“too often and too easily reduced wage laborers to objects of manipulation […]; to 
victims of the inexorable forces of capitalist accumulation […].“ (Burawoy 1979: 77). 
One of the first and today still active proponents of such a turn-to-agency-Marxism is 
our above referred-to methodological guide, Michael Burawoy. While criticizing 
conservative industrial sociology for its presumption of the capitalist mode of 
production as inevitable, Burawoy nevertheless looks to certain elements thereof in 
order to help “[…] restore the subjective moment of labor, to challenge the idea of the 
subjectless subject, to stress the ubiquitous resistance of everyday life.“ (1979: 77). 
His explicit aim is to integrate certain elements of neoclassical industrial sociology 
into Marxist theory in order to dialectically “move beyond them” (1979: 4). 
In his classic ethnography of American workers in an industrial factory, 
Manufacturing Consent. Changes in the Labor Process Under Monopoly Capitalism 
(1979), Burawoy examines the everyday struggles and more importantly the 
everyday consent between workers and management. Burawoy points out that in fact 
neither conflict nor consent between workers and management are primordially 
given. Far more, they are products of the particular organization of the labor process 
in its specific place and time as well as of the agency of both workers and 
management themselves. 
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In the factory studied by Burawoy, the particular organization of production allowed 
workers a limited, yet decisive amount of autonomy – which they gladly seized. This 
perceived option of choice saw workers spontaneously constitute and participate in 
“games” of their own making. In these, workers tried to “make out” and produce the 
most in the shortest amount of time. During his participant observation, Burawoy 
himself admits to being sucked into this game even after previously questioning its 
rationality. He comes to the conclusion that it in the end, the games arising from this 
consensus-oriented organization of work simultaneously guarantee as well as 
additionally obscure the extraction of a higher amount of surplus labor. Yet under the 
circumstances given, it nonetheless becomes “rational” for the worker to participate. 
In this sense, partially reflected later on in Adam Przeworski’s work (1986), class 
interests and rationality are also not seen as given, but as dynamically born out of a 
class’s particular place in a particular historical stage of capitalism. 
Individual agency being emphasized, however, Burawoy in no way seeks to dismiss 
the macro-level of structures and institutions. For the organization of the labor 
process described above is not simply an abstract product of some creative 
manager’s good ideas, but (as the title of the book suggests) a direct product of 
monopoly capitalist development on the one hand and collective class struggle by 
organized labor on the other, both having reached unforeseen peaks in the postwar-
era. It is these two contradicting forces which are not only driving motors of capitalist 
development, but also ones wielding a significant effect on the shop floor. The 
dialectic mix between the two made it on the one hand economically possible for 
company management to grant certain concessions and on the other hand politically 
sensible to introduce systems based more on Gramscian hegemony than on direct 
repression and confrontation. 
While Burawoy’s study is embedded in a direct critique of Marx, he emphasizes that 
his work is not an exercise in “neo-marxism“ (Burawoy 1996: 78). And despite being 
influenced by Foucault’s microphysics of power, he chose not to “follow him into 
poststructuralist nihilism“ (ibid). In fact, Burawoy suggests that while the previously 
described book starts with a critique of Marx, in the end he returns, using precisely 
the tools of Marxism, to Marx’s original interest in the organization of the labor 
process (1979: xii). In the same spirit, Burawoy elsewhere paraphrases Georg Lukás, 
who boldly stated that “even if all of Marx’s individual theses were disproven, one 
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would not have to renounce Marxism for a single moment. The validity of Marxism 
lies not in this or that thesis but in its “method.”„ (Burawoy 1996: 97).  
While Burawoy’s particular research subject is different than our own, he does point 
us in the direction we need to travel. He skillfully shows that the tools of Marxist 
theory can and should continue to represent a main starting point when explaining 
the ambiguous and many-faced aspects of class, class consciousness and 
(un)organized labor in capitalism. What he also points out, however, is that while 
Marxists have long excelled at producing studies of power harnessed in society’s 
structural settings, a fatal weakness has been to neglect the “subjective moment of 
labor” (1979: 77). It is thus, in Burawoy’s view, the duty of the ethnographer to 
continue to develop and ally the original concept with other theoretical work so that it 
can continue to be successfully employed in social scientific research. 
By shifting our focus to include a greater emphasis on both individual and collective 
agency, the brief description above of Burawoy’s classic ethnography allows us to 
now move on to a related school of thought heading in a similar direction: Analytical 
Marxism. Like Burawoy, with whom these scholars have directly collaborated, they 
also perceive a necessity for a renewal of Marxist theory in dialogue with other 
models. In doing so, however, they go much further and with a significantly higher 
degree of abstraction than the former. This group has, in fact, radically re-structured 
Marx’s original work to an extent that they themselves question if it indeed should 
continue to be categorized as “Marxist” (Roemer 1986a: 4).  While undoubtedly a 
polarizing example, and by no means one without weaknesses, it is also an approach 
displaying the great opportunities of enhancing Marxism with radically different 
theoretical currents in order to regain the above sought after “subjective moment of 
labor“ (Burawoy 1979: 77). 
Emerging in the United States in the late 1970s as an interdisciplinary discussion 
circle, Analytical Marxism was not, as theoretical schools seldom are, the product of 
isolated intellectual experimentation. In the words of one of its most known 
exponents, John Roemer, himself a former union organizer, the theoretical direction 
was born out of the “the chequered success of socialism” on the one hand and the 
 - 59 - 
simultaneous “dubious failure of capitalism” on the other (1986a: 4)5. Another key 
advocate, Erik Olin Wright, sees Analytical Marxism’s development as growing out of 
a firmly held stance that Marxism continues to “constitute a productive intellectual 
tradition within which to ask questions and formulate answers, but that this tradition 
was frequently burdened with a range of methodological and metatheoretical 
commitments that seriously undermined its explanatory potential.“ (1994: 179). While 
a close and rather concentrated circle, Analytical Marxism is far from any 
academically homogeneous mass, which the advocates themselves repeatedly make 
clear. As such, I again wish to make no claim as to providing a comprehensive 
review of the entirety of the therein developed thoughts. Far more, I seek to discuss 
some of the reflections that might particularly contribute to the thesis at hand. 
Analytical Marxism begins from the perhaps obvious, yet by no means consistently 
recognized premise that the theoretical fountain of Marxism originally burst open in 
the works of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels in the middle of the 19th century – more 
than 150 years ago. While this mature age in no way automatically discredits its 
findings and assumptions a priori, it does provoke questions as to whether the 
original theoretical thoughts might “be primitive by modern [scientific] standards, 
wrong in detail, and perhaps even in some basic claims.“ (Roemer 1986a: 4). In this 
sense, Analytical Marxism seeks not to “throw away a good tool because it fails in 
certain applications“ (ibid), but to attempt to sharpen it for further and more precise 
use. 
This endeavor primarily encompasses the following points summarized by Wright 
(1994: 181): 
 The conscious use of “conventional scientific norms” 
 Securing deep, logical and “systematic conceptualizations” of the theoretical 
terms used 
 Developing and employing specific micro-models when studying unfolding 
processes and people’s actions therein 
 Emphasizing the “intentional action of individuals” when analyzing social 
processes and change 
                                               
5 A number of the articles cited here were published in the reader „Analytical Marxism“ (1986), edited 
by John Roemer. This collection provides an excellent overview of some of the thoughts developed by 
the school. 
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Underlining their self-identity as one of “non-dogmatic Marxism“ (Roemer 1986a: 4) 
(a description many Marxists would perceive as a grand understatement), the 
scholars connected to this intellectual current commence their voyage by not 
necessarily negating central pillars of Marxist theory, but by posing basic questions 
logically preceding the establishment of those pillars. How can the economic base be 
determined by the productive forces and class struggle still be the motor of history 
(Cohen 1986)? Are classes then in fact meaningful collective actors in the 
development of history (Elster 1986a)? Is a socialist revolution actually in the material 
and rational interest of the working class in modern day global capitalism (Przeworski 
1986)? Should Marxists even be interested in exploitation (Roemer 1986b)?  
In searching for an approach with which to tackle the missing aspect of micro-
mechanisms in Marxist theory, the Analytical Marxists enter into a realm few if any of 
their “fellow travelers” have ever ventured. For in their quest to revive Marxist theory 
and transform it into a tool able to hold up to scientific scrutiny, the group in question 
has ventured into what some Marxist theoreticians would perceive as the intellectual 
belly of the beast. While not all academics with an affinity to Analytical Marxism’s 
high scientific standards would necessarily subscribe to this point, the main 
representatives have chosen to embrace some form of methodological individualism 
“as a postulate in modeling Marxian concerns“ (Roemer 1986a: 7). 
Generally speaking, we can say that from such a perspective, social phenomena can 
be broken down and explained “in terms of the elementary individual actions of which 
they are composed“ (Scott 2000: 127). Seeing individual human action as “the 
elementary unit of social life“ (Elster in Scott 2000: 127), social phenomena, 
institutions and change are explained as the result of actions and interactions 
between individuals. People are seen as being driven by their individual “wants or 
goals that express their ‘preferences’.“ (Scott 2000: 127). Armed with the information 
they have, the costs and benefits of actions are logically weighed out and decisions 
made are based upon calculations pointing to the maximal utility for the individual in 
question. In other words, “Rational individuals choose the alternative that is likely to 
give them the greatest satisfaction […].“ (ibid). 
Before continuing, I should state that I personally view some of the assumptions of 
methodological individualism from a critical standpoint. This has less to do with 
condemning the viewpoint per se as a form of ideological domination or mystification 
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(Durrenberger 2009), although it can be and often is employed as such, but far more 
with the fact that I do not believe that said theory, with some of the very generalizing 
and abstract assumptions it proposes, is on its own capable to explain the countless 
aspects, even universal assumptions, it claims to cover. I particularly do not perceive 
a general reduction of all social phenomena and interactions to the individual level as 
especially helpful, as some of the proponents of methodological individualism seem 
to suggest. This critique is not only due to logical concerns, but reinforced by the 
endless masses of empirical data from different times and places pointing to the fact 
that individuals not only often act in group dynamics transcending the simple sum of 
individuals involved, but also that the actors involved do not necessarily exclusively 
pursue their interests in a consistently “rational” manner in the sense of individually 
and materially profit-maximizing and cost-reducing (Klandermans 1984; Kelly 1998; 
Ostrom 2000; Tarrow 2011). This latter point will also become clear in this thesis. 
These cautions in mind, there is nonetheless good reason to take a closer look at this 
unconventional project aimed at fusing Marxist theory with an approach seeking to 
shed light on the micro-mechanisms of why and how people act as they do. It is 
Przeworski who rightly states that “Marxism was a theory of history without any 
theory about the actions of people who made this history.“ (1985: 382). Orthodox 
Marxism, viewing history entirely “at the level of forces, structures, collectives, and 
constraints“ (ibid), pays in his eyes far too little attention to the mechanisms involved, 
let alone to the actors at play. 
A useful theoretical and for our purposes especially relevant empirical platform upon 
which to discuss this shift from structure to agency is provided by the question of 
collective action. Besides being at the center of this ethnography’s subject, the vast 
debate concerning collective action not only displays how Analytical Marxists 
distinguish themselves from orthodox Marxist theory, but also at least how part of the 
group differs from more orthodox methodological individualism. 
While collective action is no doubt a highly debated and often controversial topic in 
the broader social sciences, proponents of methodological individualism in particular 
have spent large parts of their careers focused on the subject. Many of these 
scholars in fact seem to have dedicated their work towards attempting to establish a 
sui generi non-rationality and general improbability of unified agency by groups of 
individuals. While often constructing highly sophisticated models, their approaches 
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are largely defined more by abstract and primarily normative assumptions, i.e. on 
how people should act, rather than on empirical data of how people actually do act. 
One of the leading pieces of literature in this tradition is Mancur Olson’s The Logic of 
Collective Action (1977), which sought to overturn “a cherished foundation of modern 
democratic thought that groups would tend to form and take collective action 
whenever members jointly benefitted.“ (Ostrom 2000: 137).  
Olson’s main goal was to break down the phenomenon of collective action to the 
level of the individual and thus refute the “popular notion that individuals with a 
common interest would act together so as to achieve that interest.“ (Kelly 1998: 68). 
What became known as the “zero contribution thesis” suggested that “unless the 
number of individuals in a group is quite small, or unless there is coercion or some 
other special device to make individuals act in their common interest, rational, self-
interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or group interests.“ (Olson 
in Ostrom 2000: 137, italics in the original). 
Using the example of an individual worker’s perspective in the context of trade 
unionism, the argument goes as follows: “I will receive the benefits of union action 
whether I belong to the union or not. Therefore I might as well save the cost 
contributing to the union and free-ride on my colleagues. In any case my own 
contribution won’t make a noticeable difference to the outcome of the union’s action 
and furthermore nobody will notice if I don’t contribute.“ (Kelly 1998: 68). In Olson’s 
view, since everybody will calculate as such, seeing only costs and no exclusive 
advantages for active participants and will thus attempt to free-ride, collective action 
is generally unlikely. It is seen, at least in the absence of institutional rules suggesting 
otherwise, as simply “[…] not rational for individuals to cooperate, even though 
cooperation would bring positive results for all“ (Acheson 2003: 8). As such, only in 
small groups, where individual contributions have a greater effect and (non-)activism 
is more noticeable (thus also entwined with social pressure from peers), or when 
institutions provide incentives or threaten constraints is collective action achievable: 
“The rational individual will then join the union and take part in strikes  because the 
alternative course of action (free-riding) is more costly.“ (Kelly 1998: 69). 
While some of Olson and his disciples’ arguments are indeed plausible, empirical 
studies, both quantitative and qualitative, vividly contradict the universal applicability 
of the normative assumptions he seems to suggest. As Ostrom points out:  
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The zero contribution thesis […] contradicts observations of everyday life. After all, 
many people vote, do not cheat on their taxes, and contribute effort to voluntary 
associations. Extensive fieldwork has by now established that individuals in all walks of 
life and all parts of the world voluntarily organize themselves so as to gain the benefits 
of trade, to provide mutual protection against risk, and to create and enforce rules that 
protect natural resources. (2000: 137f.) 
In other words, while collective action may not be given or automatic, it indeed clearly 
exists in a number of different social situations, times and places. Indeed, looking 
closer to home, thriving collectives such as trade unions indeed managed to grow 
into large, active and successful organizations – even before they amassed enough 
political capital to push through stable institutions supporting and enhancing this 
growth. As will become clear in the following chapter, while certain institutions can 
most definitely help organized labor to flourish, they more often than not are only 
introduced after the latter has managed to build enough collective power so as to 
either force through the birth of favorable institutions or at least make a more 
integrational approach seem more rational for capital and the state. 
As such, an obvious gap between the above theoretical assumptions and broader 
empirical reality becomes evident (Ostrom 2000: 138) and these abstract laws, 
proscribing how people should act, often simply collide with how people often do act. 
Representing a fundamental problem for Olson’s thoughts (Kelly 1998; Scott 2000: 
133), the mass of empirical data depicting dynamics of collective action further points 
to his neglect of any deeper layers of cultural and historical context as well as 
existing power and class relations and the formal and informal conditions these 
entail. 
At the same time, however, it would conversely be equally irresponsible to portray 
the phenomenon of collective action as something automatically given or even easily 
constructed, let alone a common social phenomenon per se. And while there are 
countless examples of collective action unfolding every day in the diverse spheres of 
social interaction, there is just as much field data pointing to the existence of “the 
temptation to free ride on the provision of collective benefits” as a “universal problem” 
(Ostrom 2000: 138). This does not mean that collective action is impossible, but 
suggests that when it does come to collective action, “cooperation levels vary from 
extremely high to extremely low across different settings.“ (Ostrom 2000: 148). 
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It is in this sense that Analytical Marxism steps on to the stage to provide us with a 
more plausible approach. For if Olson and his followers point to how collective action 
does not come about, thus not only limiting the scope of analysis, but also to a 
certain extent contradicting empirical reality, Analytical Marxism provides us with 
stimulus to ask under which conditions collective action does in fact come about? 
Thus, it may be said that while Analytical Marxism approaches the same dilemma as 
other methodological individualists, namely the “problem” of collective action as a 
social phenomenon facing a number of obstacles, it does so from the other side of 
the tunnel. 
Equally putting any romantic notions of collective action aside, however, Analytical 
Marxism points out that if we accept the extensive empirical data at hand suggesting 
that collective action does occur in specific settings of time and place, then not only 
does it exist as a social phenomenon that must be explained, but that it must under 
circumstances be rational for individuals to act together as a group in pursuit of their 
collective interests (Przeworski 1985; Elster 1986b). Thus, abandoning the more 
normative assumptions suggesting collective action as sui generi unlikely and 
irrational, yet at the same time remaining true to the above noted “conventional 
scientific norms” and perspective focused on the micro-mechanisms of consciously 
acting individuals (Wright 1994: 181), the far more complex task proposed is that of 
exploring how, when and under what circumstances collective action may appear or 
be constructed as calculatedly rational to the actors involved and what obstacles it 
must overcome to do so. In the words of Adam Przeworski, the “central question 
posed by methodological individualism is the following: under what conditions, from 
always to never, is solidarity (class cooperation) rational for individual workers or 
particular groups of them?“ (1985: 389). 
Abandoning the exclusively normative stance proscribing rational individuals as self-
interested in the more narrow sense of short-term material gains, Analytical Marxism 
suggests that in taking a broader, more open and more empirically congruent 
concept of rationality, we must treat individuals participating in collective action 
indeed as rational, but not necessarily as exclusively individually “selfish” per se 
(Elster 1986b: 214). For it may indeed be rational in a more complex, broad and 
holistic sense of a long-term costs and benefits for an individual to participate in 
collective action from which the individual as well as the collective as a whole 
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benefits. This points to the fact that while free-riding is undoubtedly common, it may 
under circumstances not necessarily maximize one’s benefits as much as choosing 
to participate in concerted action in pursuit of collective interests – even if the latter 
produces short-term costs. This is indeed something that will be empirically 
confirmed later on in this thesis. 
This broader approach of rationality furthermore leads us to question what we are 
actually talking about when discussing the concept of interests. Generally speaking, 
most Analytical Marxists have chosen to focus their attention on questions of 
“material interests” as anything else might blur the scientific rigidity of their approach. 
According to Wright, this encompasses the “interests people have in their material 
standard of living, understood as the package of toil, consumption and leisure. 
Material interests are thus not interests in maximizing consumption per se, but rather 
interests in the trade-offs between toil, leisure and consumption.“ (1997: 5). At the 
same time, interests must not be seen as something existing in social isolation or as 
given, but are in fact embedded in social relations and within individuals’ interactions 
with others (Fung and Wright; Mansbridge in Lévesque and Murray 2010: 338). So, 
like power (Wolf 1999), interests must as well be seen from a relational standpoint. 
That being said, while the pursuit of material interests may be seen as an important 
motor behind determining social actors’ decisions to participate or even initiate 
collective action, it is not necessarily the only one. Slightly widening Analytical 
Marxism’s scope, three points are of particular importance in this regard. 
First of all, collectively acting individuals may not only seek the actual consequences 
of collective action themselves as rewards (such as higher wages), but can also 
perceive collective action in itself as a means to furthering their individual interests. 
Let me elaborate. Borrowing from a broad definition of bounded rationality, which 
takes into consideration the cognitive bounds of human beings and that in reality 
decision-making may be rational yet not necessarily optimizing per se (Gigerenzer 
and Selten 2001), as well as recognizing the loaded social context in which human 
(inter)actions take place, we may broaden the catalogue of potential rewards 
produced by collective action. Besides material benefits, such things as prestige, 
reputation, social standing and even individual fulfillment can matter just as much. 
Or, as the economist Hirschman asks, why should collective action be seen only as a 
cost, when to many it may be a benefit in itself: “For people whose lives are mired in 
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drudgery and desperation, the offer of an exciting, risky, and possibly beneficial 
campaign of collective action may be an incentive in itself.“ (paraphrased in Tarrow 
2011: 29). 
Secondly and directly related to the above, social dynamics of participation 
(Klandermans in Tarrow 2011: 24) and the diverse settings of social relations in 
which this unfolds must equally be taken into consideration. While only briefly 
touched upon, this is a point indeed taken up to a certain extent by the Analytical 
Marxists. It is Elster who suggests that “as a result of interacting with one another 
people come to be concerned about one another, so that there emerges a positive 
interdependency in the reward structures.”, thus encouraging the prospect of 
collective action (1986b: 213). While not producing specific empirical examples, 
Elster indeed suggests that when it comes to “working-class collective action, this 
approach would appear to have the advantage of realism. In the light of many studies 
of the history of the early working class, it is hard to believe that their solidarity was 
nothing but long-term self-interest.“ (ibid). 
And finally, from a more negative standpoint, otherwise unwilling actors may  choose 
to participate in collective action in order to avoid social sanctions from being inflicted 
upon them by their peers due to non-participation. This is indeed something that not 
only Analytical Marxists recognize, but also Olson himself, although the latter limits 
the relevance thereof to small groups. Of course, besides social sanctions, when 
certain institutions exist, these may also sanction non-participation in a more material 
sense. The latter is something particularly emphasized by the Analytical Marxists.  
In the end, Przeworski’s concludes that from the perspective of Analytical Marxism, 
“The appropriate view [of collective class conflict] is neither one of two ready-to-act 
classes nor of abstract individuals, but of individuals who are embedded in different 
types of relations with other individuals within a multidimensionally described social 
structure.“ (Przeworski 1985: 393). So, despite or in their view precisely because of 
their general allegiance to methodological individualism, Analytical Marxism does 
allow for social actors to individually conclude that concerted action may indeed be in 
their individual interests (Elster 1986b). Actually translating that into action, however, 
means not only overcoming free-rider problems, but coordination problems as well 
(Betram and Carling 1998). And while it is often no simple task, the former can be 
overcome through the above mechanisms (social rewards, social pressure, 
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institutional stimulants and sanctions, etc.). And the question of coordination is, of 
course, the function of trade unions as organizations. 
Despite these strong and refreshing elements provided by Analytical Marxism, their 
theoretical contributions are not without limits. While not fatal to its utility as a 
theoretical influence, a number of issues point to the fact that Analytical Marxism, just 
like more classic Marxist approaches before it, will indeed remain one tool in our 
toolbox and cannot represent our sole explanatory instrument. 
Generally speaking, the limits of Analytical Marxism are largely located in precisely 
the same sphere that represents its strength. For while the provocative insistency of 
the Analytical Marxists to shift our view (almost exclusively) to the level of the 
individual and take on more positivistic, laboratory-like scientific standards has no 
doubt provided us with a fruitful stimulus to broaden our horizon from that of 
conventional Marxism, it seems the baby may have been thrown out with the 
bathwater. What I mean by that is that in its search for a scientifically plausible form 
of Marxism, these scholars have, self-consciously and “unabashedly” committed 
themselves to a complex and particularly intense level of abstraction (Roemer 1986a: 
3). While all theories must transcend single case studies and enter onto a certain 
level of abstraction, Analytical Marxism has in its quest for positivist legitimacy to a 
certain extent shifted Marxism’s focus from a theory grounded in empirical data to 
one more based on laboratory-like games of intellectual experimentation. Thus, Marx 
and Engels’ – as well as wider anthropology’s – focus on “real, active men“ (1974: 
47) seems to have gone somewhat forgotten and theory’s direct relationship to its 
empirical base become severed. This generally common weakness of 
methodological individualism is particularly troublesome from a social anthropological 
perspective, as collective action tends to be treated as “parts of natural processes 
rather than historically given cultural or political matters […]“ (Durrenberger and 
Reichart 2010: 6). 
In a similar sense, despite the value of pushing us to uncover the micro-mechanisms 
underlying Marx’s original thoughts, the analytical value of Analytical Marxism’s 
choice to place more-or-less all bets upon methodological individualism remains, 
precisely because of this almost exclusive concentration, questionable. One gets the 
impression that the Analytical Marxists do so in order to somehow legitimize their use 
of Marxist theory. This is not completely absurd given that their inputs were 
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developed towards the end of the Cold War, when the failures of real-existing-
socialism not only questioned the value of Marxist theory as a political program, but 
its validity as a scientific tool as well. My critique is, however, directed less at the 
integration of elements of methodological individualism per se, as has hopefully 
become clear above, but far more at the almost exclusive reliance upon a 
methodology which has time and time again shown itself to be only one piece of the 
greater puzzle when confronted with empirical reality. This particularly became clear 
above, when we were led to enhance the Analytical Marxist approach with ideas from 
related, yet different schools of thought (such as bounded rationality, participation 
theory). 
Finally, and as a direct consequence of the above, despite asking the right questions 
on collective action, Analytical Marxists often seem to fall back on neo-classical 
assumptions for the answers. This is primarily expressed in perceiving the existence 
of formal institutions as the main if not only means to achieve collective action by 
dissuading members of the collective in question from noncooperation (Przeworski 
1985: 392). While in organized labor institutions often play a vital role in solving 
collective action problems, exclusive reliance on institutional solutions can not only 
be problematic but quite often simply impossible, especially when it comes to 
contentious collective action in a social movement-oriented sense. While institutions 
may and in some cases do encourage collective action on the level of formal 
membership (such as in the case of the closed shops in the Anglosphere), only rarely 
if ever do institutions exist that explicitly encourage contentious collective action such 
as strikes. While in some times and places institutions deem organized work-
stoppages legal, thus formally enabling them, seldom do institutions exist that 
actively reward (or sanction) (non-)participation in industrial action given that labor 
peace is generally at the heart of institutional trade-offs between capital and labor. 
Furthermore, Analytical Marxism’s heavy reliance on institutions as explanations 
(instead of as conditions) for collective-action-problems neglects to explain how such 
institutions came about in the first place. 
Thus, to come to a résumé, we may view the Analytical Marxists in much the same 
light as they themselves saw Marx in. While the theory may not provide all of the 
answers, it definitely points us in the right direction. For what both the Analytical 
Marxists and Michael Burawoy have achieved, and this is significant, is to force us to 
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shift our view from focusing solely on the determinant macro-level and restore “the 
subjective moment of labor“ (1979: 77). As such, we are encouraged to not only 
study the micro-mechanisms of collective agency, but also to do so from a 
perspective taking the conscious thoughts and actions of individuals seriously and 
seeking to uncover the rationality of their decisions to participate (or not) in collective 
action. So, while we may not choose to adopt everything Burawoy and the Analytical 
Marxists have developed, as they themselves did with classical Marxism, they do 
provide a number of decisive stimulants for assembling the theoretical toolbox 
needed to explore organized labor in the Swiss construction industry. As such, we 
are again reminded of Erik Olin Wright’s words in that we might profit more if we were 
to view Marxism not as “a unified theory with well-defined boundaries, but [as] a 
family of theories united by a common terrain of debate and questions.“ (Wright 
1994: 178). 
Arising from Conflict: Rethinking Institutions Within Capitalism 
Our discussion with Analytical Marxism points us in two directions. On the one hand, 
it shows that especially when attempting to construct a holistic exploration of a trade 
union’s various power resources, we will have to at least partially look elsewhere. 
Using theoretical inputs from the Jena power resources model, this is something that 
will be done in the next subchapter. On the other hand, it points towards the 
importance of understanding individual as well as collective agency – and the aims 
and goals thereof – in the context of and in relation to new, existing and changing 
social institutions. And while the Analytical Marxists’ overly strong reliance on 
institutions as explanations for collective action may be problematic, this does not do 
away with the fact that social institutions as such “are prevalent wherever individuals 
attempt to live and work together“ (Knight 1992: 1) and thus to a large extent shape 
the conditions under which people act. Furthermore, institutions equally represent the 
social framework in which concessions, compromises and agreements, such as early 
retirement or minimum wages, are realized. 
What is important in our case, however, is that we find an institutional approach that 
will enable us to not only understand situations of cooperation and consensus 
between the different social players involved, in our case labor and capital, but also 
to make sense of episodes of conflict stemming from the structural relationship 
between the two. For this we turn to the political scientist Jack Knight’s thoughts on 
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“Institutions and Social Conflict“ (1992). That we choose to study Knight’s thoughts 
directly after our excursion into Analytical Marxism is of no coincidence. Knight 
himself was a student of Jon Elster as well as being strongly influenced by Adam 
Przeworski, both important representatives of Analytical Marxism. Despite not 
embracing an (Analytical) Marxist standpoint per se, Knight’s sympathy for certain 
aspects thereof does not go unnoticed. Claiming that while Marx’s “emphasis on 
distributional effects is important to the explanation of institutional maintenance”, 
especially in the greater capitalist mode of production, its weak point according to 
Knight is that “it fails to enter adequately into an account of the mechanism of 
institutional change.“ (1992: 9). 
In his own words, Knight seeks to provide the missing micro-foundations for the 
macro-level accounts provided by Marx as well as Max Weber:  
Macro-level accounts of social institutions can find in the distributive theory those 
microfoundations that capture their underlying ideas. […] Here the distributive account 
demonstrates that rational-choice theory is capable of treating issues such as power, 
social context, and community. (1992: 211). 
Similar to many of his institutionalist colleagues, Knight sees social institutions such 
as laws, collective labor agreements, etc. as: 
[…] sets of rules that structure social interactions in particular ways. These rules (1) 
provide information about how people are expected to act in particular situations, (2) 
can be recognized by those who are members of the relevant group as the rules to 
which others conform in these situations, and (3) structure the strategic choices of 
actors in such a way as to produce equilibrium outcomes. (1992: 54) 
As such, the main function of social institutions is to establish rules guiding or at least 
influencing the future actions and strategies of social actors by providing information, 
sanctions and social expectations concerning the different strategic options available 
for the actors concerned. Thus, we find institutions “wherever individuals attempt to 
live and work together”, or in other words “in all aspects of our social life“ (1992: 1). 
Like many of his colleagues, Knight explicitly uses a rational choice approach to build 
a bridge between individual actions and the development of institutions structuring 
wider social interactions: “People choose those strategies that maximize their 
expected utility. The key here is the capacity of social institutions to stabilize social 
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expectations.“ (1992: 209f.). Knight takes the critical discussions about this 
theoretical area seriously, however, and claims a “broad view” of methodological 
individualism: “Institutions are clearly the product of human action. […] Nonetheless, 
it does emphasize that institutional rules have a special collective quality about 
them.“ (1992: 74). Thus, Knight seems to imply no direct contradiction between 
collective actions and rational individuals. He regularly talks of trade unions, 
collective organizations of workers, as social actors and not simply sums of 
individuals. Knight furthermore highlights the importance of not remaining solely on 
the level of abstraction, but of aiming at an empirical and “actual understanding” of 
how institutions shape social life (1992: 213). Interestingly enough, it is precisely this 
rational choice approach that sees Knight part ways with many of his institutionalist 
colleagues. Let me elaborate. 
Following Olson’s influential work (1977), theoretical discussions about social 
institutions and their role in regulating collective goods as well as interactions 
blossomed. Implicit in a large part of this work has been the belief that dominant and 
prevailing institutions in society are those which optimally coordinate social 
interaction and bring the highest amount of collective goods or benefits to a 
supposedly homogeneous community. In other words, institutions are generally here 
to benefit everybody. As such, in these neo-classical theories, power asymmetries 
are generally seen as unimportant and interactions between social actors tend to be 
implicitly perceived as interactions between equals. To a certain extent, this 
represents a continuation of the thoughts by David Hume and Adam Smith (Knight 
1992: 10). 
Despite the fact that the great majority of these authors emphasizing the importance 
of social institutions have claimed a rational choice approach, Knight unveils a stark 
contradiction between this and the above mentioned assumption of collective 
benefits. For, if we presume that social actors as rational beings will pursue their own 
interests, why should we presume that they will support – let alone initiate – rules, 
which do not maximize their own utility and, in some cases, even diminish it? Knight’s 
answer is clear. They will not and as such, theories emphasizing collective benefits 
are unable to explain the micro-foundations for the development of social institutions 
(1992: 39). Noting that empirical analyses of existing institutions clearly point out that 
institutions effect some social actors differently than others, Knight invites us to 
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consider institutions not as neutral inventions for mutual benefit but as originating as 
a by-product of social conflict between self-interested actors with power 
asymmetries. 
For Knight, social conflict is the interaction between actors with at least partially 
antagonistic interests, who optimally and intentionally pursue their goals by choosing 
certain strategies according to the given circumstances and the strategies their 
opponents choose (1992: 17). Thus, in Knight’s view, while Marx and Weber 
emphasized questions of resources, distribution and power, yet neglected the 
establishment of micro-foundations thereof, neoclassic and mainstream 
institutionalist theory seem to have paradoxically committed the opposite sin. 
So, while institutions may as a side-effect be efficient and in fact provide collective 
benefits, these are not the driving mechanisms behind the actual emergence and 
development of institutions: 
Rather than focusing on collective goals, self-interested actors want institutions that 
produce those social outcomes that are best for them as individual strategic actors. […] 
This is not to say that social institutions do not produce benefits for all of the members 
of a group or community. […] The main point here is that such gains cannot serve as 
the basis for a social explanation; rather, these benefits are merely a by-product of the 
pursuit of individual gain. (1992: 38) 
Emphasizing the “primacy of distributional consequences in all aspects of explaining 
social institutions“ (1992: 41), the primary aim of social actors is to “gain strategic 
advantage vis-à-vis other actors, and therefore, the substantive content of those 
rules should generally reflect distributional concerns.“ (1992: 40). Thus, supposedly 
inefficient institutions are not necessarily faulty institutions, but reflect the self-interest 
of powerful actors rationally pursuing individual benefits. Of course, despite 
stemming from the intentions of the actors involved, the “final form of institutional 
rules“ (1992: 27) should not be understood as a mere dictatorial design of the most 
powerful actor, but as a dialectic product of the conflictual interaction between the 
parties involved. Thus, institutional arrangements always have a certain ambiguity 
and while powerful actors will choose institutions that give them (distributional) 
advantages, “[…] they are faced with the fact that social institutions constrain the 
choices of all actors in some ways.“ (1992: 64). 
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Like Olson and the Analytical Marxists, Knight pays particular attention to cases of 
organized labor as a form of collective bargaining on such issues as wages, working 
conditions, the organization of production and participation in decision making – all 
questions relating to “who will control the revenues of the firm’s production process 
and how they will be distributed“ (1992: 195). He also discusses the problem of free 
riding as an omnipresent threat to collective action. Unlike Olson, however, Knight 
perceives the collective organization of workers as a potentially rational act to 
enhance their bargaining power and emphasizes that the “relative bargaining power 
of workers and employers depends directly on the workers’ ability to organize and act 
collectively.“ (1992: 197, italics by CK).  
However, Knight equally emphasizes the key importance of overcoming collective-
action problems. While unions need a large membership in order to negotiate 
successfully, employees themselves are “more inclined to join unions when their 
chances of losing their jobs from membership are low and their chances of gaining 
benefits are high.“ (1992: 198). Protecting union members from employer repression, 
thereby lowering the costs of unionization, can be provided either by strength in 
numbers, yet also by legal rights enforced by the state. That being said, Knight also 
points to the fact that while state intervention may be profitable for some of the actors 
involved, state intervention is usually only initiated by weaker unions without well-
organized working classes. Furthermore, while state intervention may represent a 
compensation for a union’s missing collective bargaining power, it is an ambiguous 
measure as it introduces an actor with its own interests into the field. In fact, while 
state intervention can be advantageous, legal institutions in “advanced industrial 
societies” tend to constrain unions’ scopes of action more than they protect or 
enhance them as disproportionate constraints are placed upon the unions. This is 
especially so when it comes to regulations of union recognition and the legal ability to 
strike (1992: 205f.). 
One reason for this ambiguity of state interventions is the fact that collective-
bargaining institutions interact with other social institutions of greater domination, 
primarily in this case the institution of private property. As such, “For the weak, it is a 
mixed blessing; for the strong, it is a last resort.“ (1992: 208). Thus,  
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In countries with a weakly organized working class where the collective-action problem 
has not been resolved without institutional protections, institutionalization is beneficial 
vis-à-vis the unconstrained market […]. In countries with a strong and unified working 
class where the collective-action problem has been resolved without formal institutional 
protections, such institutionalization is a hindrance to workers because the loss vis-à-
vis the unconstrained market can be great. (1992: 206) 
After enlightening ourselves with Knight’s insight, it indeed becomes clear that Olson, 
as well as to a certain extent the Analytical Marxists, indeed seem to have taken or at 
least implied a rather functionalist stance when explaining how institutions can aid 
collective organization and action. “We need institutions, and therefore we have 
them.“ (Knight 1992: 210) seems to be the logic. So, while Knight shows that 
institutions can aid or hinder collective processes, he also points to the fact that these 
institutions themselves reflect former or current power asymmetries and must thus be 
seen as the products of conflicts already played out in the past. 
Even when social institutions are established, however, this in no way means that 
this is the end of the game. In fact, it probably makes far more sense to think of 
institutions as social processes and not to assume some futile illusion of endless 
stability. For precisely because institutions are products of continuous power 
struggles, they can themselves only be dynamic and will continue to be shaped and 
changed by shifting power relations. Depending on how these power relations shift 
and how the actors concerned behave, i.e. which strategies they take, even long 
trusted institutions can falls into crisis. 
A number of actions and interactions can open the door for institutional change and 
crisis, especially since “[s]ome people may prefer other rules, on distributional 
grounds. If so, then there will always be an incentive for those actors to change the 
status quo.“ (1992: 174). This is, in itself, a constant given as institutions can and 
most often do have very different effects, advantages and disadvantages for the 
various actors involved. Generally speaking, however, we can say that when 
institutions start to no longer fulfill the function they should or when players begin to 
ignore the “rules of the game” or interpret them in contradictory terms, we find 
ourselves in a situation of upheaval. This is because in order for institutions to 
function, even despite (or precisely because of) opposed interests, social actors have 
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to be confident of the credibility of the institution and thus of the reliability of the 
information provided on what to expect (1992: 73f.).  
Of course, a number of situations can see social actors stray from the hitherto 
institutional path respectfully from the palette of options condoned by the institutional 
arrangements concerned. On the one hand, this can be due to external forces or 
events. These may, for example, change the settings which previously allowed the 
original institutions to flourish, i.e. which previously made them make sense (1992: 
145). On the other hand, distributional effects may be produced by existing 
institutions which were not anticipated by the actors upon negotiation (1992: 146). If 
we assume, like Knight, that the actors involved tend to represent rational beings 
attempting to maximize their utility based on a cost-benefit calculus, then as such we 
can assume that they will no longer choose to play by certain rules of the game if 
they expect the (long- or short-term) benefits from straying from that course to be 
greater than the sanctions. Such a situation can often arise from changing power 
relations which see one actor’s bargaining power rise in relation to the others. In 
other words, social institutions are historical in the sense that they are born into 
particular social relations and (in)balances of power relations. When the latter 
change, so may the institutions once built upon them as well. 
Generally speaking, the conflict-oriented institutionalist approach of Jack Knight 
provides us with a plausible tool of analysis to investigate the background, role and 
development of social institutions as well as the motivations of the various actors 
involved. And if we accept that social institutions are indeed everywhere, both as the 
rules of the game as well as the products of the players playing the game, then 
Knight’s thoughts on the issue are another asset to our budding theory network. The 
value of Knight’s approach lies not only in its inherent and organic relation to both 
classic and especially Analytical Marxism, and is thus easily compatible to the other 
tools in our set, but also due to its focus on power relations and conflicts of interest 
as an inherently defining aspect of social relations. As will become clear, Knight’s 
insights will be of considerable help when it comes to explaining the numerous and 
sometimes seemingly ambiguous institutions existing in the Swiss construction 
industry. 
That being said, while we have now discussed the political economic structural 
foundations of capitalism allowing trade unions to exist and function, as well as the 
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need for understanding micro-mechanisms of collective action and the institutions 
under which they unfold and the ones they produce, we have yet to find a 
perspective bringing these factors together and highlighting what this actually means 
for a union’s strategic choices. It is for this that we now turn to the Jena Power 
Resources Approach, which will not only provide us with a theoretical approach to 
tackle these questions, but equally sum up the theoretical toolbox we will then have 
assembled. 
Empowering Labor: the Jena Power Resources Approach  
We commenced this chapter with the dialectic materialism of Marx, telling us that due 
to the organization of the capitalist mode of production, workers should and must 
transform from a class in itself into a class for itself able to struggle for its own 
collective interests. Realizing that while Marx gave us finely-tuned instruments to 
analyze the greater capitalist economy, yet neglected the agency of social actors 
therein, we then proceeded to sharpen our tools with the ideas of Michael Burawoy 
and those of Analytical Marxism, encouraging us to look at the micro-mechanisms of 
how such class struggle might unfold. We then moved on to Jack Knight’s critical 
insight that social institutions – both born out of as well as conditioning labor’s 
agency – must be understood as a product of social conflict between different actors 
with often different and sometimes even antagonistic interests. 
As noted above, however, we have yet to find a theoretical approach bringing this all 
together and enabling us to make sense of how a trade union as a strategic actor 
actually develops and uses its agency in the context within which it finds itself. Or in 
other words, to return to our main research question: How can we explain how a 
trade union shifts the existing power relations in workers’ favor in the context of a 
changing construction industry and a complex environment of industrial institutions? 
Inspired by the wave of organizational transformations within innovative trade unions 
seeking to revitalize, a group of academics centered around the renowned German 
sociologist Klaus Dörre sought to assemble a theoretical model that focused on just 
that. Strongly inspired by the Analytical Marxist Erik Olin Wright, these scholars 
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constructed a model that has become known as the Jena Power Resources 
Approach (Schmalz and Dörre 2013)6. 
The Jena approach begins by reiterating what is at the heart of the subject at hand: 
“Power is at the core of current debates over the future of trade unionism.“ (Lévesque 
and Murray 2010: 334). This is, of course, not simply because trade unions (or 
employers for that matter) are guided by some proverbial power trip for the sake of it, 
but due to the simple and broad assumption that “Power reflects and is the material 
basis of the complex relationship between actors [in general].“ (ibid). In a similar 
sense, Wright himself further describes the concept of power in the context of class 
analysis as “the capacity of individuals and organizations to realize class interests.“ 
(2000: 6, italics in original). If we assume that the interests of one class can and often 
are opposed to each other, then “this implies that the capacity of workers to realize 
their class interests depends in part on their capacity to counter the power of 
capitalists.“ (ibid). Thus, we must envision power as a relational concept (ibid), just as 
the anthropologist Eric Wolf pointed out in his in-depth discussion of the subject in 
Envisioning Power (1999). 
Precisely because of power’s fundamental position at the center of labor-capital 
relations, what the Jena scholars emphasize is that it is simply not enough to say that 
a union must focus on regaining power. This is not because that would be wrong or 
missing the point, but because the topic is more complex and the field of power 
relations deeply heterogeneous. It is precisely this heterogeneity that the group aims 
to take into consideration. Proposing that organized labor must be recognized as an 
actor in a field of dynamic power relations, the Jena approach dissects those 
relations so as to more aptly understand how a union may reach its goals. It does so 
by viewing power not as a unified whole itself, but as an ensemble of various 
elements – some more important than others. Emphasizing that in the end these 
elements are all inherently (yet dialectically) interlinked, their approach differentiates 
between four pillars of power resources. 
                                               
6 As this thesis is written in English and a number of the Jena scholars’ direct influences were 
originally published in English (such as Wright (2000) or Lévesque and Murray (2010)), I have 
sometimes chosen to directly quote the latter in their original language so as to avoid double 
translations that might blur the intended meaning of certain terms and definitions. 
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Starting with structural power, this analytical category refers to the power arising from 
the position of workers in the wider historical as well as industry-particular economic 
system in question. Perceiving it as a “primary” source of power (Arbeitskreis 
Strategic Unionism 2013: 347), such structural power is strongly reminiscent of 
Marx’s thoughts on why workers may be exploited, but through that same exploitive 
system are simultaneously armed with possibilities to disrupt and therefor shape the 
very process of labor. This is first of all reflected in a subcategory of structural power 
the authors refer to as production power. By having the potential to interrupt the 
process of production by withdrawing one’s labor power, this resource is often 
articulated through collective actions such as work stoppages. The main idea is that 
through their place in the labor process as producers of surplus value, workers are in 
a position to drive a metaphorical (and sometimes literal) wedge into the process of 
capital accumulation, thus causing or threatening to cause severe loss to employers’ 
interests. This is especially given in the case of strategically placed worker groups in 
key industrial sectors. It is, however, essential to emphasize that this production 
power simply provides workers with the structural opportunity to disrupt the process 
of capital accumulation and not necessarily with the organizational ability to do so. 
A slightly different subcategory of structural power is less clearly derived from Marxist 
theory and leans on the more classic thoughts of supply and demand on the labor 
market. This so-called market power draws its essence from the relationship between 
a tightened labor market and the possession of certain qualifications in high demand. 
A far more subtle form of structural power, this resource can be tapped more 
indirectly as well as individually. Referring to Polanyi, however, the Jena group 
reminds us that even when such individual strategies are taken, they are nonetheless 
located in collective social settings, such as segmented workforces, and that markets 
themselves are per se socially embedded and sometimes closely regulated by 
institutions enforced by the state as well as other actors (Arbeitskreis Strategic 
Unionism 2013: 350). 
As such, this market power indeed plays its own particular role and is sometimes 
individually tapped, but it does not do so in a limitless fashion. Furthermore, both 
sides of this structural power, production and market power, are directly and strongly 
influenced by the rate of economic growth, recession and upheavals and are as such 
in a constant state of flux. This touches upon questions of the “making and remaking” 
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of the working class (Arrighi in Arbeitskreis Strategic Unionism 2013: 351), when new 
forms of more or less precarious employment are created, but also upon larger 
waves such as high rates of structural unemployment. 
A second main power resource discussed by the Jena group is that of institutional 
power. Stemming from institutional arrangements in either an industry or legal 
setting, this resource refers to power flowing from the “rules of the game” that either 
constrain or empower labor in pursuing its interests. Since, as previously pointed out 
by Knight, institutions are not simply given or fall into place for the greater good, but 
are born out of concrete struggles waged by workers collectively tapping into their 
structural power, this form is considered a “secondary form of power“ (Brinkmann 
and Nachtwey in Arbeitskreis Strategic Unionism 2013: 356) and the institutions 
themselves thus as “remnants of earlier activations of power resources“ (Korpi in 
Arbeitskreis Strategic Unionism 2013: 356).  
Whether constitutional guarantees allowing trade unions to recruit members and 
collect dues or industry-specific collective labor agreements defining minimum 
wages, the rights and possibilities provided by such institutions are – very similar to 
Knight’s thoughts on the matter – seen as products of struggles between labor and 
capital pursuing their respective interests. While such institutions may not be direct or 
even intended results of conflicts, and they may not even be immediately identified 
as furthering either labor or capital interests, the power resulting from such 
institutions and the rules they set can have a decisive impact. So, while institutions 
are born out of earlier conflicts, they may equally constitute (some of) the rules of the 
game for future conflicts. 
That being said, institutional power is an ambiguous one. On the one hand, 
institutional power is a double edged sword. For, while it may render certain 
strengths and benefits to both workers and the unions representing them, the 
institutions doing so – as again Knight points out above – may simultaneously limit a 
union’s agency in other questions. For due to the fact that “institutional power stems 
from antagonistic class relations“ (Arbeitskreis Strategic Unionism 2013: 356), 
institutions are not isolated products of one or the other social actor, but ones acting 
as a compromise or concession in order to overcome or at least momentarily calm 
conflict from disturbing the process of capital accumulation. It is thus of no 
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coincidence that institutions providing workers and unions with certain rights often 
also limit their legal possibilities to call strikes. This is not necessarily a conspiratorial 
plot, but simply due to the fact that since institutions arise as products of conflict 
between two or more parties, they per se simultaneously constrain all actors involved 
in one way or another (Knight 1992). 
On the other hand, and equally ambiguous, is the fact that institutional power is a 
temporal, historical resource. It is so in two senses. First of all, this means that even 
when the conditions that brought about the institutions in question begin to change, 
the institutions themselves may respond somewhat slower to that change. So, while 
the greater power relations surrounding the institutions may have already shifted, 
institutions born into previous power constellations and out of earlier struggles may 
continue to prevail. Second of all and in the opposite sense, while institutions 
supporting one or the other actor in society may continue to do so even after the 
latter has come to assume a weaker position, this does not mean they are indefinite. 
If institutions are to remain in existence as they are, then they must ever so often be 
renewed by the same interest conflicts that brought them about. In other words, if a 
collective agreement came about through industrial action and against fierce 
employer resistance, it would be foolish to think of such an entity as indestructible 
unless at least the threat of a strike resurfaces every now and then. Even then, 
however, changing economic and political settings can shake these institutions in 
their very core. 
A third power resource, and one that the Jena group only added in a later revised 
version of the Jena Power Resources Approach, is that of societal power. Somewhat 
different than the previous two forms, this power resource is one striving towards a 
Gramscian idea of hegemony (Arbeitskreis Strategic Unionism 2013: 361). 
Transcending the more materialistic level of political economy and institutions, this 
category refers to the power a union can gain from influencing, shaping and 
mobilizing wider public opinion beyond the immediate industry or workplace affected. 
This can on the one hand be done through constructing alliances with other societal 
actors, such as consumer or community groups, social movements and even 
churches. By doing so, unions not only gain access to some of the resources of other 
actors in such an alliance, but are also put into a position in which they are able to 
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transcend the perhaps narrow setting of the workplace in question. This is what the 
Jena scholars consider cooperative power. 
Societal power can, however, also be articulated as a form of discursive power 
representing the ability to portray the interests of the workers involved at least to a 
certain extent as being congruent with the interests of “society” or the majority 
thereof. Such interventions in wider public debates or even the construction thereof 
are deeply interwoven with the narrative skills of the union to portray its struggle as 
being harmonious with the dominant “moral economy“ (Thompson in Arbeitskreis 
Strategic Unionism 2013: 361) or their opponents as having violated broadly held 
moral codes. It also enables the union to place its demands in a broader portrayal of 
social justice and liberate them from being denigrated as nothing more than the 
narrow particular interests of a spoiled labor aristocracy. That being said, exclusively 
tapping into this form of power resource can equally be perceived as a sign of 
weakness when other power resources are missing or drained. Furthermore, while 
naming and shaming opponents and constructing a discourse of justice and morality 
are key ingredients to a successful campaign, unions must equally and almost 
simultaneously be able to provide constructive answers to the problems they 
highlight and criticize.  
All this being said, while structural power as a primary source of power is decisive, as 
Marx already pointed out almost two centuries ago, and institutional as well as 
societal power are undoubtedly important channels to pursue worker interests, a 
fourth power resource is no less than pivotal when it comes to a union’s ability to 
actually tap into any of these resources: associational power. Associational power is 
nothing more and nothing less than “the various forms of power that result from the 
formation of collective organizations of workers“ (Wright 2000: 962). Derived from 
individual workers or groups of workers constituting themselves into an entity capable 
of collectively acting in pursuit of their interests, this category of power is the primary 
and underlying key not only to accessing structural power and unleashing societal 
power but as such also necessary to wage conflicts giving birth to institutions and 
institutional power. As such, associational power is the main bedrock of our pyramid 
of union power resources. While it is only one part of the greater picture of power 
relations, it is an absolutely vital one logically preceding organized labor’s use of 
almost all aspects of the previously described power resources. 
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Associational  power is described as being neither “spontaneous” nor “subtle” (Silver 
in Arbeitskreis Strategic Unionism 2013: 352), but far more the product of often 
protracted processes of organizational growth. This can take the form of workplace 
associations, worker councils, industry-wide unions and even political parties 
pursuing labor interests in the electoral arena. When it comes to trade unions, the 
Jena approach suggests measuring this associational power on two separate, yet 
interconnected levels.  
First of all, associational power must fundamentally be understood as the  “power of 
numbers“ (Marx in Arbeitskreis Strategic Unionism 2013: 353): the higher the degree 
of workers organized in the union, the greater the union’s influence. Besides using 
that degree of organization to apply political and moral pressure on an employer, 
many states also have institutional settings demanding a certain amount of 
representation as a legal condition for union recognition. A large membership 
simultaneously allows for the necessary financial, infrastructural and personnel 
resources needed to wage industrial strife: “For not only do powerful unions possess 
impressively high membership statistics, but also vast financial means […]“ ( 
Arbeitskreis Strategic Unionism 2013: 353f.). 
Second of all – and this is decisive – a union attempting to shift power relations in its 
favor must not only have a membership that is willing to pay membership dues as a 
formal badge of belonging, but it must also have a membership willing to act in 
concerted action in pursuit of its collective interests (Arbeitskreis Strategic Unionism 
2013: 354). While a particular union may perhaps formally represent only a small 
portion of the workforce, if it has the capacity to mobilize that membership and 
perhaps even beyond its formal membership, thus translating quantitative 
membership into industrial action, it can represent a formidable force. Conversely, a 
union with a high degree of membership, yet with little capacity to actually mobilize 
those workers into taking concerted action will have little leverage at the bargaining 
table besides moral and in some cases legal arguments of representation. 
In order to achieve a high degree of mobilization as mentioned above, studies have 
shown that this not only means constructing optimal organizational frames therefor 
and defining concrete methods and tactics of communication and mobilization, but 
also that the higher the degree of participation and the more involved workers are in 
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the strategic as well as operative process of decision making, the higher the turnout 
will be (Schmalz and Dörre (eds.) 2013). In other words, democratic structures may 
not only be a method of representation, but also one of strategic efficiency. 
The four pillars described above make up the pyramid of power resources according 
to the Jena model. Whether the associational power of being able to call a strike or 
the structural power making that strike particularly impactful, the “societal” shaming 
and blaming of a scandalous move by a company or the forcing through of 
negotiations in court due to favorable institutions, the Jena approach provides us with 
an all-encompassing, yet at the same time differentiated model to understand as well 
as critique a labor union’s moves on the chess board. What is essential, however, is 
that despite including four analytical categories, all four must be understood as being 
in a constant and interdependent relationship to one another. In other words, the 
single power resources described cannot be understood as additive elements, but 
are a dynamic, interconnected and sometimes even contradictive construction. It is 
the union’s job to analyze its position within that pyramid and develop optimal 
strategies balancing out the various power resources at its disposal as well as 
developing ways to strengthen or widen the resources at hand.  
While the actual power resources themselves are illuminated above,  the Jena model 
emphasizes that in order to actually use those power resources in practical 
campaigns, unions must continuously develop and adapt a certain set of capabilities 
and skills connected thereto (Lévesque and Murray 2010; Arbeitskreis Strategic 
Unionism 2013). Perceiving this as a union’s “strategic choice“ (Brinkmann et al. 
2008), the Jena group suggests that the actors involved must know when and 
especially how to tap which array of power resources. 
Decisive in this process are (Arbeitskreis Strategic Unionism 2013): 
 Learning capacity: Starting from the recognition that society, its political 
economic structures and the institutions therein are in a constant state of flux, 
unions (as well as all social actors) must equally remain in a constant process 
of learning. This means on the one hand constantly studying the changing 
political economic as well as discursive environment at hand and on the other 
hand determining and continuously developing old and new methods of 
intervention therein. How have the lives and realities of workers changed since 
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the altering of political economic structures allowing new forms of labor? 
Which organizing strategies are needed in a changed labor setting? How do 
we train our organizers and activist members in this regard? 
 Organizational flexibility: This skill refers to the ability of an organization to 
adapt its own organizational structures and functioning in order to optimize its 
output and balance its actions with the structural conditions at hand. For 
example, what structures are needed in the given environment in order to 
optimize membership numbers, mobilization capability as well as political 
influence and financial and personnel means? Organizational flexibility is 
essentially at the heart of all efforts of union renewal and revitalization (Voss 
and Sherman 2000; Arbeitskreis Strategic Unionism 2013: 371). That being 
said, this capacity is at the same time perhaps one of the most difficult skills to 
master, as it involves the “organizational sociologically improbable case” that 
bureaucratic organizations depart from their “seemingly prescribed path“ 
(Brinkmann in Arbeitskreis Strategic Unionism 2013: 371). While this can be 
done, as will become clear, this is often a complex and not always  
harmonious negotiation between existing realities and an organization’s 
ambitions. 
 Conflict capacity: While unions are not always in constant and direct conflict 
with employers and indeed cooperate closely on certain levels and at certain 
times (Wright 2000), unions as “class organizations“ (Deppe 2012) 
nonetheless find themselves in a political economy of inherent structural 
conflict. Thus, a successful union must have a high degree of conflict capacity. 
This means on the one hand the actual willingness to engage in conflicts when 
necessary, but also the capacity and (micro-mechanic) skills needed therefor, 
such as strategic courses of action, appropriate methods as well as economic 
means to support itself and its members during strike periods. This means 
having experience and know-how in the organization and execution of 
collective mobilizations, but also being flexible enough to avoid “ritualizing 
strike procedures“ (Arbeitskreis Strategic Unionism 2013: 372) and retaining 
the ability to develop innovative forms of collective conflict. 
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 Framing: If we assume that societal power and the construction of hegemonial 
discourses is an important power resource to unions, then the organization in 
question must be able to construct, provide and spread broad narratives built 
according to its interpretative frame. Whether on a direct and industry-
particular level aimed at workers themselves or in the sense of a more grand 
narrative addressed at the broader public, “The ability to provide overarching 
narratives as a frame of reference for union action is increasingly seen as a 
key factor in union renewal.“ (Lévesque and Murray 2010: 343). This means 
identifying and seizing the “right topics” at the “right time” and optimally using it 
to intervene in societal debates and worker mobilizations (Arbeitskreis 
Strategic Unionism 2013: 372).  
 Preserving autonomy: One of the more complex and subtle, yet equally 
decisive tightrope-walks a successful union must master is that of balancing 
between a grassroots social movement capable of industrial conflict and the 
simultaneous ability to participate as a “social partner” in the institutional 
arrangements born out of such conflicts. This involves recognizing the double 
character of institutions as enabling and empowering, yet simultaneously 
constraining and producing dependencies. Thus, developing optimizing 
strategies for dealing with this contradictive situation of the “two faces of 
unionism“ (Webster in Arbeitskreis Strategic Unionism 2013: 373) are 
paramount. 
What the Jena Power Resources Approach has done is to provide us with a model 
that not only equips us with a differentiated approach to investigate the various power 
resources at a union’s disposal, emphasizing associational power yet also pointing to 
other resources, but also acts as a bracket binding our other theoretical tools 
together. Travelling from classic Marxist theory pointing out the structural political 
economic environment workers and their unions move in (structural power) and the 
need to move from a class in itself to a class for itself (associational power) to the 
Analytical Marxists and Knight’s demands for more attention paid to the micro-
mechanisms creating and sustaining collective action (learning capacity, conflict 
capacity, framing) in order to produce rules of the game that are favorable for labor 
(institutional power); all of these aspects are brought together in the Jena model. 
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We may thus conclude, at least for the meantime, our task of assembling a 
theoretical toolbox providing us with the tools to guide us through our empirical data. 
As noted in the beginning, what may at first draw the wrath of theoretical purists 
screaming “eclecticism” is in fact the finely tailored assembly of the toolbox 
demanded by the research project at hand. Furthermore, as demonstrated above, 
such endeavors can be a highly fruitful undertaking – both despite as well as due to 
their differences. 
While such a theoretical toolbox could be expanded into infinity, in the end we 
equally need a toolbox that is adequately equipped, but at the same time not too 
heavy to actually use. Thus, just as one would on a construction site, if we need 
other tools for a specific task, then nothing speaks against organizing those tools for 
that particular job. Just in that sense, readers will from time to time find other 
theoretical inspirations sprinkled throughout this thesis.  
Now let us now enter the ethnographic scene. 
















Dual Transformations: Industry and 
Industrial Relations in Upheaval 
 - 88 - 
3. Between Conflict and Cooperation: Transforming the 
Labor Movement 
It was the day of the union’s national demonstration. As if reflecting the colorful 
composition of the procession that was soon to commence, golden beams of sunlight 
blazed through the thick grey clouds that had just minutes ago unleashed a massive 
shower of rain onto the 15’000 construction workers and their families who had 
assembled to march through Zurich on that day in June. A young group of union staff 
manning the “sound truck” positioned at the front of the crowd were doing their best 
to rouse the moods of the impatient participants eager to start marching. To the 
surprise (and relief) of the slightly worried union organizers, the not exactly pleasant 
onslaught of wind and rain that had just passed did not seem to have dampened the 
mood. Meanwhile, more and more participants exited the nearby train station and 
were marshalled by union staff equipped with high visibility vests and walkie-talkies 
scattered along the way to the waiting procession. 
Then, just before the assembled masses commenced to march across the bridge 
leading onto Zurich’s famous Bahnhofstrasse, like a pistol at the beginning of a race, 
a group of ten women and men, slightly mischievous grins adorning their faces, 
unveiled a gigantic “Uniti siamo forti”-banner (“Together we are strong”) across the 
bridge for all to see. After managing to untangle a last corner of the banner, they then 
ignited a symphony of wire-pull red smoke grenades in the background. The roughly 
thirty year-old worker driving the huge digger-vehicle leading the march then 
accelerated, his young son smiling proudly on his lap, and Los Lusitanos, a 
Portuguese drum band, sounded the march, thus giving the thousands waiting the 
cue to start walking themselves. 
Embellished with thousands of flags, hand-made banners, red clapper toys and 
numerous props symbolizing the construction workers’ struggle to defend early 
retirement and renew their collective labor agreement, the sea of marchers flooded 
the prominent Bahnhofstrasse. While the great majority were members of Unia 
dressed in red campaign t-shirts, workers organized in the smaller Christian union 
Syna were also present with their blue and white flags. After the dramatic kick-off at 
the beginning, the next highlight of the march came as the thousands walked past 
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the Paradeplatz, the prestigious banking center of Switzerland. While the banks had 
little to do with the direct issues of the day’s march, the irony of thousands of union 
workers with a visible sense of collective agency walking past this icon of financial 
capitalism was far from lost on its subjects. This ambiguous moment was particularly 
relished when one of the organizers with a megaphone announced that walking past 
the Paradeplatz was explicitly not part of the authorized demonstration route, “[…] 
but we took it anyway!” Greeted with cheers, this statement seemed to further 
confirm the workers of their collective strength and agency. 
Finally arriving at the Helvetiaplatz, where the demonstration was to conclude with 
speeches by activists and union leaders, the masses filled the square and gathered 
around a large black-colored stage with red draping. An Italian Ska band, raising 
clenched fists from time to time during their short intermissions between songs, 
entertained the first thousands of marchers who had already reached the square as 
thousands more poured into the arena. Following speeches by a number of other 
union leaders and activists, the leader of Unia’s construction sector then took to the 
stage. To a huge round of applause, he concluded that “Those who attack retirement 
age 60 attack the very dignity of construction workers! […] We are ready to fight!”. 
Suddenly, to the surprise of the crowd, a team of seven professional climbers started 
to abseil down a neighboring building, drawing with them an immense, circa forty 
meter long banner: “Struggle together: more protection, retirement age 60, stop 
wage-dumping”. Finally, in a choreography led by a number of worker activists on 
stage and accompanied by vertically pointed flame throwers ignited to the beat, the 
crowd started slowly clapping. Getting faster and faster, and then as fast as possible, 
the masses assembled then broke into a cheer and mortar-like cannons erected on 
stage shot out clusters of confetti scattering out into the crowd. 
The scene depicted above paints a condensed picture of the June 25th demonstration 
of construction workers organized by Unia. Following the kick-off rally in April 
described in the introduction, the demonstration was the next big event in the middle 
of the greater campaign to renew the workers’ collective labor agreement and save 
their early retirement scheme. It not only served the function of transporting the 
issues at hand into the public arena for all of the country to see, thereby building 
pressure on the employers of the industry, but also served as a first mass 
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mobilization for the workers themselves, thus upping the ante and visualizing their 
own collective agency as a tool to pursue their common interests. And last but not 
least, it fulfilled the somewhat ritualistic function of throwing down the gauntlet 
towards the construction employers. As reflected in the speech of the Unia leader 
noted above, the demonstration gave the union a space within which it could not only 
build up the threat of more confrontational industrial action, but also present the 
employers with evidence that they were capable of fulfilling that threat – in the form of 
15’000 workers heeding the call of the union to take to the streets. 
The scene also clearly points to the fact that we are dealing with a case of 
contentious, movement-oriented politics. While all of the characteristics of a classic 
social movement (Tarrow 2011) are hardly given considering the union’s established 
place within the deep web of industrial and state institutions, the central role of 
conflict portrayed above is remarkable. It is particularly noteworthy considering that at 
the same time both the union and the construction employers association refer to 
each other as mutually recognized social partners and cooperate concretely as such 
on a vast number of levels. In order to understand this seemingly contradictive 
situation and also to make sense of where the union stands today, we must go back 
into time and follow the not always unilineal path the labor movement in Switzerland 
has travelled. While this will not only be helpful in order to understand the historical 
roots of today’s Unia, it is also essential when seeking to explore the union’s current 
attempts at revitalizing its associational power and the context within which this task 
is pursued. 
Not so Humble Beginnings 
Despite its internationally-held reputation as either non-existent, conservative or 
corporatistic, the Swiss labor movement can in fact boast a rather tough genesis. Up 
until the 1930s, the country’s “strike culture” was no different than in any other 
European country  in regards to strike frequency and insensitivity (Rieger 2017: 115). 
Tracing its roots back to a number of organizational forms and causes, organized 
labor’s beginnings in Switzerland are in fact less to be located in large industrial 
manufacturing, as was often the case in other countries, but were driven by skilled 
craftsmen who had gradually begun to perceive their social distinction as one of 
belonging to a greater class of wage-earners and not only that of their respective 
trade (Degen 2014). While the first work stoppages in the country can be dated back 
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to the end of the 18th century, some with very militant aspects, workers’ associations 
of the time were particularly concerned with the establishment of their own financial 
support funds for the sick and needy of their group. These funds in time expanded to 
what would become strike-funds, but for a long time they mostly fulfilled a function of 
social insurance. Looking back, the embryos of later trade unions were indeed 
articulated around these funds, but at the time the associations had a rather 
spontaneous character and were further dampened by strict laws regarding political 
coalitions, which only gradually changed following the birth of the new constitutional 
Swiss state in the European revolution year of 1848. 
In the 1830s and 1840s, however, some of the first trades started to assume more 
stable forms of organizations, such as the watchmakers in Geneva and the 
typographers in Bern (Degen 2014). Some of these budding associations were 
influenced by socialist thought, especially transmitted by political immigrants from 
Germany and Italy, yet the harsh repression of the Swiss state, often in the form of 
mass immigrant-deportations, temporarily hampered the spread of such ideas. While 
the first broad worker associations were the so-called Grütlivereine, with a strong 
emphasis on self-help and education, it was the International Workers Association 
that not only consolidated the hitherto  fragmented associations, but also shifted their 
emphasis towards collective action in the context of social conflict. In fact, in 1868 it 
was the construction workers of Geneva who organized the most intensive strikes the 
country had so far ever seen. While the International Workers Association soon fell 
apart again, the phenomenon nonetheless laid the seeds on both a conceptual as 
well as on a practical level for the construction of a broad labor movement based on 
the pursuit of collective interests (Degen 2014). 
Significantly aided by the economic upswing of the era and the political upheavals 
unfolding, the turn of the 20th century saw a significant intensification of social and 
labor conflict. There were no less than 2’416 strikes in the period between 1880 and 
1914 (Degen 2014). 193 of these were answered by police repression and 40 of 
them by military interventions (ibid), further strengthening the alpine country’s then 
growingly militant reputation, even by international standards. At the same time, what 
would later become today’s trade unions also started to take shape. 
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In the case of construction workers, their level of union organization was at first not 
very high and strikes tended to be rather spontaneous uprisings. That being said, 
these uprisings were occasionally of a rather grand scale. Examples of such 
struggles in construction are to be found in the great strike during the construction of 
the Gotthard Tunnel in 1875 or in Winterthur in 1909 and 1910. While difficult to 
pinpoint in retrospect, the rather slow and spontaneous organization of the 
construction workers was probably related to the high mobility in the industry as well 
as to linguistic barriers. That being said, a Bricklayers and Laborers Association 
(Verband der Maurer und Handlanger) was formed in 1897 and two decades later it 
merged with other construction trades in 1922 to become the far stronger Swiss 
Construction and Woodworkers Association (Schweizerischer Bau- und 
Holzarbeiterverbandes) (Vuattolo 1953). This was in general a period of 
consolidation for organized labor as the associations of a number of related trades 
joined together to form greater, more powerful unions along industry-lines. 
Despite the Swiss labor movement’s growing associational power through its 
militancy and swelling membership of what had meanwhile developed into formal 
trade unions, the concept of collective labor agreements (CLAs) between unions and 
employers was far from established. This was despite the fact that a legal article had 
been introduced in 1911 explicitly allowing for CLAs to be negotiated – a first taste of 
institutional power for the budding labor movement. In 1914, despite a high number 
of strikes and growing union membership, only around three to five percent of all 
Swiss workers fell under some sort of collective agreement between unions and 
employers (Rieger et al. 2016: 4). At this time, labor uprisings were to a large extent 
directed against the state with the goal of enhancing broader legal protections for 
workers (Rieger 2010: 10). The latter was, in fact, done with some success. While 
this may seem surprising today given Switzerland’s currently liberal legal framework, 
the country once took on a pioneer role in the field of labor laws and regulations 
concerning work safety, child labor and working times (ibid). This tendency of laying 
demands at the doors of the state was particularly expressed during the general 
strike of 1918, which is arguably the most important event in the history of the Swiss 
labor movement.  
However, due to a massive upsurge in strikes directly following the First World War 
and the generally unstable political atmosphere seeing socialist ideas and their 
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organizations assuming a growing significance, the concept of negotiating collective 
agreements began to become more attractive both from the perspective of organized 
labor as well as from that of some employers. For the unions, this meant having the 
opportunity to shape the working conditions of their members through direct 
negotiations in contrast to the broader and often smaller steps offered by state 
regulations. This was further encouraged by the fact that a red-menace-atmosphere 
was spreading and had led some of the unions to shed themselves of their more 
radical political elements who pursued more revolutionary goals (Degen 1987: 15f.). 
For some of the more open employers, while negotiations with the unions were a 
bitter pill to swallow, they were also looked upon more kindly than state-interventions. 
Furthermore, the concept of CLAs also represented an opportunity to “tame the 
capital-labor contradiction” and channel class conflict away from industrial action 
(Dörre 2010: 873). At the time, particularly the employers of the craft trades were 
open to the general idea of CLAs and what would later become “social partnership”. 
This was, of course, not a gesture of goodwill, but a rational calculation of the kind 
described by Knight and some of the Analytical Marxists: If the benefits of integrating 
organized labor and thus constraining the activities of the latter outweigh the costs of 
the concessions involved, then it is rational to do so. 
Yet despite the gradual and very selective openness of certain employers, many at 
the time continued to vigorously resist the idea of any kind of agreement and were 
generally wary of even giving unions any kind of formal recognition as a legitimate 
actor in industrial relations. Particularly in construction as well as in the machine-
building industry, employers were far from enthusiastic about what they saw as 
shackling themselves to the very organizations that had so far primarily been 
concerned with calling for strikes and other forms of militant action. As a result, by 
1929 only five to eight percent of workers had the protection of a collective 
agreement (Rieger 2010: 10). As can be expected, the economic situation after the 
crash of 1929 and the thus simultaneous weakening of labors structural power did 
not necessarily make things easier. 
However, the economic recovery after 1935 on the one hand (Rieger 2010: 10) as 
well as the growing spread of fascism throughout Europe on the other (Degen 2014), 
steadily accompanied by a continuously growing labor movement, reshuffled the 
cards on both sides. While the healing economic situation encouraged unions to 
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demand and aggressively strike for higher wages and other concessions, at the 
same time the fascist threat moderated their long-term goals of greater structural 
change. On the side of employers, the situation of the day prompted many to 
consider collective agreements as an instrument of both political and economic 
stability – giving in to certain concessions, but simultaneously preventing greater 
social strife from producing even greater threats to capital accumulation. 
It was around this time that two major agreements were signed that would carry with 
them major significance for future industrial relations in Switzerland, both firmly 
establishing the concept of CLAs as an established institution and beginning to 
integrate the unions into mainstream political and civil society. That being said, each 
represented a very different understanding of the essence of a collective labor 
agreement and thus simultaneously cleared the way for somewhat different traditions 
of social partnership to develop. 
In mid-July of 1937, after years of labor militancy in the machine-manufacturing 
industry and a very real strike threat in Winterthur just weeks beforehand, the Swiss 
Metalworkers and Watchmakers Association, which would decades later become 
part of Unia, signed a so-called “Peace Agreement” with the employers of the 
industry (Degen 1987). As one of the largest sectors of the economy at the time, and 
one that had long refused to recognize organized labor, this was a significant event. 
However, while the signing of the agreement per se involved a recognition of the 
union as a legitimate negotiating partner and as such must be attributed its historical 
significance, on a material level the agreement did nothing besides cementing 
industrial peace by constraining the union of its ability to strike (Degen 1987; Rieger 
2010). By establishing a complex, multilevel system of dispute-resolution and at the 
same time failing to introduce any normative regulations on wages, working times or 
general conditions, the agreement represented a rather one-sided institutional 
constraint of organized labor (Degen 1987). As such, due to these missing normative 
regulations, the agreement was in fact at the time not even broadly recognized as an 
“actual CLA”, but was simply known as the “Agreement” and later the “Peace 
Agreement” (Degen 1987: 18). While it was in later years expanded to include 
normative regulations on working conditions, the agreement nonetheless gave birth 
to what came to be known as “absolute industrial peace” and indeed became the 
bedrock for “mythologizing” a tradition of controlled industrial peace and backroom 
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negotiations in contrast to movement-oriented collective bargaining involving 
industrial action (Degen 1987). 
In stark contrast to this “Peace Agreement”, both from a historical perspective as well 
as noticed at the time, a second watershed moment emerged (ibid). This time, it was 
at the center of the industrial home of this thesis: construction. Following a wave of 
fierce strikes on construction sites throughout the country, a Landesmantelvertrag 
(LMV) or “National Framework Agreement” for the entire main construction trades 
was signed on May 18th, 1938. Materially as well as symbolically, the agreement 
differed strongly from the above noted peace agreement. In marked contrast to the 
machine-manufacturing industry, construction’s CLA did not place conflict resolution 
at its center, but was primarily based on normative regulations concerning working 
conditions, wages and working times. In fact, it did not even contain an absolute 
peace clause constraining all strikes until years later in 1958, at the ensuing height of 
the Cold War. 
While the material standards of construction’s new agreement were modest from 
today’s perspective (it included a 48h week among other things), at the time the CLA 
not only represented a great material step forward, but also one associated with the 
logic of collective action as a key leverage mechanism for social and economic 
change. Despite the fact that an absolute industrial peace clause was later added to 
the agreement in exchange for material concessions, construction’s CLA nonetheless 
laid the historical groundwork for a different, less corporatistic approach to industrial 
relations than that in the machine-manufacturing industry. Given the size and 
meaning of the industry in question, the significance of the CLA radiated far beyond 
construction. Around this time, a number of other collective agreements were 
negotiated as well, raising the percentage of workers covered by a CLA to 25 percent 
in 1938 (Rieger 2010: 10). 
Despite their different approaches and ideologies, however, both agreements played 
their part in mainstreaming the general idea of collective agreements between trade 
unions and employers. This concept was further consolidated following a “second 
wave of collective labor agreements“ (Rieger 2010: 11) born out of a huge upsurge in 
strikes towards and after the end of World War II. Representing the largest work 
stoppages since 1918 (Rieger 2010: 11), the post-war years saw an average of 33 
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strikes per year with thousands of participants (Rieger 2017: 116). These industrial 
conflicts led to further concessions in already existing agreements on the one hand 
and the establishment of new agreements in previously untapped industries on the 
other (such as pharmaceuticals). By 1950, around fifty percent of all workers in 
Switzerland fell under some sort of collective agreement (Rieger 2010: 11). This 
proportion was double that of before the war and has in fact remained rather stable 
ever since. 
Besides these developments on an industry-level, the state also started to step in 
more closely. As mentioned above, previous turbulences in the political economic 
arena had encouraged the introduction of legislature giving collective agreements a 
legal base as of 1911 in the Swiss Code of Obligations (Obligationenrecht). In 
retrospect, it represented a first step towards a broader institutionalization of a 
system of social partnership by providing the necessary legal space for it to unfold. In 
1947, however, the state went a significant step further. It introduced a new article in 
Switzerland’s constitution making it legally possible for the Bundesrat, the country’s 
national executive, to declare certain CLAs as allgemeinverbindlich, or legally binding 
for all. 
Up until now, a collective agreement was negotiated and signed by the unions on the 
one hand and by the relevant employers association on the other. In our case, that 
would have been the Swiss Wood- and Construction Workers Association and the 
Swiss Construction Employers Association. This meant, however, that while the 
agreements may have been national ones, the terms thereof were only binding for 
the contract partners signing the agreement. As a result, they were not relevant for 
companies that were not members of the employers association. By constructing the 
legal possibility for the terms of CLAs to be deemed legally binding for all companies 
of the concerned industry, even if they were not members of the signing employers 
association, this represented an unprecedented intervention by the state into the 
industrial relations of the country. It was, of course, also new institutional power that 
had arisen as an indirect product of conflicts fought out beforehand, in turn helping to 
expand organized labor’s influence even more. 
While the widening of CLA-coverage to fifty percent of workers by 1950 was a direct 
result of the massive post-war strike waves mentioned above, the introduction of this 
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new legislature of course also played its part by expanding the reach of already 
existing agreements. By October 1948, 1’349 CLAs had been declared generally 
binding for a total of 32’009 companies and 82’398 employees (Schweizerischer 
Arbeitgeberverband 2009a: 149). 
As can be imagined, such a fundamental constitutional change did not go without 
opposition, especially from those companies that were not part of any employers 
association and now saw their ability to determine their workers’ conditions of 
employment significantly constrained. In order to respect these “minority interests”, 
the declaration of a collective agreement as generally binding was only to be given if 
a certain set of quotas were fulfilled. This meant that the majority of companies had 
to be organized in the employers association, the majority of workers had to be 
employed in these companies and finally that the majority of employees had to be 
organized in a labor union that was part of the CLA7.  
While the interest of the unions towards the idea of strengthening the system of 
CLA’s and simultaneously widening their reach, thus boosting labor’s influence as 
well as raising the potential to recruit new members, is understandable, the new 
system’s acceptance by employers and their conservative political allies may come 
as a slightly bigger surprise. This can, however, be just as rationally explained when 
embedded in the political economy of the time and the budding system of social 
partnership. The reasoning behind it is threefold. 
First of all, after the defeat of fascism in Europe and in the context of strong unions 
and a growingly influential political left (Schiavi and Brassel 1987), the project of 
integrating the latter two into the folds of mainstream society had grown in 
acceptance in the conservative camp. On the one hand, this followed the basic logic 
that when organized labor is powerful enough to represent a real threat to the 
accumulation of capital, yet is at the same time itself ready to enter into a dynamic of 
negotiation and compromise (and does not pursue more revolutionary goals), then it 
can be a sensible path for employers and the state to integrate a potentially 
dangerous insurgency, despite the material costs of the concessions involved. On 
the other hand, in the context of the unfolding Cold War, which was not only 
                                               
7 Since the signing of the Bilateral Agreements with the European Union in 1999, as part of the so-
called flanking measures to protect Swiss wages and working conditions, the above-mentioned quotas 
have become more flexible, making it easier to declare the terms of certain CLAs generally binding. 
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expressed along the lines of an arms race but also as one for people’s hearts and 
minds by guaranteeing economic prosperity, this stance of integration and mutual 
recognition and legitimacy seemed more rational on both an economic as well as a 
wider political level than one of continued social conflict. 
When suggesting that in democratic capitalist societies the ruling order can be 
upheld not merely through physical force, but also through “real compromises 
involving real concessions“ (Wright 2000: 999), Antonio Gramsci’s thoughts come to 
mind. Despite widening the sphere of Marxist thoughts further onto the discursive 
plain, Gramsci’s concept of hegemony is nonetheless a dialectically material one. For 
it emphasizes that such compromises are not simply a given, nor are they a purely 
deliberate strategy developed in some back room, but a contradictive process arising 
from “the specific configurations of power and interests that characterize the 
relationship between the capitalist class and the working class“ (Wright 2000: 999). 
Similar thoughts are expressed in Burawoy’s Manufacturing Consent. Changes in the 
Labor Process Under Monopoly Capitalism (1979), discussed in our theory chapter. 
What Burawoy points out, and something that is just as relevant in our case, is that 
such hegemonial strategies will only be pursued if not only the political conditions 
and power relations encourage it, but also if the economy allows for class 
compromises to be introduced without impeding too severely on companies’ profits. It 
is thus vital to emphasize that the above integration of the Swiss labor movement 
was simultaneously embedded in a seemingly infinite economic boom era of the 
postwar years, the “30 glorious years” as former Swiss labor leader Vasco Pedrina 
(2012) put it. In this time, the country experienced a remarkably strong growth of its 
gross domestic product, hovering around five to seven percent (Rieger 2017: 116). 
Besides giving employers the necessary economic leeway, it also gave the union 
movement, next to its strong position of associational power at the time, a strong 
structural one as well since capital had an unquenched thirst for labor power at the 
time. Of course, in exchange for this new place in mainstream society, both the 
political Social Democrats and the union movement were expected to drop their more 
radical demands and in the particular case of the latter, adhere to absolute industrial 
peace. 
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The second mechanism behind many employers’ openness towards a strengthening 
of the system of social partnership, in particular in regards to the newly introduced 
legal base allowing CLAs to become generally binding, had a very direct and rational 
economic base. This particularly concerned industries that already had a CLA and 
were searching for an institutional path to ensure they would not suffer therefrom at 
the benefit of their competition. In fact, precisely because the possibility of the state 
to declare a CLA as legally binding had such a profound (and for some employers 
beneficial) effect on the greater market situation, some of the stronger voices 
supporting this constitutional change did not, in fact, hail from organized labor, but 
from the side of employers. 
Ideological prejudice laid aside, the material logic behind such a stance is rather 
simple. From a purely economic and institutionalist perspective, if employers A, B 
and C have signed a collective labor agreement constraining their ability to shape 
their workers’ wages and employment conditions, then in the rationale of a market 
economy they will equally demand that employer D and E adhere to the same 
conditions. For if A, B and C pay higher wages for lower working hours, then they 
can, if not otherwise compensated, quickly land in a less competitive position to D 
and E. However, if all companies adhere to the conditions of the signed CLA, then 
none of them can oust the other from the market through “unfair competition”. It is in 
this sense that working-class associational power can under circumstances, as will 
become particularly evident in the next chapter, even play a central role in solving 
capital’s own collective action problems, thus making agreements “much more 
durable than when they emerge simply from capacity of workers to impose costs on 
capitalists.“ (Wright 2000: 999). 
So, while “in conventional wisdom, capitalist-class interests are best satisfied when 
the working class is highly disorganized” and this is true to a certain extent, as soon 
as organized labor has increased its associational power to a certain extent, thus 
crossing a certain threshold, working class power can in some cases have “positive 
effects on [certain] capitalists’ interests.“ (Wright 2000: 95f.). That being said, from an 
employer point of view it is the protagonists of Burawoy’s monopoly capitalism who 
will tend to particularly profit from such an institutionalization of collective bargaining 
and binding rules, as due to their size and productivity they are in a better position to 
cushion the concessions made. From an empirical perspective, it is thus of no 
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surprise that it was (and still is) especially the larger companies who supported and 
continue to support the declaration of CLAs as legally binding. 
A third point, and less a driving motivation than a discursive articulation of the above, 
was and continues to be employers’ portrayal of this newly erected system of social 
partnership as an “independent Swiss answer to interest conflicts between employers 
and employees“ (Schweizerischer Arbeitgeberverband 2009b: 170). Interestingly 
enough, while the normative constraints of a collective labor agreement are, next to 
already existing laws and institutions, clearly a strong intervention into the free 
market economy, strong voices within the wider employer community have in fact 
come to depict it as precisely the opposite. For while the state lends its support by 
declaring certain CLAs legally binding, the system of social partnership, as depicted 
by the employers involved, allows for a particularly liberal legal environment. 
This is, so the argument goes, because the social partners of the industry, i.e. the 
employers and the unions, are free from any outside intervention by a third party, i.e. 
the state, and are given the necessary space to develop their own institutional 
rulebooks according to the supposed needs and realities of the particular industry. It 
is this ideological flexibility that, in the eyes of the employers, makes their position 
within the system of social partnership compatible with a broader ideology of 
economic liberalism that would otherwise shun any such strikingly profound 
interventions into both the scope of action of single companies as well as the market 
in general. Unsurprisingly, such a narrative disregards any reference to power 
asymmetries and is often strongly and explicitly connected to absolute industrial 
peace as well as sometimes even the specific “Peace Agreement” of 1937 
(Schweizerischer Arbeitgeberverband 2009b: 170).  
So, while the players involved had very different motivations and interests concerning 
this system, Switzerland had, in the eyes of the unions, organized employers and the 
state, become “the country of “social partnership”” (Rieger 2010: 12). All of the above 
display a strong case of dialectic interplay between power relations, the political 
economy and ideological constructions arising from the former. It also underlines the 
fact that while social institutions might be a product of colliding interests and are often 
born out of direct social conflict, they may nonetheless develop in an unexpected and 
sometimes unintended way (Knight 1992). As such, while originally arising from the 
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labor movement’s associational power and fierce industrial conflict, the pre- and post-
war years saw a relatively stable and mutually accepted system of social partnership 
come to be established as an institution of collective bargaining. 
The newly acquired legitimacy of these previous labor insurgents did, however, come 
at a price. By now, practically all collective labor agreements contained strict clauses 
concerning absolute industrial peace, which were expected to be upheld in both a 
practical as well as political sense. Thus, the instrument of the strike was just as 
much discursively banished as it was legally and practically. A strong “myth of 
industrial peace” (Degen 1987: Schiavi and Brassel 1987) had been constructed, 
suggesting that the country’s economic prosperity was a direct result of this industrial 
peace and that strikes and industrial conflict in general only served to damage the 
Swiss economy’s “reputation of reliability“ (Rieger 2017: 117). Those propagating this 
position, both employers and union leaders alike as well as the state, pointed to the 
fact that at the time unions were indeed able to gain concessions without having to 
resort to industrial action (ibid). While this may have started as a myth in the sense of 
a false or politically construed analysis, it nonetheless in time came to shape reality 
in the sense that slowly but surely even the idea of a strike became a thing of the 
past for many of the now firmly integrated unions. As a result, it even became a false 
but popularly held belief that it was in fact illegal to strike in Switzerland (Pedrina and 
Hartmann 2007: 90). 
According to Knight, “such constraints [on strike action] seem to work to the benefit of 
employers.“ (1992: 205). By assuring “that workers will be unable to choose to strike 
during the contract period, the constraint diminishes the worker’s overall bargaining 
power.“ (ibid). That being said, at a time when employers seemed wedded to the idea 
of social partnership and were regularly granting concessions at the negotiating 
table, such cautions remained relatively abstract and moot warnings. Why evoke 
unnecessary and costly conflict, when the model of “economic boom unionism“ 
(Oesch 2011: 94) was working? Going even further, if mobilizations are not needed 
anymore, why invest the effort in upholding the networks of activists necessary for 
carrying them out? 
So, despite continuing to recruit members and thus maintaining a high degree of 
“paying union membership“ (Arbeitskreis Strategic Unionism 2013: 354), far less 
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effort was put into strengthening and renewing an active union membership at a 
grassroots level, let alone in the form of collective mobilizations. In a process seen 
throughout Western Europe and the United States, the unions had to a certain extent 
mutated from activating movements of the working class into bureaucratic 
organizations representing the working class; going from social movements with 
activist participation to service suppliers where fulltime staff were the driving force 
(Kelley 2017). As Dörre reveals, the more institutionally powerful the unions had 
grown in the postwar era, the more they themselves underwent a process of change 
(2010: 882f.). However, while this process did unfold in a number of Western 
countries, the utter strength of this “myth of industrial peace” was indeed unique to 
Switzerland (Rieger 2017). 
All this being said, it would be unwise to assume that either side had suddenly 
developed a disregard for their own respective interests. As such, the concerns that 
employers expressed in 1948, directly following the postwar strike wave, that despite 
their strategic benefits, collective labor agreements are nonetheless “binding for a 
long period of time despite the fact that economic conditions may change” 
(Schweizerischer Arbeitgeberverband 2009a: 149), were far from gone. They were, 
in hindsight, perhaps simply muted by the concrete political economic situation of the 
place and time. So, far from any historical infinity, as institutions and institutional 
power seldom display, this heyday of welfare capitalism and industrial peace had an 
expiration date. 
Of Crisis, Renaissance and Revitalization 
Despite the fact that it only covered around half of the workers of the country, the 
system of established social partnership rapidly gained a position of legitimacy and 
was portrayed by both unions and employers as the mutually beneficial “Swiss” way. 
In construction as well, the unions managed over the years to reduce working times, 
raise the number of paid vacation days and gain other achievements at the 
negotiation table without the threat or actual calling of strikes. The unprecedented 
economic upswing of this “golden age“ (Deppe 2012: 23), accompanied by a broad 
radiance of CLA-achievements even into CLA-free industries, allowed for a never-
before-seen prosperity across the economy (Rieger 2010: 11f.). From 1953 on, 
Switzerland’s economy was characterized by a sustained upswing lasting over 
twenty years. 
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Yet if we accept that within the capitalist mode of production, economic upswings can 
only go so far and crises are an inherent part of the “enigma of capital“ (Harvey 
2011), then the writing was on the wall. In 1973, a first turbulence hit in form of the 
first oil crisis, sending shock waves throughout the global capitalist economy and 
leading to a deep recession and mass lay-offs in a number of industries. The 
economy temporarily recovered, yet was hit again in 1980 into 1981, leading again to 
more mass dismissals and shattering anew any hitherto held illusion of indefinite 
economic prosperity. 
While from today’s perspective it may seem surprising, but at this time the system of 
collective labor agreements remained remarkably stable. From the perspective of 
organized labor, these platforms of collective bargaining were more needed and 
valuable than ever before as they protected already gained achievements in an 
increasingly instable economic environment. From the perspective of the employers, 
still the generation retaining a collective memory of previously unstable political 
times, they neither had much interest in dismantling CLAs as they saw them as a 
stabilizing instrument, especially in such turbulent times (Rieger 2010: 12). 
That being said, these ruptures in economic-boom capitalism and the mass 
dismissals they produced did lead to debates within some parts of the labor 
movement about the future of industrial relations. While industrial peace clauses 
were still a central and generally unquestioned part of social partnership, both from a 
political standpoint as well as from a contractual one, first discussions unfolded about 
the question of an absolute versus a relative industrial peace. While the former, 
which by this time was an inherent part of almost all collective agreements, meant 
that strikes were a priori forbidden as long as a collective agreement was in place, 
the latter suggested that strikes were legitimate as long as they did not concern 
anything already negotiated in the standing agreement (such as already defined 
minimum wages or working times). 
Not necessarily surprisingly, these at the time still superficial discussions particularly 
took place in the Construction and Wood Union (Gewerkschaft Bau und Holz, GBH), 
which was the successor organization of the union that had negotiated the first 
collective agreement for construction in 1938. That being said, at this point in time 
strikes were just as rare in construction as in any other industry and construction’s 
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CLA was repeatedly renewed at the bargaining table and without the accompaniment 
of industrial action. In fact, despite the shaky economic situation, the construction 
employers continued to grant concessions throughout the 1980s, when a number of 
advances were made in questions of minimum wages, working hours and paid 
vacation time. 
The length and depth of the economic recession of the 1990s, however, mixed with a 
newly arising political climate, finally rocked social partnership’s hitherto remarkable 
stability. As Knight emphasizes, social institutions only exist in their actual state and 
form as long as the players involved perceive them as beneficial (1992: 207).  And 
now, for the first real time since its broader institutionalization in the postwar-era, the 
system of collective labor agreements was effectively called into question (Vatter 
2016: 184f.). While at the time this came as a strong surprise to many in the union 
movement, looking back, both at these years as well as at the deeper history of 
industrial capitalism, it is perhaps more astonishing how long the “exception” of 
welfare capitalism (Boron 2010) and harmonious social partnership actually lasted. 
Embedded in a far deeper “great transformation” of growing neoliberal hegemony 
(Deppe 2012: 14), the background of this crisis of social partnership was twofold. On 
an economic level, the 1990s were hit by one of the deepest recessions since the 
end of the Second World War. Collapsing markets and global structural changes had 
led not only to a rupture in the process of capital accumulation, but also to the 
highest mass unemployment of the post-war times (Rieger 2010: 12). The era of 
endless growth and prosperity in postwar capitalism had vividly come to its end. As a 
result thereof, the leeway of employers to grant or even maintain already given 
concessions without at the same time sacrificing profits was drastically reduced. 
Entangled in an environment of increasingly sharp competition and falling profits, 
both on a local as well as increasingly global scale, employers’ hitherto allegiance to 
the system of social partnership with its job security, guaranteed minimum wages, 
regular pay raises and caps on working time suddenly seemed far less rational 
(Dörre 2010). 
On a political level, the articulation of this great transformation was no less dramatic. 
By the 1990s, the Keynesian political economic principles of welfare capitalism, 
whether shaped in a Social Democratic or liberal corporatist way, had rapidly lost 
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ground to a growing hegemony of neoliberal thought. In place of Fordist job security, 
steadily progressing and regulated wages and guaranteed social welfare, there came 
the “recommodification” of labor relations (Standing 2007), the privatization of public 
goods and the general shifting of “responsibility” from the collective to the individual 
sphere. Displacing to a large extent any empirical facts questioning this shift, a 
mystification of what Stiglitz calls “market fundamentalism” swept the ideological 
arena (in Durrenberger 2005: 129). Touching all corners of social and political life, a 
new formation of capitalism was being born. It was, in the words of David Harvey, a 
“re-empowerment” of capital (2011: 131). 
In Switzerland, this global transformation hit with slight delay, yet the effects thereof 
were felt just as hard. They were particularly swift and strong in the area of social 
partnership (Mach and Oesch 2003). Going hand in hand with the above noted 
political change, the old generation of corporatist “patrons”, socialized in the postwar-
era of welfare capitalism and who had headed the various employers associations 
since the 1940s, were being replaced by a younger generation of “Chicago-Boys” 
(Pedrina and Hartmann 2007: 88). Trained in Stiglitz’ “market fundamentalism” and 
with little experience or interest in social dialogue, they largely perceived the unions 
as unnecessary baggage. Furthermore, whereas in the pre- and postwar-eras center-
right liberals had historically dominated the various employers’ associations, large 
parts of the new generation now associated themselves with the far right Swiss 
Peoples’ Party (ibid). 
In this changing atmosphere, a number of employers called for a general “co-
ordinated elimination of excessive regulation” (Mach in Oesch 2011: 89), both on the 
level of legal protection concerning such things as maximum working hours and night 
shifts, yet also on that of social partnership. Guido Richterich, then president of the 
trans-industrial Swiss Employers Association, even demanded the abolishment of the 
constitutional article making collective labor agreements legally binding, portraying it 
as an illegitimate intervention into the markets (Oesch 2011). What had for decades 
been presented as an indestructible and taken for granted pillar of Swiss society was 
now fundamentally up for debate. 
That being said, while some employers effectively attempted to rid themselves of the 
constraints of collective labor agreements in general, particularly in the printing and 
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media industries, this was not necessarily a homogeneous wave and some 
employers far more sought to selectively pick the cherries of social partnership. This 
can on the one hand be attributed to the general social phenomenon that institutional 
arrangements are often surprisingly durable (Knight 1992; Arbeitskreis Strategic 
Unionism 2013) and those born in one era can indeed “constrain future policy 
options“ (Kelly 1998: 13), but also because some employers saw it in their own 
rational interests to maintain certain instruments of the system. So, instead of 
seeking to overthrow the entire concept of CLAs, a number of employers preferred to 
keep the general notion of social partnership, in particular its element of industrial 
peace, yet fundamentally flexibilize normative regulations concerning wages, working 
times, etc. In other words, the spirit of the narrow “peace agreement” of 1937 was 
taken out of the closet of history. After decades of a remarkably stable “social pact”, 
balancing out the interests of capital and labor (Pedrina and Hartmann 2007: 87), the 
rules of the game were being fundamentally challenged. 
Due to the structure and workings of the construction industry, namely that of a highly 
mobile sector with low entrance barriers to new competition, the articulation of these 
developments was slightly different. Since, as will be elaborated upon in the next 
chapter, especially the larger employers had a rational economic interest in retaining 
central regulations of the CLA, not least in order to tame “unfair” competition from 
driving them from the market, an abolishment of the legally binding collective labor 
agreement was at the time not seriously debated. What was called into question, 
however, were the particular contents of the agreement. This was, almost from one 
day to another, visibly expressed in the fact that in 1991 the pay raise was for the first 
time in years under the inflation rate and in 1992 employers went a step further and 
called for an abolishment of the 13th month’s salary as well as other parts of the CLA. 
While in the end a deal was struck and the 13th month’s salary was retained, it clearly 
characterized the new rules of the game. 
Following decades of corporatist industrial peace, these developments caught the 
unions completely off-guard (Oesch 2011: 82). Far from igniting the spark that would 
unleash a revolt against this harsh employer offensive, the union movement was 
paralyzed (Pedrina and Hartmann 2007: 90). As Hicks points out, “Weapons grow 
rusty if unused, and a union which never strikes may lose the ability to organize a 
formidable strike, […]“ (Hicks in Coppola 2011: 11). In fact, besides collective 
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memories of a strike-culture having all but disappeared, the movement effectively 
lacked organizers and activists with any real experience in coordinating and leading 
industrial action. The strike had, in fact, slipped from the movement’s repertoire of 
contention (Tilly and Tarrow 2007). It had been become unlearnt. In hindsight, it is 
actually astonishing how a historically speaking relatively short era of industrial peace 
can in fact so severely rob a union of its mobilization ability, pointing again to the very 
real challenges in maintaining collective action as soon as a certain dynamic is 
interrupted. 
So, while the system of social partnership was not dead, if the unions wanted to be 
more than just a symbolic junior partner in an arrangement of “fake corporatism“ 
(Pelizzari and Schief 2007), then they would have to fundamentally reinvent 
themselves and their way of functioning. It is in this sense that two parallel 
developments within the union movement provided the necessary air for such a 
discussion to not only breath and pick up on already existing debates concerning a 
“relative industrial peace”, but also for the ideas forged within these debates to flow 
into reality and be put into practice (Kelley 2012). 
The first of these developments was in fact not born in the traditional labor 
movement, but outside of it, namely in the remnants of the New Left of the 1970s and 
1980s and in particular in the remaining structures of the Trotskyist Socialist Workers 
Party (Sozialistische Arbeiterpartei, SAP). What characterized this small, yet 
disciplined and active group of activists was not only the more typical leftwing 
approach criticizing a bureaucratization of the labor movement, but also, in marked 
contrast to other fringe groups of the time, a strategic decision to actively work within 
the formal structures of the union with the strategic goal of revitalizing the labor 
movement. Many of the discussions and debates surrounding this proposed 
revitalization of the labor movement were published in the political magazine 
Diskussion, which appeared three times a year and whose editorial board was made 
up among others of future Unia co-president Andreas Rieger. 
As their target of entryism8, the majority of these activists joined the Construction and 
Industrial Union (Gewerkschaft Bau und Industrie, GBI), the latest merger product of 
organized labor in construction. Particularly when compared to other radical 
                                               
8 The strategy of „entering“ into already existing mass labor organizations in order to influence their 
program and tactics, often used by Trotskyist groups, is known as entryism.  
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organizations attempting to enter into mass organizations and influence the latter’s 
agenda, the activists of the Socialist Workers Party and the broader New Left were 
remarkably successful. Not only managing to fill staff and organizer positions 
throughout the union, they rapidly moved into leadership positions.  
Looking back at those years, one of the former activists, still in a regional leadership 
position, recounted some of his experiences to me during my fieldwork: 
We were disciplined, we were passionate, well actually we were downright obsessed 
with seizing this opportunity to actually bring about change in the labor movement and 
lead the unions back into a more conflict-ready place. What made our task both so 
absolutely necessary, but at the same time relatively easy, was that the union was just 
so gutted. Nobody really wanted to work for the union then and the ones that did were 
pretty much good for nothing. So, even when the then union leadership did have issues 
with our politics, if they even knew about them, they just did not care that much 
because where else would they find active and eager guys that were willing to put in 
the effort and the hours that we did? 
The fact that these radical activists chose the construction union as the preferred 
organization within which to become active was of no coincidence. Besides its more 
militant historical reputation going back to the pre-war years, especially when 
contrasted to that of the more conservative Metalworkers and Watchmakers 
Association that had signed the 1937 Peace Agreement, there was also another 
reason leading them to conclude it to be most fruitful to concentrate their efforts on 
construction. This equally brings us to the second of the two developments providing 
the necessary conditions for a practice-oriented debate of union revitalization. 
As noted above, despite its historically militant reputation, construction’s system of 
social partnership was in reality by now just as much characterized by the institution 
of industrial peace as were other industries. As such, ideas of militant labor activism 
and strikes largely continued to exist in name only, as the historical legacy of days 
gone by. That being said, when discussions thereof again started to become reality, 
they were nonetheless particularly well received by large parts of construction’s 
immigrant workforce of the day9. Largely having immigrated from Italy and Spain, at 
                                               
9 Despite today’s leftwing postions of the unions and the large proportion of the workforce made up of 
immigrant workers, the latter had for a long time been banished to the margins of the formal structures 
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first as temporary Saisonnier-workers, many had to a certain extent been socialized 
in relatively conscious working class cultures and traditions of political and labor 
activism (Steinauer and Von Allmen 2000; Frigerio and Merhar 2004). It was thus not 
uncommon at the time for many of these workers to be involved in politically-tinted 
social clubs and a number were even active members in the Communist Parties of 
their respective homeland, in particular the then relatively strong Partido Comunista 
Italiano (PCI). Far from confirming any crude construction worker stereotypes of 
Bibliophobia, some of these workers devoted large parts of their free time to reading 
and debating complex political literature. 
Proudly reciting anecdotes of his political coming of age before migrating to 
Switzerland, Emilio, one of these Italian worker activists, who has recently retired but 
remains active in the union, recounted to me how: “You know, we were all 
communists back then.” Removing a yellowed and slightly torn newspaper article 
from an old tin box, he continued: “See, this is an article about when I was a teenager 
in a small town in Sicily in the 1960s. The fascists wanted to march through our 
neighborhood. So we waited until they got to a narrow crossing and then ambushed 
them.” Now broadly smiling and dewy-eyed, he recounted how: “All of the working 
class kids from the neighborhood took part in that. And we all emigrated in later 
years. Almost all of my friends at some point or another worked construction in 
Switzerland. Exciting times…” 
While a certain nostalgic aspect of these “exciting times” probably plays a strong role 
both in the memories of union organizers and worker activists, if even a portion 
thereof have an empirical base then it was a rare gift for any union activists seeking 
to bring the movement back into a “more conflict-ready place”. Thus, in cooperation 
with a number of other activists like Emilio, the meanwhile established new 
generation of union staff and leaders started to implement significant changes in the 
labor movement and unleash a profound process of transformation. 
                                                                                                                                                   
of the unions. Either looked down upon or simply not trusted, especially in the red-scare period of the 
Cold War, it was paradoxically enough the socialist-oriented unions that took the longest to finally 
open up to immigrants taking up more influential positions in the 1960s and 1970s (Steinauer and Von 
Allmen 2000). 
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Pushing for more emphasis on campaigning and mobilizing workers into collective 
action, the new generation had more than its fair share of work ahead of themselves. 
As noted above, despite a pool of somewhat politicized workers in construction, due 
to the missing role of any real type of mobilizations in the years beforehand, the 
union had largely ceased to even invest the necessary time, effort and resources into 
maintaining the formal and informal structures necessary for widespread collective 
action. It was these structures as well as a general “culture of solidarity“ (Fantasia 
1988) that the union now sought to rebuild. In other words, a tradition of contentious 
labor activism was to be reinvented.  
As early as 1992, some of the first construction site mobilizations aimed at enhancing 
the union’s bargaining power during contract negotiations began to be realized. While 
generally modest in comparison to the intensity of the “old days” as well as to what 
would soon come, it nonetheless represented a paradigm change as contentious 
mobilizations re-entered the stage of the construction industry. In the following years 
the union organized more and continuously growing collective actions, both on the 
construction sites themselves as well as disruptive actions in the wider public sphere, 
such as in front of the construction employers association’s delegates assembly in 
1994.  
This return of industrial skirmishes to the landscape of industrial relations in 
Switzerland was equally visible on the institutional level. In what represented a 
product of skilled lobbying with their social democrat allies in parliament, in 1999 the 
union managed to formally and explicitly introduce a “right to strike” to the new 
constitution of Switzerland. The instrument of the strike was thus given the highest 
possible form of political legitimacy. While the strike had not been illegal before, this 
explicit mention was nonetheless a new symbolic quality (Rieger 2017). It also points 
to the hybrid character of this reviving labor movement, with one foot once again 
dipping in the water of contentious politics and the other remaining firmly embedded 
in institutional politics. 
When placed in the context of industrial peace, the glowing tinder of these first 
mobilizations also revealed something else, especially in the eyes of the new, more 
combative union leadership. While the formal industrial peace clauses embedded in 
almost all collective labor agreements hamper a union’s ability to call strikes, both in 
 - 111 - 
a legal and discursive way as well as in the field, the legal consequences thereof can 
under certain circumstances “take a backseat“ (Pedrina and Hartmann 2007: 93) and 
simply become less important. This is especially the case when employers are 
perceived as having broken some kind of “moral economy“ (Thompson 1966; 1971) 
of basic rules and decencies and a strike is seen as being particularly legitimate 
despite institutional constraints. 
All this being said, however, it is important to emphasize that this return to conflict 
was not an absolute or exclusive one, but a rather pragmatically dialectic one. The 
element of industrial conflict was thus not brought back with the idea of replacing the 
system of social partnership, but as one to be embedded within it.  For although the 
unions sought to bring contentious mobilizations back into the world of industrial 
relations, they consciously did so within the existing institutions of the CLA (with the 
relative exception of stretching the principle of absolute industrial peace). As such, 
not only did regular negotiations and bipartisan inspections of working conditions 
continue, but when the construction industry’s crisis of the mid-1990s hit, the “social 
partners” actively worked together to push among other things for more public 
investments in infrastructure and thus stimulate the construction economy. 
While the construction union continued to use the annual wage negotiations as well 
as the renewal periods of the CLA (usually every three years) as platforms upon 
which to continuously rebuild a culture of labor militancy and redevelop their own 
skills at organizing broad mobilizations, the leadership came to the conclusion that 
something more, something bigger was needed. After broad debates and deep 
discussions within the union, a “grand issue”, as one union leader of the time put it to 
me, was found. At a time when conservatives, liberals and employers were 
demanding the general retirement age to be raised, the union would demand the 
lowering of retirement age for construction workers from 65 to 60. Besides 
representing a potentially huge step forward for the workers themselves, it equally 
represented an ambitious project upon which the union could rebuild itself. 
Lasting a number of years, the campaign for early retirement was a comprehensive 
one taking on a number of forms. The union used it to organize colorful 
demonstrations activating workers, to carry out disruptive actions calling industrial 
peace into question and finally as a public campaign to gain sympathy for the cause 
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of labor. The latter point, aimed at enhancing the union’s societal power, included the 
publication of a lengthy study allocating the deteriorating health conditions of 
construction workers in their 60s. As such, the campaign not only reached 
construction workers on a very practical as well as emotional level, but managed to 
gain the blessing of large parts of the general public as well.  
As a result of these efforts, the issue was seriously negotiated between the union 
and the employers. In fact, in the spring of 2002, it seemed like a compromise had 
been found. Soon thereafter, however, the employers retracted an already negotiated 
agreement, thus not only robbing the workers of their chance at early retirement, but 
simultaneously breaking the rules of the above mentioned “moral economy“ ( 
Thompson 1966; 1971). It was now that the union leadership saw its real chance. 
After formally deciding upon industrial action at a delegates assembly in September, 
the campaign culminated into what was to be the most intensive industrial action the 
country had seen in decades. On November 4th, 2002, ten thousand construction 
workers went on strike. The climax of the strike occurred in the German-speaking 
part of Switzerland, where striking workers blocked a main Autobahn at the Baregg-
Tunnel, causing mass disruption and thus immense public pressure on the 
construction employers association. A few days after the strike, the employers 
conceded. An agreement was signed and early retirement at the age of 60 was 
implemented starting the following year. This new institution was to be financed to 
80% by employer dues (four percent of all wages of the company) and to 20% by 
employee dues (one percent of their wages). 
The momentum of this historical, water-shed moment was felt on a number of levels. 
Within the construction union, it was a strong sign that not only was change possible, 
but that the strategy of renewing the union through contentious mobilizations was 
working. Within the wider federation of unions, the idea of rebuilding a social-
movement-oriented, conflict-ready labor movement had been “proven in the field”, as 
one labor leader told phrased it. These discussions even reached the Swiss 
Metalworkers and Watchmakers Association, long considered as more conservative 
and dominated by corporatist thought. And finally in the public sphere, where strikes 
were largely seen as either residues of bygone days or even hostile assertions of 
particular interests, the strike gained new recognition (Pedrina and Hartmann 2007). 
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Indeed, after decades of industrial peace, construction’s strike for early retirement 
represented a “rehabilitation of strikes“ (Oesch 2011: 94) both inside and outside the 
labor movement. 
On a more personal level, the strike also touched the emotions of many workers in a 
remarkable manner. Looking back at his own participation in the strike, construction 
worker Antonio recalled how: 
It was a weird feeling. We were really doing the unthinkable. Not only did we refuse to 
work and had gather together with other workers from all over Switzerland, we were 
actually blocking a highway! Cars beeping everywhere… And then we just 
spontaneously ran through the tunnel to meet the other striking workers on the other 
side. Over a kilometer long! I remember hugging people on the other side. And we 
didn’t even know we were going to win then! At the time, it seemed like we had already 
won just by doing what we were doing, just by the fact that we were fighting together! 
That was enough for us at the moment.  
A few days later, I was back on the construction site, back to everyday life, and the 
radio was on. Then they announced it, right there on the radio: We had won, the 
employers had given in. I started to cry. Right there in front of my colleagues on the 
construction site. I started to cry.  
Besides this uplifting spirit and the individual as well as collective experiences 
gathered during the mobilizations leading up to 2002, in order to seriously rebuild 
labor’s associational power in an increasingly hostile environment, such an endeavor 
also required an organizational consolidation. This was needed in order to provide 
the necessary size, framework, resources and clout. It would, in the long run, be 
especially important if the union movement was to not only consolidate its power in 
its traditional bastions, but also expand to the growing service sector, which largely 
represented a “union desert”. It was into this ambiguous atmosphere that a new 
name was born: Unia. 
The New Union in Town 
The pictures and videos of Unia’s founding congress in Basel in 2004 symbolically 
visualized what the new organization aspired to be: big, loud, extravagant and full of 
activist members devoting their time and effort to “their” union movement. Massive 
red banners decorating both the inside and outside of the building, fireworks and 
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confetti blasting across the stage and combative speeches were the defining 
moments. However, reflecting not only its movement-oriented stance, but also the 
union’s nonetheless still solid place in the established institutions of social 
partnership and politics, a prestigious visit by a member of the Bundesrat, the Swiss 
government executive, was also part of the program. The transformational aspect of 
the event was captured when Vasco Pedrina, hitherto president of the Construction 
and Industry Union, and Renzo Ambrosetti, hitherto president of the Swiss 
Metalworkers and Watchmakers Association, both donned Unia-hats and addressed 
the crowd. Their respective organizations had joined together to become the multi-
industry trade union Unia. As a result of this merger, Unia had overnight become the 
by far largest union in Switzerland with around 200’000 members in various branches 
of the private sector. 
The actual roots of this merger go back to at least 1996, when both the construction 
union and the metalworkers union joined together to form the cooperative project 
unia (with a lowercase “u”). The goal of this first step together was to organize more 
workers in the service sector as this was considered a strategically important “union 
desert”, where only a fraction of the many workers were organized. At the same time, 
it was precisely the service sector that was, in contrast to the union heartlands of 
construction and manufacturing, actually growing in the economy. Yet while the 
“greening” of the service sector was an important pillar of this cooperation, the 
alliance between the two unions was part of a far greater “strategic project” and 
pooling power resources in “traditional industries” was just as important (Rieger 
2014: 17f.). 
Intensifying their cooperative efforts throughout the years, a formal merger of the 
Swiss Metalworkers and Watchmakers Association with the Construction and 
Industry Union, which had by now overtaken the former to become the largest union 
in Switzerland, was principally decided upon as early as 2000 and 2002 in the 
respective delegates assemblies of the two organizations (ibid). At the end of 2004, 
however, the merger became official and the two organizations melted together, 
managing to additionally recruit the smaller Union for Retail, Trade, Transport and 
Groceries (Gewerkschaft Verkauf, Handel, Transport und Lebensmittel, VHTL) as 
well. 
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While this was generally speaking a merger of equals, and both the construction 
union and the metalworkers union were able to assert many of the organizational and 
political points that were important to their respective organizations, “[…] the 
construction groove remained dominant in the new organization”, as one regional 
director of Unia told me (in Kelley 2017). In fact, the re-thinking process that had 
unfolded in the Construction and Industry Union about the future of the labor 
movement and industrial relations had not only become rather hegemonial in the 
newly founded Unia, but even more intense as well. 
It was at least in this point that the dedication of the activists of the New Left, who 
had pursued a very concrete project of bringing organized labor back to its more 
movement-oriented roots, undoubtedly succeeded. Not only retrieving the instrument 
of the strike as a legitimate instrument of bargaining power, the very fundamental 
idea of a new “conflictual social partnership”, where conflict was to represent a 
normal and inherent component of industrial relations between labor and capital, had 
developed as well (Kelley 2017). Besides touching the material reality of negotiations 
and workplace mobilizations, this rupture was also expressed on the discursive level. 
As one of the most important union leaders of the time, who played a central role in 
the 2002 construction strike, remarked to me: “The employers can call it “social 
partnership” if they want and refer to us and them as “social partners”, but to me we 
are simply in a Vertragspartnerschaft [contract partnership] as Vertragspartner 
[contract partners] with very different interests – no more and no less.” And in an 
article titled “conflictive partner”, the center-right daily Neue Zürcher Zeitung 
concluded that “Since the nineties, SMUV [the Metalworkers and Watchmaking 
Association] and GBI [the Construction and Industry Union] respectively Unia has 
developed from a classic social partner to a combat organization.“ (Gemperli 2015: 
13). 
It goes without saying that this fundamental shift away from “legitimately expected 
behavior“ (Parsons in Knight 1992: 15) has not been well received by most 
employers. Employers, especially in construction, regularly criticize the union for 
supposed breaches of the industrial peace. In the words of the current president of 
the construction employers association, this conflictive bargaining style of Unia is 
fundamentally “un-Swiss” (Lardi in Gemperli 2015: 13). As such, there has been a 
significant divergence in the respective understandings of what social partnership 
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actually means and especially what constraints it actually places on the union’s 
contractual ability to organize protest actions – expressed on both a discursive level 
as well as one of concrete behavior and actions (Kelley 2017). 
Yet while heavily and regularly criticized as ideologically-driven by both employers 
and some media commentators, from labor’s perspective this conflictual social 
partnership has a certain rationality to it. On the one hand, if we adhere to Wright’s 
(2000) conclusion that as long as capitalism exists, then it is in the best interest of 
organized labor to go into contractual relations with capital, i.e. a “class compromise”. 
Thus, despite a clearer focus on mobilizations and a semantic shift in vocabulary and 
discourse, the system of social partnership in the sense of CLA-bargaining and 
bipartisan CLA enforcement was not fundamentally challenged from the side of labor. 
On the other hand, equally emphasized by Wright (ibid), if labor is to actually profit 
from such a “class compromise”, it must be in a strong enough position of 
associational power to ensure that it is able to push through its demands within that 
compromise if not otherwise given. As such, a conflictual social partnership can 
represent a logical answer to this dilemma. 
Today, Unia is made up of 200’000 members stretching across various industries of 
the economy, each organized in one of the four sectors of the organization: 
construction, crafts, manufacturing and services10. The heads of each sectors are 
voted in to their fulltime position by active union members and are then confirmed by 
the organization’s congress, held every four years. These sector leaders are also 
part of the organizations seven-head national executive. While a national campaign 
such as that in construction is conceptualized, developed, coordinated and led by the 
respective national leaderships of the sectors, i.e. by the sector heads and their 
teams, the day to day organizing of workers, i.e. the operative realization of national 
campaigns such as the one in construction, is carried out by the organizing teams of 
Unia’s 15 regional units. 
Stretching across all of its four sectors and 15 regional units, Unia today employs 
around 300 political staff, including frontline organizers, researchers, political 
analysists and members of the national leadership. While in earlier days, union staff 
were almost exclusively recruited from the pools of activist workers, today’s labor 
                                               
10 Unia website. https://www.unia.ch/de/ueber-uns/ (1.8.2017) 
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world has made that recruitment process more heterogeneous. On the one hand, the 
sharp left turn of the unions, one mirrored throughout a number of countries of the 
Western world, has attracted political activists who cut their political teeth in 
grassroots social movements such as the anti-globalization movement, the Young 
Socialists or anti-fascist groups, thus in a way representing a continuity of the New 
Left tradition of the 1990s. On the other hand, the changing profile of the job of a 
union organizer, evolving from a more stable and service-oriented one, to one with 
odd hours, high mental strain, daily conflict situations and one demanding high social 
skills mixed with complex conceptual abilities, is a rather unique one. In the case of 
the construction industry, with its blend of different languages, the necessity of 
mother-tongue Portuguese and Albanian speakers has further defined the pool of 
potential organizers. 
While not all of the staff have an activist or political background, many do. In fact, as 
one union organizer even put it: 
In my eyes, I am basically a full time activist. I have the luck and privilege to serve the 
labor movement one hundred percent. To me it is not just a Beruf [job], but a 
Berufung [a calling]. That’s why I personally do my eight hours a day as paid work, 
but I am proud to work much more in the sense of Engagement [activism] – just like 
thousands of our worker activists do after their long hours of often physically 
exhausting work. Yeah, of course I know it is not exactly the same and the daily 
realities and perspectives of staff organizers and volunteer activists are different in 
some regards, but that’s the perspective I have on it and it’s what drives me forward – 
together with our activists. I am a Gewerkschafter [union man]. 
Despite the important role of this rather large staff outfit, the main project of Unia is in 
fact, besides the quantitative growth of its membership base, to recruit and activate 
more workers themselves to take on active roles in the organization (Alleva 2014). 
While long an implicit vision of both the Construction and Industry Union as well as 
the newly founded Unia, a strategy of Unia Forte (“strong Unia”) was formally 
launched in 2008 with the goal of building new and strengthening existing worker-
activist-groups. This was particularly important as this volunteer worker activism had 
been strongly neglected during the corporatistic years of industrial peace and activist 
structures in many industries and companies had gradually petered out. This is an 
aspect which will be elaborated upon in chapter six. 
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Despite the fact that Unia has indeed managed to make headway in strategic areas 
of the service sector, in particular in hotels and catering, retail trade and newly health 
care, one of its more traditional sectors continues to take on an absolutely central 
role: the construction sector.  
Continuing to fulfill the function of a union flagship within and outside of the labor 
movement, the construction industry has indeed remained one of Unia’s most 
strongest sectors and also one of its most active ones. As one union organizer 
explained: 
Look, we founded this union because we wanted a labor movement that is strong, 
active and effective in all areas of the economy. From construction to manufacturing 
to health care. A fighting trade union that really deserves that name. But in today’s 
reality, construction is the place where that is actually reality. Not that we aren’t active 
or successful in other areas, but construction is the only industry where we are 
actually able to mobilize thousands of workers throughout the country and show 
everybody, both other workers as well as the public, that standing up together works. 
The union works. Fighting works. It’s just an almost one to one example proving that 
we say can be reality. At the same time, it’s just as much an inward goal and 
important to us as an organization. Because looking back at our predecessors, when 
you stop fighting, you get fat. You get lazy and weak. So waging broad, intensive and 
regular campaigns in construction also keeps us as a union active. It’s the tugboat 
that keeps this whole movement going. Maybe that will change some day and that 
role will be taken up by some other group of workers. But for right now, it’s 
construction. 
In a similar tone, yet slightly more gleeful and personal, following a construction rally 
in one of the union’s local regions that had had a surprisingly good turnout, union 
activist Emilio stated that: “You can tell the president [of Unia] that this is it! This is it! 
Construction is the motor of Unia that makes it drive like a Ferrari going 300 an hour! 
You can go tell that to the president!” 
Yet despite this spirit of optimism, not all has been carefree in the union’s historical 
stronghold. Looking back at the 2002 strike five years later, the former president of 
the construction union and first co-president of Unia, Vasco Pedrina, came to the 
ambiguous conclusion that while the union had indeed made significant steps in the 
years leading up to and after the strike, they still had a long way to go (Pedrina and 
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Hartmann 2007). For despite its success in 2002, construction’s “Blitzstreik” for early 
retirement was just as much the product of an emotional topic, tireless agitation and 
good planning as it was the intuitive seizing of a very unique and rare opportunity 
(Pedrina and Hartmann 2007: 95). For by having exploited the fact that at the time 
the construction employers association was weak and divided and also having 
managed to take the employers by surprise with the union’s spectacular highway-
blockade, the union managed to compensate for the fact that it had not truly regained 
the level of mobilizational ability it had lost during the decades of industrial peace. 
Thus, emphasizing that the 2002 strike could not simply be replicated at will, Pedrina 
and Hartmann state that “The unions will have to develop new paths if they do not 
want to be pushed back into the defensive.“ (Pedrina and Hartmann 2007: 95). 
This was, however, no simple task. Generally speaking, employers throughout the 
industry had continued to drift far to the political right and had consolidated the 
mainstreaming of neoliberal principles both on a political level as well as on an 
economic one. Furthermore, they had begun to react more systematically and 
professionally when unions attempted to organize industrial action (Pedrina and 
Hartmann 2007: 90). After their embarrassing defeat in 2002, the construction 
employers association went through a profound process of change. Looking back, a 
former Unia construction leader (who was otherwise proud of his militant reputation) 
even privately admitted that “Maybe it would have been smarter of us not to have so 
publicly ridiculed the employers after winning in 2002.”  
Besides replacing its leadership with a more hardliner president, one who had run on 
a slate of never again giving in to the unions, the construction employers association 
had also professionalized its workings as an organization. Starting by encouraging its 
member companies to take a harder stance against union organizers when the latter 
visited their construction sites, the association also built up a skilled political 
communications department. Together with its legal department, the association 
began to provide companies with step by step tactical instructions on how to prevent 
even the most timid union mobilizations from unfolding. 
This anti-union posturing was particularly expressed in 2007 when the construction 
employers unilaterally terminated the collective labor agreement. This unprecedented 
step came when the union refused to consent to a “light version” of the CLA (“LMV-
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light”), which would have made the industry’s CLA immensely more flexible in 
questions of minimum wages, working times, etc. While Unia was ultimately able to 
turn the overly aggressive stance of the employers into a dynamic of “defending our 
rights” and responded by organizing strikes and ultimately renegotiating the CLA, it 
was a clear manifestation of the course employers were steering in their attempts to 
discipline the union. While employers were wise enough not to actually terminate the 
agreement in the next round of negotiations in 2011, both parties nonetheless took 
such a bullish stance that the running contract expired before an agreement could be 
found and there was a short period of Vertragslosigkeit (a time where the industry is 
“contractless”, without a contract). It also saw the employers toy with the idea of 
having a CLA, but not with Unia, the largest union in the industry. 
When 2015 arrived and the CLA was once again to be renegotiated by the end of the 
year, both the employers and the unions were aware of what was at stake. This 
concerned not only the latest demands of the union, but touched upon a far deeper 
level of who was able to assert themselves. The situation was particularly sensitive 
as both the construction employers association and Unia’s construction department 
had new leaders as the previous ones had retired. As such, neither side was 
particularly keen on the idea of giving in and losing face. 
While the union as usual had a long catalogue of demands, three issues were 
particularly important from its perspective. First of all, it wanted to introduce a more 
worker-friendly CLA-article concerning criteria for shutting down construction sites 
during bad weather as well as for guaranteeing that workers did not lose hours or 
wages when work is put on hold in such situations. Today, despite a minimum 
amount of protective measures, the industry’s CLA is rather vague as to what 
actually constitutes for bad weather. And when workers actually do stay at home, 
they often pay for it with wage- and/or hour-deductions. Second of all, the union has 
long pushed for more effective provisions against CLA-violations by employers, i.e. 
measures against so-called wage- and social-dumping. As will become clear in the 
next chapter, the Swiss construction industry has become increasingly plagued by 
intense competition between companies, often ending with some employers either 
illegally depriving workers of their minimum wages and benefits or otherwise keeping 
personnel-costs systematically low. 
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The union’s third demand, however, was by far the most decisive one. As noted 
above, the construction industry’s early retirement scheme gives workers the chance 
to retire at 60 instead of the regular age of 65. It was and is not only a highly popular, 
but also deeply emotionalized institution. For construction workers, the Flexibler 
Altersrückritt FAR (flexible retirement), as it is called, is both a source of hope in the 
sense of knowing they will not have to “work and die as a cripple”, as one worker 
phrased it, as well as a source of pride by feeling that their hard manual labor is not 
only given meaningful and material recognition, but that they had successfully fought 
for it. 
However, as described in the introduction, due to demographic changes seeing a 
particularly large number of workers reaching retirement age in the next ten years, 
FAR needed additional funding. While Unia together with the smaller union Syna 
demanded that the problem be resolved through raising employer and employee 
dues, the employers had a different solution in mind. Referring to wider societal 
debates on retirement and the growingly dominant idea that employees everywhere 
will have to work longer in the future, the employers demanded that the construction 
workers’ early-retirement-age should either be raised from 60 to 61 or even 62 or that 
the workers’ monthly pensions be reduced. 
Aware that Unia would attempt to wage a campaign along the issue, the employers 
decided to wait it out. Starting at the end of 2014, they refused to negotiate with the 
union on anything at all. The reason the employers gave for their refusal was neither 
the explicit issue of retirement nor even Unia’s generally combatant approach. It was 
in fact a new department in one of Unia’s local regions (Kelley 2017). Sporting the 
name Department for Risk Analysis (Fachstelle Risikoanalyse), the goal of this new 
unit is to provide prime contractors with systematic assessments on whether or not 
their subcontractors abide by labor laws and CLA regulations.  
The background of this new department is complex. In 2013, after a public pressure 
campaign by Unia and its allies in parliament, a new law of Solidarhaftung (solidary 
liability) was passed making prime contractors in construction partially liable for the 
labor-violations committed by their subcontractors. In fact, this step alone had 
already upset the construction employers. For in their eyes, such a rule could and 
should not to be determined by the third-party state, but by the social partners alone. 
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Thus, by (successfully) campaigning and calling on the state to introduce such a law 
after having failed to win it as a CLA-concession in the 2011/2012 negotiations, Unia 
had in the view of the employers already clearly overstepped a red line. 
When one of the union’s local regions then introduced its Department for Risk 
Analysis, unilaterally offering prime contractors assessments as to whether or not 
their subcontractors (including renowned construction companies) abided by CLA-
regulations and labor laws, the construction employers association was livid (Kelley 
2017). In their eyes, this latest move by Unia represented a clearly unilateral version 
of contract enforcement, thus breaching the very essence of bipartisan social 
partnership. In the eyes of Unia, however, not only had they previously offered to 
launch this new unit together with the employers, which the latter had explicitly 
declined, but in any case the new department did not actually enforce the contract. It 
did not carry out inspections nor did it sanction violations, but simply provided 
analysis based on already existing information after obtaining the written permission 
of the potential subcontractor (who were asked to give this by the prime contractor). 
As such, this was, in the eyes of the union, not contract enforcement, but a severely 
necessary preventive measure in the fight against the growing menace of wage-
dumping. 
Besides undoubtedly authentic opposition to the union’s new department described 
above, in the eyes of Unia the employers’ rationale behind their refusal to negotiate 
also had a strategic logic. By Swiss law, if a social insurance, such as construction’s 
early retirement, finds itself unable to pay out its pensions, then a governmental 
board is compelled to intervene. However, as the government cannot force the 
institution in question to raise its funding, but only intervene in the preexisting 
financial framework, then the only possible measure at hand is the forced reduction 
of pensions and/or raising workers’ retirement age. Thus, in other words, if the 
employers could continue to refuse to negotiate, then their demands would be 
automatically fulfilled after a certain point in time. According to Unia’s calculations, 
that time would arrive rather quickly, namely at the beginning of 2016.  
This was the situation in which the union found itself at the beginning of the 2015 
campaign: a setting demanding that the union either give in to the partial dismantling 
of early retirement or amass enough bargaining power to force the employers to first 
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of all start negotiating and second of all actually concede to raising their financial 
contributions towards the early retirement scheme. Besides the already tense 
situation in the industrial relations of construction, the political environment 
concerning the question of retirement age in general did not make the union’s 
position any more easy. 
When looking back at our journey through the chequered development of industrial 
relations in Switzerland, going from conflict to cooperation and to a certain extent 
back to conflict again, it becomes clear that the subject is neither one of some 
unilineal evolution nor a simple case of history repeating itself. While a historically 
speaking relatively short phase of corporatist social partnership has now been 
succeeded by a return to more openly waged conflicts of interest, today’s case is 
neither one of exclusive conflict nor one of exclusive cooperation. As pointed out 
above and will be seen in greater detail in the coming chapter, todays growing 
industrial strife is, in marked contrast to industrial relations of the pre-war years, 
nonetheless embedded in the deep institutional framework held together in the 
collective labor agreement. We are thus dealing with an entirely new form of social 
partnership, one that is spread out on a multilayered continuum of cooperation and 
conflict, including collective bargaining, bipartisan CLA-enforcement and occasional 
cooperative projects such as that during the industry’s crisis of the 1990s. 
Yet besides more aggressive construction employer stances in a more neoliberally 
influenced political economy and the union still not having completely recovered from 
decades of mobilizational passivity during the era of industrial peace, the union was 
simultaneously facing additional barriers of a more structural nature. While the roots 
of these barriers can also be contextualized in the neoliberal changes of the time, 
they were less a conscious or direct product of union-busting, but more an 
unintended consequence of the increased use of precarious forms of labor. 
Nonetheless, they undoubtedly represented and continue to represent yet further 
obstacles to collective action. In order to not only shed light on those structural 
upheavals,  but also on the changing functioning of the industry in general, we will 
now explore the world of the Swiss construction industry. 
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4.  Unstable Foundations: Changing Swiss Construction 
The team of union organizers stood in front of the construction site in preparation for 
one of their routine visits. It was the construction site of a tall building, located just 
along the train tracks leading into the capital city of Unia’s Mittelland region. The site 
was located in a dense urban area, hugged by railroad tracks on the one side and a 
busy main street on the other. Despite this lack of space, the gradually arising office-
building-to-be was nonetheless a rather grand undertaking. Because of this density 
everything on the site was rather compact. Unlike many other sites, there was little 
space leading up to and around the new building itself. The green and white 
containers of the workers, the “barracks” in which they had their coffee and lunch 
breaks, were wedged together as well as stacked upon each other to save space, 
with wooden stairs ascending to the upper ones. The building material and surplus 
scaffolding was closely bunched together in a remarkably neat manner. Only the tall 
crane towering above was given its due space, although even it sacrificed no 
unnecessary room. 
In contrast to smaller sites visited throughout the day, the local region’s union 
organizers would often visit such large ones during the workers’ lunch breaks. It was 
far from the first time they had been on this particular site, nor were its workers 
unknown to them. In fact, a lot of the workers on the site seemed to be well 
acquainted with the union organizers. 
“Back again? You must really miss us if you have nothing better to do!”, laughed one 
of the workers in a teasingly provocative, but friendly manner. “Yeah, I really can’t 
live without you Paulo, as you can imagine.”, one of the female organizers of the 
team hurled back at the longtime union member, jestingly rolling her eyes. “Want a 
coffee?”, he then said, evidently satisfied that he had fulfilled the obligatory ritual of 
challenging the organizers – letting them know that they were welcome, but not 
without a jab. 
“Can we assemble everybody together? We have some news we want to share with 
you. It’s important.” As noted above, the workers were far from strangers to the 
structured routines of the union’s organizing team and quickly gathered in the little 
space there was in front of the castle of containers. Forming a half circle, some were 
sitting, some were standing. It was the second half of the lunch break and a number 
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of workers were by now sipping espresso from disposable plastic cups. In total, there 
were about forty workers present and this time, even the foreman joined the group. 
He was not without his own testing digs, but was generally sympathetic to the union.  
The union organizers, alternating between one organizer speaking German and the 
other Portuguese, then proceeded to inform the workers about the latest move by the 
construction employers and about how the latter still refused to negotiate based on 
supposedly shady reasons. Towards the end of this “presentation”, as the organizers 
termed it, a rather lively discussion broke out and a lot of the workers had a number 
of questions, something that was not necessarily always the case. What happens if 
the employers continue to refuse to negotiate? What will the union do about it? What 
did the union want the workers to do about it? Can the state do anything? 
To anybody unfamiliar with construction, the half circle formed was a rather 
homogeneous pack. All were wearing work clothes and each had heavy, steel-toed 
safety boots. Of course, some were more tanned than others, some sported tattoos 
while others did not, and the fact that the organizers were switching languages 
revealed the obvious fact that this was a group made up of different nationalities. 
Looking closer, however, while all were wearing some kind of work clothes and had a 
hardhat and tool-belt lurking somewhere nearby, at second glance a surprisingly 
large variety of company logos adorned the sweatshirts, pants and hardhats of the 
seemingly unified crowd. Furthermore, also far from clear at first glance, some of the 
workers wore the gear of companies that were actually not even involved in the 
project at hand. The fact that their logos were present was a remnant of some of the 
workers’ past employments, equally serving as a subtle sign that their current 
employer had not equipped them with new clothes. A scant majority, however, wore 
green and orange pants and jackets displaying a large “A” standing for the company 
“Anker” [company pseudonym], the main construction firm involved. 
Having previously briefed each other on the drive to the construction site, one of the 
organizers had remarked upon the heterogeneity of the group: “[…] Anyway, this is 
an Anker site and the majority are Anker guys, but right now there are a number of 
subs [subcontractors] on the site as well. Iron-layers, shuttering workers, even some 
bricklayers that are subs. Besides that, as you all know, a lot of the Anker workers 
are temporary workers. It’s not so clear how long they will stay on this site.” 
 - 126 - 
Once the union organizers had concluded their presentation and the lively 
discussions had died out, the workers slowly dispersed back to their containers, 
either to get another coffee or to lay down for five minutes before the second half of 
the day began.  
Themselves walking back to the car, the lead organizer of the union team was 
beginning to assess their visit: How many people were there? What was the mood 
like? Which “groups” had come to the presentation? The permanently employed 
Anker workers? The temporary workers? The subcontractors? 
“Wait – what about the temporary workers from the container back left. The Spanish 
ones? Were they there?” “No, I don’t think so”, the other organizer replied.  
“Why didn’t somebody talk to that group?! Why?!” 
What towards the end of this episode may come across as comical confusion to an 
uninvolved onlooker was by now a rather common phenomenon on the construction 
sites of Switzerland: a growingly fragmented workforce. In fact, in the larger 
metropolitan centers such as region Mittelland, such diverse and heterogeneous 
workforces were the rule, not the exception. In place of solid crews employed by one 
company, today’s workforces tend to be composed of one main company, in the 
above case Anker, a substantial number of temporary workers momentarily 
embedded in the main company’s team (yet employed through personnel agencies), 
and finally a number of groups employed by smaller subcontractor companies sent to 
do specific, often repetitive tasks and then being deployed to other sites after the task 
is completed. And this was, of course, only the main construction trades, i.e. the 
building of the main, outer skeleton. As can be imagined, the effects of this process, 
both on the workers as well as on the union organizing them, are dramatic. 
After our historical journey through the development of organized labor in the last 
chapter, this one will take a closer look at the currently changing world of 
construction labor itself. After first introducing the reader to the structures and 
particularities of the industry, we will then examine the wider political economic 
parameters thereof. This in particular concerns the industry’s collective labor 
agreement and the various and sometimes contradicting ways it shapes the 
economic workings of construction. What will become clear is that the CLA not only 
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protects workers’ wages and working conditions, but that it may simultaneously be 
saving the employers from their own collective action problems (Wright 2000) and 
general “shortsightedness“ (Marx paraphrased in Harvey 2010: 157) by serving to 
stabilize otherwise “wild” and “unfair” competition. Furthermore, the flow of much 
needed migrant labor onto Switzerland’s construction sites, guaranteed to a large 
part by the bilateral agreements with the European Union, and the interdependencies 
between this and the industry’s CLA, will also be examined. 
The second half of the chapter will then examine in depth the transformational 
changes unfolding in construction, ones leading directly to the realities noted in the 
introductory paragraphs above. It will show how a vicious cycle of price and time 
competition, articulated along the wider neoliberal turn elaborated on in the last 
chapter, has led to the introduction of new and more precarious forms of 
employment. Besides calling the wages, working conditions and job security of 
individual construction workers into question, on an even deeper level it has altered 
the composition of the labor force as a whole. By focusing on the effects of this 
precarization on the social structure of the workforce, our analysis will reveal the 
serious challenges arising for a union attempting to organize these workers into a 
collective force. 
The Industry: Hard-Hats, Containers and Interest-Rates 
Whether in Switzerland or in the United States, the construction industry often plays 
a vital role in the greater economy of industrialized nations. While the industry 
exercised even greater weight in the immediate post-war years and into the 1970s, 
construction continues to be an essential motor of economic growth in modern-day 
capitalism. Making up roughly around one tenth of the entire gross domestic product 
(Schweizerischer Baumeisterverband 2016: 8), the construction industry in 
Switzerland is a major player in the greater economy and, due to this economic 
importance, the significance as well as influence of the industry stretches far into the 
political sphere. As can be imagined, the great bulk of construction activity is carried 
out in metropolitan areas such as region Mittelland, where everything from the 
building of massive apartment buildings to gigantic industrial construction is 
conducted.  
 - 128 - 
The main construction industry, which represents the heart of the greater building 
sector as well as the subject of this thesis, is responsible for producing the main 
framework and outer shell of buildings, roads, canals, tunnels, etc.11 In Switzerland, 
this is generally divided into Hochbau (construction above ground such as houses 
and buildings) and Tiefbau (infrastructure construction on or underground, such as 
roads and tunnels). While infrastructure construction is an important part of the 
industry and can also be very profitable for the companies involved, the majority of 
employees work in Hochbau, i.e. in the construction of above-ground buildings.  
Once the excavation of a building site is completed, a task often conducted by 
Tiefbau-companies, the main construction process is made up of a wide number of 
tasks and jobs. Leading the actual construction operation is one or on larger sites 
several Poliere or foremen. They are the highest-ranking construction workers still 
involved in the operative part of the production process. To quote one such informant 
of mine: “We run the show, but we still get our hands dirty.” These foremen are in 
turn assisted by one or more Vorarbeiter, squad leaders in charge of smaller sections 
of the site. The crew itself is then made up of Maurer, bricklayers with the widest 
diversity and skills, as well as Eisenleger, who install the iron-reinforcements upon 
which concrete is later poured, and Schaler, who assemble the temporary wooden-
boarding along the iron-reinforcements. The Maurer, however, are the main group 
that not only tend to be employed by the main construction company leading the site, 
but also the ones that are on the site for the longest period of time due to their wide 
range of tasks. Furthermore, each site will also have one or more Kranführer or crane 
operators, depending on the number of cranes, and one or more Maschinisten, 
heavy-machine operators. 
Despite technological progress, construction remains a labor-intensive industry. As a 
result, the main construction industry alone employs between 80’000 and 100’000 
(almost exclusively male) workers. This number varies depending on the statistical 
source as well as on the season of the year. Thus, the main construction industry 
represents an important player in the wider labor market. Especially when the 
                                               
11 Following the main construction phase on building sites, there is of course an equally complex 
phase of interior construction, involving plasterers, painters, electricians, etc. The thesis at hand 
focuses its perspective on the main construction trades due to the latter’s central economic 
importance as well as its strategic meaning for the union and because interior construction is 
embedded in different CLAs and displays different social phenomena. 
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industry finds itself in an economic upswing such as that of today, it is desperately 
reliant on a steady flow of labor power, which is not always so easy to find. In fact, at 
least every third worker has no formal training, but is recruited to learn “on the job” 
(Schweizerischer Baumeisterverband 2016: 41). The other two thirds are made up of 
previously unskilled workers who have meanwhile completed a machinists or crane-
operator course and a minority of workers who completed a three-year-
apprenticeship to become a qualified Maurer or in the realm of Tiefbau, a qualified 
Strassenbauer (street builder). 
Such three-year apprenticeships generally begin after one has completed obligatory 
schooling, when the candidates are around sixteen years of age. The Swiss 
apprenticeship system is built as a dual-education system, meaning that apprentices 
generally work three days a week and go to vocational school on the other two. Due 
to their later much needed skills and thus strong individual position in the 
construction labor market, many of these qualified Maurer go on to become 
Vorarbeiter (squad leaders) and then Poliere (foremen). That being said, the industry 
finds it notoriously difficult to recruit young people for an apprenticeship. While 
perhaps phrased in somewhat different words, many employers in the industry 
attribute this to construction’s universal reputation as a “dirty job“ (Piore 1979) as well 
as “society’s lack of respect for manual trades”, as a number of informants, both 
employers and employees, have phrased it. Each year, a little more than one 
thousand apprentices complete their training (Schweizerischer Baumeisterverband 
2016: 5) – a comparatively low rate given the size of the industry. 
Not least as a result of the difficulties construction employers have in securing labor 
power in Switzerland and in keeping with what seems to be a strikingly common 
aspect of construction throughout the industrialized world, the Swiss construction 
industry has long been reliant on migrant labor. In fact, the great majority of 
construction workers in Switzerland are not Swiss citizens. At least 63% of 
employees in the main construction industry are non-Swiss-citizens (Schweizerischer 
Baumeisterverband 2016: 43). This number does not include workers with an 
immigrant background who are meanwhile naturalized citizens. Every year, between 
8’000 and 10’000 new workers need to be recruited from outside of Switzerland just 
in order to compensate the industry’s fluctuation of labor (Gygi 2014). That being 
said, the great majority of formally qualified bricklayers, squad leaders and foremen 
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are Swiss citizens, while migrant workers tend to fall into the categories of “unskilled” 
or semi-skilled laborers. 
While some of these migrant workers were already living in Switzerland at the time 
they entered the construction industry, a great number thereof are systematically 
recruited in their countries of origin. This recruitment process can take on a more 
formal style, such as through personnel agencies publicly advertising in Portugal or 
Italy, yet it can also fall back on more informal networks, when for example an 
employer will directly ask one or more of his employees if they “have a brother or 
cousin that would be interested in a job”, as a number of informants pointed out. 
While yesterday’s construction workforces were, besides Swiss workers, primarily 
made up of Italian and to a certain extent Spanish workers, the quantitative 
significance of both of the latter groups has drastically declined in the past decades. 
The construction sites of today are in fact manned by far more ethnically 
heterogeneous crews. Next to the Swiss workers, the by far largest group today are 
Portuguese, constituting almost a third of the entire workforce. While representing a 
significantly smaller portion of the entire personnel, Italians workers and workers 
coming from ex-Yugoslavia follow behind the Portuguese with 11, respectively 9 
percent. 
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Figure 1: Nationality structure of Swiss building site personnel  
Source: Schweizerischer Baumeisterverband (2016: 43), own illustration 
 
Besides the mobility of the labor power flowing into the production process from 
nearby and not-so-nearby countries, construction is simultaneously characterized by 
both a structural mobility as well as at the same time, on a different level, a strong 
geographical immobility. Understanding this dialectic puzzle is in fact vital in order to 
not only understand the workings of the industry, but also the associational as well as 
structural power of a union organizing and bargaining within it. 
On the one hand, the construction industry is a fundamentally mobile industry in the 
sense that in contrast to a factory producing transportable commodities, the 
production process in construction, with the exception of construction materials, must 
largely take place at the location of future “consumption” itself, i.e. where the 
envisioned building is to be constructed. The labor process thus occurs in “travelling 
factories“ (Bosch and Zühlke-Robinet 2000: 14) and the individual workplace of each 
construction crew is one that shifts every few years, months and sometimes, 
depending on their function within that process, even weeks or days. Everything from 
labor power, heavy-machinery, building materials and the workers’ resting containers 
are brought to and later taken away from these “travelling factories”.   
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Due to this local boundedness and a simultaneously low entry barrier for new 
companies (as some of the tasks are not necessarily capital-intensive), there is a 
rather strong regionalization of the construction industry. In other words, while a 
trans-regionalization is indeed unfolding today, local companies continue to play an 
important role in the industry. From an organizing perspective and thus one of 
associational power, what this mobility also means, is that it is easier for the union to 
establish contact with workers as their workplaces are generally “open” in contrast to 
the closed gates of a stationary factory. That being said, it is also easier for violations 
of the CLA and labor laws to occur (Bosch and Zühlke-Robinet 2000: 23), as the 
industry is far less surveyable due to the fact that some of the smaller companies, 
usually ones either installing iron-reinforcements or boarding, will only stay on a site 
for a number of weeks or even days. We will return to this later on. 
On the other hand, representing the dialectic flip side of this mobility, the construction 
industry is also inherently immobile in a greater sense, due to the very same 
reasons. Given that the place of production, i.e. that of construction, is bound to the 
place of future consumption, the labor process itself cannot be exported or 
outsourced to other countries. It is, in this sense, bound to its future locality. While in 
some countries ready-installable houses are produced in factories and then 
transported to their future residencies, this is far from common, let alone prevalent. 
Besides technical aspects and transportation difficulties, this is also because 
buildings generally represent architecturally unique specimens and not mass staple 
articles. 
The vital importance of this second feature for a union’s structural power cannot be 
overemphasized. Given organized labor’s traditional strongholds in the 
manufacturing industry, unions in many countries have in the past decades been 
paralyzed by the outsourcing of their members’ jobs to far off countries with lower 
wages, taxes and general production costs. Even when not (yet) the case, the threat 
thereof has served to discipline labor from calling for “too high” demands. In the 
Swiss construction industry, however, this outsourcing-threat is, given the structures 
of the industry, simply not a factor. In the globalized and neoliberal realities of today’s 
economy, the  removal of this sword of Damocles hanging over the head of labor 
represents a significant relief to labor’s structural power. 
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Also adding to organized labor’s structural power is the fact that, currently speaking, 
the Swiss construction industry has been going through an intensive economic 
upswing for more than a decade. The industry has in fact reached the highest record 
of growth Swiss construction has ever witnessed. While a number of massive 
infrastructure projects in the last decade have contributed to this growth, the most 
important motor thereof has been the building of new housing. This is in turn is 
traceable to currently low interest rates which have made investing in real estate a 
lucrative project. 
That being said, the long-term stability of this growth is, as is any in the capitalist 
economy (Harvey 2011), certainly questionable. Indeed, it would not be the first time 
a bubble popped in the industry, leading among other things to absolutely massive 
lay-offs. During construction’s last severe crisis, in the mid-1990s, this led to a 
reduction of the entire workforce to around half of its previous size.  
 
Figure 2: Construction Index of expected turnovers in construction as of mid-May 2015,  
100% = 1st quarter of 1996 
Source: Bauindex Schweiz, Credit Suisse and Schweizerischer Baumeisterverband.  
http://www.baumeister.ch/de/politik-wirtschaft/wirtschaftsdaten/bauindex (24.5.2017) 
Construction’s “Bible”: the Collective Labor Agreement 
Considering that the economy is, like any other social phenomenon, embedded in a 
vast array of social institutions (Bugra and Agartan (eds.) 2007), we must continue 
our exploration of the changing Swiss construction industry and what that means for 
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organized labor by looking at the collective labor agreement, which as a social 
institution plays an absolutely vital role in shaping and structuring how the industry 
works. 
As noted in the previous chapter, the construction industry in Switzerland has been 
institutionally framed by a nationally valid collective labor agreement since 1938. This 
institution was, in a classic Knight-ian sense, originally born out of fierce industrial 
conflict between workers and employers. And while it continues to represent the main 
battlefield for both the unions as well as the construction employers association when 
it comes to diverging interests, especially during phases of contract renewal every 
three years, its main effect during contract periods is in fact a stabilizing one that is to 
a certain extent in the interest of both parties.  
Negotiated for a set amount of time, usually three years, by the Swiss Construction 
Employers Association on the one hand and Unia and the smaller Christian union 
Syna on the other, the CLA “pretty much has something to say about everything you 
could possibly imagine”, as one leading union official put it. While this does not mean 
that each side is necessarily content with every aspect of the agreement, as the CLA 
in effect represents a collection of bygone concessions between both labor and 
capital, the CLA has a remarkable depth. Furthermore, as it is declared generally 
binding by the state, it represents the rules of the game for all players involved, 
irrelevant if they belong to one of the signing parties or not and also making no 
exceptions for dispatched workers, firms temporarily working in Switzerland and 
personnel agencies temporarily “renting out” workers. As Leonardo, a long-time 
worker activist put it: “For all we are concerned, the CLA is our bible.” 
When compared with the roughly six hundred other CLAs in Switzerland12, the 
construction industry’s so-called Landesmantelvertrag (national framework 
agreement) indeed stands out as one guaranteeing particularly high standards. This 
characteristic is something both the construction employers as well as the union 
often point out, although also here the interpretations of what that means diverge 
greatly. While the employers suggest that because the CLA is so progressive, any 
and all talk of enhancing it is unrealistic, the unions recruit and keep members by 
                                               
12 Bundesamt für Statistik. Gesamtarbeitsverträge und Sozialpartnerschaft. 
https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/de/home/statistiken/arbeit-erwerb/gesamtarbeitsvertraege-
sozialpartnerschaft.html (5.6.2017) 
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pointing out their achievements, yet simultaneously emphasizing that “not all issues 
have been resolved yet, such as the question of wage-dumping and bad weather”, as 
one union recruiter phrased it. 
The CLA indeed covers a vast array of issues: minimum wages, working hours, 
overtime supplements, five weeks of paid holiday respectively six for those over 50, 
sick leave regulations and dismissal conditions to name only a few. Considering the 
seasonality of the industry, which involves most companies doing more work in the 
spring, summer and fall and far less in the cold and icy winter, in which it can be both 
irrationally difficult as well as dangerous, complex rules regulate how a yearly total of 
2’112 hours can be spread throughout the year. There is a separate CLA for the 
industry’s foremen, yet it is largely based on the industry’s main CLA. And while the 
industry’s early retirement scheme, covering both construction workers and foremen, 
is also an institution of social partnership between the same players involved in the 
CLA, it is technically a separate CLA for actuarial reasons. 



















































































Figure 3: Minimum wages in the Swiss construction industry since 2014 
Source: www.gav-service.ch (1.4.2017) 
 
While the unions and employers generally clash when it comes to enhancing or 
dismantling certain articles during renewal negotiations every three years, as soon as 
the new CLA is negotiated and signed, it is, generally speaking, in the interest of both 
organized labor as well as organized employers to ensure that the rules they have 
now agreed upon are actually enforced. Discussed in the previous chapter, as soon 
as employers A and B concede to a minimum level of wages and working conditions, 
they have a very clear and material interest to ensure that their competition adheres 
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to the rules of the game as well. Only this can prevent competitors from being able to 
offer lower prices due to a more modest level of wages and working conditions. It is 
within this convergence of material interests that the “paritätischer Vertragsvollzug” or 
paritarian (i.e. bipartisan) contract enforcement is embedded. Let us take a closer 
look. 
According to Swiss law, the normative regulations of a CLA declared legally binding 
by the state have a clear legal status. As such, they are, for the employers of the 
industry in question, just as legally binding as any other law. That being said, and 
indeed fitting well with the liberal discourse propagated by employers, the state 
systematically withdraws itself from the field of contract enforcement (Kelley 2017). 
Instead, it transfers its powers of enforcement, that in the case of any other law 
would clearly lay in the hands of the state, onto the social partners of the relevant 
industry’s CLA. In other words, the actual task of inspecting and sanctioning 
violations of the agreement are carried out by the employers and the unions together. 
This task is, however, neither executed by the employers nor by the unions alone, 
but by so-called paritätische Kommissionen (paritarian commissions). Their decision-
making bodies (Vorstand/executive board, Vereinsversammlung/general assembly) 
are made up of a small but equal number of employer and union representatives 
delegated by their respective associations and these bipartisan commissions are 
responsible for ensuring that the rules of the game are upheld. Their activities consist 
of checking company pay-rolls and working hours, carrying out visits to construction 
sites and interviewing the workers present. Then, if a violation is detected, the 
commissions will inform the company in question of its violation and duty to 
reimburse the workers effected. The commission will also decide upon whether or not 
as well as how much to fine the offending company depending on the severity of the 
offense. 
In contrast to contract enforcement in other, smaller industries, in construction this is 
organized on a local, regional basis. This is on the one hand due to the size of the 
industry as well as due to historical reasons, but also fits well within the generally 
strong position of federalist institutions in Switzerland. As such, there are twenty-five 
regional paritarian commissions for the main construction industry in Switzerland. 
While these commissions are paritarian or bipartisan, they are free to delegate 
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certain tasks or activities to the contract partners themselves. In this sense, there are 
a number of commissions in which the local branch of the construction employers 
association is financially compensated for conducting the secretarial aspects of the 
work and Unia is in turn charged with carrying out actual inspections on the 
construction sites themselves. The latter does so, however, not as Unia, but as a 
representative of the paritarian commission. There is furthermore a national 
commission that deals with complex and unclear cases and supports the local 
commissions in the interpretation of certain articles, yet does not carry out operative 
inspection work itself. 
Besides the enforcement of the normative regulations put forth by the industry’s CLA, 
a further institutional column of social partnership in construction is the so-called 
Parifonds. Representing a particularly strong case of entangled interests (Kelley 
2017), this paritarian fund is, in the words of one union officer, “the glue holding 
everything together”. As its name suggests, the Parifonds is a fund both jointly 
financed as well as jointly administered by capital and labor. Paid for by employee 
and company/employer dues, in 2015 0,55% of each employee’s monthly wage and 
an employer contribution of 0,4% of the total wage sum were paid into this fund. The 
institution itself was established following CLA negotiations in the 1970s. The 
Parifonds’ stated goal is to provide the finances necessary for the enforcement of the 
CLA on the one hand, yet also to pay for workers’ professional training as well.  
Considering the high amount of unskilled labor in the industry and the difficulty of 
recruiting young apprentices, the financing of professional training is often just as 
much in the interest of the employers as it is in that of the workers. So, while the 
Parifonds pays for labor inspections and the wider activities of contract enforcement, 
companies can also sign their workers up for professional courses and pass on the 
costs thereof to the Parifonds. In both aspects, it is particularly the larger and/or more 
professional companies that profit from the Parifonds’ services. This is due to the fact 
that it is these companies which tend to more strictly adhere to CLA regulations on 
the one hand and also send more employees to training courses, in contrast for 
example to a smaller company focused on the repetitive task of installing iron-
reinforcements. 
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Besides the tasks of supporting contract enforcement and workers’ professional 
training, the Parifonds also fulfills a third, less formal function (Kelley 2017). It is this 
function that is particularly interesting from an institutional perspective on collective 
organization. As described in the theoretical chapter of this thesis, institutionalist 
theoreticians, as well as many other scholars focusing on the subject, have long 
emphasized the vital importance of specific institutions when it comes to supporting 
collective action. From an Olson-ian worker’s perspective, if the CLA counts for me 
anyway, whether I belong to the union or not, then why should I pay to be a union 
member (Kelly 1998)? It is here that social institutions can come into play. Aimed at 
either rewarding individual actors for their participation or sanctioning them for not 
participating, institutions can serve to reduce this much-discussed free-rider problem. 
In Swiss construction, at least when it comes to formal union membership, such a 
role is assumed by the Parifonds. As noted above, all workers in construction, as do 
their employers, pay Parifonds dues. Considering that a union member pays both 
these dues as well as monthly membership-dues to the union, he or she, so the 
argument goes, makes a double contribution to the industry’s system of social 
partnership. In order to reduce this double financial burden, a union member is, 
according to the rules of the Parifonds, entitled to a reimbursement of up to 80% of 
his union membership fees. What this means in a practical sense, is that a union 
member will pay around fifty francs per month to the union, depending on his exact 
income, yet at the end of the year is reimbursed for twelve times forty francs, i.e. 80% 
of his total dues. What this in effect does, is to substantially reduce the financial costs 
of union membership. In the words of one union recruiter, “Because of that, I can 
basically tell potential members that it will cost them a Kebab-sandwich a month, but 
that through that they are guaranteed better wages and working conditions and they 
also have individual legal insurance – something that only union members have.” 
That being said, while this mechanism of the Parifonds-institution does to a large 
extent reduce the costs of an individual’s membership in the union, it of course does 
not solve the question of active participation in the union’s structures and activities, 
something that will be revisited in the following chapter. In fact, expressing Knight’s 
warning that institutions can simultaneously empower as well as constrain all actors 
involved, while the Parifonds may aid individual recruitment, it also has a more 
constraining effect on a union’s conflict and campaigning ability. For given that the 
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Parifonds is tied to the collective labor agreement, this makes both the unions as well 
as the employers, assuming they want the Parifonds and financial benefits thereof to 
continue, dependent on the existence of a CLA. This becomes especially clear when 
the fund’s existence is called into question during periods of Vertragslosigkeit 
(“contractless” periods), i.e. when the old CLA has expired and the unions and 
employers have not (yet) reached an agreement on renewing it. 
For the employers, a potential loss of the Parifonds during such a period would mean 
not only losing inspections that help to curb overly cheap and “unfair competition” 
(and there would be no more legal base to conduct inspections anyway), thus again 
unleashing their own collective action problems, but also losing millions of francs for 
professional training. For the unions, besides losing all regulations ranging from 
working time to minimum wages during a contractless period, a potential loss of the 
Parifonds would also raise the individual cost of union membership to five times what 
it effectively is today (through the loss of reimbursement). This would in turn likely 
lead to a visible reduction of its membership. It is precisely because of this that 
following the contractless period of 2007/2008, the social partners changed the 
Parifonds’ rules so as to ensure that it continues to run for a certain period even in 
such times. That being said, in such a period, the Parifonds is then no longer 
generally binding nor is its long-term existence secure. It is in this sense that longer 
periods of conflict can be extremely costly, weakening and unsettling for both sides. 
Thus, the Parifonds, through its emancipating functions as well as through the 
dependencies those functions simultaneously create, indeed serves, as noted above, 
as the “the glue holding everything together”. 
Importing Labor Power: the Bilateral Agreements and the Question of 
Labor 
A further institutional sphere relevant to our topic, one interlocked with the above 
institutions of the CLA, concerns that of migration. As noted above, due to the 
simultaneously mobile as well as stationary structure of the construction industry, the 
process of production cannot be outsourced. Not only that, because of the real 
difficulties in recruiting labor power at home, the great mass thereof must in fact be 
“imported” (Kelley 2017). This is, however, of course not an isolated question of 
economic demand, but a social phenomenon transcending the narrow borders of the 
industry itself and revealing itself as an intertwined meeting of the economic with the 
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political. While the articulation thereof may be different depending on space and time, 
the question of labor migration is always one demanding the state to master a tense 
balancing act between securing the economic needs of capital’s thirst for migrant 
labor power (Harvey 2010) and its role as “the fulcrum of contention between social 
actors“ (Polanyi in Tarrow 2011: 77), thus acting as a “regulator of capitalism” (ibid). 
This will become clearer later on. 
For the majority of the 20th century, the flow of labor power in construction was 
channeled by the so-called Saisonnierstatut. This law, today widely perceived as 
controversial, was in power between 1934 and 2002. It saw limited quotas of migrant 
workers be given temporary, seasonal work permits without the immediate right to 
permanent residence. The quotas were determined according to the needs of each 
industry and were distributed as such. These Saisonnier-workers were only allowed 
to reside in the country for a certain amount of time, at one point for a maximum of 
nine months, and were thus particularly attractive for seasonal industries such as 
construction. Often housed in shanty-like Baracken, today the very symbol of the 
Saisonnier-era, these workers had few legal rights. They were not allowed to change 
their employer nor their residency during their stay and could only apply for a 
permanent residency permit after a number of years. It was only then that these 
workers could bring their partners and children. 
From the 1970s on, when organized labor started to take a more open approach to 
migrant questions (Steinauer and Von Allmen 2000), Swiss trade unions were at the 
forefront of the struggle against the Saisonnierstatut. This resistance was, on the one 
hand, due to the growing influence of the labor left, but in time was also a result of 
very strategic calculations that migrant workers with more rights would be less 
exposed to employer threats during periods of industrial strife. In time, despite this 
struggle having started as a leftist, humanitarian project, the economic liberals of the 
country also began to gradually distance themselves from a system that in their eyes 
had outlived its usefulness and was a too rigid system with its infamous quotas.  
Thus, the writing appeared to be on the wall for the Saisonnier-system. Following 
years of negotiation, in 1999 Switzerland and the European Union, of which the 
former is not a part, finally agreed upon an accord of bilateral agreements. Touching 
upon a range of topics, one of the most important as well as controversial elements 
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thereof concerned the free movement of workers between Switzerland and the EU. It 
allowed, among other things, for European citizens to seek employment under the 
same conditions as Swiss citizens and take up indefinite residency in Switzerland – 
and the other way around. 
As noted above, the unions had been vehement opponents of what in their eyes was 
a discriminatory Saisonnierstatut. Thus, as soon as the end of that system became 
apparent, the unions were more than relieved. This particularly concerned the 
Construction and Industry Union, which by that time was not only one of the more 
progressive of the Swiss unions, but also one representing a substantial migrant 
membership. That being said, the union’s official position towards the new bilateral 
agreements was (and continues to be) an ambiguous one. For despite ending the 
discriminatory Saisonnier-system, the bilateral agreements with the EU were in their 
core an economically liberal project. As such, the agreements did not simply 
regularize the Saisonnier-workers that were already in the country, but opened up the 
national borders of the labor market in general. By doing so, this in effect provided 
Swiss capital unlimited access to a seemingly endless “reservoir of labor power” 
(Schiavi 2013: 112ff). Given that the economy in the neighboring countries of the EU 
was not only far less stable, but that working conditions and wages were generally 
lower than in Switzerland, particularly in construction, this massive widening of the 
labor market simultaneously represented a potentially serious threat to the wages 
and working conditions of workers in Switzerland. 
Yet as one union official who has long been active on issues concerning migration 
put it: 
Is it a threat? Yes, of course it is. We would be naïve to think otherwise. But by saying 
no to the bilateral agreements, does that do away with the threat? Of course not. It 
would be equally naïve to think that the bosses would not otherwise get access to 
labor, including cheap labor, some way or another. This is sometimes hard to explain to 
our Swiss colleagues, but because the bilateral agreements actually give the migrants 
much more political rights, this is actually good for all workers concerned. That’s 
because it means they are less susceptible to the blackmail of the employers. They can 
stand up for their rights and can thus less be used simply as a cheap labor substitute 
for more pricy Swiss labor power. So what we have to do is to take the good parts of 
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this new system and try and contain the side-effects of it. And that is what we have 
been trying to do ever since. 
In fact, the heterogeneous political composition at the time of the bilateral 
agreements’ establishment and the complex balance of power concerning the 
question thereof led to what in the end resulted in a “remarkable power play” by the 
unions (Rieger 2010: 13). While the support of the liberal and centrist parties for the 
bilateral agreements was clear and the official position of the federal government was 
equally explicit, there was a substantial amount of unease in the wider population. 
These fears were particularly held by working class Swiss, many of them union 
members (or ones the union sought to organize), who were fearsome their jobs 
would be up for grabs once the free movement of workers became reality. Up until 
today, many Swiss construction workers are indeed extremely critical when it comes 
to any opening of national (and thus labor market) borders. 
Given that the bilateral agreements had to be ratified in a popular vote, the political 
elite pushing the project, i.e. the liberal and centrist parties, in fact had good reason 
to worry, especially when taking into account Switzerland’s voting history on 
migration topics. It was particularly alarmed given that the rightwing national 
conservatives, led by the so-called Swiss Peoples Party, had tapped into the above 
noted fears and were mobilizing for a no-vote in the upcoming referendum. In this 
particular situation, the balance of power seemed to lay in a rather surprising place: 
in the hands of organized labor and the political left. If the Social Democrats and 
especially the unions publically supported the deal, it might pass. If they too 
mobilized against it, the bilateral agreements seemed doomed to fail. This put the 
labor movement in a unique position of strategic opportunity – one it immediately 
seized with little hesitation. Ultimately, this exceptional situation of unexpected 
societal power led to a strengthening of the unions’ institutional power. 
Equipped with these newfound bargaining chips, the unions and Social Democrats 
immediately went into negotiations with their temporary liberal allies. By shifting the 
debate concerning the threat to wages and working conditions away from a 
xenophobic direction and framing it as a question of “protecting wages not borders”, 
the unions, again led by the then Construction and Industry Union, were able to 
negotiate the introduction of so-called Flankierende Massnahmen (flanking 
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measures). Following the explicit goal of protecting working people from the “abusive 
undercutting of Swiss wages and working conditions”13, these measures oblige non-
Swiss companies to uphold minimal working conditions and brought about new legal 
instruments of labor inspection and regulation. Among other things, it has made it 
easier for the state to declare CLAs generally binding and has also led to a higher 
number of and more systematic labor inspections in industries with already generally 
binding CLAs. 
Having achieved this victory, unique throughout Europe, the unions and the political 
left threw their support behind the ratification of the bilateral agreements. In the end, 
the bilateral agreements were ratified in the popular vote and with them came the 
introduction of the flanking measures in 2004. 
Since then, especially Unia has – rather successfully – campaigned for an 
enhancement of these flanking measures. Besides some smaller steps forward, such 
as raising the number of inspections in diverse industries, one of their biggest coups 
has been the introduction of the previously noted Solidarhaftung, solidary liability, 
making prime contractors in construction partially liable for the labor violations of their 
subcontractors. While the law was not nearly as strict as it ought to be in the eyes of 
the union, from a power relations perspective it was nonetheless significant given 
that this mechanism was introduced exclusively for construction and against the 
vehement opposition of the construction employers. Not only that, this had been a 
key demand of the union which it had not been able to push through during the CLA-
negotiations in 2011/2012. After this defeat at the industry’s negotiating table, the 
union had shifted its efforts to public campaigning in order to pressure the Swiss 
parliament into introducing the law. It did so, besides lobbying and bargaining, by 
systematically uncovering and very publically scandalizing cases of CLA violations, 
so-called wage-dumping. It also collected over 27’000 signatures on construction 
sites across the country for a petition supporting the law. While some of the firms 
caught violating the CLA were foreign companies, the new law de facto had little to 
do with migration per se as it counts for Swiss as well as foreign companies, thus 
                                               
13 Swiss government website on the flanking measures. 
https://www.personenfreizuegigkeit.admin.ch/fza/de/home/aufenthalt_und_arbeitsmarkt/ 
flankierende_massnahmen.html (4.4.2017) 
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pointing to the wider significance of the flanking measures, despite their narrow origin 
in migration politics. 
From a power relations perspective, the introduction of these flanking measures, in 
particular their enhancement with the solidary liability, can be read as the strategic 
capturing of a unique situation arising from wider political dynamics (Wyler 2012), 
which at least in this case served to substitute for the union’s then too weak 
associational power. Through a balanced mix of public campaigning and political 
bargaining, the union had managed to widen the institutional web protecting labor 
rights. 
Moving back to the construction sites themselves, a further change unfolding in the 
arena of migrant labor was that of a growing heterogenization thereof, i.e. a growing 
and more balanced variety of different nationalities. While also a product of the 
widening of the labor market through the bilateral agreements, these changes had 
already began to unfold in the late 1970s and 1980s. On the one hand it started 
when the first unemployment waves hit the country and many of the Italian workers 
either voluntarily or forcibly returned to their former home. This process was 
intensified during the severe construction crisis in the mid-1990s. It was furthermore 
supported by the fact that the Italian economic situation was simultaneously 
improving itself. On the other hand, even during the Saisonnier-era it had become 
easier for immigrants of other European countries to enter Switzerland. One of the 
groups whose immigration would rise to particularly high levels was that of the 
Portuguese. 
Beyond the quantitative world of statistics, however, this change had very palpable 
effects on the social sphere of the construction world. One of the most important 
ones thereof, which had a strong effect on a number of aspects, concerned the 
gradual loss of the Italian language as the “lingua franca“ (Steinauer and Von Allmen 
2000: 58) of the industry. It is, ironically, well described by Admir, a young Albanian 
construction worker: 
My father came here as a Saisonnier many years ago. It was not easy for our family, 
because we couldn’t come with him then, but we survived. He actually learned a lot 
back then. Among other things Italian [laughs]. I mean, we just thought this was 
hilarious. He went to Zurich in Switzerland and yeah, he learned German later on, but 
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first he learned Italian. Can you believe it?! I mean, I work construction too now, but I 
don’t speak Italian. But back then, there were just so many Italians… It was like the 
construction language. Know what I mean? 
A similar account was given by Alessandro, a retired Italian construction worker and 
union activist: 
I learned German rather late. When I’m at Unia assemblies, I still listen to the 
translation in Italian and when I speak, I prefer to do it in Italian. But when I started 
working here, back in 1977, you just did not need to speak German. I mean, in 
construction you were either Italian or you were something else, but you spoke Italian 
– or needed to learn it fast! Even the Swiss foremen spoke Italian. We worked in 
Italian and even union meetings were held in Italian. It was… the first language of 
construction! It’s not really like that anymore. 
Thus, the changes in migration in the 1970s through to the 1990s not only altered the 
migratory patterns and the ethnic makeup of construction labor, making it more 
ethnically heterogeneous, but also slowly dissolved its “lingua franca”. While the 
Portuguese today make up a large portion of the workforce, Portuguese has not 
assumed the same function as that Italian once had, and since many Portuguese 
workers still perceive themselves as temporary residents planning to someday return 
home, a strong motivation to learn German is not necessarily widespread (Fibbi et al. 
2010). This biblical “confusion of tongues” led the newspaper Tagesanzeiger to sum 
up the situation as follows: “Swiss construction sites are like the tower of Babel. 
Whereas it used to be Italians and Yugoslavs working, there are now close to a 
dozen languages to be heard.“ (Merkt 2016: 18). 
Under these circumstances, it has not only become more difficult for workers to 
communicate among themselves, often seeing foremen giving instructions through 
long lines of informal translators (i.e. through other workers who speak German as 
well as the language in question), but also presents a serious challenge for the union 
itself in its ambitions to organize the workers into a collective force capable of 
concerted action. Furthermore, this linguistic barrier has also emphasized national-
boundaries, leading to particular ethnic or linguistic groups often socializing primarily 
among themselves. This is often articulated by certain rest containers being used by 
one linguistic/nationality-group, such as the Portuguese, and others being used by 
other groups, such as Swiss, Albanian or Polish workers. 
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As we have now been able to see, the question of migration plays a vital role in 
construction, both for the industry as well as for the trade union organizing in it. This 
role is, however, an ambiguous and many-faced one, touching upon a number of 
aspects. On the one hand, as elaborated upon in the previous chapter, it generated a 
wave of worker activists politicized in postwar Italy. It was this generation that played 
an important role in the union’s returned focus on associational power and industrial 
conflict. Equally important for the union, yet stemming from a completely different 
angle, the controversies surrounding migration and its role in the labor market in fact 
paradoxically strengthened the union’s institutional power after it seized a unique 
opportunity provided by its unexpected place in the balance of power. On the other 
hand, today’s heterogenization of migration patterns, leading to the banal but 
decisive loss of the industry’s “lingua franca“ (Steinauer and Von Allmen 2000: 58), 
have produced challenges not only for the organization of work, but also the 
organization of the workers by the union. Furthermore, the seemingly endless 
“reservoir of labor power“ (Schiavi 2013: 112ff) produced by the bilateral agreements 
has also, as will become clear, presented challenges in the realm of wage-dumping 
and other CLA-violations. This is, however, embedded in a far greater process 
unfolding in construction, one that will now be explored. 
“Mala Edilizia”: Sick Construction 
As of the 1990s, the neoliberal upheaval unfolding throughout the Western political 
economy, as described in the previous chapter, began to strike roots in Swiss 
construction (Pelizzari 2010; Schiavi 2013; Kelley 2012; 2014a; 2014b; 2017). The 
timing of this ensuing change, the mid-1990s, was not only the era when 
neoliberalism finally began to establish itself as a dominant ideology in Switzerland’s 
political-economy, but also just after the perhaps hardest crisis Swiss construction 
had ever experienced, one that had just ravaged the industry and cut its workforce in 
two (Schweizerischer Baumeisterverband 2011: 17). As an intertwined result of both 
this “neoliberal conversion“ (Knöpfel in Pfister 2010: 205) on the one hand and a 
tougher economic situation in construction on the other, a fierce principle of 
competition by any means necessary slowly but surely came to rise as the guiding 
force of the industry. This would, rather quickly in fact, snowball into a process 
“shaking the very foundations of the construction site world“ (Pelizzari 2010: 171). As 
will become evident, these changes have had a severe impact both on the individual 
 - 148 - 
workers themselves, yet also distinct effects on the workers as a collective social 
group – and thus for the union organizing it. 
Due to the labor intensity of the construction industry, it is a truism that any 
heightened competition between companies will, as far as the institutions within 
which it is embedded allow for it (i.e. the legal environment, the CLA), largely be 
fought out on the level of labor power and the cost thereof. This is of course 
particularly the case when ingrained in a growing neoliberal discourse aimed at 
“recommoditizing labor“ (Standing 2007). As a result, we are today witnessing a 
structural upheaval unfolding in the Swiss construction industry that in its essence 
represents a multilayered process of a precarization of labor. While especially the 
industry’s CLA and to a certain extent the concessions granted in the flanking 
measures have been able to dampen this development, in their current form they 
have as of yet not been sufficient to truly stop it. With some media and union 
observers have come to dub the construction industry “the Wild West” or even speak 
of a “crime scene construction“ (Conzett and Gruhnwald 2017) in reference to the 
growing chaos of labor violations, on many construction sites this worrying state has 
become known as mala edilizia: sick construction. 
Generally articulated along a creed of “the cheaper one wins“ (Kelley 2012; 2014a), 
with companies cutting prices and building-time in order to win highly competitive 
bids, this still unfolding process of reducing and flexibilizing labor costs has come to 
involve both somewhat banal as well as deeply profound labor changes on both a 
legal as well as illegal level. 
One of the most mundane yet simultaneously widespread steps of this process has 
been to ensure that a significantly smaller number of workers carries out a far greater 
work load. In other words, smaller construction teams are assigned to do more work. 
And indeed, since the great crisis in the 1990s, when the number of workers in 
construction was basically cut in two, the total number of workers on site has 
generally speaking not recovered – despite record economic growth in the industry 
itself (see figure two). 
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----- technical-economic personnel 
----- total personnel 
----- construction site personnel 
Figure 4: Personnel statistics in the main construction industry in percent 
Source: Schweizerischer Baumeisterverband (2016: 40), own translation of legend 
 
While the changing ratio between labor power and construction activity can to a 
certain extent be attributed to a rise of mechanization on the construction sites, 
representing an increase in labor productivity (Marx 1990), the volume thereof paired 
with the rather sluggish process of mechanization in construction suggests that it is 
equally traceable to a broader culture of speed ups, in other words an increase in 
labor intensity (Marx 1990), (Kelley 2012). In any case, this trend towards “more 
work, less workers” is most definitely something explicitly noticed and felt by the 
workers themselves. Throughout my years of activity and fieldwork in the 
construction industry and despite heated discussions on a number of different 
subjects, the topic of doing more in less time has been one mentioned by almost all 
of my informants, independent of their particular position in the labor process or their 
feelings towards the union. 
“You do the same thing with two people today that you would have done with five a 
couple of years ago!”, as Giovanni put it, a veteran construction worker with decades 
of experience on the job, yet something that has been articulated in similar terms in 
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countless other conversations. “Construction has always been hard work.”, he 
continued, “But today, you can feel the vibrations of it in your bones. And I don’t 
mean the actual feeling when you are operating a jackhammer or plate compactor 
[machine used to level base foundations]. I mean knowing you are always on the 
clock, always running after the things you were supposed to have been done with 
yesterday. Always worrying…” 
Besides more hectic and stressful work situations, this change has seen more and 
more companies not only ordering overtime, but regularly working on Saturdays as 
well. Furthermore, in order to expand their market, more and more regional 
companies are taking contracts in other parts of the country, thus leading to the 
above noted gradual trans-regionalization of the industry and making workers’ daily 
commutes significantly longer. Before and after a long day of manual labor, long 
hours of commuting can be absolutely energy-draining. 
And while these speed ups with less workers have no doubt had a palpable effect on 
the crews themselves, it is in fact the foremen that have perhaps absorbed this 
pressure the most. A surprising number of foremen confessed to me that the growing 
time pressure is not only “breaking them”, but also regularly causing sleepless nights. 
Every now and then, one will also hear of a foreman who suffered a nervous 
breakdown or burnout and is now in a recovery clinic. Given the rather prevalent 
“hard man”-culture in construction, I was at first rather surprised at this honesty and 
openness. 
Besides this speed-up culture and growing shear between construction activity and 
the number of workers carrying it out, the precarization of labor in construction has 
primarily been unfolding on two other levels, each interlinked with the other: 
temporary labor and subcontracting. While both developments have become 
increasingly visible throughout the wider economy since the unfolding of the 
neoliberal conversion, both in Switzerland and globally, their prevalence in Swiss 
construction is significant. Besides their immediate effects on the financial and job-
security situations of the workers themselves, both phenomena question the very 
foundations that have long dominated labor-capital relations in the capitalist 
economy. 
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Since the mid-1990s, temporary labor has significantly risen in Swiss construction 
(Bianchi and Lampart 2007: 13) and has come to represent an important pillar of how 
the industry actually works. Around twelve percent of all temporary workers in 
Switzerland are employed in the main construction trades, meaning roughly 10’000 
full-time equivalents (Rahm 2016a: 52). Dismantling any direct relationship of 
employment between worker and employer, temporary labor sees construction 
companies de facto “rent” workers through personnel agencies instead of indefinitely 
and directly hiring them themselves. From capital’s perspective, this provides a 
remarkably flexible tool, as workers can be temporarily borrowed according to the 
specific workload of the company at the specific time and place. In a seasonal 
industry such as construction, this is of particular significance. As a result, the 
entrepreneurial risk of the employer is passed from the construction company to the 
personnel agency, which passes that on to the worker himself given the short notice 
periods for employment terminations involved. 
From labor’s perspective, this represents a severe precarization of workers’ statuses 
as sellers of labor power. For despite the fact that even temporary workers fall under 
the industry’s CLA and must thus (in theory) be guaranteed minimum wages, holiday 
time, etc., they are nonetheless in a far more precarious state than their permanently 
employed colleagues. If we remember Marx’s insight of workers as being free in a 
double sense (Marx 1990), both from feudal chains as well as means of production, 
these temporary workers are free in yet another way. They are free of any direct and 
binding contractual relationship to their employer (Kelley 2012), thus breaking “the 
mutual dependency between workers and employers that has been so central to the 
labor movement in the past“ (Wills 2009: 444). 
Because of this indirect and temporary employment, these workers are not only 
continuously passed from construction site to construction site, but can also be laid 
off in just a number of days14. During the icy winter months, when construction 
activity generally slows down, the vast majority of these workers are indeed laid off 
and in most cases return to living off of unemployment benefits. This process is 
repeated year after year. As a result and since temporary workers are generally paid 
                                               
14 A further negative aspect of temporary labor is a strong correlation between temporary workers and 
a higher than average accident risk, especially among those with less job experience (Studer et al. 
2009). 
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by the hour, many try to collect as many hours as possible during spring, summer 
and fall. There are, of course, some temporary workers, especially younger 
bachelors, who profess to preferring such work as it allows them to work when they 
want. Yet for the great majority of temporary construction workers I talked to, 
temporary labor is either a last resort or an attempt to prove themselves to potential 
employers, thus hoping to get permanently hired somewhere down the road.  
One such worker, who works temporarily for one of the largest building companies in 
Switzerland, showed me a letter he regularly receives from the personnel agency that 
directly employs him: 
Dear employees 
The winter months are soon before us. For this reason, the company XY [construction 
company’s name] wishes to remain flexible concerning periods of notice. This means 
that we will terminate your employment as of the 16.11.2012, your employment will 
continue, however, as of the 19.11.2012. We are doing this so everybody has a 
termination period of two days and we are thus able to make things easier for the 
company XY.  
We cordially thank you for your understanding.  
 
Figure 5: Letter from a personnel agency translated above 
Source: worker informant 
 
As long as the construction economy remains in a steady state of growth, as is 
currently the case, temporary workers can generally rely on having work between the 
months of March and December. However, the general precariousness of this state 
is immense, both on a material as well as emotional level. For they are very well 
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aware that if anything should happen to the economy or the company, they will be 
the first to go. As Pedro, another temporarily employed construction worker, puts it: 
Yeah, I have work today. Yeah, I will probably have work tomorrow. But if anything 
happens, if the company loses an important contract or something, I am going to be 
the first told to leave. And I know that. Everybody knows it. I’ve got one foot in the job 
and one foot in unemployment. My wife goes crazy because we are having our third 
child now. But it’s not only that. It’s also a question of dignity. I am passed around 
from construction site to construction site and I am – as all temporary workers are – 
always on the outside, not really belonging. 
These two aspects, a high degree of precariousness and a sense of “not-belonging” 
to the core team of workers, despite being embedded in those teams for the duration 
of deployment, are both consistently reoccurring themes when speaking with 
temporary workers. For not only are the workers aware that they will be the first to go 
if the company’s workload is reduced, they are often socially marginalized and in 
some cases even stigmatized. Some of the permanent employees perceive their 
temporary colleagues as a kind of second-class worker or are simply frustrated when 
“another new temporary” has to be integrated into the team and shown the ropes, 
only to be moved off to another team soon thereafter.  
José, another temporary worker, recounts how: 
I’ve worked at Meier [construction company, pseudonym] for four years now – four 
years. But temporary. I know everybody, I work with them, but I’m still not invited to the 
company’s annual barbeque. Everybody goes, but I don’t. I’m not invited, none of the 
temporary workers are. It’s humiliating. And then I’m let go every December for two 
months and have to beg the government for money. Then back to construction in 
March. Is that even legal?! 
While some of these personnel agencies are large and generally professional 
corporations, others are smaller offices surviving off of their informal networks and 
direct contacts to construction companies. Many of these agencies also cooperate 
closely with regional unemployment offices (Marti et al. 2003: 165) in order to 
systematically recruit labor power from the otherwise unemployed, thus building a 
profitable bridge between traditional employers and Marx’s “reserve army of labor” 
(Kelley 2012). 
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Despite the fact that temporary workers also fall under the industry’s CLA, it is not 
uncommon for personnel agencies to “forget” certain regulations thereof (Pelizzari 
2010). While not necessarily entailing more obvious CLA-violations, such as 
undercutting minimum wages, other offenses such as failing to pay overtime benefits, 
lunch expenses, etc. are common. Furthermore, personnel agencies will often 
regularly change a worker’s place of employment from one of the agency’s offices to 
another, so as to avoid paying travel expenses. Taking an even darker turn, the 
industry is also full of whispers concerning individual project managers of 
construction companies who run their own personnel agencies “on the side” and use 
their managerial positions to rent out workers to their own projects, thus earning 
substantial sums of money per worker next to their normal salary as project manager. 
Besides temporary employment, a second instrument of labor recommodification has 
become an increasingly inherent part of the industry: subcontracting. Also 
representing a global feature of neoliberal capitalism (Hann and Hart 2011: 151), 
subcontracting has become just as prevalent as temporary labor, yet often with even 
more precarious dimensions. Like temporary labor, subcontracting companies also 
fall under the industry’s CLA, as all companies working construction do. That being 
said, in these often small companies largely made up of unskilled and migrant 
workers, violations of the CLA are known to occur on a regular basis (Conzett 2016). 
Almost all of the most prominent and public wage-dumping cases uncovered by the 
union in the past few years have involved such subcontracting companies. 
Like temporary labor, subcontracting’s position in the construction industry has risen 
significantly since the mid-1990s, after construction’s crisis and when neoliberalism 
began to dominate the political economy in Switzerland. Generally speaking, 
subcontracting in Swiss construction is when a main building company outsources 
parts of its work to other, usually (though not exclusively) smaller companies, i.e. 
subcontractors. This may concern more difficult or specialized tasks, yet more often 
than not applies to the repetitive and “unskilled” tasks of installing iron-reinforcements 
and wooden boarding. It is either done by setting a fixed lump sum or a piecework-
price depending on the amount of iron or bricks laid. In a similar logic, the workers of 
subcontracting firms are usually paid by the hour, seldom much more than the lowest 
minimum wages, yet can earn a bonus if they work particularly fast. 
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Some subcontracting firms, extending the same rationale as their prime contractors 
did towards them, have found it lucrative to not necessarily complete the work 
themselves, but to pass it on to yet other subcontracting firms at an even lower price. 
As a result, complex and seemingly endless subcontracting-chains can arise. 
While this phenomenon may at first seem uncontroversial, such a model 
economically only makes sense when the various stations of these subcontracting 
chains are able to pass the job down at a lower price, so as to still make a profit 
despite not doing the actual work (Kelley 2017). Thus, besides the fact that the 
original prices/bids offered by prime contractors tend to be notoriously low to begin 
with, each transfer down the subcontracting chain produces further pressure to 
reduce costs. Again, due to the labor-intensive aspect of construction, in particular in 
the repetitive tasks outsourced to subcontracting companies, costs are often and 
sometimes exclusively reduced in the realm of labor power. Thus, as a result of this 
price pressure, which is often initiated by the prime contractor, yet reproduced and 
intensified at each level of subcontractors, CLA violations have become a common, if 
not even inherent feature of subcontracting in the Swiss construction industry. 
The term Lohndumping (wage-dumping) has come to describe the wider 
phenomenon of undercutting CLA-regulations. This can, in a more classic sense, 
mean paying less than the obligatory minimum wage, yet it can also involve longer 
hours than specified, less or no holiday time, failing to pay overtime-benefits, etc.  
Despite its political touch, the term wage-dumping is in fact a rather apt term to point 
to the overarching consequences thereof. For if a prime contractor passes work 
down to a Slovakian subcontractor that pays its workers too little wages, then 
obviously these workers themselves are effected. However, this simultaneously 
serves to “dump” the wages and wage-level of all workers in the industry by – in time 
– lowering the market price of labor power. As a result, significant pressure can arise 
on all workers’ wages and working conditions. While it is meanwhile generally 
accepted by both the union and employers that wage-dumping is a serious problem 
in construction, the actual depth thereof is difficult to quantify given the inherent 
shadow-character of the phenomenon (Conzett 2016). 
Two characteristics of the construction industry make it particularly susceptible for 
wage-dumping (Bosch and Zühlke-Robinet 2000: 23). First of all, due to 
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construction’s labor intensity on the one hand and the sometimes significant pay gap 
between Switzerland and other European countries, wage-dumping can be a 
lucrative scam for the subcontractors involved, who in turn offer prime contractors 
low prices. Second of all, due to construction’s “travelling factories“ (Bosch and 
Zühlke-Robinet 2000: 23), involving highly mobile teams (especially in the areas of 
iron- and boarding-installments) that change sites every week or even day, it is often 
difficult to detect violations committed by these often smaller companies. According 
to Pelizzari (2010: 172), labor inspections have found that one in four construction 
firms have paid under the minimum wages prescribed by the CLA and even one out 
of two temporary agencies have done so. The leftist-leaning newspaper Woz even 
went so far as to decry what they saw as “mafia methods on Swiss construction 
sites”, noting that some subcontractors simply did not pay their workers at all or were 
even using pseudo self-employed workers (so-called Ich-AGs or Me-Incorporateds) 
to circumvent minimum wages, physically threatening any workers who complained 
(Fagetti 2015). While the workers themselves are almost always migrant workers, the 
Swiss prime contractors outsourcing tasks to these subcontractors “wash their hands 
free of guilt“ (ibid). 
Perhaps even more so than temporary labor, the growing role of subcontracting has 
substantially changed how Swiss construction works. In today’s Swiss construction 
world, it has become almost impossible to find a construction site upon which 
subcontractors do not play a substantial if not even vital role in the labor process. 
While the larger companies often use their core teams to do the bulk of the 
construction coordination and especially more skilled tasks, iron and boarding 
installments and often even brick-laying are often almost universally outsourced to 
cheaper subcontractors. This was, however, not always the case, but is indeed a 
newer development: “As taken for granted as it used to be that a builder [company] 
would perform all main construction tasks itself, it is just as self-evident for him today 
that iron-reinforcements and masonry will be done by subcontractors.“ (Rahm 2016b: 
54). 
This trend is directly reflected in what can only be described as an explosion of the 
number of (small) companies operating in Swiss construction. While since the 
industry’s crisis in the mid-1990s the number of workers has remained rather stable, 
especially since the turn of the millennium, the number of companies itself seems to 
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have significantly risen (Baumann 2015). Taken together, this points to a strong 
atomization-tendency of the industry. While this does not necessarily contradict the 
general tendency towards monopoly capitalism noted by Burawoy (1979) and many 
other Marxist scholars, considering that the larger companies still retain control of the 
bulk of the market as prime contractors, it does suggest that in neoliberal capitalism, 
the term monopoly may point more towards market control than an actually carrying 
out all of the work secured on that market in a productive sense. 
 
Figure 6: Number of above-ground construction companies according to size 
Source: Baumann (2015: 4), own illustration 
 
As CLA-violations are seldom directly committed by the larger, more established 
companies, but far more often by their smaller subcontracting firms, the former are 
able to distance themselves from any legal wrongdoing, especially if they can prove 
they formally “instructed” their subcontractors to respect the CLA. In the eyes of the 
union, however, these larger companies and prime contractors are often just as 
complicate as they not only encourage such behavior by demanding unrealistically 
cheap prices, but also because “any idiot can see that they do not give a damn about 
the rules of the Landesmantelvertrag [construction’s CLA]! It’s as if somebody tells 
you to get from Bern to Zurich in 10 minutes [a distance of 120 kilometers], but not to 
break the speed limit. It’s physically not possible.”, as one labor inspector put it (in 
Kelley 2017). 
It is precisely as a response to these developments that Unia has attempted to 
negotiate the introduction of stricter measures against wage-dumping and has, when 
negotiations with employers have failed, campaigned for the state to do so or even 
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introduced such instruments itself, such as its controversial Department for Risk 
Analysis. However, while Unia and the construction employers definitely do not have 
a completely congruent vision of how CLA-violations ought to be tackled, it would be 
equally wrong to suggest that all employers are a priori uninterested in (stricter) 
measures against CLA-violations. That being said, employers’ stances towards the 
phenomenon of wage-dumping are both as heterogeneous as they are ambiguous 
and in the end represent a collective action problem of their own. Let us take a closer 
look. 
On the one hand, as actors in an increasingly fierce cycle of time and price pressure, 
construction companies – whether they like it or not – are forced to “compete or lose” 
as one employer put it to me. This is less a moral question than one stemming from 
the general laws of capitalism reflected in Marx’s “coercive laws of competition“ (in 
Harvey 2010: 146ff.; Kelley 2012). Confronting the individual capitalist “as a coercive 
force external to him“ (Harvey 2010: 146), companies are sucked into participating in 
the same or preferably even cheaper labor practices than their competitors. This is, 
however, not necessarily in the long-term interest of companies as it can – as we see 
in construction today – easily lead to a more destructive or ruinous competition, one 
in which not only labor is aggrieved, but also profit margins themselves may sink. 
That being said, any company seeking to individually free itself from this cycle would 
be disciplined by the market as it would no longer be competitive. So, while many 
companies might sincerely prefer a less vicious competition in their own very rational 
interests, it is individually irrational to take the first step themselves. 
It is here where the CLA – and thus paradoxically organized labor – steps in. As the 
CLA provides competing companies with certain “rules of the game”, it serves to 
stabilize an otherwise shaky slope. This is particularly the case today, where the 
bilateral agreements with the EU have not only opened up a large reservoir of labor, 
but also an open market in general, one that would bring about even harsher 
competition if the CLA were not in existence. So, while employers do not necessarily 
want the same concrete CLA-standards the union wants (such as higher wages, 
more protection during bad weather, etc.), many do want some form of standards as 
opposed to open and “wild” competition. As Erik Olin Wright (2000) suggests, it is 
here that organized labor can play a role in solving capital’s own collective action 
problems. This is, in fact, an aspect even pointed out by Marx, emphasizing that the 
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collective power of labor can “save the capitalists from their own individual stupidity 
and short-sightedness“ (paraphrased in Harvey 2010: 157). 
The empirical reality of this dilemma is, of course, just as in cases of labor’s collective 
action, slightly more complex as well as ambivalent and construction employers are, 
depending on their size as well as strategy, deeply heterogeneous and may thus 
have more or less interest in a CLA. It would furthermore be wrong to completely 
dismiss the role of ideology in sometimes blurring or at least slightly deferring 
employers’ rational interests (Wolf 1999). Furthermore, again returning to the 
individual level, the very real time and price pressure can obviously lead even the 
most correct companies to “look away from obvious wage-dumping on their 
construction sites if the price is right”, as one employer phrased it. 
That being said, it can be safely assumed that the great majority of construction 
employers see the industry’s CLA as a necessary tool serving their own direct 
interests. While they do not necessarily agree with the union on how to fill the CLA, 
i.e. what rules of the game should exist, they do want rules in general, thus viewing 
the CLA as a stabilizing institution preventing an even fiercer competition. This 
dependency of course, paradoxically, strengthens the union’s structural power, as it 
can under circumstances use it as leverage before and during “contractless periods”, 
when the CLA has or is about to expire. 
“Like Milano at 12” 
As described above, while construction’s CLA has undoubtedly prevented an even 
greater upheaval, phenomena such as temporary labor, subcontracting and CLA-
violations in the form of wage-dumping have not only changed the very workings of 
the industry, but have also had a grave effect on thousands of individual workers. Yet 
this process of precarization has simultaneously produced and continues to produce 
just as significant consequences for the workers as a collective whole. This is in turn, 
as will become evident, especially relevant for the union’s own organizing efforts and 
thus its associational power. 
By creating new types of employment aimed at cheapening and flexibilizing labor, 
neoliberal labor practices have had far-ranging consequences, be that in Swiss 
construction or elsewhere. They have not only shifted the price and conditions of 
capital’s acquisition of labor power, as described above, but simultaneously altered 
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the social realities of labor. Furthermore, and in vivid contrast to Marx and Engels’ 
predictions (1969) of a growingly homogeneous working class, these practices have 
often created a “fragmented and disorganized labor force“ (Hyman in Ariovich 2007: 
17) and a general “fragmentation of social experience“ (Deppe 2012: 51f.). This 
process is acutely visible in the Swiss construction industry today (Kelley 2012; 
2014a; 2014b). In the words of Toni, a construction worker who has served the 
industry for decades, Swiss construction has become “Like Milano at 12 – absolute 
chaos!“ (in Kelley 2012; 2014a). 
Generally speaking, while “precariousness is everywhere“ (Bourdieu 1998) and this 
wave of precarization has indeed touched the entire industry, it has done so in very 
different ways, depending on the individual worker’s position in the production 
process (Kelley 2012; 2014a; 2014b). At the same time, whether permanent worker, 
temporary laborer or employee of a subcontracting company, each only gains its 
social relevance and meaning through the co-existence and contrasting difference of 
the other (Kelley 2012). This is, however, not a unifying meaning, but a fragmenting 
one and the realities flowing therefrom can produce very different perceptions as well 
as individual strategies. As Bloch points out, “[…] people will act in the world, not in 
terms of what it is actually like, but in terms of what they see it as being like.“ (1983: 
135). 
In the eyes of permanent workers in Swiss construction as well as in the empirical 
context of production, the former are – in contrast to their temporary and 
subcontractor colleagues – the “core workers“ (Stammbelegschaft) of the industry. 
Not only are they seen as generally more skilled and qualified and are often well 
aware of their cultural capital (Bourdieu 2002) in this regard, they are also the ones 
so far most shielded from the direct effects of the precarization described above. In 
contrast to other workers, they have a fixed monthly income, are able to count on 
having a job throughout the year and generally profit the most from the benefits set in 
the CLA. Most are very aware of this, which is sometimes articulated in a self-
confident attitude. 
That being said, despite a perhaps superficial security, during longer discussions a 
somewhat apprehensive posture can also emerge. The latter is well summarized by 
Reto, a Swiss construction worker employed by a larger company:  
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Let’s be honest. If a crisis hits tomorrow or if the firm just doesn’t have that much work 
to do, they [temporary workers, subcontractors] are going to be the first to go. And for 
some of them, that’s really too bad. Some work really hard. Others are just interested 
in the quick money. But if you look at it in the long-term, who says they won’t replace 
us?  
It is with workers like Reto that the union’s demand for a limitation of temporary work 
and subcontracting has fallen on particularly sympathetic ears. Besides the more 
direct arena of precarization, however, there are a number of other questions of high 
importance for permanent workers – most if not all are at least indirectly tied to their 
particular status and reality as permanent employees.  
First of all, as workers who in most cases intend to spend their professional lives in 
construction, the industry’s early retirement scheme is both an emotionally as well as 
rationally important issue. As a result and as will become clear later on, the 
participation of these workers in the campaign of 2015 was an important pillar of its 
ultimate success. Secondly, regular salary increases are, hardly surprisingly, just as 
important. This is, however, particularly relevant due to the fact that permanent 
employees are paid fixed monthly wages. Third of all and on the other hand, 
precisely because of their fixed wages, many are often less thrilled at the thought of 
doing overtime and Saturday work. While this overtime is compensated for with 
overtime-pay, many permanent employees, especially those with families, have long 
pushed the union to negotiate stricter caps on hours exceeding the annual working 
calendar. Last but not least, and also not completely separable from the permanent 
status and fixed monthly wages of these employees, clearer criteria as to when to 
stop working during bad weather is often cited as an important concern. 
From the perspective of many temporary workers, however, exactly the same 
subjects can have a very different meaning. For while a number of these workers 
aspire to someday be hired permanently, the fact that they are as of yet not has a 
significant effect. “Why should I pretend to have the privileges of a permanent worker 
when I don’t?”, as one temporary worker phrased it. 
This temporary employment status touches upon long-term perspectives as well as 
upon every-day, immediate interests. For one, many temporary workers also share 
an interest in such things as retirement age at 60 and, if they are in the industry long 
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enough, have just as much right to it as permanent workers. But given their more 
precarious position, making it uncertain they will actually remain in the industry until 
retirement age, the attachment thereto is often less deep as well as less emotional. 
Furthermore, given that they are, in contrast to their permanent colleagues, paid by 
the hour and then let go in the winter, many have very little interest in limiting 
overtime and Saturday work. While of course temporary workers would also cherish 
more free time with their families, overtime and Saturday work represent a welcome 
source of extra pay that can later represent a much-needed reserve for the annual 
months of unemployment. And in the case of bad weather, these workers are often 
out of a job in the icy winter months anyway, thus making criteria to shut down 
snowed in construction sites far less relevant. If they by chance do work during the 
winter, some prefer to work during bad weather anyway as they may otherwise not 
get paid their hourly wage. This will to work during (often dangerous) bad-weather 
situations can conversely invoke the rage of their permanent colleagues, as it puts 
pressure on them to work as well. 
Finally, the occurrences unfolding in construction are perhaps most ambiguously 
experienced by subcontractor-employees due to their often blurred employment 
conditions. Sometimes paid monthly, sometimes by the hour, sometimes even 
according to the amount of iron-reinforcements they install or bricks they lay, these 
workers’ interests often vary and can be rather short-term-oriented. This latter point is 
not least due to the fact that labor fluctuation in the realm of subcontracting is 
particularly high and workers are aware that they may not be at the same company, 
or even in construction at all for that matter, in a few months’ time.  
Many subcontracting workers with their precarious employment backgrounds are 
simply happy to have a job at all and, like temporary workers, are dependent on 
accumulating as many hours as possible as a buffer against the uncertain future. If 
they are further paid a bonus according to their speed, which can have significant 
meaning considering they are otherwise often paid the bare minimum, this can be a 
further factor shaping subcontracting workers’ particular interests. As a result, the 
immediate interests and worries of these workers can in some cases bypass those of 
permanent employees and in other cases even contradict them in a similar way as 
done by temporary workers. As one permanent worker described his subcontracting 
colleagues: 
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Some of them are absolutely crazy. I am serious. They are insane. Some of those 
subcontracting workers would work if it were snowing, the scaffolding was iced and 
bricks were raining from the sky. And obviously that puts pressure on us to work in 
such conditions too. Great. 
Hardly surprising, these different realities, perceptions and interests arising therefrom 
are just as much articulated along material interests as they are along everyday 
social lines. Deeply interwoven with the previously debated heterogenization of labor 
along migration lines, the social dynamics between the various workers on 
construction sites are often channeled along both ethnic as well as labor profiles 
(Kelley 2012). 
One of the lines this fragmentation can be articulated upon is through company 
uniforms. As Bruno, another veteran construction worker put it: 
When I started working forty years ago, everybody worked in their own work clothes. 
We were all part of the same crew and you saw that. We all looked different and thus 
looked the same. Even when you did have a different company working on your site, 
we were all construction workers and you saw no difference. Today, every company 
has their own uniforms and you can see from a mile away if somebody works at this 
company or that. You can really see the mix of permanents, temporaries and 
subcontractors. You can see it! 
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Another level upon which this fragmentation is articulated is that of workers’ rest 
containers. Representative of construction sites throughout the country, the social 
mapping of a semi-large construction site in Unia’s Mittelland was on full display 
when studied in relation to the structure of the site’s Baracken: 
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Figure 7: Bird’s-eye view of the rest containers on a construction site  
Source: own illustration based on ethnographic data 
 
While the above differentiations are to a certain extent generalizing and it would be 
naïve to assume that the workforce of yesterday’s construction site were some 
homogeneous mass, the bottom line is that today we find ourselves dealing with a 
complex mosaic of rotating and increasingly fragmented workforces (Kelley 2014a; 
2014b; 2017). Besides the different, sometimes even contradictive material interests 
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at hand, the social dynamics of this fragmentation are accentuated even more by the 
fact that the temporary and subcontractor employees (and sometimes even some of 
the permanents) are routinely shifted from site to site and are thus far less embedded 
in the social collective of the “core workforce” of the respective construction site. 
Throwing in the increased ethnic heterogenization and current lacking of a “lingua 
franca” as previously described, the chaos is complete and the metaphorical smoke 
and smog of a packed and tense “Milano at 12h” are vividly clear (Kelley 2012; 
2014a). 
As can be imagined, while this phenomena may to a certain extent serve to enhance 
a company’s short-term interests in the fierce price-and-time-competition of today’s 
construction industry, the chaos arising therefrom can often present a severe 
headache for the workers actually on the site. This is particularly the case for the 
foremen and qualified core-workers taking on a more coordinative role in the 
construction process. It can furthermore, under circumstances, lead to certain 
animosities between the numerous groups involved, which is also not in the direct 
interest of those directly coordinating and working on-site. 
Far from some abstract analysis locked away in the ivory towers of social sciences, 
the workers themselves are in fact very aware of the developments discussed above. 
This was vividly on display at a small national meeting of worker union activists in 
Olten. Commencing a discussion on the changes occurring in the construction 
industry, the head of Unia’s construction sector asked the activists present: “A lot of 
you have worked construction for years. Some for ten years, some for twenty and 
you Alex, even for more than forty years. What has changed since you all began 
working in the industry?” 
This question immediately unleashed a remarkably intense and impassioned 
discussion. A first worker raised his hand: “Our crews have been cut in half. You 
have to do more work with less workers.” A second picked up the ball: “Yeah, the 
time pressure that exists today is like somebody punching you in the stomach every 
day. The bosses always tell us how workplace safety has increased and that’s true. 
But today instead of falling off of scaffolding, you just have a burnout instead.” 
Concurring with this analysis, a third added that: “There are more machines, 
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computers and all that – but they don’t unburden us like they should, they just give 
the bosses a way to speed things up even more.” 
Writing down the workers’ inputs onto small cards and hanging them up on a pin wall, 
the construction head continued the discussion: “OK, what else?” Four hands 
immediately shot up. “The construction site as a unit is decaying, it’s falling apart. 
You used to have one firm on a construction site. One company did everything and 
they were proud of it. Even laying iron-reinforcements. Today you have more and 
more temporary workers and more and more subcontractors.” Continuing, yet 
another asserted that: “Yeah, and that not only means more wage-dumping, but also 
that our teams are falling apart. The bosses switch everybody around, there are just 
more and more temporary workers and more and more subcontractors. Nobody 
knows each other anymore.” Another: “When I started working, workers were seen 
as workers, as people. Today you are just a number. There is no more respect. And 
they fire people a lot quicker today.” “Yeah, back in the day the boss was a real boss 
and would come to the depot every morning. You knew who you worked for. Today 
everybody has a different boss and they change every three years. They are 
managers, not Patrons anymore.” The discussion continued for at least an hour in a 
similar way and worker after worker offered his own personal experiences and 
thoughts. Few discussions were as intense and impassioned as this one. 
 
Figure 8: Pin wall of activists’ discussions on the changes occurring in construction 
Source: own picture 
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For a union seeking to mold these chaotic groups of individuals into a collective and 
action-oriented whole, the challenges arising from the developments above have 
been drastic and often brutal. 
On a very banal, yet decisive level, the process of precarization unfolding in 
construction has not only had a severe effect on the individual workers themselves, 
but as we have seen above has created new groups of workers with slightly different, 
sometimes even contradicting material interests arising from their form of 
employment. As a result, the union can find it difficult to juggle the various interests at 
hand and find an overarching demand or claim that will have a broad mobilizing 
effect on the fragmented mass of workers involved. For example, the demand to 
negotiate a better solution for the problem of bad weather or a demand for capping 
overtime is received very differently by permanent, temporary and subcontracting 
workers. 
On a more complex social level, the union is no longer attempting to mobilize more 
established, coherent and consistent social groups, but fragmented, atomized ones 
embedded in shifting collective puzzles and deeply splintered along various lines. 
Besides the various and often contradicting social and interest realities of these 
groups, this precariousness has in some cases also led to a “creeping de-
solidarization“ (Dörre et al. 2011). This sees each group place the blame for the 
developments in construction not at the doors of capital, but at least implicitly at 
those of their permanent, temporary or subcontracting peers. 
As a result of this multifaceted process, it can be far more difficult to mold collective 
identities and spark collective dynamics than in a situation where workers have 
known, worked with and trusted each other for years. Already existing social 
networks, which social movements throughout history have tapped into and built their 
success upon (Tarrow 2011), are often missing or are contorted. Throwing in the 
linguistic difficulties noted previously, the union’s activities have basically developed 
into, as one union staffer phrased it, “organizing in chaos”. This may not affect the 
union’s efforts at recruiting new members on an individual basis, as many are more 
than happy to sign up for membership that includes legal insurance, but it most 
definitely complicates its ambitions aimed at turning that passive membership into an 
active one taking part in concerted action. 
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Stephan, a union organizer particularly tasked with building activist groups and 
organizing collective actions, describes the union’s predicament as follows: 
You are not speaking to one workforce. It’s like you are trying to organize five 
different professions at the same time. They all have different realities, different 
needs, different desires, different questions. Even though they all use the same 
hammer, work at the same place, breath in the same dust. You have to change your 
language, structure your message differently according to whatever subgroup of 
workers you are talking to. You have to find out who is the important individual in 
each and every subgroup. And then you have to convince all of them that they should 
stand up for each other, fight together for their rights even though they all have 
different rights. It’s complicated. 
So, while the logics of trade unionism stemming from the structures of capitalism are 
generally speaking still valid as described by Marx, namely that employers are still 
dependent on the labor power of their workers, tapping into those logics has indeed 
become more difficult from the structural changes unfolding in this particular sphere 
of capitalism. 
We have spent the last two chapters, part II of this thesis, concentrated on 
unravelling the various, yet interlinked challenges for the union arising from changing 
political-economic processes and structures. As a result, it has become clear that the 
union is not only fighting against more universal collective action problems debated 
by scholars from various traditions, but also against systematic employer offensives. 
Yet not only have industrial relations become more tense, but very particular 
structural challenges arising from the very “recommodification of labor“ (Standing 
2007) the union is attempting to curb have begun to present challenges of their own. 
This is the dual crisis in which organized labor finds itself today: the very same 
process threatening the material interests of labor as a whole is precisely the same 
one hampering its efforts to collectively defend itself against such threats (Kelley 
2012). 
As a result of these political as well as structural challenges, it has become clear to 
union leaders that rebuilding a union “for rough times“ (Rieger 2014: 22), a “unionism 
in times of crisis“ (Oesch 2011: 94), must not only include having the “guts” and 
conflict capacity to enter back into a more confrontational model of social partnership, 
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as we saw in the last chapter, but must also entail the development of new 
organizing models capable of coping with the structural challenges arising from such 
rough times. For while unique strategic opportunities such as those provided by the 
vote on the bilateral agreements may provide the union with a certain amount of 
societal power, which in turn may strengthen its institutional power, as the Jena 
scholars pointed out in our theory chapter and as confirmed in our historical 
overview, this cannot be a substitute for a union’s main bedrock of associational 
power. In this sense, we will now shift our vantage point to focus on some of the 
strategies developed and employed by union organizers and activists in their quest to 
strengthen the associational power of organized labor. 







Organizing in Chaos: Developing New 
Models for Collective Action 
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5. Relearning to Walk: New Strategies for Mobilizing 
 
The union’s “protest day” was in full swing and the next element thereof was about to 
unfold. After weeks of planning, the entire set-up took a mere fifteen minutes time. 
Seconds after the final “go” crackled through the walkie-talkie, a number of trucks 
burst into Zurich’s main train station. Far from any chaotic mess, however, the events 
that would unfold in the next quarter of an hour were characterized by military-like 
precision. Recognizing their cue, dozens of union activists emerged from the crowds 
in the train station and swarmed around the trucks. They then proceeded to help 
unload the countless tables and benches stacked in the open cargo area of the 
vehicles. Passers-by gawked at the activists, who had now donned orange reflective 
vests and were setting up the tables and benches throughout the Western wing of 
the station. Anticipating this curiosity, a group of women, some union staff and others 
the wives of construction workers, were handing out what they referred to as 
“Streikschokolade” to the hundreds of curious commuters: small bars of chocolate 
with red wrappers adorned with the union’s campaign logo and the words: “Who 
builds our houses and streets? We construction workers! Now we are fighting for 
more protection and our rights! Thank you for your support.” 
Timed to coincide with the exact moment the activists had not only finished setting up 
around one hundred tables and benches, but also a make-shift food-serving-station, 
about one thousand construction workers then streamed into the spacious hallway of 
the station. A loud concert of cheers, whistles, shouts and laughter invaded the 
previously comparatively quiet station. Directed by organizers and activists to first 
grab their waiting meal of mashed potatoes and chicken from the serving station and 
then take a seat at one of the tables, the “lunch-occupation” of Zurich’s main train 
station had begun. 
In an endless stream, more and more construction workers continued to pour into the 
scene, either being dropped off by union busses that had collected them from the 
hundreds of construction sites throughout the city or having arrived by train from 
other parts of Switzerland. The number peaked at two thousand at around half past 
noon. Following some tense episodes in the morning, where employers on numerous 
construction sites had warned their workers not to take part in the union’s “protest 
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day”, the workers present were now clearly enjoying this rather spectacular event. “I 
cannot believe we are doing this! My wife will never believe this when I tell her!” 
shouted one worker to his colleague with an endless grin and mischievous twinkle in 
his eyes. Others were snapping away countless selfie pictures with friends and co-
workers. At the same time, union leaders were giving interviews to journalists and 
others were dealing with station security personnel and the police, some of whom 
were only partially amused by this massive intrusion. 
Soon after the workers had finished their lunch, union leaders announced via 
megaphone that they would now commence to march to the construction employers 
association’s headquarters, which was located about a kilometer away. Gradually, 
yet surprisingly efficiently, the roughly two thousand construction workers present 
fell-in behind a large, homemade banner saying “We build Switzerland” and 
proceeded to walk out of the station and into the city’s Bahnhofstrasse. While it took 
some of the same route the demonstration in June had taken, today’s march was 
different. Besides the colorful train station occupation, the day of the week was just 
as decisive. In contrast to the Saturday of June’s demonstration, today was a 
Tuesday – an otherwise normal working-day. 
What would later emerge as a decisive turning point in the 2015 campaign to renew 
the collective labor agreement (CLA) and defend early retirement, this so-called 
“Protest Day”, one of three in November 2015, made headline news across the 
country. On Monday, the day before, over three thousand workers in the country’s 
Italian-speaking canton had laid down their tools and marched to the local employers 
office in protest. On the Tuesday described above, three thousand workers had done 
the same in the German-speaking part of Switzerland, with two thirds thereof 
travelling to Zurich, where the construction employers association’s national office is 
located. Then on Wednesday, four thousand workers took part in demonstrations 
throughout the French-speaking part of the country. When asked by the media about 
the CLA’s industrial peace clause and if these actions had not violated it, union 
speakers emphasized that this was not a strike, but a “protest day” (Kelley 2017). 
In this third section of the thesis, our focus is shifted from one that has so far 
explored the changing construction industry and the challenges these 
transformations have produced to one zooming in on how the union itself is changing 
in order to actively cope with those challenges on the level of associational power 
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and collective action. For while the blend of labor’s structural and institutional power, 
seeing the CLA act as a stabilizing instrument for employers, is indeed exploited by 
the union, this only sets the starting point at having a CLA, yet by no means shaping 
what that CLA actually entails. In other words, while the employers’ reliance on some 
kind of institution to solve their own collective action problems means that the 
necessity of certain rules of the game may (currently) remain undisputed, what those 
rules actually look like is a trophy still up for grabs and embedded in capital-labor 
power relations. In a similar logic, while the union has to a certain extent mastered 
strategies of publically “shaming and blaming” employers, thus producing a certain 
amount of societal power that is undoubtedly useful, it will only take organized labor 
so far considering that such public pressure first of all is often connected to collective 
action anyway and furthermore only rarely has a direct effect on the process of 
capital accumulation – especially in an industry such as construction. 
Thus, despite the growing barriers thereto, the flexing of its associational power 
through collective actions by the workers themselves has shown itself to remain 
organized labor’s key instrument for not only winning new concessions, but also 
defending old ones, especially in times of a more neoliberally dominated political 
economy. For not only can broad and public collective action increase pressure on 
employers, in its most potent form – that of the work stoppage – it directly interrupts 
the process of production and thereby infringes on capital accumulation. 
As Tarrow points out: “Because disruption spreads uncertainty and gives weak actors 
leverage against powerful opponents, it is the strongest weapon of social 
movements.” (Tarrow 2011: 103). And indeed, since its return to a more contentious 
style of industrial relations, organized labor in Swiss construction has developed a 
vast repertoire of contention (Tilly and Tarrow 2007) with a variety of collective action 
forms and protest routines stretched out along a continuum of escalation, depending 
on the situation and level of confrontation needed. In more relaxed times or at the 
beginnings of campaigns these can range from assemblies after work to “protest 
barbeques” during workers’ lunch breaks on the construction sites. In more 
confrontational periods, these can range from two-hour protest breaks during working 
hours to full-day work stoppages and strikes. 
That being said, while collective protest actions such as those described above 
indeed play a paramount role in shifting power relations in labor’s favor and 
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strengthening the movement itself, they are far from given or automatic, even when 
recognized grievances exist (Thompson 1971; Kelly 1998; Tilly and Tarrow 2007; 
Tarrow 2011). Indeed, the eventful scenes unfolding in Zurich’s main station were the 
product of intense, tiring and nerve-wrecking preparation: during long nights of 
planning at the union offices, yet especially while overcoming collective action 
obstacles on the construction sites themselves. For as has become visible in the 
previous chapters, not only has organized labor been up against more aggressive 
employers, the very precarization the unions were fighting against had 
simultaneously produced labor structures which had, as an unintended consequence, 
made collective action significantly more difficult. In the words of one union veteran, 
the process was akin to “relearning to walk” – regaining the ability to carry out 
behavior that had once seemed natural to organized labor. 
This chapter examines the ideally systematic, yet often slightly more chaotic and far 
from complete efforts of union organizers aimed at overcoming this dual crisis of 
labor. It looks at union organizers’ strategies aimed at not only having a membership 
“willing to pay” dues, but one also “willing to act” (Arbeitskreis Strategic Unionism 
2013: 354) in a more hostile environment. Focusing on one of Unia’s local regions 
during the campaign of 2015, region Mittelland, we will travel through the process of 
a construction mobilization. Beginning by analyzing the structural changes made in 
the region’s construction team, we will then move on to the innovative strategic 
model it has developed. Proceeding to see how the union’s ideas can unfold in the 
field, concrete cases of organizing and mobilizing are then examined. Crossing the 
metaphorical barricades, we will also look at how some employers react and how 
their actions influence the process of collective action. Finally, if we, as well as the 
union, accept that despite the strengths of region Mittelland’s approach, this model 
must continue to be refined, then this chapter will be concluded by discussing the 
areas in which the union is seeking to enhance the model, at the same time 
preparing us for the next chapter. 
Organizing to Organize: Adapting Structures for Collective Action 
Looking back at our definition of the organizing model of trade unionism discussed in 
the introduction, Unia in construction is seeking to develop innovative and systematic 
methods and strategies to activate and empower workers in participating in broad, 
comprehensive campaigns using unconventional and often disruptive methods with 
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the long-term goal of shifting power relations in worker favor (Bronfenbrenner et al. 
1998, Voss and Sherman 2000, Dörre et al. 2009). 
Yet even besides the specific challenges arising from the changing political economic 
environment in Swiss construction, it is a truism that:  
The conflict of interests that lies at the heart of the capitalist employment relationship 
does not necessarily give rise to conflict behavior. Since workers depend on employers 
to hire their capacity to work, then they too have an interest in the viability of their 
particular employing organization. More, the subordinate class often exists in a state of 
disorganization, lacking an agreed view of its interests and without the organizational 
resources with which to pursue them. (Kelly 1998: 25) 
While Kelly goes on to state that “fluctuations and variations in ‘individualism’ and 
‘collectivism’“ (Kelly 1998: 25) do occur, thus allowing collective action to unfold, his 
remarks remind us that the latter is indeed something that must be deliberately 
constructed and is by no means a product automatically or mechanically arising from 
labor-capital contradictions – no matter how severe those might be. 
According to Pedrina and Hartmann (2007: 93), both longstanding veterans of the 
Swiss labor movement, some of the most important factors for successful 
mobilizations and strikes are: 
 the objective reasons behind the cause and a recognized legitimacy thereof 
 a correct analysis of power relations in the process of the conflict 
 the unity of workers during the mobilization and the existence of active 
workers ready to take on responsibility  
 the experience and the skills of union organizers and the support of union 
leaders 
 good planning, logistical support and the right timing, i.e. the ability to tap into 
the rhythm and dynamics of the movement 
 successful campaigning for broad public support 
The above made points are undoubtedly important factors, which few union activists 
would refute. That being said, however, they in fact tell us little of the necessary 
structural-organizational conditions as well as the micro-mechanisms that are no less 
than vital when it comes to organizing collective action in the field. While this was 
hardly the goal of the authors above in their short review of industrial conflict in 
Switzerland, it nonetheless reflects the fact that for a long time, more systematic and 
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micro-oriented models for igniting and sustaining contentious collective action indeed 
remained rather rudimentary or were even completely neglected in the Swiss labor 
movement. Instead, things were largely done by Bauchgefühl (gut feeling), as a 
number of organizers have confessed. 
This was, however, not necessarily due to lack of interest, skills or capability, but 
because the conditions in the field did not necessarily demand it. As one union 
veteran recounts: 
When I started as a union staff worker some 25 years ago, we were far, far from any 
professional outfit. We were passionate fighters, don’t get me wrong. And you need 
that – it doesn’t work without passion. But you know, we would just drive out there 
and scan the horizon for cranes. Then we would walk up to the workers, talk about 
this and the other aspect of what was going on in the negotiations and see where the 
conversation led. Having a list of the sites in our area was pretty much the pinnacle of 
our conceptual thinking. But that’s also because it worked! When things got rough, on 
some of the sites you could just walk up and yell “Sciopero!” [strike in Italian], and a 
few minutes later the boys would be boarding a bus [to go to a demonstration]. Don’t 
get me wrong, we worked long and hard too. I mean back then, campaign organizers 
still did legal cases [of members], administrative stuff, you name it. But when it came 
to movement work, I wouldn’t say it was necessarily easy or anything, but in the end it 
somehow just worked out. That was when we first started to organize protest actions 
[again]. It’s different today – that just doesn’t work anymore. Today, it’s like we are 
organizing in chaos. 
What becomes clear in this strikingly honest retrospective view is that while the 
union’s degree of methods and systematic courses of action was modest to say the 
least, the surrounding conditions did not necessarily demand an increased 
complexity: “[…] in the end it somehow just worked out.” However, especially when 
paired together with the statements and experiences of other informants emphasized 
in previous chapters, today’s challenges to collective action – stemming from both 
changes in the industry and a growingly aggressive stance of employers – seem to 
demand a different approach. 
While the entire organization of Unia has been travelling through a process of 
professionalization and systematization, one of the most explicit examples thereof 
has unfolded in the construction team of local region Mittelland. Besides the region 
generally enjoying a rather avant-gardist reputation throughout the organization, the 
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bare necessity and urgency of developing adequate and innovative mobilizing 
models has been further encouraged by the dialectics of the local construction 
industry. On the one hand, representing a great opportunity, region Mittelland is an 
area with one of the highest levels of construction activity in the country. In other 
words, there is great potential to both recruit, activate and mobilize construction 
workers in this urban metropolis. On the other hand, as a direct result of this high 
amount of construction activity, the degree of precarization and fragmentation, both 
on the level of labor as well as languages, is substantial. This in turn has increased 
the demand for structural and strategic coping mechanisms in the form of a new and 
more efficient organizing and mobilizing approach. 
Region Mittelland’s answer to this puzzle has been a radical one. And while the 
region itself admits, even emphasizes, that the model is far from flawless and is 
constantly in adaptation and development, the results it has produced have been 
noticed throughout the organization – and also by the employers. As one employer 
viciously complained to me: “I work in different areas of the country. The second I 
step into Mittelland though, it’s just a different story – you guys won’t leave us alone!” 
Starting from the question of organizational structure, region Mittelland has 
dramatically reshuffled the way the union staff themselves are organized. For a long 
time, and as continues to be the case in other regions, the profile of a union staff 
worker had been that of a classic “all-rounder”. Seeing a total of around twelve 
fulltime staff active in construction, these women and men were not only responsible 
for recruiting, mobilizing and building activist groups in both the main construction 
trades as well as in interior construction (painters, electricians, etc.), they were 
further tasked with providing legal advice to members as well as preparing basic 
legal interventions when necessary. Some would furthermore even represent the 
union in the paritarian commissions of the various CLAs.  
Thus, many of the staffs’ days would have looked something like this: visiting workers 
of both the main construction trades and interior construction in the morning and 
during their lunch breaks, then returning to the office to process growing heaps of 
paperwork in the early afternoon and finally giving legal advice to members in the late 
afternoon, followed by in some cases both activist and/or paritarian meetings in the 
evening. 
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When it came to this eierlegende Wollmilchsau (translated directly into an egg-laying, 
wool-giving, milk-providing pig, emphasizing the difficulties of being a jack of all 
trades), as some critics in the union have tagged it, a number of problems were 
glaringly evident. First of all, there was the mundane fact that there are simply few 
people (if any at all) that are so diversely qualified so as to fulfill such a profile of 
simultaneously being a skilled paralegal, extroverted member-recruiter and persistent 
and intuitive organizer and campaigner, especially in today’s construction labor 
world. While the system no doubt had its advantages, one very negative result was 
that the quality of work was often rather ambiguous – both in the area of movement-
campaigning as well as that of individual servicing in the realm of legal work. 
Secondly, union staff functioning along this all-rounder-model of course only had a 
fragment of time for each function and lacked both a task-oriented as well as a 
temporal focus. In the words of one veteran union officer who worked in both this and 
the newer model: 
If we are completely honest with ourselves, looking back we did everything. But we 
did everything half-way – if even that. Each task was burdened down by the other, 
you were constantly running from one thing to another, leading to a vicious circle in 
which we didn’t really have time to do anything right. Not exactly ideal when you are 
trying to start a revolution. [laughs] 
Furthermore, given that membership recruitment and legal tasks were more quickly 
quantifiable than worker mobilizations, the latter representing more of a long-term 
process with many uncertain and not always controllable factors, this de facto saw 
concentrated mobilization work take a back seat place. Not only that, precisely due to 
the increasing precarization of the construction industry, the time dedicated to legal 
advice and dealing with individual legal problems had skyrocketed as a result of the 
increased level of CLA-violations, thus dominating large parts of the staff’s days. And 
last but not least, things were further complicated by the fact that the staff of the 
region were generally assigned to the various geographical sub-sections of the 
region instead of working as one comprehensive construction organizing team. As a 
result, not only were construction crews continuously meeting different staff 
organizers whenever they changed construction sites, thus hampering long-term 
relations between the union and the crews, but the region’s personnel resources 
 - 179 - 
were also rather inflexibly spread out instead of focused on the dynamics of the 
industry and the areas of the region where construction activity was currently highest. 
Region Mittelland’s answer to this organizational dilemma has been threefold. First of 
all, it has focused its resources by abolishing the sub-sectional deployments of the 
staff. As a result, besides being able to more flexibly focus on the areas of the region 
with high construction activity, staff organizers were now able to work in flying 
columns zigzagging across the entire region, from one “travelling factory“ (Bosch and 
Zühlke-Robinet 2000: 14) to the next. 
Second of all, staff organizers in the field were relieved of their tasks in the realm of 
both legal servicing as well as any paritarian work. These tasks were delegated to 
back-office staff within the union. So, if a member had legal questions, the 
construction field officers could direct them to a trained specialist in the union office 
and no longer conducted the legal work themselves. Not only could staff organizers 
in the field thus focus completely on die Bewegung (the movement), but the quality of 
legal work also increased. 
Thirdly, field staff active in construction were divided into two different teams. One of 
these teams concentrated its efforts on the interior construction trades (painters, 
electricians, etc.) with a clear focus on individual member-recruitment. While the 
region continued to inform the members of these trades about changes in their 
respective CLAs and their rights,  provide legal advice and generally lend support 
when needed, when it came to more intense mobilizations and in-depth campaigning, 
a clear decision was made to focus the region’s resources on the main construction 
industry due to its strategic importance. As such, the second team, the construction 
campaign-team, was able to dedicate its resources solely to the activities of 
organizing, recruiting, building networks and mobilizing construction workers for 
collective action in the main construction industry. 
Of course, in the sense of organizational flexibility ( Arbeitskreis Strategic Unionism 
2013), these new structural changes not only dramatically altered the functioning of 
how the union worked, but also entailed a shift and concentration of financial and 
personnel resources both from individual servicing to collective action as well as, at 
least in the realm of mobilizing and campaigning, from the interior construction trades 
to the main construction industry. As a result, the staff organizers in this new 
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construction campaign-team truly became movement-focused field organizers. Now 
made up of around eight full-time staff, with the exception of training, planning and 
preparing, this team was able to dedicate its full time and resources to organizing 
and mobilizing on the construction sites. This not only meant that these organizers 
were free from “the headaches and distractions of the bureaucratic stuff”, as one 
organizer involved put it, but also drastically increased the amount of time they were 
able to spend in face to face contact with workers – either on the construction sites or 
at “one-to-one”-meetings with key activists after work. 
Moving on to how this construction campaign-team works, it is indeed this face-to-
face communication with workers on both a collective and individual basis that 
today’s union leaders perceive as laying at the heart of successful union organizing. 
Despite the dramatic impact the internet and social media have had upon a number 
of social movements in different settings (Tarrow 2011: 137), the vital importance of 
personal contact cannot be overstated. This is, however, particularly important in 
labor organizing, given the fact that employees are being dared to directly challenge 
their employer and thus their source of financial income. In fact, the importance of 
personal contact is something also emphasized by the neo-institutionalist theoretician 
Elinor Ostrom in her thoughts on collective action, stating that “Face-to-face 
communication in a public good game – as well as in other types of social dilemmas 
– produces substantial increases in cooperation that are sustained across all periods 
[…]“ (Ostrom 2000: 140). 
So, while social media and the internet are indeed used to spread the union’s 
message on this or the other topic, in particular in the realm of public campaigning 
(societal power) and often using pictures and short films, the main platform of 
communication with workers is the construction team’s daily Aussendienst or field 
work. Usually divided up into rather steady two-people sub-teams, this field work 
mainly consists of visiting construction sites: smaller ones during working hours and 
the particularly large sites during lunch and coffee breaks. These visits can include 
collective talks in the form of small speeches and presentations, yet can also see 
organizers specifically talking to certain individuals. 
The goals of these visits are generally speaking located on three levels. First of all, 
on a very broad level this “presence at the workplaces” is done to not only normalize 
the union’s role and presence in everyday work-life, but also to ensure the building of 
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deep-rooted, durable relationships with the workforces by building contacts and trust. 
Second of all, as there are no so-called closed shops or collective membership 
schemes in the Swiss system of industrial relations, each and every union member 
must be individually recruited. This can either mean the worker in question 
approaches the union him- or herself or that he or she is actively recruited by either 
worker activists or especially staff organizers, such as those in region Mittelland’s 
construction team. Third of all, and perhaps the most emphasized goal of Mittelland’s 
construction team, is that of turning dues-paying union members into active union 
members (Arbeitskreis Strategic Unionism 2013: 354) taking part in collective 
industrial action such as rallies, demonstrations, protest days and if need be strikes. 
This third point is perhaps the most challenging as well as complex task, as it not 
only involves convincing workers of the necessity, utility and rationality of often 
contentious actions, but also means dealing with sometimes significant employer 
repression – something which will be studied closer later on. 
As can be imagined, due to the linguistic heterogeneity of the construction industry, it 
is only sensible for the union to recruit union organizers who not only have the wider 
social skills, political commitment and assertive character needed for the job, but also 
the relevant language skills. As such, during the 2015 campaign, the construction 
team in region Mittelland was made up of a team leader, who was Swiss, and then a 
number of Portuguese, Italian, Albanian and Serbian organizers. Coming from 
various professional backgrounds, from journalists to airport workers, most had been 
in Switzerland before joining the union’s construction team. Besides the multi-
tongued organizing team itself, all of the union’s flyers, newspapers etc. are also 
translated into the seven so-called Bausprachen (construction languages): the Swiss 
national languages of German, French and Italian and then further Portuguese, 
Spanish, Albanian and Serbo-Croat.  
While there is no shortage in obstacles and challenges facing the union in its efforts 
to organize and collectively activate workers, there is in fact one factor inherent to the 
building industry that is indeed helpful. Because of the mobile and developing 
character of these “travelling factories“ (Bosch and Zühlke-Robinet 2000: 14), in 
contrast to actual factories with their stationary and walled-in work-spaces, it is easier 
for union organizers to gain access to the often open construction sites in order to 
talk with employees. For even though labor lawyers and some legal academics 
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generally argue that union organizers must be given access to all workspaces based 
on the Swiss constitution’s Koalitionsfreiheit (freedom of association) (Niggli 2014), 
this interpretation is (unsurprisingly) not shared by many employers, who contrast it 
with their rights to private property. As such, gaining access to workplaces is often 
easier without physical boundaries and is further invigorated by the often unclear 
question of who actually has property rights on a building site (given that the 
construction firm itself is technically only a service provider). 
That being said, this by no means should suggest that construction employers 
always accept union visits to their sites. Some employers not only argue viciously 
with visiting organizers, but will also occasionally take them to court charging them 
with trespassing. While the union has almost always won such legal cases, some 
employers nonetheless use it as a means to hamper the efforts of the union. Being 
that such cases are, legally speaking, directed at individual union staff and not at the 
union itself, if organizers do not have Swiss citizenship, this can under circumstances 
be very worrying for the individuals involved. Furthermore, an increasing number of 
employers have taken to fencing in their construction sites and hiring private security 
services to guard the sites, specifically instructing them not to allow union organizers 
on to the premises. 
Especially in Mittelland, with its high construction activity and the union’s 
concentrated and visible efforts to activate workers, tensions can be high: be that in 
the form of over-zealous private security guards overstepping their boundaries or 
project managers interfering in organizers’ discussions with workers. As one of the 
campaign-team’s organizers put it: “It’s really a jungle out there”. While such tense 
situations and the arguments resulting therefrom can be both individually and 
emotionally exhausting, they can also threaten the success of a mobilization. If an 
organizer gives in to an employer too quickly, this can be seen by the workers as a 
sign of weakness. However, if an organizer too ferociously defends his or her stance 
or is perceived as being irrationally stubborn, this can have an alienating effect on the 
workers. 
In order to train their organizers’ skills in this regard, region Mittelland has introduced 
a rather unconventional instrument: role plays. The point of such theatrical role plays 
is to reenact actual or hypothetical situations occurring during organizers’ field visits 
with the goal of then collectively discussing the strengths and weaknesses of the 
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organizers practicing and to debate the best ways of dealing with complex situations. 
While for some organizers this rather unorthodox step required a phase of “getting 
used to”, it has meanwhile become an inherent part of the team’s training. 
In the words of one of the team’s organizers:  
The first time I did it, it was rather weird, to be honest. I could not stop laughing. I 
mean here I was, pretending to be some hard-ass security guy intimidating my 
colleagues. Don’t get me wrong, that’s what happens out there. They try and stop us 
whenever they can. Sometimes they even have dogs with them. But it was just weird 
at first playing such otherwise tense situations with my team. But as soon as that first 
shock wears off, it’s a really great way to actively and concretely discuss problematic 
situations on the sites. But you have to ready to really expose yourself not only during 
the role play, but also afterwards in the discussion.  
Of course, collective rhetoric and communication techniques towards workers can 
and are just as well practiced during such role plays. When embedded in reflective 
and critical discussions on actual experiences collected on the sites during 
mobilizations, these role plays provide, in the eyes of region Mittelland, an excellent 
platform to learn das Handwerk, the tools of the trade, and refine as well as transfer 
one’s practical skills collected and honed in real experiences, successes and failures 
in everyday organizing and mobilizing. Besides rhetoric, vocabulary and oral 
communications, physical gestures are also practiced and discussed. 
While the radical restructuring of the region’s construction team, departing from the 
all-rounder-profile and creating flying columns allowing for a clearer focus on 
mobilizations, has produced visible progress when it comes to worker turnout at 
mobilizations, it is not completely uncontested. Especially by some union staff 
outside of region Mittelland, the changes made have been greeted with a certain 
amount of skepticism. This is not necessarily surprising. For not only have the 
changes altered the everyday-life and portfolio of the union’s staff, they have also 
changed union organizers’ very identity. By relieving field staff of their tasks in the 
realms of legal advice as well as introducing more specialized jobs focused on 
recruiting and mobilizing, some older staff workers, who have long been comfortable 
with such an all-rounder-position and often perceive the legal advisory aspects of 
their job as the more prestigious ones, can feel threatened. 
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Furthermore, despite the fact that this specialization and focus has relieved staff of 
certain tasks in order to concentrate on others, it is no secret that this intense 
campaign-oriented as well as confrontational model has led to longer hours as well 
as to more hectic and often confrontational situations on construction sites. 
Expectedly, such changes are also not exclusively greeted with enthusiasm by all. 
Such objections are, however, far from unique to Unia or Switzerland, but represent 
an inherent concomitant accompanying union transitions to more campaign-oriented 
organizations, something noted by almost all scholars of labor revitalization (Voss 
and Sherman 2000; Lopez 2004; Dörre et al. 2009). Commenting on staff resistance 
in American unions going through transition phases, Voss and Sherman note that 
“They [parts of union staff] also resist having to perform unfamiliar and daunting 
tasks, as organizing means working harder and being more confrontational than they 
are accustomed to […].“ (2000: 321). Such skepticism of course generally reminds us 
of the challenges involved in introducing change in large, often bureaucratic 
organizations such as trade unions and reawakens the by now infamous warnings of 
the “iron laws of oligarchy” expressed by Michels (in Voss and Sherman 2000). 
However, while this skepticism can make the introduction of new organizing models 
more difficult, it is not necessarily fatal if these changes are regarded and treated by 
the leadership as normal parts of a progressive, yet not necessarily linear and often 
dialectic transition process. As Lopez points out, “Social movement unionism is not 
simply a laundry list of tactics, it is a process of change within the labor movement 
itself, and to know whether it can succeed over the long run we need to understand 
what its dilemmas are and how it might be able to deal with them.“ ( 2004: 12). 
Besides openly discussing the reasons and vital necessities behind such changes 
with both union staff and worker activists, it may also make sense to recognize that 
the skills of some existing union staff indeed lay more in the realms of legal advice 
and servicing and offer them the possibility of changing to such a position. This can, 
however, of course only be done to a certain extent given the limited amount of 
positions. When it comes to expanding its staff and filling vacancies, however, many 
revitalizing unions, Unia included, have found that it can be useful to especially 
recruit “outside” people with backgrounds in more contentious, grassroots social 
movements. Not only are these organizers unburdened with more “traditional” and 
conservative perceptions of how a union should work, but often bring with them both 
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know-how as well as a thirst for more innovative and contentious methods of 
organizing. 
All this being said, despite the essential opportunities provided by the organizational 
changes noted above and the fact that they provide the necessary space to focus on 
organizing and mobilizing, they alone do not provide an answer to the challenges 
faced by the union in construction today. In a way representing the mere skeleton or 
outside construction of the union’s efforts towards enhanced collective action, the 
construction team’s new structures must equally be filled with new and innovative 
ideas, strategies and tactics aimed at understanding and invigorating the micro-
mechanisms of collective action in fragmented and precarious settings. Let us 
proceed to these questions. 
Framing Contention: Region Mittelland’s Phase Model for Mobilizing 
As noted in the beginning of this chapter, while collective action can sometimes 
spontaneously spring from workers’ grievances, “theories of movement participation 
have long recognized that there is no one-to-one correspondence between 
grievances and action […]“ (Lopez 2004: 40). And as labor anthropologist Kasmir 
reminds us in reference to both Thompson and Jones, it is central that we as 
anthropologists study the production of interest, identification, grievance and 
aspiration when it comes to collective action and understand that “[…] class identity 
is neither primordial nor automatic, but must be brought into being by social actors.“ 
(Kasmir 2005: 79). 
Furthermore, as stated above, while rather spontaneous, “gut instinct”-organizing 
may have worked in the past, the structures of the Swiss construction industry today 
as well as the growingly aggressive stance of some employers call for more 
innovative and structured organizing approaches. Taking into account the 
fragmented realities and sometimes colliding interests of the different workers 
involved, this means that the union must not only actively frame individual workers’ 
grievances as questions of labor-capital conflict, but also convincingly portray 
collective action as a plausible instrument when it comes to solving those grievances. 
The model developed and used in region Mittelland during the campaign of 2015 
represents just as much a radical departure from its previous mobilizing approaches 
as the region’s organizational changes did from their previous structures. Especially 
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when contrasted with the functioning of other regions, X’s approach is a particularly 
complex, systematic and goal-oriented one. That being said, it is at the same time 
not simply a complete replacement of old ideas, but more a negotiation between a 
more disciplined systematization of tools that have spontaneously worked in the past 
and new and innovative ideas aimed at overcoming today’s collective action 
obstacles. In region Mittelland, this approach has become known as the phase 
model.  
In the eyes of the organizers developing and using this model, while the different 
forms of collective action at different points in the campaign obviously call for 
different communicative frames and particular messages, the logic and micro-
mechanisms behind the different forms of collective action are generally speaking the 
same. In this sense, leading organizers in region Mittelland have constructed a model 
that seeks to abstract the general process of collective action mobilization and can 
thus be applied to basically all of the protest routines the union employs. At the heart 
of this model is a systematic and often mathematically precise planning approach 
based on almost ethnographic social mappings on the one hand, blended together 
with a communicative framing approach transferring continuously escalating 
discourses of urgency. What I mean by that should soon become clear. 
Let us begin with the first aspect, namely that of systematic planning based on social 
mappings. This aspect is perhaps best introduced using a quote of one of the leading 
organizers of the region: 
It’s easy, it’s just math. If I want x number of workers to take part in a rally or 
demonstration, then I know I have to visit each worker at least five times in order to 
secure a commitment. More when employer repression is tough. Subtracting a rough 
third of probable no-shows, that means I have to get at least x plus x/3 to explicitly 
agree to participate. And if say seventy percent of the people we talk to will probably 
agree to participate, that in the end means I have to talk to a total of (x plus 
x/3)/70*100 workers at least five times. So that means I have to draw up a mobilizing 
radius with at least that many workers in it and make a timeline for visiting the sites in 
that radius allowing me to see each worker at least five times before the rally or 
demo. It’s simple. 
This “simple” mathematical planning has become a particularly characteristic element 
of region Mittelland’s model. Taking a step back, what this logically means, however, 
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is that the construction team must have a relatively exact idea of how many workers 
are on which sites at that particular point in time as well as in the immediate future. 
As such, in what almost resembles ethnographic methods, social mappings of each 
construction site located in region Mittelland’s territory are drawn up. How many 
workers are on each site? How many are permanents, temporaries and 
subcontractors? How many thereof are union members? How many and who are 
active members? Furthermore and just as important, the main languages spoken on 
each particular site must be taken into consideration as well, so the union’s team can 
send organizers with the necessary linguistic skills to the respective sites. In order to 
determine these factors, at the start of an important campaign the construction team 
may first carry out a “research round” during which organizers put their flyers and 
newspapers aside and simply try and construct a precise picture of the social 
composition of the sites. 
Such mappings not only help the union plan its mobilization efforts, but also provide a 
rather precise and adaptable depiction of its relative strength on the sites. For as the 
campaign unfolds, these mappings can be dynamically enhanced to include a traffic-
light-system of red, yellow or green referencing the general sentiment and morale on 
the respective site in regards to (potential) participation in collective action. As a 
result, not only do these essentially ethnographic mappings provide the numerical 
base for the “simple” mathematical planning noted above, the union is furthermore 
able to track its own progress when it comes to mobilizing for a rally, demonstration 
or strike. Of course, it goes without saying that this aspect of the phase model 
demands rather rigorous discipline when it comes to calculating as well as constantly 
updating the dynamic social mappings of the sites. 
Yet if the above aspect demands a high level of discipline, then the second pillar of 
the model, that of communicative framing, demands an equally high amount of 
creativity as well as deep cognitive insight into the social and emotional dynamics 
unfolding on the sites. For while mathematical planning guarantees for the space 
within which communications and persuasion efforts can take place, it is meaningless 
without discursive content. 
As the name suggests, the phase model abstracts the mobilization process by 
breaking it down into a number of phases representing the key moments of such a 
process as well as the chronological unfolding of union visits to the construction sites. 
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In other words, if the end goal is to encourage x number of workers from z number of 
sites to participate in a rally, protest action or strike, then the mobilization process 
aimed at fulfilling that goal is broken down into five different phases, each 
representing one or sometimes more visits to a construction site. 
Following the guiding principle that the entire process must transfer a continuously 
escalating sense of urgency and escalation in order to both motivate as well as 












Figure 9: Region Mittelland's phase model 
Source: own illustration 
 
 
In the first phase, that of sensitization, organizers introduce the campaign topics at 
hand and encourage workers to openly think about them and if and why they are 
important. These topics are usually ones already decided upon beforehand as the 
result of broad interactive questionnaires, in which workers can tell the union what is 
the most important topic for them during the (upcoming) CLA-renegotiation. In the 
second phase, that of identification, workers are reminded of the essential relevance 
of their own collective agency when it comes to achieving or losing the campaign 
topic at hand. As such, this is both an identification with the campaign goal(s), but 
more importantly with their own ability to act and achieve them. In the third phase of 
mobilization, a concrete collective action is discussed with the workers and the 
necessary steps as well as possible consequences (such as employer repression) 
are consciously discussed. In the fourth phase, that of action, the collective action 
itself is carried out, be that a rally, demonstration, strike or in less confrontational 
times even just a union barbeque. In the last, phase, that of demobilization, the union 
team revisits the sites to discuss the hopefully fulfilled action with the workers, i.e. 
with the action’s participants, as well as to inform them of potential progress in CLA-
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negotiations as a result thereof and to counteract any potential employer repression. 
Furthermore, organizers place a strong focus on recruiting new union members in 
this phase. 
While the phase model is an attempt to abstract the mobilization process so as to 
create a model applicable to most if not all mobilizations, the actual raw content filling 
these phases of course depends on the particular campaign at hand. In the sense 
that struggles between capital and labor do not only take place “in the streets, but in 
contests over meaning“ (Melucci and Rochon paraphrased in Tarrow 2011: 32), the 
region’s construction campaign-team – in collaboration with key worker activists – 
designs a set of precise messages it wishes to confer during each of its five or more 
visits. Developing one broad message per phase noted above, each message builds 
upon the preceding one and assumes a specific function towards achieving the final 
goal of collective action. In order to ensure that the messages transferred are both 
precise as well as consistent from site to site, the content thereof is precisely written 
down in a roughly page long “scripts” beforehand. The idea is that union organizers 
learn these by heart and then hold collective talks or “presentations” on the 
construction sites. 
While the union does not explicitly style it as such, the specific mobilizing messages 
in region Mittelland’s phase model in effect represent a cognitive framing of labor-
capital conflicts with the goal of producing a sense of injustice on the one hand and a 
recognition by workers of their own collective agency on the other. Stretching back to 
the cultural turn in social movement studies in the 1960s, the renowned Marxist 
historian E.P. Thompson was one of the first to deeply study what he termed “the 
moral economy” of social groups (1966; 1971). In doing so, he pointed out that 
people do not automatically or mechanically act against grievances, but only once 
they are “empowered by a sense of injustice“ (paraphrased in Tarrow 2011: 25, 
italics by CK). Based on this insight, numerous social movement scholars have 
continued to develop these thoughts when analyzing the collective action frames 
employed by social movement organizations. 
According to Snow and Benford (in Tarrow 2011: 144ff.), collective action frames are 
interpretive schemas that simplify and condense “the world out there” and help to not 
only “redefine as unjust and immoral what was previously seen as unfortunate but 
perhaps tolerable“ (ibid), but also display the possibility of acting against those 
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injustices. Such a “cognitive liberation“ (McAdam 1988) allowing for collective agency 
is particularly feasible when employers violate (sometimes implicitly) established 
rules or customs (Burawoy 1979; Kelly 1998: 29), i.e. informal institutions. This in 
turn points to another important aspect: Besides the perception of injustices and 
grievances, this must furthermore be specifically attributed to a particular agent (in 
our case the construction employers association) instead of to “uncontrollable forces 
or events“ (Kelly 1998: 29). Besides presenting a target onto which contentious 
actions can be projected, the attribution of fault simultaneously helps to construct 
social identities of “us” and “them” (Fantasia 1988; Kelly 1998: 29f.; Tarrow 2011: 
31). This in turn reminds us of Marx’s recognition of the need of the working class to 
develop from an objective class in itself to a subjective and aware class for itself (in 
Kasmir 2005). That being said, such frames are of course neither constructed nor 
applied in social vacuums. As such, they can and usually are contested by some of 
the other actors involved. In this sense, collective action frames have to be fit enough 
to assert themselves in “framing contests“ (Goffman in Tarrow 2011: 144) against the 
narratives of their opponents. 
Looking at the case of Swiss construction, however, a clear challenge presents itself 
for organizers seeking to bring about collective action. As a result of the variety of 
employment forms and realities stemming from the precarization of labor, the union’s 
greater audience is one made up of workers with different employment realities, 
problems, hopes and fears. The union is thus challenged to construct relatively 
comprehensive collective action frames that are able to reach the various fragmented 
workforces to which it speaks. It must, in other words, mobilize and stimulate a 
certain consensus (Tarrow 2011: 11). At the same time, however, these frames must 
also be specific enough to effectively persuade workers into collective action. 
During the 2015 campaign, organizers attempted to negotiate this dilemma by on the 
one hand broadly highlighting the union’s three demands of securing early 
retirement, fighting wage-dumping and introducing a more worker-friendly solution to 
the bad weather problematic. This provided a broad platform to reach all workers of 
the industry in one way or another. In doing so, organizers were at the same time 
able to emphasize the very fundamental importance of the CLA for all workers. Given 
that the CLA would expire at the end of the year if no agreement was reached, there 
was a certain objective urgency to this claim. Thus, using the general concept of the 
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CLA as a contentual as well as emotional bracket with which to not only clasp the 
various demands but also the different workers involved, the union was able to 
construct a rather comprehensive collective action frame. 
That being said, putting the isolated realm of communicative discourses momentarily 
aside and taking into account the empirical social dynamics on the construction sites 
themselves, union organizers simultaneously realized that it was especially essential 
for them to reach the permanent workers of the core workforces operating on the 
sites. This was important for two reasons. On the one hand, despite a growing 
degree of precarization, these permanent workers still represent (in most cases) the 
majority of workers on the sites and also belong to the more influential companies 
within the construction employers association. On the other hand, precisely because 
of their often dominant position in the social hierarchy of construction, the actions (or 
lack thereof) of these workers exercise a strong amount of influence on those of the 
other workers. When preparing for the “protest day” described in the introduction to 
this chapter, one organizer noted that: “If the permanent workers walk, then so will 
the others.” So in other words, while the union’s collective action frames needed to 
reach all workers to a certain extent, they had to be conceptualized so as to 
especially galvanize the core workforce due to their particular social importance. 
It is here that the union’s main demand, that of defending early retirement, played a 
vital role. While all three of the union’s demands took a prominent place in the 
collective action frames used during the first half year of the campaign (up to the 
mass demonstration in June), union organizers increasingly recognized that early 
retirement was the most important topic as well as the emotional priority for most of 
the workers involved. As a result, in the second half of the year, which involved the 
more tense mobilizations for the protest days during working hours in November, the 
question of early retirement took on a particularly dominant place. While early 
retirement is generally speaking positively connoted throughout the industry, it was 
and is particularly relevant for permanent workers. On an emotional level, due to their 
more stable position within construction, these workers identify more strongly with the 
industry as part of their social identity and are proud of such rather unique institutions 
as that of early retirement at sixty. On the material level, most permanent workers 
very calculatingly and rationally assume that they will one day immediately and 
individually profit from this institution. Given that the average age in construction is 
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rather high, this furthermore did not represent some far off utopia for most workers, 
but was something in arm’s reach (which was of course also the reason the 
institution itself needed financial reinforcement). 
In building a collective action frame around the issue of early retirement, union 
organizers tapped into shared understandings of a moral economy, one stipulating 
that it was “only right that we as construction workers get to retire early – nobody 
works harder than us!”, a feeling often expressed by workers in the industry. 
Furthermore, by emphasizing the openness of the union for a refinancing plan and 
simultaneously disclosing the employers demand that the age of early retirement 
either go up or the actual pensions be reduced, the blame for the problem could 
clearly be placed at the doors of the employers. As noted above, by identifying and 
attributing the problem to this specific agent, this simultaneously helped to construct 
social identities based on one’s status as a worker versus that of 
employer/management. 
Besides highlighting the necessities and justifications for early retirement, organizers 
furthermore drew on narratives of the original struggle to introduce it in 2002. Besides 
orally retelling the story of that strike, the union produced large posters made up of a 
collage of pictures thereof, designed to act as a visual reinforcement of organizers’ 
presentations. In doing so, the union not only mobilized collective memories of past 
struggles, “quasi-mythical incidents that have been told and retold” as the union’s 
“living organizational heritage“ (Lévesque and Murray 2010: 339), but also pointed to 
the legitimacy as well as obvious effectiveness of collective action. In other words: 
“We did it back then, so we can do it now.”, as organizers repeatedly told workers on 
the sites. This was not least aided by the fact that at least some of the workers 
addressed had themselves gone on strike back in 2002. While this was a minority as 
most were retired or had otherwise left the industry by now, it nonetheless 
occasionally led to scenes in which union organizers would first retell the “grand 
narrative” of the 2002 strike and individual workers would then proudly recollect their 
own individual memories thereof, filling organizers’ narratives both with emotional 
content as well as providing a stamp of approval by workers’ well-known and trusted 
by their peers. 
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Figure 10: Poster depicting the original struggle for early retirement  
Source: Unia 
 
Put together, these factors enabled a relatively high degree of McAdam’s “cognitive 
liberation“ (1988). While the union’s narrative was, of course, contested by 
employers, it was difficult for them to deconstruct it. The fact that the union had 
offered to negotiate a refinancing of the early retirement scheme and the employers 
had so far refused to negotiate was hard to twist – something the union was more 
than happy to accentuate. That the employers had so far not even come to the 
negotiating table was furthermore perceived as particularly outrageous by many of 
the workers, even by some of the otherwise more conservative Swiss ones with 
higher qualifications: “In Switzerland, you sit down and discuss things. That’s the way 
it’s done here!”, as one such worker put it. 
One thing that a number of companies did do, however, was to hang banners 
(provided by the construction employers association) on their construction sites 
attempting to portray the employers themselves as supporting early retirement: 
“Retirement at 60! We stand behind it!” On many sites, however, due to the fact that 
workers were already highly informed by the union’s presentations, this strategy 
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vividly backfired and workers would gleefully poke fun at these banners, noting that 
although the employers might claim to stand behind retirement at 60, whether or not 
the height of the pension stayed the same remained unmentioned. On some sites, 
workers even glued makeshift signs onto the banners saying “Up to 1000 francs of 
pension theft”, the amount the union calculated would go missing if a refinance-plan 
was not negotiated. 
Looking back at the campaign’s collective action frames, we can see that the union 
dealt with the fragmented workforces and their different cognitive realities by on the 
one hand developing a relatively comprehensive frame serving as a bracket for the 
different types of workers involved. On the other hand, by later on particularly 
focusing on the key players in the social hierarchy of the sites, organizers highlighted 
a key demand that was particularly important as well as emotionally charged from the 
perspective of the permanent employees of the core workforces. While this strategic 
and simultaneously pragmatic solution was not perfect and to a certain extent 
represented a kind of bricolage, it indeed produced the communicative framework 
that ultimately helped lead to the rather impressive mobilization results during the 
campaign – in turn producing the bargaining power necessary to actually secure 
early retirement. It also reminds us once again of the fact that: “[…] interests are not 
a given.  Individuals define their interests in interactions with other actors and these 
interactions affect the understanding of those interests (Fung and Olin Wright, 2003; 
Mansbridge, 1992).“ (Lévesque and Murray 2010: 338). 
While a number of the union’s other regions employed similar discourses, what 
distinguished region Mittelland’s approach was, besides the almost military-style 
planning and mathematical calculations, a strikingly clear and very strategic 
conceptualization of how, when and in which order to convey which exact messages. 
The goal thereof was to construct a communicative escalation that was not only 
comprehensive, but also took into account the empirical social dynamics and 
hierarchies of the site – thus producing a “cognitive liberation“ (McAdam 1988) and 
actively raising the probability of collective action. 
Of course, the above described phase model and the collective action frames filling it 
are ideal types located on the level of strategy and planning. In this sense, the often 
uncertain empirical realities of everyday life on the construction sites can naturally 
turn even the most systematic and well-planned interventions into chaotic and 
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dynamic events – even when they do ultimately succeed. Looking at some empirical 
examples thereof is the focus of the next subchapter. 
The Abstract Becomes Concrete: the Phase Model in Action 
As noted above, while region Mittelland’s approach to collective action in construction 
is indeed both a highly systematic as well as disciplined one, this clear concept 
interacts and sometimes collides with the more complex empirical realities of 
everyday-life on the construction sites. In order to unearth what that means, as well 
as to provide a more ethnographically rich picture of how the ideas above are 
actually realized, I will now depict three episodes of collective action in Swiss 
construction. 
Introducing agency: mobilizing and motivating for an assembly after work 
As one of the least confrontational forms of collective action, mobilizing workers for 
an assembly outside of working hours can nonetheless represent an important 
starting point for a string of collective actions and can under circumstances unleash a 
dynamic echoing throughout the entire campaign. While they may not directly 
interfere with the process of capital accumulation, after-work assemblies nonetheless 
introduce the very concept of collective agency by suggesting that workers may join 
together and become active in pursuit of their collective interests. On a more informal 
level, such rallies can also offer worker activists from various companies and building 
sites the possibility of becoming acquainted with each other, thus enabling them, in 
the words of one union organizer, “to see that there are other people just like them, 
that it’s normal to be a union activist.” Continuing, the same organizer stated that: “If 
people eat together, drink together and laugh together, it is also easier to later stand 
up and fight together.” 
Mobilizing for a rally of 300 workers on the evening of March 30th, 2015, the aim of 
the assembly was to kick off the 2015 campaign in the region with some of its more 
loyal and enthusiastic activists. As noted above, the process of motivating workers to 
participate in this event largely unfolded during the construction team’s daily visits to 
the sites. On middle-sized and larger construction sites, this mainly took place in 
workers’ rest containers during the coffee breaks at nine and the lunch breaks at 
twelve. On smaller sites, this was done during working hours.  
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When visiting one of these sites made up of around thirty people, union organizer 
Sara went from container to container to talk to the workers, now divided up into 
groups of around ten per container for their nine o’clock coffee break. In two previous 
visits, she had already informed the workers of the general topics at hand and as 
such, this visit was one introducing a first concrete action, that of the assembly. It 
was thus the mobilization phase. During her short five minute presentation to the 
workers, Sara’s main goal was twofold. First of all, she had to consolidate the moral 
economy of fighting for the topic in question – the renewal of the CLA and defense of 
early retirement. While she had already discussed this on her last visit some two 
weeks ago, considering the importance thereof, continuously refreshing the morality, 
justification and necessity of the cause was vital. Second of all, she had to convince 
these individuals or individual groups of workers that it actually made a difference if 
they themselves took action, at this moment meaning participation in said assembly.  
The script she had rehearsed and practiced was therefor designed to portray the 
event as not only just, but also necessary and rational. Thus, after reintroducing the 
cause in question, early retirement and the CLA, she shifted from the moral economy 
of the subject to the question of worker agency: 
[…] Look – how did we get early retirement? How did we even get our CLA? Did the 
employers just give it to us? No, we had to fight for it. We had to work together. We 
had to move our asses. And we didn’t just get up one day and say “let’s do a strike”. 
We had to prepare, we had to get our colleagues on board, we had to show the 
employers that we meant business. Big surprise: it’s no different today! And now the 
bosses are threatening to attack early retirement and have so far refused to re-
negotiate the CLA. So again, we have to work together, we have to move our asses! 
And as a first step, we are organizing a protest assembly after work on March 30th at 
five thirty. We want to protest against the disrespectful attitude of the employers, but 
also start preparing ourselves for the campaign to come. It’s important that as many 
people as possible are there, because we need to start this campaign with a bang! 
And I want to see as many Strata [company pseudonym] people there as possible – 
make yourselves proud! 
Focusing on one particular worker she knew well, Sara concluded her speech by 
personally calling upon this individual: “José, are you coming?” “I’m in!”, the worker 
responded with a thinly veiled wink. Sara handed him a clipboard with an enrolment 
list. While this ritual of signing up was not formally binding, it nonetheless raised 
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participants’ commitments. “Remember, we are ordering food and drinks for you, so 
don’t forget the date!”, Sara said, as she handed José a business-card-sized flyer 
with the date on it. Much to her delight, José’s expected confirmation unleashed an 
equally positive dynamic amongst his colleagues. As he was a well-respected 
permanent worker, his positive response carried a certain amount of weight.  
As will become visible throughout this chapter, this short episode actually points to an 
aspect of construction that is favorable to collective action. Despite the generally 
critical stance taken towards Olson’s rather absolutist and universalist approach to 
collective action (1977) in this thesis, the inversion of his argument that collective 
action is generally unlikely unless in small groups is actually well on display here. 
For, while the CLA covers the wages and working conditions of tens of thousands of 
workers and the union’s collective actions involve thousands of workers as well, the 
mobilization process itself often takes place within rather small social constellations: 
namely in the rest containers of a construction site. As such, positive group dynamics 
can more easily unfold than in large, more chaotic constellations. Furthermore, due 
to workforce fragmentation, workers generally tend to spend their breaks with their 
immediate co-workers, who usually share their employment status. As a result, union 
organizers can tailor their communication to fit their specific audience, emphasizing 
one aspect in a container of permanent employees and highlighting another in one of 
subcontractors. 
Yet while the majority of José’s group did sign up for the assembly, one older worker 
remained distant. “Look, I’ve taken part in a lot of your events, and there will always 
be more. I’ll come when things get serious, but not before.”, he replied. Besides this 
individual worker’s generally hesitant stance, what particularly stands out is that this 
individual is not only suggesting that it simply did not seem worth it to him to come at 
this early stage when it was not yet “serious”, but also that such assemblies were 
“your events”, thus implicitly (even if not necessarily negatively) portraying the union 
as a third party instead of a direct association of workers themselves. While this in 
turn provoked Sara into asserting that “This is about your life, about your job – it is 
your assembly”, the worker remained unimpressed and reiterated that “I’ll be there 
when it gets serious, but not now.” In order to not overemphasize the meaning of this 
single non-participant, which in turn might unsettle the other workers’ commitments, 
Sara let the matter rest. 
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At the end of the five week mobilization process for the March 30th rally, the region’s 
campaign-team had easily collected the amount of registrations necessary to 
guarantee a minimum participation of 300. While this was still a rather modest 
number of participants, it nonetheless fulfilled its function of a first step in the 
unpacking of the union’s repertoire of contention (Tilly and Tarrow 2007) during this 
campaign. For even the workers who had chosen not to participate in the March 30th 
rally were still confronted with the union’s message of cause (“And now the bosses 
are threatening to attack early retirement.”) and agency (“We have to work together. 
We have to move our asses.”). And while it was important that a certain “minimum 
mass” of 300 were ultimately present at the assembly, as the one more critical 
worker keenly observed, this was just the beginning of the campaign, not the 
“serious” part. 
Crossing the threshold: organizing protest breaks during working hours 
Entering the construction site in time for the workers’ twelve o’clock lunch break, the 
first thing union organizer Maria did on this sunny September day was to shift her 
glance towards the open door of the workers’ container. This was the day before a 
planned two hour protest break between nine and eleven on the following morning 
and tensions were high. What Maria was looking for was a poster she had put up a 
few days ago. While the poster highlighted the importance of workers standing 
together for their rights, she herself was less interested in the content thereof, but 
more in its condition. “Posters don’t just transfer messages one way, they are a two-
way street. You see, if the poster is still hanging, it’s an indicator that the union is 
supported on that particular site. If it’s not or if it’s torn up or something, you know 
you still have work to do.”, she explained. Indeed, on this site the poster was still 
standing. 
Considering that this particular construction site was nearby the point of assembly for 
tomorrow’s protest break, Maria wanted to convince the workers to come directly to 
the assembly point instead of picking them up with busses, as was the plan for the 
other construction sites not so nearby. Her reason was twofold: “It’s not only because 
it saves us resources, but also because the more they do themselves instead of us 
doing it for them, the more it reinforces the workers’ conviction of their own strength.” 
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Maria had already visited the site a number of times and knew the workers well. She 
began today’s visit by stopping by the container of the site foreman and again 
reminded him that tomorrow was the protest break between nine and eleven and that 
he should not order any concrete for the time. She also invited him to the protest: “It’s 
your early retirement too, you know!” While many foremen supported the campaign, 
as it indeed directly concerned them, they were often under substantial and very 
individual pressure from their supervisors not to explicitly support militant actions by 
the union. Thomas, the foreman at the site, was a cooperative guy, but one that 
tended not to take risks. It thus came as no surprise to Maria when he replied: “I 
can’t. I’ve got a dentist appointment tomorrow.” “Really? Of all days!”, Maria replied 
with a smile, well knowing that he was not least choosing to remain absent so he did 
not have to carry out company directives ordering him to instruct his workers not to 
take part in the protest. Not responding to Maria’s friendly gibe, Thomas concluded 
the conversation by stating that “If the workers want to participate, then it’s up to 
them.” 
When she got to the crew’s container, the conversational culture was more direct. 
During previous visits, Maria had already explained the necessity as well as the logic 
of the protest break and it was not the first time these particular workers had 
participated in union actions. Since the workers thus knew what to expect, both in 
terms of the action itself as well as how to deal with their supervisors, this 
represented a certain advantage for Maria. As Ostrom points out, when players learn 
how to play “the game” of collective action and have done it before, this generally 
leads “to more cooperation, not less” (2000: 140). This site proved to be no exception 
and when Maria asked “So – are you boys still in for tomorrow?”, there was a 
generally positive tendency. 
“We said we would come and we stand by our word”, one worker, the apparent 
leader of the group, proclaimed. Most of the others responded similarly. Not only that, 
when two of the eight workers in the container were slightly more hesitant, it was not 
only Maria that began to argue with them, but the other workers themselves. “No! We 
either all go or nobody at all. We are a group! And we said that we would go, so I say 
we go! Capiche?” “Yeah! Are you guys going to walk out on us or what?!”, added 
another worker harshly. Finally, after Maria took the risky, yet apparently successful 
 - 200 - 
step of asking them “Are you men or what?!”, the two hesitant ones agreed that they 
would come. “Good – then it’s abgemacht [settled].”, replied Maria. 
What particularly stands out during this episode is that while collective action is made 
up of the participation of willing individuals, these individuals do not make their 
decisions in a social vacuum, but embedded within the social dynamics of their 
interpersonal networks. Indeed, according to Tarrow, such interpersonal networks 
are “the sites for the normative pressures and solidary incentives out of which 
movements emerge and are sustained.“ (2011: 124). Not only do they influence 
actors’ decisions, but can under circumstances exert a social control function (ibid). 
While in this case, it was a pro-union one, it can in other cases just as well be the 
other way around, especially if recognized group leaders are not union supporters, 
but are more critical. 
In the scene above, we essentially witnessed how what Ostrom (2000) terms willing 
cooperators can exert pressure on the other game players so that they too will 
participate. This is, of course, not only due to a commitment towards the union, but 
also out of individual rational interest. For by assuring that others cooperate as well, 
willing cooperators make sure that the former do not free-ride on their costs. 
Sometimes, as was the case in the scene above, these willing cooperators will also 
be supported by conditional cooperators, who base their commitment on whether 
they think others will reciprocate (Ostrom 2000: 142). In contrast to more committed 
individuals, however, these conditional cooperators can get easily disappointed by 
others’ non-cooperation or free riding and may also withdraw their own participation if 
they assume others will not participate. It is in this sense vital that either union 
organizers, committed workers or at best both clearly reaffirm that once collective 
action is decided, then it “is abgemacht [settled]”, thus offering all participants a 
stronger feeling of security. Such assurances are generally important, as: “Those 
who believe others will cooperate in social dilemmas are more likely to cooperate 
themselves.“ (Ostrom 2000: 140). This is furthermore often reinforced by formal 
collective votes, as will be seen below. 
All this being said, while Maria succeeded in confirming and cementing the workers’ 
commitment to participating in the protest action, her goal of persuading them to 
come to the assembly point directly, instead of being picked up, was less successful: 
“You guys are picking up everybody else, right?”, the group leader critically asked, 
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challenging Maria to a certain extent. “Then pick us up too!” While this was far from 
the answer Maria had hoped for, the workers’ hesitation towards going there directly 
should not be confused with laziness, but represents a protective mechanism from 
employer repression. For if the union team picks the workers up, so the logic, the 
“blame” is thus shifted towards the union as an organization and away from the 
individual workers themselves. As such, we can see this example as a case of 
collective action participants negotiating with collective action organizers on the 
terms of their participation. 
“Alright, alright. We will send a bus here tomorrow at 8:55h precisely. Either I will be 
here or somebody else. Be cleaned up and ready to go then though, OK?” Maria 
said, giving as clear instructions as possible not least so as to again provide the 
participants with as much informational as well as emotional security as possible. 
“See you tomorrow!” 
Upping the ante: protest days 
Located on the far end of the union’s continuum of confrontational collective action, 
protest days such as the one described in the introduction to this chapter are 
contentious events organized on working days. Representing full work stoppages for 
at least an entire day, these events can on the one hand be highly confrontational 
and on the other almost always involve a high degree of what Tarrow calls “protest 
performance“ (2011: 99), i.e. colorful mass rallies and/or marches. For the 
organizers, yet especially for the workers involved, these days and even the time 
leading up to them can be full of tension and turbulence. Seeing that such events can 
not only have a significant effect on CLA-negotiations, but also fundamentally 
challenge management’s control of the labor process, employers have a high interest 
in thwarting the success of such a day – not only in terms of limiting the immediate 
economic impact thereof, but also in order to break a dynamic that might otherwise 
bring about more such events in the future if negotiations continue to falter. 
From the union’s perspective, two factors are decisive when it comes to determining 
the success of such protest days: the amount of construction sites not working and 
the active turnout of workers at the protest rally or demonstration itself. It was in this 
sense that region Mittelland’s construction team threw its entire energy into working 
towards both goals in what resembled “a complex process of persuading and 
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activating“ (Klandermans 1984: 107). In the above described logic of the phase 
model, in the weeks leading up to the protest day, union organizers carried out a 
complex series of presentations emphasizing not only that the employers continued 
to threaten the workers’ early retirement, but also that the next logical step after the 
shorter protest breaks in September and October was the planned protest day.  
Three broad messages were thus central to this mobilization: 
 The employers still want to raise the retirement age or cut our pensions. That 
is unjust and so we need to stand together and act. 
 On November 11th, there will be a protest day in region Mittelland and in the 
entire German-speaking part of the country. That means construction sites 
across the area will not be working. The same thing will happen the day before 
in Ticino and the day after in the French-speaking part of the country. 
 We need to show the employers and the public that the construction workers 
in this country mean business – that we are determined and unflinching. So 
we need everybody to come to meeting point A at seven in the morning on 
that day.  
Accompanied by growing employer pressure on workers not to participate in the 
protest day, the weeks leading up to it were characterized by enormous efforts by 
both union organizers and worker activists and seemingly endless visits to the 
worksites. As these efforts generally followed the same logic as the mobilization for 
the shorter protest break described above, similar elements stood out here as well, 
yet simply more intensely, as the protest day represented a clear escalation from that 
of the protest break, one raising the stakes for all participants. 
As Klandermans (1984) points out, individuals base their decisions on whether or not 
to participate in collective action on a sometimes blurry, yet in the end from their 
standpoint rational calculation of their own personal costs and benefits. In contrast to 
more narrow-minded rational choice theoreticians, however, Klandermans goes 
beyond an exclusively individually-oriented, material cost-benefit analysis. First of all, 
according to Klandermans, potential participants weigh out their expectations of the 
total number of other participants in the collective action in question, the value of their 
own individual contribution towards its success and the general probability of success 
when many individuals participate (1984: 585). Second of all, rational calculations in 
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the sense of costs and benefits are, according to Klandermans, complex and made 
up of different motives. The collective motive encompasses individuals’ expectations 
of the success of the collective project when many participate. The social motive 
consists of the expected reactions of one’s social environment, be that colleagues or 
friends and family. The reward motive is finally comprised of the direct 
consequences, both negative and positive, stemming from one’s participation in the 
collective action at hand. It is in this sense that organizations seeking to mobilize 
groups of individuals into collective action must take a broad approach, appealing to 
collective as well as to social and reward motives (1984: 586f.). 
During the mobilization process for the protest day in November, many of 
Klandermans’ insights were vividly on display. One episode portrays these aspects 
particularly clearly. After having gathered around the relatively small group of workers 
renovating a school in the middle of the city, union organizers Paulo and Sara began 
their presentation. Detailing the planned procedure of the protest day lying ahead, 
their goal was to not only reaffirm the workers’ (so far shaky) commitment to 
participation given two weeks beforehand, but also to provide as much information as 
possible so as to increase the workers’ feelings of security. For as Klandermans 
(1984) emphasizes, people can only expect (often based on previous experiences), 
yet do not actually know what will happen and are equally aware of that. 
Once again emphasizing that given the workers’ already “promised” commitment 
(despite how shaky that might be), the fate of the action is thereby “settled”, Paulo 
and Sara went about constructing the necessary parameters to bring about the 
highest possible actual worker turnout:  
If possible, please come to the meeting point at seven in the morning. That is the best 
option and also very important because lots of other workers will be there. If you cannot 
come, then in that case we will come and pick you up here on the construction site in 
the course of the morning. Alright? 
By providing these two concrete scenarios, the organizers not only pointed out that 
they had an alternative plan B, but in doing so proactively closed potential 
information gaps that might have otherwise led to insecurity and thereby reduced the 
probability of participation. 
While most of the workers on Paulo and Sara’s site continued to remain generally 
positive towards the idea of the protest day, they nonetheless posed many questions, 
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quite visibly weighing out the pros and cons of their own participation: “How many 
other workers will be there?” asked one of the laborers. “And what happens if the 
bosses subtract the missing hours from our working time calendar?” continued the 
crane operator. And reflecting the particularities of Swiss construction: “What if my 
[subcontractor] boss assigns me to another construction site outside of the city?” as 
well as “I am a temporary worker employed by the hour – will I still get paid?” 
Since most of the workers on this site were Portuguese, the questions were mostly 
directed at Paulo, whereas Sara summarized the important points for the smaller 
non-Portuguese-speaking part of the group: a Swiss permanent worker and two 
Albanian subcontractors. By this time well-versed in answering the often similar 
questions posed on the numerous construction sites they were mobilizing, Paulo and 
Sara did their best to give clear answers wherever possible as well as to logically 
explain various scenarios when straightforward answers were impossible.  
“It’s not only a moral thing, when you give straight and honest answers, the workers 
take you more seriously. Even if it is not always what they want to hear”, Paulo 
pointed out later on. Being that the union reimburses its members for pay losses 
resulting from industrial action, regardless of whether employed by the hour or 
permanently (so-called Streikgeld, “strike money”), strictly material questions of pay 
loss could easily be answered and thus banished from an individual’s cost summary. 
More of a challenge was presented by questions as to how to deal with employer 
pressure, which will be studied closer in the next subchapter. 
Given that only rarely will “each and every member of a collectivity” be won over by 
arguments of the collective good (Klandermans 1984: 587), it is not surprising that 
organizers also appeal to still-wavering participants on the level of social and reward 
motives: “What will your colleagues think if you keep working while they are out 
risking their necks for you?”, “There are going to be thousands of workers taking part 
in our action, do you really want to look back on that day remembering that you shied 
away?”, “Your colleagues, the crane operator and the foreman are taking part, so the 
boss will send you home anyway – so it’s your choice: do you want to stay at home 
for nothing or stand together with your friends and colleagues?” 
In the end, in a conscious return to the main message at hand, Paulo and Sara 
repeated the two scenarios of either directly meeting up at seven or picking the 
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workers up from the site if employer pressure turned out to be too severe. The entire 
debate as well as the positive experiences this group of workers had already gained 
during the more mild rallies and two-hour protest breaks leading up to the protest day 
ultimately seemed to tilt the balance in the workers’ calculations towards one of 
participation. “We’re in – we will see you tomorrow at seven.”, one of the men said, 
while the others nodded their heads in confirmation. “If we are going to take part, we 
might as well come to the meeting point directly.”, he said, going even further than 
the two organizers had expected. 
Similar scenes played out throughout the hundreds of building sites in Mittelland (as 
well as in other parts of the country) and as a whole, the protest day in mid-
November was ultimately a success. Hardly any of the construction sites the 
organizers had mobilized in the region were working that day. This was, however, not 
only a result of the team’s efforts, but also because the managements of some sites 
had specifically told their workers not to show up for work that day. This should 
hardly be confused with some show of solidarity or sympathy, but because many 
employers had made their own calculations: if the work day would be lost anyway, 
they might as well do their most to minimize the active turnout of workers taking part 
in the demonstration that day. This again hints towards the fact that while the 
economic effect of such a work-stoppage is one factor, it is just as much a struggle 
over hegemony. 
As one organizer of region Mittelland’s construction team pointed out: 
The bosses will do everything, capital E-V-E-R-Y-T-H-I-N-G, to stop our protest day 
from being a success. Preferably, they would like to continue work like any other day. 
That would be their plan A. If, however, they think that that is not possible, then they 
will decide to close the site themselves and convince workers to stay at home and 
enjoy the day. “Have a nice day with your families”, “Go to the movies”, whatever – 
“Just don’t go to the union’s demonstration.” It’s a symbolic fight over who is in 
control. 
So, while the total turnout on the protest day was still more than respectable, with 
region Mittelland’s team alone mobilizing up to around one thousand workers to 
actively take part in the protest activities of what would otherwise have been a 
working day, the efforts of some employers nonetheless had their effect as well. This 
was not least the case because this de-facto “day-off” by employers had fractured the 
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collective by making it more of an individual choice whether to participate or not and 
thus freeing Ostrom’s (2000) conditional and uncertain cooperators from the 
influence of their more active colleagues. This had a particularly strong effect on 
temporary workers, as they were either deployed by their personnel agencies to 
other construction sites outside of the region’s mobilization parameter or seemed 
less interested in risky industrial action due to their particular employment status. 
Thus, while the union’s local region Mittelland had managed to reach a level where 
together with the workers it was able to effectively shut down the process of 
production on a protest day, the organizers equally realized that they would have to 
enhance their skills at convincing more undecided workers of the importance of 
active turnout. 
That being said, this partial weakness by no means tarnished the mood of the day. 
As noted in the introduction, the eventful climax was the lunch occupation of Zurich’s 
main train station and the demonstration that followed. Leading through the city and 
then up to the construction employers association’s office building in a more quiet 
part of the town, the participants were in high spirits following the surprise occupation 
of the train station, something only a small circle of people had known about 
beforehand. This enthusiasm grew even stronger when the demonstration’s 
organizers drove in a more than two meter high “60”-statue, symbolizing that the 
workers’ early retirement age was here to stay. Worker activists and organizers then 
proceeded to cement it into a casing in front of the construction employers 
association’s office and one person even ignited a red smoke grenade producing a 
red cloud arising from behind the giant statue. Speeches in the different 
Bausprachen (construction languages) were then held and workers were encouraged 
to sign a five meter long sign with the union’s demands that had been set up in front 
of the building. 
By unleashing this eventful stream of colors, actions and rhetoric, the union was not 
only able to generate creative and impressive pictures of the workers’ struggle for the 
media and the wider public, thus linking its associational power with its societal 
power, but the events of the day represented the visual embodiment of lived 
solidarity for the individual participants involved. Workers that had previously been 
cautious if not even terrified of taking part in such contentious actions, including 
Paulo and Sara’s group described in the scene above, could now be seen proudly 
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standing at the front of the crowd, their commitment more solid than ever. “This is 
one of the most exciting days of my life!”, one of them cried out to the affectionate 
amusement of some of the other participants. 
When looking at such events, we are again reminded of some of Tarrow’s insight 
concerning protest performances: 
What is it about protest performance that makes it appealing to organizers of 
contentious politics? First, protest performances add amusement or excitement to 
public politics; second, they help solidarity to grow through the interaction of the 
“performers” in protest actions. But the most important reason they are appealing is 
that they disrupt the routines of life in ways that protesters hope will disarm, dismay, 
and disrupt opponents. Disruption is the common coin of contentious politics and is the 
source of the innovations that make social movements creative and sometimes 
dangerous. (2011: 99) 
“When Repression Hits”: Dealing with Employer Pressure during 
Mobilizations 
Despite the broader question of collective action by organized labor having received 
significant attention throughout the wider social sciences, in particular what collective 
action needs in order to occur, its opposite twin has, regretfully, received only 
marginal if any interest at all. Known as “union busting” in the Anglo-American world, 
with the exception of the newer labor revitalization studies, surprisingly little 
academic work has been conducted on the subject of how employers themselves 
react to and intervene in the activities and campaigns of organized labor (Kelly 1998: 
58ff.). Yet as already briefly witnessed above, it goes without saying that employers 
generally have a strong interest in subduing collective actions carried out by workers 
in pursuit of their collective interests – both actions as well as interests often going 
against those of capital/management. And just as individual workers do not make 
their decisions in social vacuums isolated from their interpersonal networks as 
described above, neither do they make their cost-benefit-calculations separate from 
how they think their employers may react. 
Thus, whether actually implemented or “only” explicitly or even implicitly threatened, 
in labor-capital conflicts the factor of employer intervention can significantly “impair 
the capacity of a group to organize and act collectively.“ (Kelly 1998: 58). In Swiss 
construction, this is no different. Not surprisingly, in region Mittelland, where the 
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union is particularly active, employer pressure can be an especially relevant variable 
in the dynamics of collective action. “Depending on the company and site 
management”, as one of the team’s organizers explained, “when repression hits, it 
can be rough.” And just as the union has its own repertoire of contention (Tilly and 
Tarrow 2007), so too do the employers. Taking on a number of forms, some 
employer interventions into union mobilizations are rather direct, formal and obvious, 
whereas others are somewhat more discrete and indirect. 
One of the more indirect instruments in the employers’ repertoire, one that has 
become increasingly common, is a rather mundane, yet often remarkably effective 
one: ordering concrete on the day of a union action. When the union announces 
either a protest day or even a shorter protest break, often public knowledge at least a 
month in advance, many employers have taken to ordering concrete needed to fill in 
walls specifically for that date and time. Since for technical reasons concrete must be 
immediately processed, site supervisors then use this as an argument to try and 
convince workers that “they simply cannot walk out now”, as that would lead to 
severe damage and additional costs for the company. In doing so, not only do they 
raise the pressure on workers to stay, but they do so in a way not directly related to 
the union. 
As I heard one site manager say to the workers on his site on the day of a protest 
action: 
This company looks out for you. And it’s not that we are forbidding you to go to the 
protest. That’s your free choice. But right now we really have to work, because 
otherwise this concrete will dry up. That would cost the company thousands of francs. 
You don’t want that, right? 
While this is not, as is no instrument of repression, necessarily a knock-out argument 
guaranteed to sabotage collective action, it can nonetheless have quite an effect – 
especially on the many workers who are deeply loyal to their company and both 
consciously and unconsciously perceive the labor struggle more as one against an 
abstract construction employers association than against the management of their 
own particular company. As a result, such moves can cost both organizers and 
worker activists time and effort to point out to the workers that:  
Management knew this protest was planned, we told them so ourselves. So if they 
ordered concrete anyway, something they could have done yesterday or tomorrow, it 
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means that they either don’t take your right to protest seriously or they are 
deliberately trying to stop you! 
Another, slightly more direct form of employer intervention can occur when the union 
organizes some sort of event and employers seek to “occupy” the time space within 
which this is to unfold. Even if the union’s event is outside of normal working hours, 
some companies will consciously organize an assembly or event of their own at the 
same time. Whether mandatory or voluntary for their employees, such simultaneous 
company events represent a means for employers to significantly reduce the union’s 
turnout at best or at least to force workers to individually take a stand, thus openly 
“confessing” that their loyalty to the union is stronger than that to the company – a 
not necessarily easy task. 
For example, when the union team organized a barbeque on a construction site at 
the beginning of the 2015 campaign, the site management itself also organized one 
at the same time, telling the workers: “It’s completely up to you. You can either eat 
with them [the union] or with all of us [the company].” In doing so, not only did the site 
management attempt to drive a wedge between the workers and the union by subtly 
portraying the latter as an interfering third party, they also used this to make a list. 
“Since we need to know how many portions of food to order, please fill out this list 
saying that you are either going to the union event or staying here with us.” In the 
industry, so-called blacklists of employees that are “too active” in the union are not 
unheard of, so the implicit message of this request, whether it was actually to be 
used as a blacklist or not, was clear. 
In a similar sense, both on the day of the demonstration in June as well as on the 
protest days in November, some companies organized mandatory work-safety 
courses for their workers. In doing so, not only were workers taken off the sites, but 
they were forced to either specifically take the day off – thereby individually 
confronting the employers with the rather obvious fact that they wanted to take part in 
industrial action – or take part in the course, thus preventing them from showing up at 
the demonstration. 
Subtle interventions can also take place on a more individual level. Some companies, 
after having identified the key worker activists on the sites, have taken to arranging 
individual performance reviews specifically with these employees during the union’s 
activities. Especially in the case of some of the younger and more ambitious workers, 
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managers will often hint that they are considering a promotion, thus making the 
employee either take part in the performance review or insult the company by 
“ungratefully” turning down or rescheduling the review. Considering that key 
workplace leaders can play an important role in collective actions, as we have 
already seen and will see even clearer in the next chapter, removing them from the 
equation makes it significantly easier for management to break the dynamic of 
whatever collective action the union is planning. 
Besides such rather indirect or subtle interventions, employer pressure can also, 
depending on the company, place and time, be far more explicit and direct. During 
the 2015 campaign, a number of companies regularly carried out detailed briefings 
with site managers and foremen, some using lengthy PowerPoint-presentations to 
instruct them how to best prevent collective action. According to a number of union-
member foremen who took part in those briefings, suggested measures included 
more integrational ideas like explicitly guaranteeing workers that CLA-conditions 
would continue in the firm even if the CLA expired, but also more repressive ones 
such as subtracting the time workers even speak to union organizers from their time 
sheet and also systematically calling the police as soon as union organizers step foot 
on the site. While the union insists that Switzerland’s constitution gives them the right 
to access all workplaces and indeed the police rarely actually intervene, the police’s 
mere physical presence on the sites can serve to criminalize union activity and 
suggest some sort of wrongdoing. “Many workers think that if the police show up, 
then whatever the union is doing must be somehow illegal or wrong.”, one organizer 
pointed out. 
During such briefings of site foremen, many employers place a particularly strong 
emphasis on trying to integrate the foremen into their efforts. For given their formal 
authority as immediate supervisors as well as their often high prestige among their 
crews, whether a foreman speaks out for or against the union can be a highly 
influential factor in the success or failure of collective action. And given that foremen 
find themselves in a certain “sandwich position”, simultaneously being supervisors 
with a certain amount of managerial responsibility, yet also employees with their own 
CLA and early retirement, which way they tilt is often a variable factor. But by 
negatively portraying the union as an organization exclusively for “Hilfsarbeiter” 
(unskilled laborers), “immigrants” and otherwise “lazy workers” on the one hand and 
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simultaneously emphasizing what Boltanski (1982) describes as the privileged cadre 
identity of the foremen on the other, some employers will seek to alienate the 
foremen both from the union as well as from the other workers.  
While such efforts can take place in the company itself, they can also occur during a 
worker’s training to become a foreman. As Remo, a union member and freshly 
graduated foreman, describes it:  
It’s not only the bosses themselves, even the teachers at the training institute will put 
enormous pressure on you to leave the union. They even talk about it in class and 
make you raise your hand if you’re a union member before starting a tirade about the 
union! 
Generally speaking, the union has in recent years noticed a clear systematization 
and professionalization of employer interventions. As one organizer noted, “we are 
not the only ones learning and developing our strategies, so are the bosses.” Starting 
with the mass distribution of flyers in German, French, Italian, Portuguese, Spanish, 
Albanian and Serbo-Croatian, a number of employers attempt to actively sway 
workers’ opinions against the union. About a month before the union’s large 
demonstration in June 2015, the construction employers association sent out an 
“urgent request” e-mail to all of its member-companies, instructing them to distribute 
an attached flyer to all of their employees, specifically together with the latter’s 
monthly wage slips. The attached flyer explicitly displayed the union as both 
untrustworthy and unfair as well as portraying the employers in a strongly 
paternalistic light. 
Similar measures by individual companies have included sending letters to all of their 
employees warning them that any and all protest actions during CLA-periods 
represent breaches of the agreement’s industrial peace clause. While this is formally 
speaking a moot point as individual workers cannot be made legally responsible for 
breaches of the CLA’s industrial peace article – any potential lawsuits in this regard 
would be directed towards the union as an organization – such notifications can 
nonetheless have an intimidating effect. 
Going even a step further, almost exactly a month before the union’s protest day in 
November, the construction employers association distributed internal guidelines to 
all of their member-companies titled “Directives for Conduct during Labor Conflicts” 
(Schweizerischer Baumeisterverband 2015). In this step-by-step manual for 
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“company management and cadre”, of which a copy was passed on to the union, the 
following advice is given (excerpts): 
 Keep detailed recordings of the disturbances, whenever possible through 
photograph or film […] 
 Consider sanctions for employees who take part in the disturbances 
 Consider legal steps together with the construction employers association 
 Information for employees about potential consequences of participating in 
disturbances 
 Fence-in the construction site, periodic checks of the fence 
 Establish an access control (IDs, badge), organize relief, organization of 
reporting of all events to local branch [of the construction employers 
association] 
 Keep driveways and streets open (if need be with the support of the police) 
 Organize an emergency team and predefine mutual reachability 
 Organize the responsibly for media contacts on company-level 
 
Furthermore, the construction employers association also produced a standardized 
reporting sheet for companies to hand in detailed reports of Arbeitsstörungen (work 
disturbances) on their construction sites and to declare whether they wish to pursue 
criminal charges against union organizers on the grounds of trespassing, etc. As is 
apparent, both workers and some people on management level of certain companies 
pass on such material to the union – regularly, yet often anonymously. 
During the union’s actions themselves, particularly during protest events during 
working hours, site managers are often present on the site and will seek to actively 
stop workers from participating. These attempts can range from more confrontational 
threats, such as “If you go, don’t mind showing up for work tomorrow!”, to more 
shrewd ones, seeing site managers gather around the workers and then asking them 
one by one, often addressing them individually by name, if they truly wish to 
participate in such Störaktionen (disturbances). 
Furthermore, on at least two different occasions, the construction employers 
association dressed up one of their office staff in construction worker clothes with the 
goal of infiltrating a protest break on one day and a union assembly in the evening on 
another. When a union organizer at the latter assembly suspected this, given that 
none of the other workers or organizers knew the “worker” present, he politely 
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introduced himself to the stranger and asked him interested questions about where 
he worked and who his teammates were. After the man was unable to answer any of 
these questions, the organizer made it clear that he knew “what was up” and politely 
asked him to leave as it was a private event. The somewhat startled man’s 
responded: “OK, I understand – should I pay for my drink?” A couple of weeks later, 
the very same man was present at a round of negotiations between the union and 
the employers – this time wearing a suit and tie and writing the minutes of the 
negotiations on behalf of the employers. 
Of course, threats of and actually laying off workers as a sanction against their 
participation in union activism have also occurred, despite this being highly illegal 
due to the freedom of association and right to strike guaranteed by the constitution. 
While this is far from common or a general rule, not least because such would entail 
firing large portions of the workforce, some companies that are able to identify key 
worker activists do formally reprimand and sometimes even terminate their 
employment. After the protest day in November 2015, a number of worker activists 
were summoned for individual “questionings” and were formally cautioned by their 
employers, especially those who had been photographed by newspapers or filmed by 
television reporters. 
And in October 2015, shortly before the protest day in November, one employer even 
(anonymously) wrote the union a letter protesting the latter’s actions and among 
other things informing the union that: 
[…] Our employees will not take part in a strike, we have discussed this very clearly 
with our workforce! If due to your “pressure” some employees do want to take part, 
their salaries will be linearly shortened and they will be dismissed as soon as 
possible. We are able to get enough good construction guys [Bauleute] and laborers 
on the market! We receive inquiries from people interested every day! […] 
As Kelly points out, even when only a small number of activists are actually laid off,  
the significance thereof “cannot be measured simply by the number of people 
involved […]“ (1998: 58). What he means by this is that employer pressure is 
something not only dynamic but also something unfolding on a discursive level as 
well. In other words, while the number of workers suffering formal consequences 
such as being fired for taking part in union activity may be relatively low compared to 
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the number actually participating, the threat arising therefrom is often more potent 
than the act itself and can spread like wildfire through the industry as a warning.  
Hardly surprising, the particularities of the changing Swiss construction industry are 
also reflected in this sphere. While temporarily employed workers, many of whom 
hope to get a permanent employment at some point, are often more taken aback and 
can be strongly intimidated, many permanent employees, aware of their skills and 
individual market value, are often less impressed. “Fire me? Yeah, let’s see them do 
it. Really! Where else are they going to find a qualified bricklayer who knows the sites 
as well as I do.”, explained Cedric, a self-confident bricklayer who was, despite his 
young age, already in training to become a foreman.  
Interestingly enough, many subcontracting employees are in fact also less 
intimidated – something that can, paradoxically, perhaps be explained not despite but 
precisely by their already precarious position in the industry. As Blerton, a middle-
aged subcontracting employee and father of two, states in a rather “nothing to lose”-
manner: 
Look, I’ve been through more than ten different companies in the last three years. So 
you know, the probability that my boss either files bankruptcy or just can’t pay me and 
lets me go is basically as good as given. So what stops me from standing up for my 
rights?! I’m a man and that’s what I’ll do. 
It is important to state, however, that despite the fact that interventions by employers 
always have some kind of an impact on collective action, the severity thereof not only 
varies depending on workers’ individual employment position, but also depends 
strongly on the social dynamics of the site as well as the presence and role of active 
workplace leaders. Depending on these factors, employer pressure can also have a 
boomerang effect and motivate workers even more to participate in collective action, 
as embodied by the statement made by Cedric above. Generally speaking, the 
consequences of employer pressure are thus neither mechanical nor automatic and 
the union and its members have a certain amount of agency when it comes to 
preventing, minimalizing or even flipping around the impact of employer pressure on 
collective action. 
One method used by union organizers is to preemptively introduce the topic of 
repression themselves. In this sense, before employer pressure is actually even 
exercised by the employers, union organizers will ask workers during their 
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construction site visits: “What do you think management will do if we organize an 
assembly?”, “How will they react?”, “Is that right?”, “What can we do to protect 
ourselves?”, etc. 
By proactively addressing this sensitive topic, employer pressure can thus not only 
be demystified, but workers’ emotions of fear can sometimes be channeled into ones 
of “justified anger”. Besides asking the workers what they expect, sometimes 
organizers will also themselves predict what might happen, such as that site 
management will suggest a barbeque of their own in order to keep workers away 
from the union event or that they will demand one-to-one talks with worker activists. If 
this does not occur, then the topic is irrelevant. If it does, however, occur, not only is 
the surprise factor taken away and the episode becomes part of a mentally 
rehearsed playbook, the union’s position is also strengthened in the sense of: “This is 
exactly what they said the bosses would do!” 
Following such Impfungen (immunizations, vaccinations) to employer pressure, as 
they are often called, organizers encourage workers to formally vote on whether or 
not they want to take part in the proposed collective action. As this is usually done 
before employer pressure has begun, workers are more free to express their actual 
views. The decisive point, however, is that since the various individuals collectively 
state their will to participate in the collective action at hand, each individual worker 
also receives a visible commitment by his colleagues that they will participate. So, 
when making and remaking their Klandermansian cost-benefit analyses later on, one 
factor flowing into individuals’ calculations is that they can at least to a certain extent 
expect their peers to participate as well – thus raising the rational probability of the 
action’s success and simultaneously lowering the potential individual costs thereof. 
One union organizer, Alexandra, herself of an academic background, actually 
described the mechanism of such an approach as follows: 
For me, mobilizing means overcoming a prisoners dilemma. Mobilizing a number of 
people that don’t necessarily trust each other and don’t really know what the other will 
do. My job is to show one worker that the other will also participate – and vice-versa. 
At best, I get everybody on a site to come together, take a vote and say “I’m in.”. It’s 
like a kind of contract between them. That is the best way to create trust. My fear is 
not that nobody will show up to the action. My fear is that those who do show up see 
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who did not. That can be a dangerous dynamic for the future. So basically, it’s all 
about building trust and everyday overcoming a new prisoners dilemma.  
Besides such collective trust building exercises, the union has also found it useful to 
fall back on slightly more mundane and spontaneous techniques. It is here that the 
media can play a helpful role. While media reports primarily help to strengthen the 
union’s societal power in the sense of producing discursive pressure on employers, 
they can simultaneously be used by the union to strengthen its own associational 
power. For although union flyers, posters and pamphlets are important and do have 
an effect, media articles can sometimes be even more important as they display a 
supposed “truth”, that under circumstances can more “objectively” legitimize the 
union’s message. 
As one organizer recollects:  
At this one site, the employers had briefed everybody and we were having trouble 
convincing the workers that the employers actually wanted to raise the retirement age 
or cut the pensions. “Nah, they wouldn’t do that”, they said. We had distributed our 
flyers, pamphlets, even had charts to visualize how much money the workers would 
lose. But they did not believe us and said that the company had written them a letter 
saying that this was not true and that they should therefore not take part in the 
protest. Then on one day there was this really good newspaper article on the subject 
and so we made copies of it and handed them out to all the workers on that site. 
Suddenly, it was no longer the union simply saying that the employers wanted to cut 
the pensions, but the newspapers as well! The union’s voice was suddenly 
considered far more legitimate and the workers all said “Tell us more.”. 
And last but not least, since the CLA is an industry-wide agreement and the union 
does not negotiate directly with the workers’ individual companies, organizers can 
frame the struggle at hand not as one against the company, but against the more 
abstract construction employers association. Organizers often explicitly emphasize 
that “the fight is not against your company – you are Strata [company pseudonym] 
workers and can be proud of that. The quarrel is with the association.” While 
employer pressure may continue and the individual companies are of course 
members of the construction employers association, such a communicative frame 
portraying the association as the direct opponent nonetheless relieves the workers, 
who often identify strongly with their companies, of feelings of guilt or of “biting the 
hand that feeds them”, as one worker activist put it. Skilled organizers can even turn 
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the argument around and style it as a question of pride and reputation that “as many 
Strata workers as possible” take part. During the campaign, region Mittelland in fact 
organized specific assemblies exclusively for the workers of the larger companies 
operating in the region. 
Yet despite having developed some answers such as those above, many organizers 
are nonetheless wary that the union will need to more aptly equip itself with 
increasingly complex techniques to deal with increasing employer pressure, 
especially for times when the latter gets even rougher and has a greater blanket 
coverage. As one former union leader explained:  
Yeah, we learned how to fight again. And we are slowly getting back on our feet when 
it comes to organizing larger scale collective struggles. But when it comes to 
repression, we still operate by a Schönwetterlogik [“fair weather logic”]. We just 
assume that everybody is all sweet and nice. So when things really get ugly, we are 
helpless. Besides getting a grip on the whole precarization problem, figuring out how 
to better deal with repression has to be one of our top priorities. 
Learning Never Ends: Filling the Gaps 
Despite the visible progress made by region Mittelland in their particularly systematic 
approach to mobilizations and collective action, it is evident that in the words of one 
veteran organizer:  
We still have a ways to go if we want to truly develop ourselves into a union that can 
empower large numbers of workers to participate in labor fights even when it gets 
really tough. We have to realize that we are not even close to having all of the 
answers, if that is even possible in the first place. Learning just never ends and that is 
something we not only need to accept, but also translate into reality. 
Indeed, quite in the spirit of the Jena Power Resources Model (Arbeitskreis Strategic 
Unionism 2013), this self-critical recognition of the necessity of continuously 
developing the union’s learning capacity is seen as a priority by region Mittelland. 
And it touches upon a number of topics in very different ways. 
First of all, this means analyzing, contemplating and experimenting with new forms 
and expressions of collective action altogether. For despite the fact that the union’s 
repertoire of contention (Tilly and Tarrow 2007) has proven to be useful in the past, 
both organizers and worker activists themselves have mentioned that they would 
welcome new ideas in order to “spice up old routines” and make the union’s 
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collective actions “more attractive also for younger workers”, as one organizer put it. 
Besides this opportunity to make collective action “more attractive” on the sites, this 
would no doubt benefit the union’s societal power as well. For while the union’s 
demonstrations and protest actions are able to attract significant – and usually 
positive – media attention, there nonetheless increasingly seems to be a kind of “déja 
vu” reception by some media spectators considering that industrial action is 
comparatively common in construction. 
This is, however, far more easily said than done. As Tarrow points out, protest 
routines tend to be “sticky” (2011: 117). Since repertoires of contention are 
phenomena embedded in cultural familiarity (ibid) and “It is easiest for people to 
employ a form of collective action that they know how to use“ (ibid: 111), significant 
change in protest forms is not only difficult, but historically speaking rather unlikely. 
Especially when structural changes in the political economy do not explicitly demand 
innovation, habit and comfortability may dominate over more radical change. 
That being said, as long as protest forms seem to work – and right now that seems to 
be the case – radical change may also not be necessary. In fact, integrating new 
aspects into established protest routines may not only be more realistic, but also 
more useful given that a certain familiarity is preserved, yet more exciting elements 
simultaneously introduced. This was, for example, seen during the creative side-
effects at the demonstration in June 2015 (chapter 3) and the surprising lunch 
occupation of Zurich’s main train station in November 2015 (this chapter). However, 
even this will sometimes have to be done against the resistance of actors who are 
still wary and uneasy with even the slightest of change. After the fireworks on stage 
and the abseiling of a team of climbers down a building at the June demonstration, 
carrying with them a huge union banner, one longtime organizer complained to me 
that “What was that?! This is a labor struggle and not some damn carnival!” While 
this complaint was drowned out by the many positive feedbacks, it nonetheless 
points to the anthropologically/sociologically-speaking unsurprising resistance to 
change in large, established (and sometimes bureaucratic) organizations. 
However, even – or in fact especially – when new forms of contention are to be 
introduced, this does not minimize the challenges for collective action in general, 
especially when it comes to the growing fragmentation of the industry and employers’ 
increasingly systematic “union busting”-approaches. In other words, besides 
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pondering new forms of collective action, refining and developing mobilization 
techniques leading up to those actions remain pivotal. 
As detailed above, in region Mittelland the union has indeed shed its “gut instinct”-
organizing approach of the past and graduated to a more developed and complex 
model for “organizing in chaos”. Nonetheless, while the deep systematization, strict 
discipline and cognitive creativity of the so-called phase model have undoubtedly 
made positive contributions to accommodating the previously mentioned challenges, 
in particular labor fragmentation, the approach still lacks clearer and more 
comprehensive answers to truly overcome those problems. This was particularly 
visible during the above illustrated mobilizations for the protest day, where organizers 
rather flexibly navigated their discourses between the interests and cognitive 
perceptions of the various groups of workers involved, yet in the end pragmatically 
concentrated on the dominant social group of permanent workers. While this turned 
out to be a wise decision at the moment, a future model will probably have to unearth 
a more comprehensive and holistic approach to deal with the industry’s 
fragmentation. 
While such a future model will no doubt take on a number of forms, in a precarious 
labor world with fluid boundaries and uncertain perspectives this will probably mean 
unearthing new channels of mobilization reaching beyond the actual construction 
sites themselves. One such element with which region Mittelland is already 
experimenting is one interweaving the threads of labor with those of migrant 
communities, in particular that of the Portuguese, who make up a large portion of 
construction’s workforce. Besides simply having Portuguese labor organizers who 
are able to communicate in the workers’ mother tongue, this also means actively and 
recognizably taking part in the Portuguese community. And not least because many 
Portuguese migrants in Switzerland have a clear and conscious plan to return to 
Portugal someday (Fibbi et al. 2010), there is an active, visible and deeply 
interconnected Portuguese community with community centers, clubs, choir groups, 
etc. 
In these endeavors of “community organizing”, besides carrying out surveys about 
what is important for the Portuguese community in Switzerland, organizing 
discussions on social and political topics and carrying out folk events on Portuguese 
holidays, the union also taps into the existing networks in the community with the aim 
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of mobilizing the high number of construction workers in those networks for industrial 
action. This can be particularly rewarding given that the mobilization process can be 
conducted free of any employer intervention, but also because strong collective 
structures and a group identity are already existent – often in stark contrast to the 
growing fragmentation on the construction sites themselves. The results thereof are 
reflected in the fact that besides feeding in additional participants, June’s 
construction demonstration was also led by a Portuguese drum band well-known and 
popular in the community, “sending chills of pride down my back” as one Portuguese 
worker activist put it. Similar efforts are also conducted in the Albanian community, 
which also has a high number of construction workers in it. 
In the greater world of social movements, such a community-based organizing 
approach, either used as a main instrument or as an auxiliary to more classic 
workplace organizing, is far from novel. Whether the sports clubs of the labor 
movement of old or the role of churches in the African American civil rights 
movement, social movement scholars have long pointed out that organizations 
capable of “[appropriating] such institutions for their own purposes are more likely to 
succeed than are those that create new organizational niches (McAdam et al. 2001).” 
(Tarrow 2011: 31). 
That being said, while particular migrant communities may continue to express (and 
actively construct) more identifiable and tangible community structures as a coping 
mechanism to life in a foreign country, structures into which organized labor can tap 
and build alliances, this is not necessarily the case for all. As Tarrow points out:  
[…] twenty-first century social life, organized around the family, the TV screen, and 
the cellphone, does not offer as many opportunities for sustained interpersonal 
interaction as our ancestors found in the pub, the parish church, and the bowling 
league; […] the sheer density of formal associations in contemporary society offers 
numerous alternatives for individuals in search of organizations to join. (2011: 131) 
This dilemma is particularly relevant when it comes to Swiss workers. For, while the 
Swiss may represent a statistical minority in the industry, they are often some of the 
key players on construction sites due to their skills, permanent employment and 
dominant position in the social hierarchy of the site. Thus, while tapping into migrant 
communities is no doubt an innovative approach that has already yielded interesting 
results, it can only be a partial supplement and by no means a replacement to more 
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direct workplace organizing. And it is in the latter sphere that the union will have to 
continue to develop, create and recreate its skills and forge ahead with new ideas to 
overcome the increasingly precarious and fragmented construction industry. 
One of the most important if not absolutely paramount elements of such an odyssey 
is something already described in chapter 3, the union’s central project of Unia Forte: 
a “strong Unia” based on actively empowering worker activists to not only participate 
in the union, but to truly carry it. In fact, many in the union believe that while 
systematic and creative approaches to mobilizations such as those described in this 
chapter are indeed crucial and indispensable, one of the most important keys to 
building a trade union that is able to survive the growing fragmentation of labor and 
increasing employer pressure in the long run lies in such an Unia Forte. In other 
words, while step-by-step mobilizing efforts by union staff and detailed 
communicative framing thereof no doubt have their effect and will always play a 
valuable role in the construction of collective action, an equally important pillar of 
labor revitalization may lie in the enhanced identification, recruitment, training and 
empowerment of key worker activists that are already embedded and influential in 
the complex social dynamics of Switzerland’s construction sites. Creating a more 
participatory and grassroots-driven union is, however, just like the mobilization 
process itself, something not given or automatic and seldom spontaneous, but a 
social phenomenon that must actively be constructed by union organizers and 
already active workplace leaders. Let us take a look at this process in the next 
chapter. 
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6. “The Union – That’s Us!”: Empowering Workplace 
Leaders and Activists 
On a rainy Saturday in October, the national leader of Unia’s construction sector and 
other union staff were talking to a group of around twenty construction workers in the 
union’s central headquarters in Bern. In contrast to the otherwise mass rallies and 
demonstrations, the setting here was clearly different. Located in a middle-sized 
room with a beamer projecting a multi-slide presentation onto the wall, the meeting 
was less characterized by the usual fiery speeches and shouting matches, but more 
by sober, no-nonsense analysis and planning. Besides stacks of paper and 
newspapers, half-eaten croissants and endless cups of meanwhile lukewarm coffee 
also decorated the u-shaped table. 
Comprised of the “construction presidents” of Unia’s various regions, this regularly 
meeting body had temporarily changed its name from “construction presidents 
conference” to “campaign committee” for the duration of the 2015 campaign. This 
move underlined not only the high priority of the campaign, but also the importance of 
the regional construction presidents when it came to planning and discussing it. The 
defining characteristic of this group was that these construction presidents were not 
fulltime union staff, but were construction workers themselves, i.e. worker activists 
who dedicated their free time, this time a Saturday, to volunteer activism within the 
union. The title of “construction president” denoted the fact that they had been 
elected by their peer construction workers in their respective region to preside over 
the local activist committee and represent it at national meetings such as these. 
The national leader of the union’s construction sector, himself a full-time trade 
unionist, informed the assembled construction presidents of the current state of 
affairs concerning the negotiations as well as the planning of the then upcoming 
protest days in November. He told them that the construction employers had still not 
begun to negotiate about the renewal of the collective labor agreement and also 
continued to signal that when it came to early retirement, they were still only willing to 
discuss cutting workers’ pensions and not a refinancing-plan to guarantee the status 
quo. As a result, the protest days across the country in November were now more 
important than ever. 
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Moving on, he then asked the construction presidents what their take of the situation 
was and especially how the already carried out protest breaks in their regions had 
gone in September and early October. Besides venting their anger at the employers’ 
continued “Blockadehaltung” (blockade attitude), the activists present described in 
detail what was going on in their region. Among others, the president from region 
Mittelland gave a lengthy portrayal of both the protest breaks in his region as well as 
the individual company rallies the region had organized. He explained that: “Some of 
the guys [workers] were at first a bit scared of the upcoming protest day since they 
thought it meant breaking the industrial peace clause as the CLA is still running. But 
the smaller protest breaks in September really helped to take their fears away. It 
showed them their own power and was a necessary first step before the big day in 
November. Those went really well in our region.” He was visibly proud and enjoying 
the fact that he was able to report on this progress made. 
The national construction leader then gave his own analysis of the situation. “There is 
a chance that we will come to an agreement with the employers before the end of the 
year. But I have to be honest with you. It is a slim one. I would say twenty percent 
chance that we do, eighty percent that we don’t.” One construction president then 
raised his hand at this point: “If that’s the case, and I generally agree with you, then 
we all know what that means. It means we have to start preparing for strikes in April. 
Big strikes, really big strikes. And we Vertrauensleute [confidants/activists] have to be 
a driving force in that.” The room fell silent for a moment, everybody nodded in 
agreement. 
Whether during debates in strategically-oriented bodies such as the above, 
discussions and votes in regional construction assemblies on a local level or in the 
sometimes heated exchanges during a mobilization on the worksites themselves, 
individual worker activists can and do play a decisive role in the union. As witnessed 
in the previous chapter, while in today’s construction world fulltime union staff are 
largely responsible for organizing and mobilizing for collective action, in the end not 
only are the workers themselves the ones that actually have to take part in the action 
in question, but certain individuals within the workforce can and often do play a 
pivotal role in the mobilization process beforehand. Indeed, during tricky discussions 
on a construction site or in times of severe employer pressure, the presence of a 
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dedicated and well-respected worker activist can make all the difference in the 
success of whatever action is to be carried out. 
Going far beyond single protest actions themselves, however, a strong and wide-
reaching empowerment of grassroots activists is, next to a growing membership and 
mobilizing capacity, the main and most important goal by which Unia measures itself. 
Besides a political commitment by today’s union leadership to democratize the labor 
movement by developing a stronger and more active membership base, this long-
term project of Unia Forte (“strong Unia”) is derived, as the name suggests, from the 
conviction that only a union truly rooted in the workforce can be a successful one.  
Hardly confined to Unia, such a grassroots, “rank-and-file-intensive“ (Bronfenbrenner 
and Juravich 1995) approach is in fact, next to an innovative, systematic and 
confrontational course of action, the core pillar of the organizing model. As Jane 
McAlevey, herself a former union organizer turned academic, puts it: “[The organizing 
approach] places the agency for success with a continually expanding base of 
ordinary people, a mass of people never previously involved, who don’t consider 
themselves activists at all – that’s the point of organizing. […] Ordinary people help 
make the power analysis, design the strategy, and achieve the outcome. They are 
essential and they know it.“ (2016: 10). In a slightly more dramatic as well as polemic 
tone, Ariovich describes the same general approach as follows: “The organizing local 
approach depends on a minority of [workplace] activists ready to stand up and 
challenge employers even when the majority of workers prefer to stay home.“ (2010: 
2). And finally, as Lopez enthusiastically notes: “[…] social movement organizing 
allows the union to create a new vision of participatory, powerful unionism that is 
understood – by workers – to be different from the old-style [service-oriented] 
business unionism of [their own] experience and cultural memory.“ (2004: 18). 
Yet despite this clear and passionate ambition, just like the mass mobilizations on the 
construction sites themselves, the realization of such a dream does not come 
automatically nor without a concentrated effort. On the contrary, particularly after 
decades of industrial peace and a more passive-representative style of trade 
unionism, such an approach requires a fundamental rethinking and “directional 
change for our culture and current practice”, as former Unia president Vasco Pedrina 
put it (2009: 2). For during the years of welfare capitalism, when unions took on a 
more corporatistic role and largely confined their activities to negotiating for workers 
 - 225 - 
and occasionally giving them individual legal advice, the role of the fulltime 
professional staff grew significantly – at the cost of worker involvement and activism. 
Albeit perhaps plausible given the political economic setting of the day, as soon as 
the era of welfare capitalism came to a crashing end and the neoliberal 
“recommodification of labor“ (Standing 2007) began to unfold, the unions found 
themselves in a stark crisis as described in chapter three. And while the union has 
slowly been able to regain its mobilization ability as described in the previous 
chapter, it has done so with “a crucial limitation: the steps in this direction have 
mainly been realized by paid union staff.“ (Pedrina 2009). 
Thus, after regaining a certain conflict capacity (Arbeitskreis Strategic Unionism 
2013) and at least momentarily stabilizing its mobilization ability with new and 
innovative methods as described in the previous chapter, the “new horizon“ (Pedrina 
2009) for organized labor is one aiming to transform itself from an organization 
heavily dependent on fulltime staff to one driven by worker activists themselves – one 
resembling more of a social movement than the bureaucratic stereotype of a large 
NGO. As one union organizer poetically summarized it: “It means creating an 
organization that breaths when they [the members] breathe, that acts when they act, 
that grows and flourishes when they are dedicated and active. It means making it 
truly their organization in every sense of the term.” 
While this endeavor is central to the entire organization of Unia, it is particularly 
important to construction. For if the union wishes to maintain, let alone enhance its 
ability to mobilize and activate great masses of workers and thus continue to defend 
old and win new concessions, then building a more active and empowered base is 
pivotal. For precisely in more precarious and fragmented labor settings and 
especially during episodes of repression, the activities, efforts and commitments of 
key workplace leaders can be decisive. 
This chapter takes a closer look at how this journey of travelling “back to a trade 
union of the future”, as one organizer phrased it, can be realized in the changing 
construction industry. While some of this (re)construction process of a more 
participatory union unfolds on a national level, such as that described in the 
introductory scene above or during delegates assemblies, the great majority thereof 
as well as the often profound relationships between organizers and activists unfold at 
the union’s frontline, i.e. in its local regions. As a result, we will not only study the 
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union’s efforts as a whole, but also return to region Mittelland and explore their 
particular activities in this realm. Besides providing us with a rich ethnographic 
fountain, this perspective also allows us to see how the construction of a more 
participatory union can go hand in hand – and sometimes collide – with the 
systematic mobilization efforts of union organizers described in the last chapter. 
We will begin by analyzing where the union actually stands today, coming to realize 
that while there is already a high amount of participation when it comes to elections, 
greater strategy and material questions of the industry’s CLA, when it comes to the 
more operative sphere of actually organizing and mobilizing for collective action, 
active worker participation is often lacking. We will then continue by examining some 
of region Mittelland’s more innovative ideas of how a stronger integration of worker 
activists in the operative sphere of collective action might actually be conducted as 
well as brought in to harmony with the systematic mobilizations described in the last 
chapter. After that, we will invite three worker activists themselves to have their say, 
taking a semi-biographical approach and simultaneously transporting the discussion 
from that of a more strategic perspective to one focused on the concrete experiences 
of worker activists themselves. Finally, in a similar fashion as to how we concluded 
our last chapter, we will finish by discussing still open questions and some of the 
existing challenges for the union. 
Juggling Ambitions with Historical Baggage: Worker Participation Today 
With around 40’000 members in the main construction industry alone, Unia’s main 
power in the industry, its associational power, stems from these very members. 
There are few other economic sectors in Switzerland in which a union can boast an 
equally high level of organization. Besides paying dues and serving as a statistic, 
however, a respectable minority of these 40’000 members also actively take part in 
“union life” in one way or another at some point in their lives. This can take on 
different forms ranging from participating in collective actions, such as those depicted 
in the previous chapter, to assuming more formal, steady and individual roles in the 
structures of the organization itself. 
Such participation in the structures of the union can include events such as a local 
region’s annual general assembly, but also more regular and industry-focused 
activities such as being an active Vertrauensmann (directly translated to confidant, 
meaning worker activist) of the local region’s “construction group”. Representing the 
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elementary collective structure of organized construction workers at a regional level, 
these groups are often the easiest and most low-threshold way for a worker to enter 
into the structures of the union. Meeting between once a month and four times a 
year, among other things these groups discuss their region’s position to political and 
industry issues, hold educational evenings on current events, organize social 
evenings and in some cases brainstorm ideas to realize and if need be adapt the 
national campaign in their particular region. 
Furthermore, participation in these regional construction groups can and often does 
go hand in hand with taking part in the greater decision-making process within the 
national union itself. As a democratic organization in the legal form of a Verein 
(association, club), Unia has a strict constitution stipulating that not only must the 
general strategy of the union as well as that of its sub-units, such as the construction 
sector, be formally voted upon by union delegates, i.e. worker activists, but that all 
higher leadership-positions must also be elected by the same. In construction, what 
this means is that the regional construction groups delegate a number of their 
members to take part in national delegates assemblies, so-called Berufskonferenzen 
(vocational conferences), usually held between two and three times a year.  
A number of topics are discussed at these national assemblies. For one, the union’s 
national strategy and action plan for the upcoming time period is put forward by the 
national construction leadership and discussed, if necessary adjusted and then voted 
upon by the delegates present. Besides that, the national construction leadership, in 
particular its head, must itself be regularly voted in by the same delegates. In an 
equal sense, the CLA-negotiating team must also be elected at the start of each 
negotiation. And finally, the delegates also ratify newly negotiated CLAs if they are 
deemed good enough – and can reject them if not. These national assemblies or 
Berufskonferenzen usually involve around 120 delegates, yet during a campaign year 
they can be upgraded to a so-called Landsgemeinde including up to 400 delegates. 
On a more regular basis, usually every three months or even monthly during 
important campaigns, the presidents of the regional construction groups will meet 
with the national leadership (construction presidents conference / campaign 
committee) to discuss and if need be amend the direct strategy due to recent, 
unforeseen developments. 
 



















Figure 11: Basic worker activist structures in the construction industry 
Source: own illustration 
 
 
Describing his own experiences at such assemblies and some of the reasons why he 
participates, one veteran worker activist, Peter, who is also in the CLA-negotiating 
team, explains that: 
I am proud to be a part of it, of helping to decide what goes on in the industry. We as 
workers can’t just always motzen (complain) about what we don’t like and what’s wrong 
with construction if we don’t do anything. Always complaining, but never doing anything 
about it – that’s the sickness of our industry. While we might not always get everything 
we want [in negotiations], I can look myself in the mirror every day and say I made a 
difference and I contributed. At the assemblies, we discuss things and we decide things 
– it’s like making history in a way. But it’s not only that – I also appreciate the 
Austausch (talks, exchange) with workers from other regions. Be that on a more 
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serious topic like the new CLA, but also just about what kind of construction sites they 
are on and stuff like that. 
Considering the above, one might be surprised to read the otherwise harsh words in 
the introduction to this chapter, almost suggesting a union free from membership 
participation and decision making. And this would indeed be a truly false portrayal 
when taken in an absolute or undifferentiated way. As usual, the reality in such social 
phenomena is more complex. Yet when digging slightly deeper and also framing our 
analysis in the Jena power approach and ideas about collective action discussed in 
the previous chapter,  the comments made by Pedrina above, demanding a 
fundamental rethinking and “directional change for our culture and current practice“ 
(2009: 2), become substantially more plausible. 
Broadly speaking, this involves differentiating between participation in the sense of 
decision-making and participation in the sense of active, operative involvement in the 
realization of those decisions made. As delineated above, while the former is to a 
large extent fulfilled, the latter often tends to take a more backseat role. As described 
by Michael, a lead organizer in one of Unia’s regional construction teams: 
Obviously workers take part in the meetings, rallies and actions we organize and are 
thus the heart of those actions. Without them, the actions simply would not take 
place. Basta. And it’s not always easy to do that. Especially when the actions are 
more confrontational and during working hours, that involves a ton of courage.  
But when it comes to actually planning, organizing, mobilizing and executing those 
actions, the workers themselves are often not involved enough. That is something 
largely carried out by the organizers. That’s a problem though, because it should be 
their actions and we need to encourage and empower them, or at least the more 
interested ones, to play a more active role in it. 
Thus, according to the diagnosis given above, one echoed by a number of other 
organizers and activists as well, while worker activists may vote on strategy, elect 
officials and even decide whether or not to launch as well as take part in industrial 
action – and these are undoubtedly important things – they tend to be more passive 
when it comes to the step-by-step, operative organization and realization of that 
strategy, especially in concrete sequences of industrial action. In other words, while 
workers per se have to take part in the collective action in question for it to be a 
collective action in the first place, only rarely do they take on more active roles and 
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responsibilities in the organizational planning and mobilization process therefor. 
When deeper operative involvement does occur, it is usually more spontaneous and 
unconscious, more often than not representing the exception to the rule and often 
due to the insistence of a perhaps particularly eager worker activist or the gut instinct 
of a skilled organizer. 
In this sense, when it comes to specific participation in industrial action such as 
protest days, it is perhaps useful to differentiate between two ideal types. On the one 
hand, you have participants that may fully support the collective goals of the 
mobilization or may be motivated by social and group factors. They take part in the 
sense that they are present, perhaps even having laid down their tools during 
working hours. However, they do not actively contribute to the (protest) action at 
hand besides their passive presence. More often than not, their participation is also 
highly dependent on the motivation, coordination and organization of the particular 
action by organizers or in some rarer cases active peers. 
On the other hand, and this is at least today the rarer case, you ideally have 
participants that not only take part in the action through their actual presence, but 
actively, consciously and purposefully contribute to the success of that action – both 
before, during and after the action itself. Such a contribution can take on a number of 
forms, from selectively supporting organizers when they hold their presentations in 
workers’ rest containers to independently motivating and organizing the participation 
of their own crew in a protest action themselves, even without the direct help of union 
staff. In some cases, especially outside of coordinated campaigns with their clear 
campaign-plans, this can even mean proactively approaching organizers to initiate 
some sort of an action. This was the case in early 2016, when workers from one 
particular construction site told union organizers they wanted to lay down their tools 
to protest against a new site policy introducing car parking charges – something they 
then successfully did. 
Of course, these two qualities of participation are not absolute, nor exclusive 
categories but must be imagined as two ends of a continuum. This means that not 
only can individuals’ participation degree be located somewhere in between the two 
poles, but can also shift from time to time, with the same individuals being more 
active sometimes and less active at other times. So, while a worker may be more 
reserved and passive in one campaign, three years later the same worker may be 
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seen actively driving his crew to a union meeting or protest action in the company 
truck. 
Yet while the second ideal type is far rarer, from the strategic-choice perspective of 
the union’s leadership, it is the ultimate goal. While there is not necessarily a 
consensus on how to achieve this and there are a number of contradictions involved, 
the union is generally aiming to create an army of worker activists not only showing 
up to the battlefield, but ones capable and willing to lead their everyday colleagues 
and peers onto that battlefield as well – ones not only passively waiting to be 
activated, but acting themselves as “real protagonists“ (Pedrina 2009: 3), as 
individuals consciously and specifically contributing to a collective process. 
Besides ideological aspirations of union democratization and the chance to raise its 
mobilization capabilities to a greater level than they are today, this transition to a 
union more strongly carried by worker activists is in the eyes of some trade unionists 
also a question of survival in today’s construction world. To again quote the organizer 
Michael: 
No matter how great speeches we give and no matter how disciplined we work and no 
matter what great strategies we come up with: If we are not able to significantly 
increase our rooting in the workforce by not only being popular, but by actually having 
workers take on more active roles themselves, then the mix between precarization and 
repression – and both are getting worse – will kill us. Active worker participation is not 
just nice to have. In the end, increasing that needs to be one of our main tasks, 
because not only do we as organizers have limited resources to mobilize and are 
slowly stretching our limits, but when employer repression really hits, then the only 
antidote is having a really active crew, one that is not only committed but legitimately 
believes it is their action and as such are more willing to defend it. 
I mean, let’s take a look at the protest days last November. On the day itself, we 
[organizers] were literally speeding from construction site to construction site to deal 
with sometimes severe incidences of employer repression, bosses almost physically 
preventing their workers from taking part in the protest. And you just can’t always 
extinguish ten fires at once. But imagine if we had committed, trained and active worker 
activists on each of those sites? Standing up for themselves and for their crews? And 
as for the workers whose sites were closed that day and told to stay home – imagine if 
we had worker activists on each of those sites telling everybody of the importance of 
taking part. And the ones thinking of staying home knew they would have to hang their 
 - 232 - 
heads in shame the next day if they chose to take an easy day at home while their 
colleagues had been out risking their necks?! 
As emphasized in our theory chapter, studies have generally shown that besides the 
importance of cognitive framing and refined methods for mobilizing, the higher the 
degree of participation and the more involved workers are in the strategic as well as 
operative process of decision making and preparation, the higher the turnout will be 
(Schmalz and Dörre (eds.) 2013). 
All this being said, while the changes in the industry leading to less identified, 
precarious workers may have contributed to this state of “passive participation” and 
the hegemonial integration of foremen and qualified workers by their employers has 
undoubtedly added to this malaise, a glance back at the union’s own history is 
perhaps more vital for a deeper understanding. Looking back at the union’s original 
roots as a social movement, it becomes clear that it was not always like this and the 
present state represents to a large extent an unintended consequence of the 
organization’s own evolution in past political economic cycles. 
As elaborated upon in chapter three, throughout the era of welfare capitalism and 
industrial peace, the more institutionally powerful unions became, the more they 
themselves altered their functioning (Dörre 2010), morphing  from grassroots social 
movements to large and sometimes rather bureaucratic organizations gradually 
assuming a more passive-representative role and ritually negotiating with employers 
without any form of activating industrial action. While many on the political left would 
perceive these years as ones of betrayal and “selling out” – and in hindsight the 
union’s strategy was no doubt both shortsighted as well as naïve – due to the 
economic and political atmosphere, one in which employers were indeed willing to 
grant sometimes significant concessions, such an approach nonetheless had a 
strong rational aspect to it. This is particularly due to the fact that unions, as Marx 
critically put it (chapter two), are in fact not revolutionary organizations, but ones 
operating within the given system with the goal of “absorbing the risks stemming from 
the commodity character of labor power” and by doing so attempting to “de-
commodify” human labor power (Sauer in Deppe 2012: 10f.) – something they 
arguably achieved in this era. 
The side-effect of this integrated approach, however, was that not only was little to no 
industrial action carried out, but connected thereto a clear neglect was also shown 
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towards activating and renewing union structures in the workforce. As a (rational) 
result thereof: Why invest the huge effort in overcoming collective action problems in 
order to build activist groups embedded in the workforce when they are not actually 
needed since everything is settled behind closed doors at the negotiating table? Why 
spend hours trying to convince formal and informal crew leaders to spend hours 
themselves dedicated to the cause? Why train workers in the arts of collective action, 
when such collective actions do not take place? 
Thus, the “boom economy trade union” became a rather passive “representative 
organization”, in which fulltime union staff were increasingly tasked with getting 
results for the members, not with them (Rieger 2016). Besides leading negotiations 
and carrying out paritarian CLA-enforcement, in time this shift went so far as to 
include tasks such as keeping minutes of meetings, recruiting new members, 
organizing local regions’ annual general meetings, etc. – duties that had previously 
all been done or at least actively supported by worker activists. Besides this shift in 
responsibility (and of course power) from worker activists to fulltime union staff, aided 
by the more institutionalized place of trade unions at this time, this process also led 
to the hiring of more union staff, which represented both a product as well as a 
reinforcement of this process. Thus, not only was less effort gradually placed into 
keeping and renewing activist structures in the workforce, but even some of the 
activists themselves did not see the point of being active, as they could rely on union 
staff to do everything for them. As one veteran worker activist pointed out to me: 
“Why should I go to a meeting if it doesn’t actually make a difference if I’m there or 
not?” 
As already detailed, when the era of welfare capitalism was forcefully pushed aside 
by a more neoliberally dominated political economy, unions everywhere – including in 
Swiss construction – were abruptly forced to adapt to a more confrontational stance 
in order to defend concessions won in earlier days and in some cases even the CLA 
of the respective industry in general. As described in chapter three and 
ethnographically enriched in chapter five, in the construction industry Unia has 
indeed, at least to a certain extent, managed to regain such a conflict capacity and 
mobilizing ability. While both the changing structures of the industry and employer 
repression have produced significant obstacles thereto, the union has answered by 
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developing more innovative approaches such as the phase model described in the 
previous chapter. 
That being said, both due to the dominant organizational culture within the union and 
especially because this return to a more confrontational stance had to happen rather 
quickly, this re-embracement of conflict was largely achieved not by fundamentally 
starting from scratch, but by implementing it through the fulltime professional staff. As 
such, while collective actions started to once again be carried out and were done so 
with the (moral) support of the union base, the active responsibility for the 
organization, mobilization and realization thereof was largely carried by union staff.  
As Pedrina points out: 
Our union base often had to be pushed into acting collectively with us. Our manner 
towards them was often shaped by “paternalism”. This perspective shaped the culture 
of our organization strongly, not only that of the organizing staff, but also of our active 
and passive base. (2009: 4) 
So, while having reestablished the culture and to a certain extent the operative ability 
to organize and mobilize for confrontational industrial action after years of industrial 
peace, the union is still struggling to widen and strengthen that ability by empowering 
worker activists to take more active roles and responsibilities therein.  
This is, however, far from a simple task. While perhaps trivial, an organizational 
culture of doing things for people is fundamentally different than one focused on 
empowering them to do it themselves. Not only does each require as well as 
reproduce an essentially different cognitive mindset when working for respectively 
with active members, but the latter process of empowering people to do things for 
themselves can be a lot more challenging as well as laborious for the individual 
organizers involved. 
As one union organizer describes it: 
We don’t even have to talk about mobilizations, let’s just take the example of a 
banner for a demonstration. From a simple cost/benefit perspective of myself as an 
organizer, it’s easier for me to order a banner on the internet – two clicks and I’ll have 
a nice, professionally printed banner sent directly to the union office the next day. 
Nobody has to do anything and it’s not that expensive either. From a movement 
perspective, however, it makes much more sense to delegate such tasks to a group 
of activists. Not only do they take on responsibility – even if that is “just” painting a 
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banner – but they also realize that they themselves are the union and if they don’t 
move, it doesn’t get done. And this is something they are not used to. Usually the 
staff do everything and if not then it just doesn’t get done. This may sound weird, but 
by giving people certain tasks, by giving them work, they actually start to understand 
why it matters that they are active. Translate the whole thing to the question of 
mobilizing and you’ve got the importance thereof times ten. 
Returning to the double insight that while the union has managed to at least partially 
regain its ability to carry out confrontational collective action, yet does so by relying 
on professional staff to organize and mobilize for it, the union’s true dilemma in fact 
becomes clearer. Despite a relatively strong consensus that in the future the union 
will have to significantly increase the active involvement of worker activists on the 
operative level of collective action, actually taking the step towards doing that – and 
accepting the high risk such a change may involve – seems far more difficult. This is 
not necessarily because union leaders’ commitment to a more participatory union 
movement is lacking, but is in fact paradoxically rooted in the comparatively high 
level of industrial action in construction today. For considering the key role (staff-
driven) industrial action has so far played in not only preventing old concessions from 
being lost, but leading to new ones as well, there is a certain reluctance to actually 
introduce a too abrupt change that might upset or destabilize the union’s current level 
of mobilization. 
As such, the project of Unia Forte in the construction industry can be seen as a 
necessary, albeit double-edged sword. On the one hand, as pointed out above by 
union organizer Michael, an at least midterm shift to a more participatory and 
grassroots-oriented approach is not only more democratic and “nice to have”, but 
also a vital question of organized labor’s survival in the construction world today. On 
the other hand, given that this means introducing a radical change to the union’s 
current experiences, habits and to a certain extent the skills of both union staff as 
well as the broader membership, it is a shift that is not without risks. In other words, it 
has to be done, but how? And in which relation to current mobilizing approaches? 
As a result of this dilemma, the union has taken to juggling both phenomena at once. 
While it continues to use as well as enhance the role, skills and strategies of 
professional staff during mobilizations, as described in the previous chapter, it has 
simultaneously taken to developing, bringing together and integrating more 
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participatory aspects into that approach. This includes on the one hand strengthening 
and broadening the already established role of worker activists in the sense of 
decision-making participation, yet particularly means going even further towards 
shifting parts of the operative responsibility for collective action mobilizations to 
worker activists as well. 
And while some organizers and worker activists have already, in limited and usually 
spontaneous cases, acted in such a sense, truly and more comprehensively 
introducing a more operative worker participation as an inherent part of collective 
action indeed represents a profound cultural as well as organizational change within 
the union, as pointed out by Pedrina (2009). And just like the enhancement of 
mobilizing practices described in the previous chapter, this is also an endeavor 
requiring clear and systematic efforts by union leaders, organizers and activists.  
One of the regions that has developed a particularly systematic and strategic 
approach thereto is once again region Mittelland, the protagonist of our last 
subchapter. Taking a closer look at their ideas in this regard, the following 
subchapters will allow us to not only explore one of the more complex and strategic 
approaches aimed at increasing membership participation, but also how it can, at 
least to a certain extent, go hand in hand with the systematic approach to mobilizing 
highlighted in the previous chapter, thus simultaneously dampening the risk of a too 
abrupt change that might threaten the organization’s mobilizing capacity. That being 
said, it also points to the challenges and contradictions involved as well. 
“The People Everybody Listens to”: the Leaders Concept 
When looking at region Mittelland’s approach to this question, it is important to 
remember that it represents both an unfinished one still in development as well as 
only one possible answer aimed at raising the level of participation by worker 
activists. While both points must be kept in mind, it is, however, also one of the more 
complex and systematic approaches currently existing in the union’s efforts in this 
realm. Born out of the greater reflections noted above, yet concretely embedded in 
the region’s own practical experiences during previous campaigns, region 
Mittelland’s leadership came to the conclusion that not only did the union need a 
more systematic and strategic approach to mobilizing, as described in the previous 
chapter, but also one more consciously and actively integrating “the key players” of 
the sites into those mobilizing efforts. 
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As such, the region is not only attempting to expand the operative role of worker 
activists in general, but also seeking to very specifically recruit particular workers into 
that role. As Philipp, one of the organizers of the region put it: 
What we really realized during the mobilizations in 2011 and 2012 is that we are not 
only missing a quantity of activists ready to take on a more active role in the 
mobilization process itself, we are often missing a certain quality as well, namely the 
alpha dogs in the crews. The people everybody listens to and whose word is as good 
as gold. Guys that not only support us when we mobilize for protest actions, but who 
can actually mobilize themselves. So we as organizers can rely on them to transfer 
the union’s message to their crews and we can move on to other, less-organized 
crews and help them to start moving. That’s generally a problem we have today – the 
success of mobilizations is way too dependent on us and not on our active members. 
They participate, but they are too rarely the operative motor behind it. 
In other words, not only does the union seem to lack a “quantity” of activists taking on 
a more operative role, it often lacks among its active ranks the formal and informal 
leaders within the construction crews, individuals highly regarded by their peers and 
with a high level of symbolic and social capital (Bourdieu 2002). 
Besides the union’s very practical observance of the importance of integrating such 
workplace leaders, this is a factor equally recognized by many scholars studying 
social movements as well as collective action in general for that matter (Klandermans 
1989; Kelly 1998; Ostrom 2000; Tarrow 2011). Using Rick Fantasia’s in-depth 
ethnography of organized labor in the United States (1988) as a platform for a wider 
discussion, Kelly (1998) describes three general roles workplace leaders play in a 
mobilization process: 
[…] first, they promote group cohesion and identity which encourages workers to think 
about their collective interests. It also discourages any tendency towards free-riding 
and is likely to facilitate negative stereotyping of management. Second, leaders will 
urge workers to take collective action, a process of persuasion that is assumed to be 
essential because of the costs of such action and the inexperience of many people 
with its different forms and consequences. Finally, leaders will have to defend 
collective action in the face of counter-mobilizing arguments that it is illegitimate. 
(1998: 35) 
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Kelly goes on to equally emphasize that, precisely in the sense proposed by union 
organizer Michael earlier, difficulties in mobilizing for collective action can conversely 
be explained by the lack of workplace leaders active therefor. 
The region’s answer to this predicament has been to develop a so-called “leaders 
concept”. As the name suggests, the concept not only seeks to generally recruit 
activists and broaden their repertoire of activities and responsibilities, but attempts to 
recruit and build already existing workplace leaders into activist leaders. Such 
leading personalities can be formally appointed leaders, such as foremen or squad 
leaders, but can also be informally recognized leaders, i.e. normal workers whose 
prestige and standing in the group bestow upon them a certain recognition amongst 
their colleagues, be that due to their professional skills, networks or charismatic 
leadership personality. Given the social dynamics and hierarchies of the industry as 
well as the strategic perspective of the union, such leader activists are almost 
exclusively recruited from the permanent core workforces of the larger and more 
important construction companies. 
In a nutshell, the leaders concept aims to identify, recruit, train and finally integrate 
these natural workplace leaders into the union’s mobilization process with the goal of 
empowering them to both persuade their own crews to take part in collective action 
as well as to organize that participation. The latter can involve making enrolment 
lists, arranging group meeting points or even using the site’s work bus to drive the 
whole crew to the action in question, thus not only ensuring a means of 
transportation, but also guaranteeing everybody actually shows up. 
The main logic behind this endeavor is threefold. Whether in Swiss construction or in 
the nursing homes of Western Pennsylvania studied by Lopez, many union 
organizers believe that “[…] rank-and-file members are more effective organizers 
because they show workers that the union belongs to the members rather than to a 
distant bureaucracy.” (Lopez 2004: 73). The everyday efforts of the union can thus, 
quite in the sense of Unia Forte, be better depicted as authentic worker activism and 
not as some “interference from a third party“ (ibid:  69), however well intended the 
latter might be. In other words, these workplace leaders are, as one organizer 
summed it up, Multiplikatoren (multipliers). Second of all, a stronger and more 
intense involvement of workers in mobilizations is seen as strengthening workers’ 
commitment to the actions planned as they are not only for their benefit, but 
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authentically “their” actions. Particularly in the event of employer pressure, such a 
strengthened commitment can be decisive. And third of all, if worker activists on 
“organized sites” are willing and able to take over the briefing and mobilization of 
their own sites, then union organizers can shift their efforts to less “organized sites”, 
where workers are not yet convinced by or integrated in the union’s campaigns. 
While recruiting and activating workplace leaders has been a strategy pursued by a 
number of the unions attempting to revitalize themselves through innovative 
approaches, in the context of today’s Swiss construction industry, this can also fulfill 
a more complex function. As stated above, these workplace leaders are consciously 
almost exclusively recruited from the permanent, core workforces of the more 
important and larger companies. This is not only important from a strategic 
perspective as it makes sense to particularly have the permanent workforces of the 
industry’s main players organized, but can also serve as a countermeasure to the 
increased fragmentation stemming from the precarization of labor in the industry. For 
given the informal hierarchies in construction, seeing the permanent workers of the 
core workforces take on a more dominant position in the social dynamics of the sites, 
not only can these workplace leaders exert a high amount of influence over their 
direct colleagues, but also over other workers on the sites, in particular the temporary 
ones working directly with the core workforces.  
So, just how the union’s mobilizing messages were constructed so as to reach all 
workers, yet in particular those of the core workforces as described in the previous 
chapter, recruiting the informal leaders of these groups as union activists feeds just 
as much into the previously seen logic of “If the permanent workers walk, then so will 
the others.” 
Like the phase model approach, although the mechanisms of this leaders concept 
indeed include many new elements, the concept is also to a certain extent based on 
a more conscious systematization of past experiences, ones in which organizers 
have spontaneously and according to gut feelings integrated workers into the 
operative efforts of a mobilization process when the situation seemed to call for it.  
Union organizer Philipp describes the concept’s development as follows: 
First of all, we began by reflecting and analyzing the experiences we had collected in 
past campaigns. I mean, we’ve known lots of these guys [individual construction 
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workers in region Mittelland] for years, sometimes decades. And while we had not 
previously concentrated on systematically building leaders and giving them particular, 
concrete roles in campaigns, it sometimes did happen spontaneously. I mean, let’s 
say you are on a construction site and you know there has been a lot of repression 
and the guys are scared. But you also know that the natural leader of the group is a 
union guy and wants his crew to take part in the action. You intuitively try and get him 
to help you, even if it is rather spontaneous. So, what we did is to reflect on, analyze 
and break down such experiences in order to more comprehensively and 
systematically reproduce them. 
Second of all, we did not have to reinvent the wheel. We borrowed elements from 
other unions in different countries that were already further along in this process. 
Organizing methods that were specifically designed to not only activate, train and 
develop workplace leaders, but also to do so in situations of repression. Some of us 
even did short traineeships in unions in other countries. Bringing the two together, our 
past experiences and knowledge of the construction world here with new ideas about 
organizing in tricky environments, we began to develop our leaders concept. 
From the perspective of the worker, introducing such an approach means that he will 
have to take on tasks that were hitherto seen as belonging to the duties of the union 
staff. This, of course, not only means dedicating the time to make this effort, but also 
exposing himself in front of his peers as well as taking the risk of being singled out in 
times of employer pressure. It also collides not only with past experiences and taken-
for-granted conduct, but also to a large extent with organizers’ parallel efforts of 
mobilizing themselves. As one more skeptical worker explained to an organizer trying 
to get him to take on a more active role: “I don’t get it. Why should I suddenly do your 
job? I’ll take part and all [in the action], but the organizing and convincing is your job. 
I pay union dues each month!” 
From the perspective of a union organizer, this means graduating from the role of a 
persuader to the more complex, didactical role of coach. “It’s basically 
Erwachsenenbildung [andragogy]”, as one organizer described it. In this more 
sophisticated role, organizers not only have to first persuade workplace leaders of 
both the benefits of collective action and their very individual role therein, but then 
train and coach them for taking on the task of “volunteer organizer”. As one organizer 
noted: “This change can be rather difficult for us as union staff. Just because you are 
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a good soccer player does not make it is easy to then become a soccer coach and 
teach other people how to play.” 
Similar to the phase model for mobilization described in the previous chapter, 
Mittelland’s leaders concept is based on a certain number of phases and particular 
steps, with each building on the previous one. Considering that the main idea of the 
concept is to recruit the “alpha dogs” in the crews, the logical first phase is that of 
identifying these workplace leaders. Here it is important to again emphasize the 
double meaning of the term leader. While it is the goal of union organizers to turn 
these individuals into activist leaders in a union sense, supporting and at some point 
themselves leading industrial actions, the union’s concept is equally based on the 
fact that the individuals chosen for this job are already leaders at their workplace in 
the sense of the construction industry’s formal and informal hierarchies as well as 
social and group dynamics. This is particularly important in construction, as “the 
industry works in a very hierarchal level – we have to use that hierarchy.”, as one 
organizer pointed out. “There are already social structures in the companies and 
informal leaders already exist. We don’t need to build new groups and new leaders, 
both are already there. We need to find these rare pearls and integrate them into the 
activities of the union.” 
Identifying leaders is a multifaceted as well as creative process based on tapping into 
a number of channels. This can on the one hand involve going through lists of people 
that previously signed up for taking part in demonstrations, rallies or protests, i.e. 
digging in the ranks of already active workers to identify those with leadership 
potential. It can, however, also involve identifying workplace leaders who are not 
(yet) actually active in the union and perhaps not even members. This may flow from 
observations during organizers’ routine visits to the building sites or may spring from 
suggestions of other worker activists in the sense of: “You guys have to get that guy 
on board!” While individual organizers or other activists may suggest the notion of a 
certain person being a potential leader, organizers discuss amongst each other if that 
really is the case. This is because, as one organizer emphasized: “It’s not about 
finding the guy with the loudest mouth, those aren’t necessarily the group leaders. 
The leaders are often those that say very little, but when they do, their word is god.” 
Following this phase of identification, in a second step organizers then establish 
contact with the potential leader. In contrast to organizers’ routine visits to the 
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building sites, these individual acquaintance and recruitment talks usually take place 
outside of the workplace and are longer as well as broader. As one organizer pointed 
out: “It’s about getting to know the guy, about trying to find out what he really thinks 
about the union and what he really wants to change in construction, even in society 
for that matter – and not just what we think or hope that he thinks or wishes.” 
As suggested above, when it comes to recruiting such workplace leaders to become 
activist leaders, especially those not yet active at all, this involves the double process 
of not only persuading those individuals of the necessity of collective action, but also 
of the importance of their very particular and individual role therein. Organizers 
usually begin by asking the workers what their perceptions, hopes and dreams for 
themselves and the industry are and then laying out the organizers’ long-term vision 
for the union, one accentuating the union as a participatory coalition of active workers 
as a vehicle for social change. This portrayal is often contrasted to one of the “old 
union way”, working as an “insurance company doing everything for you”, but “not 
really being that strong” (organizer Philipp). Then, placing more abstract notions 
aside, organizers will often together with the workplace leader draw up a mapping of 
his own individual social network. Once this is done, usually leading to a dizzying 
graphic of dozens of other individuals, “you can point out to Manuel or José or 
whoever it is you are talking to, the very real power he has in his hands.“ (ibid). 
Besides being embedded within the crews with whom they work, these workplace 
leaders are furthermore almost always connected to a vast number of other 
construction workers in other crews and sometimes even other companies as well. 
These networks can be equally decisive, for as Tarrow points out: “Social epidemics 
spread not only because of the sensational nature of the news they transmit, but also 
because they are carried by people with a rare gift – the gift of being a “connector” – 
someone who knows lot of people.“ (Tarrow 2011: 57). Translating these social 
networks into the idea of collective action networks, organizers show the worker 
involved that by activating the people he knows, he can in certain circumstances 
unleash a wave of “union power”. 
However, given that workplace leaders are identified primarily by their own individual 
importance in their particular social group and at least not in a first step by their 
particular position towards the union, the process of recruitment can take a long time 
and even stretch out into a number of one-on-one meetings between organizers and 
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potential activists. For as in any labor setting, “Workers do not stand before the labor 
movement as unfilled containers – as generic “prospective movement participants.” 
Rather, they have specific experiences, perceptions, and views of unions – and these 
are not all positive.“ (Lopez 2004: 36). Such potentially negative perceptions can be 
because of things they read in newspapers, but they can also be products of 
personal disappointments, such as if the union was unable to help them in a legal 
case or if they previously got into an argument with a different union organizer about 
something. Of course, the often confrontational stance of the union can also be 
polarizing, especially amongst the more skilled Swiss workers with their 
comparatively high amount of individually-based cultural capital. As such, organizers 
may first have to build a relationship to workplace leaders and openly discuss the 
very essence of a participatory union before actually attempting to motivate them to 
take on a specific role therein. 
As one organizer points out: 
This can mean talking over and over again with the very same person a number of 
times. You can argue, you can point out certain facts, such as how early retirement 
came to be, and sometimes you just have to show that you are really sincere about 
what you are preaching, proving that by visibly investing time and effort and also 
listening. Sometimes though, you have to do all that and just wait for the person to 
actually experience what you are talking about, for example by organizing a 
successful action or by always keeping your word, even in difficult situations. What is 
important though, is that in the end you get a real and clear commitment of “Yes, I 
want to be an active part of the union.” There is no point in forcing out a halfway-
commitment just for the sake of it and then realizing later down the road that the 
person is not really committed. 
When and if the individual workplace leader does in fact give his commitment to 
taking part in this project, a third phase, that of training can begin. While many 
organizations based on volunteer activism often have a clear and very activism-
oriented training program for volunteer activists, be that civil rights groups in the 
United States in the 1960s or environmental groups today, trade unions have been 
notoriously slow in developing such measures. In the Swiss labor movement, while 
political education on such topics as social insurances or the history of the labor 
movement has long had a prominent place, activist training in the sense of “how to” 
for collective actions is strikingly absent. 
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Attempting to fill this gap, the construction team in Mittelland began to specifically 
train its workplace leaders in the arts of labor activism. Just as the organizers did 
between themselves, worker activists are encouraged to participate in role plays 
practicing debating with and persuading their colleagues of the benefits of a large, 
grassroots-based union and the necessity of collective action. Besides 
communicative exercises, this training further consists of analyzing social networks, 
brainstorming activism ideas, discussing the planning and execution of a protest 
action, etc. While such training is regularly and continuously conducted on an 
individual basis between activist and organizer, it is also conducted in collective 
group trainings together with other workplace leaders. In these collective trainings, 
organizers and activists share experiences and skills and debate various questions 
and challenges in the realm of organizing and mobilizing. Besides the practical 
usefulness of collective trainings, such assemblies can be empowering themselves, 
in the sense of seeing and working with likeminded individuals with similar realities. 
When it comes to translating these skills into practice, a steady process of steps is 
involved. Assuming that “going from zero to a hundred kilometers an hour” is both 
naïve and unrealistic (organizer of the construction team), these workplace leaders 
are not expected to start organizing protest actions from one day to another. Rather, 
organizers may suggest to start with small steps, such as hanging up union posters 
or stickers in their containers to stimulate debates. Going one step further, workplace 
leaders may analyze their individual social networks together with an organizer and 
then “recruit” their own individual supporters who can help them when it comes to 
mobilizing and organizing participation in collective actions. In a similar fashion as 
union organizers did with them, workplace leaders are encouraged to arrange face to 
face conversations with these potential supporters in which they debate union 
activism and the necessity thereof. Steadily growing in intensity, workplace leaders 
can then experiment with their own ability to mobilize their colleagues for low-
threshold, after-work events, such as the protest rally in March 2015. Considering 
that the latter event, as described in the previous chapter, was more of an inwardly 
focused rally and one “only” seeking to mobilize 300 workers, there was more space 
to experiment than say for example during the more critical mass demonstration in 
June or November protest days. 
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Moving on to a more confrontational mode, these workplace leaders can begin to test 
their conflict ability and assertiveness during bad-weather situations. Precisely 
because the CLA is rather vague when it comes to setting concrete criteria for when 
construction sites have to be closed, whether or not a site is actually closed during 
bad weather is often a result of the insistent efforts either of the workers present or 
an organizer visiting the particular site. Given the severe time pressure in the 
industry, site managers are often hesitant to close sites and stop work, even when 
snow and ice make it dangerous to work. In the case of severe bad weather – and 
representing a first step towards more contentious collective action – workplace 
leaders are encouraged to organize their colleagues and approach the worksite 
manager about closing down the site for the day due to the hazards of working in 
such conditions. As such actions represent a direct confrontation between labor and 
capital interests, they not only help to consolidate a group identity based on the 
identity of being a worker, but they also offer workplace leaders a first skirmish to test 
their abilities and assertiveness. On the other hand, since bad-weather is in itself not 
necessarily a direct or visibly union-related issue, there is less risk involved for the 
budding workplace leader in the sense of exposure to “union busting”. 
Building up momentum as well as experience, the ultimate goal is for workplace 
leaders to slowly develop into the representatives of the union on their site and thus 
in the long-term be able to motivate their colleagues into collective actions such as 
demonstrations, protest breaks or protest days. During the protest breaks in 
September and October as well as the larger protest day in November, in some 
cases workplace leaders indeed played specific roles when it came to the 
mobilization process. While far from representing the majority of sites, some were 
indeed able to mobilize their crews completely on their own. 
That being said, when it comes to significant industrial action, today’s reality is on 
average more one of a cooperative, hybrid effort between staff organizers and 
workplace leaders. This is not only due to both the lack of experience on the side of 
organizers as coaches and worker activists as mobilizers in such situations, but 
further embedded in the dilemma elaborated upon above, one in which organizers 
are often wary of risking the union’s current mobilization level by experimenting too 
rapidly. As such, while workplace leaders are encouraged to take on as much 
responsibility as possible, their roles in the larger, more confrontational actions 
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organized by the union are currently still embedded within the systematic phase 
model used by union organizers. In this sense, on most sites union organizers 
continue to regularly visit the sites themselves and hold their presentations for all of 
the workers present. However, active workplace leaders can and do actively support 
the collective presentations of union organizers. This active support can either take 
on a more spontaneous form in the sense of explicitly repeating and justifying what 
the organizer just said, but it can also mean workplace leaders taking on a very 
specific, pre-defined role in the presentation, such as initiating the discussion of 
whether the crew will participate in the collective action at hand and how to organize 
that participation (meeting up together at a certain meeting point, organizing a bus to 
travel together, etc.). 
From the perspective of the union, what this does is to not only build workplace 
leaders in a steady process instead of at once plunging them in at the deep end, but 
also provides both the workplace leaders as well as union organizers with a safety 
net in the sense that professional organizers can step in and help at any time. 
One of the perhaps most vital roles of workplace leaders in this cooperative effort 
takes place, however, after union organizers have left. Once a consensus of 
participation has been reached, i.e. when there is a commitment of the crew to take 
part in the particular action in question, workplace leaders must defend this 
commitment against counter-mobilization efforts – either those initiated by individual 
workers who are against the action for one reason or the other, yet in most cases 
against employer interventions, such as those elaborated upon in the previous 
chapter. As the organizer is only on the site for a fraction of the time, yet workplace 
leaders are of course constantly there, this role can truly be crucial to the success of 
a collective action. This “[defense of] collective action in the face of counter-
mobilizing arguments” is an aspect also highlighted by Kelly (1998: 35) in his debate 
on collective action and the role of worker leaders therein. 
While the union seeks to identify, recruit and train workplace leaders in order for 
them to help organize and carry out collective action, the latter can also have a 
reversely positive effect on workplace leaders, thus even strengthening their resolve. 
Even though mobilizations are to a large extent organized by union staff today, these 
collective moments of worker unity can contribute to a mutually reinforcing dynamic. 
For even when workplace leaders are not (yet) the driving force behind these events, 
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the experiences thereof can be inspiring and encourage them to stay committed even 
in more difficult situations. This is because, as worker activist Fabio points out:  
Whenever we stand together, flags waving and standing up for our rights, it makes 
everything much more real. Of course I believe in uniti siamo forti [united we are 
strong] and that’s why I am involved [in the union]. But when we actually do 
demonstrate, it just shows that everything we say is real and not a dream or illusion. It 
makes me want to do more. 
A similar sentiment is echoed by Lopez, who studied organizing strategies of the 
American union SEIU:  
Collective actions contributed something that face-to-face organizing alone could not, 
crucial to overcoming experiences and images of do-nothing unionism: a growing 
feeling of solidarity and power, a sense that the workers were symbolically taking 
control of the [workplace]. […] This growing sense of collective identity and power 
made the initial objections of people who worried that the union would not change 
anything seem palpably absurd. (Lopez 2004: 89) 
Besides these very specific acts and responsibilities embedded in the campaign, 
however, union organizers also make sure that active workplace leaders have 
opportunities to meet one another and collectively discuss amongst themselves their 
roles, hopes, fears and general thoughts. While this is done to a certain extent during 
the two day collective trainings noted above, other more relaxed ideas such as “gala 
evenings”, where workplace leaders can bring their partners, and “spaghetti 
evenings” are also hosted by the union. As one organizer emphasized: “It’s like what 
Alinsky [well-known community organizer in the 20th century United States] said: We 
are not doing all of this for fun, but it still can and should be fun!” While at many of 
these collective events organizers would translate for the various tongued workers 
taking part, organizers have also come to find it useful to hold other events as well, 
ones for example exclusively aimed at Portuguese leaders or German-speaking ones 
in order to provide for more flowing and less clipped conversational opportunities. 
Workplace Leaders in their Own Words 
After having discussed both the motivation as well as the concept of the union in 
regards to workplace leaders, three activists themselves will now have their say. For, 
as elaborated upon by Ariovich (2007: 3) in her own study of union organizing in the 
United States, while union organizers and activists understandings of their work “may 
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overlap”, they do not necessarily “entirely match” due to their also very different 
everyday realities and situations. Taking a semi-biographical approach, we will 
discuss three particular cases that reflect some of the typical characteristics, 
questions and challenges of workplace leaders and their empowerment witnessed 
during my fieldwork. 
The first of these, Leotrim, has actually been a union activist for some time now, long 
before the more systematized leaders concept came about. Today 47, Leotrim 
emigrated to Switzerland from Kosovo in the early 1990s. Having completed an 
apprenticeship in Kosovo as a metal worker, Leotrim first worked in a factory when 
he came to Switzerland. “I hated it though, I could hardly ever sleep at night and the 
doctor told me I should get a different job. So I went to a personnel agency to look for 
work as a temporary laborer.” Relatively quickly, the agency rented him out to a 
middle-sized construction company mainly carrying out above-ground construction of 
buildings. Impressed with his skills and particularly his motivation, Leotrim recalls 
how the company approached him after a short number of weeks, offering him a 
permanent position in the workforce. As the personnel agency had a clause in its 
contract with the company forbidding the latter from hiring Leotrim permanently in 
such a short time, the company told him they would tell the personnel agency they 
did not need him anymore and he would tell the personnel agency he had found work 
someplace else. Leotrim has worked for the same company ever since, although it 
has now been bought up by a larger construction firm. 
“I can’t remember when I actually joined the union, that came quickly. It was just the 
thing you did. But I was not really active yet.” When asked about how he actually 
became active in the union, Leotrim immediately traces this back to his youth in 
Kosovo. He explains that: 
In Kosovo I was politically active as a teenager, even though I was rather young back 
then. My family was active too. In time, I got into trouble with the police as a result of 
my activism and so I decided to leave the country. My father was already in 
Switzerland working as a Saisonnier, so it was the logical choice to come here. In a 
way, political activism has always followed me. 
Looking back at the time he actually decided to become a more active member of the 
union movement in Switzerland, Leotrim points to his personal experiences during 
the campaign to introduce early retirement around the turn of the millennium.  
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I forget his name, I’m really bad at names. But I will never forget him. It was a 
Portuguese organizer who first talked to me about it [the union’s fight for early 
retirement]. And I really remember how he passionately unleashed this fire inside me 
and I knew I wanted and needed to become active in the labor movement here. 
And while this personal conversation with the Portuguese organizer has obviously 
carried substantial weight for Leotrim, he equally emphasizes that his commitment 
was “strengthened for eternity” by the collective experiences of the 2002 strike for 
early retirement. “The organizer told me and inspired me that we should stand 
together – the strike showed me that it was possible.” 
Ever since, Leotrim has been a particularly active member of region Mittelland. Not 
only participating and initiating construction activities himself, he also helped to build 
an Albanian group in the region focused on community issues specific to Albanian 
workers. In his own words, Leotrim emphasizes that his self-identity is strongly 
connected to the labor movement: 
My facebook account is just for Unia, I don’t have any pictures of my family or some 
restaurant I am eating at – it is all dedicated to the union. On the construction site, 
people call me “Unia man”. While people sometimes joke about it and pull my leg, I 
also get respect for it. The other workers, but even the employers treat me differently. 
My boss is not a fan of the union, but he treats me with more respect since he knows 
I am really active. But I am also a good worker and proud of that. I believe it is the 
duty of every union activist to work particularly hard, to do a really good job and to 
prove that we are actually the best workers. That’s why I am also not afraid to get 
fired, because they would have to fire a really good worker. 
Working closely with region Mittelland’s organizers in the 2015 campaign, while he 
was not recruited through the systematic leaders concept described above, Leotrim’s 
activism indeed quite vividly embodied what that concept is about. Besides regularly 
talking to his crewmates about the union and the campaign, sometimes Leotrim 
would even take a day off work to accompany the fulltime organizers on their daily 
tours of other construction sites: “That worked really well, because I could tell the 
workers ‘Hey, I’m one of you guys and I want you to listen.’”  
During the mobilization process for the protest day in November, Leotrim essentially 
organized the work stoppage of his site on his own: 
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Being that I often talk to the other workers in my crew about the union, they were 
already in the know about what was going on at the time. They knew the employers 
were attacking our early retirement and were outraged by it. So, when I told them 
‘Jungs [boys], the union is organizing a protest day against the employers’ attacks and 
I think we should participate.’, they all agreed rather quickly. So, then I approached the 
foreman myself and I told him we weren’t going to work that day and that I wanted to 
tell the site manager in person. The foremen looked at me and replied ‘They are going 
to fire you on the spot.’ But I just laughed and said ‘No they won’t!’ 
I walked up to the site manager and said ‘Look, we are not going to work on that day. 
And not just me, but everybody.’ He was kind of shocked and then told me that was a 
stupid thing to do. So, I said ‘If you can guarantee me that the employers won’t take 
early retirement away, then we won’t take part in the protest day. Can you guarantee 
me that?’ Of course, he said no and so I replied: ‘You see. But I am anständig [proper, 
decent] and I don’t want any unnecessary trouble for the company. So, could you 
please tell all of the subcontractors that they can’t come to work then either? Because 
since we [the core workforce] won’t be there and the crane operator won’t be there, 
they won’t be able to work anyway. If we tell them [the subcontracting companies] they 
can’t work beforehand, then they won’t bill us. Can you do that and show me the e-mail 
when you are finished?’ You should have seen him! [laughing] But it worked. I then told 
one of the organizers and he said to me ‘That was very dangerous what you just did!’ 
But I did it! [laughing again] 
Listening to Leotrim speak, we are reminded of something pointed out by Sydney 
Tarrow in his vast research of social movements. Noting that individuals have diverse 
motivations for their participation therein and many do not necessarily spring from 
exclusively material interests, Tarrow points out that: “Movement participation is not 
only politicizing; it is empowering, not only in the psychological sense of increasing 
people’s willingness to take risks, but in affording them new skills and broadened 
perspectives.“ (Tarrow 2011: 221). 
However, while union organizers mostly point to the power aspects produced from a 
more grassroots-oriented union and predominantly emphasize the material interests 
that can be defended by union activism, Leotrim himself particularly highlights the 
social aspects thereof and their importance for him – something similarly described 
by Ariovich (2007) in her studies of an American trade union. Echoing sentiments 
heard from other activists as well, Leotrim describes the union not only as a political 
movement, but also as “a second home”. As such, he is just as wedded to the 
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personal relationships he has forged therein as he is to the instrumental aspects of 
the union as a vehicle for change: 
We need to be in the union, because otherwise the bosses can do with us what they 
want. But I also have lots of friends in the union, both worker members as well as union 
organizers. After construction group meetings, we always have a drink together, laugh 
and have a good time. We organize different social activities and every year we rent a 
forest cabin and have an annual dinner with the construction group there. That’s 
important to me and it’s important to other people in the group. And it’s also what keeps 
everything going. 
In fact, this personal aspect is something Leotrim sometimes misses from the fulltime 
organizers: 
Some of the organizers need to be closer to the Vertrauensleute [confidants, activists], 
to the active people. More networking, more contact, not only during campaigns but in 
more quiet times as well – that’s how you keep people active. Not only by calling on 
them when you need them. I need to know and trust my organizer – on a very deep 
level both as union men but also as friends! That’s something that is sometimes 
missing. 
In this sense, Leotrim also laments that when organizers in the construction team 
leave the organization or change to other positions therein, personnel changes that 
are inevitable to a certain extent, “It always means starting the whole process again. 
Getting to know people, getting to trust them. Things like that. It’s not always easy.” 
Of course, the importance of informal exchanges and personal relationships as both 
cement and lubricant for social movements have long been emphasized by scholars 
thereof (Ariovich 2007; Tarrow 2011). They are, however, also a factor not lost on 
some union organizers as well. In fact, close friendships often organically rise out of 
worker-organizer relationships. As one member of the region’s construction team 
recollected: 
I am a woman and spend my days standing in front of many dozens of male 
construction workers and telling them they need to stand together and fight. So, it is a 
special relationship to begin with. But since I’ve worked the construction sites, I have 
truly established some pretty amazing relationships. I know eighty percent of the 
workers by name. I even know the names of their children in many cases! We talk 
together, sometimes eat together, a group of workers even helped me move once. It’s 
not only nice, it’s also important because it builds trust. 
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Summing up his thoughts, Leotrim critically concludes that while they still have a way 
to go, the union, “our union”, as a whole is “much fitter” than it was in past years:  
We are stronger than before and it is clearer to a lot of people that the union – that’s 
us! We, the active members, are the union. That is a right and a privilege and lets us as 
workers be the ones to decide things. But it is also a duty in the sense that we have to 
be active. And that is something that we still have to make clear to a lot of people. 
What that actually means and that it also involves an active effort – even when your 
wife is mad that you are never home! We also need to do more training, more courses 
and also learn to confront people when they aren’t active enough and expect 
everybody else to do it all for them. But it also means allowing people to have good 
experiences so that they clearly see that, well yeah, the union, that’s us! 
Moving on to a second worker activist, Cedric is a 29 year old, soft-spoken, qualified 
bricklayer. As part of the permanent core-workforce of one of the largest and most 
important companies in the country, Cedric is the opposite of a precarious worker. 
On the contrary, he is part of the minority of formally qualified Swiss workers who 
rank high in the informal hierarchies of the construction industry. Contrary to some of 
his peers who feel that with their individual skills and cultural capital (Bourdieu 2002) 
they are not in need of the collective support of the union, Cedric is in his own words 
“union through and through”. 
In his mid-teens, when Swiss youth are expected to choose a career path, Cedric 
looked at the different apprenticeships existing, “especially handwerkliche [manual 
craft] ones”. At first he contemplated doing an apprenticeship as a polytechnician or a  
landscape gardener, even signing up for weeklong trial apprenticeships in such 
companies. Ultimately though, “I have to be honest, while I knew I wanted to do 
some kind of Handwerkerberuf [manual craft profession], in the end it was actually 
the high wages in construction that made me choose that particular trade.” Given the 
industry’s dire need of apprentices and that especially the Swiss ones are highly 
valued in construction, in his own words Cedric “did not have a hard time” finding an 
apprenticeship. 
After three years at a semi-large construction company operating mainly in 
Mittelland, he completed his apprenticeship. “To be honest though, I was not at the 
prime of my Leistungsleben [performance/achievement life] and so when I was 
finished with my apprenticeship, the company did not keep me on.” Jobbing as a 
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temporary worker for a couple of months, Cedric then completed his compulsory 
military service. As he chose to serve his time all at once as a Durchdiener [full time 
military for a year], he was away from the job market for one year. “Then I basically 
got my act together, worked temporary again on a couple of sites and finally landed 
as a temporary worker on an Anker [company pseudonym] site. After working there 
for a couple of months, they hired me permanently.” 
While he has no concrete plans, Cedric “could well imagine becoming a foreman” at 
some time in the future. “But I can tell you one thing, they [the companies] need to 
change a thing or two. Especially concerning working hours. Those foremen have to 
work like crazy – long after we all go home.” Before being able to commence with 
foreman training, however, Cedric would have to first complete training as a squad 
leader and then work for a certain time as such. “I just had my second kid though and 
it’s important for me to be a good father and actually be there for them. So I don’t 
have any concrete plans yet. I’m pretty ok where I am for the time being.” 
As mentioned above, the company Cedric works at today is one of the largest and 
most important companies in Switzerland. Active in both rural as well as urban areas 
and with branches throughout the German-speaking part of the country, the company 
is a key player in the industry and as such it is important for the union to have active 
members there. Having joined the union during his apprenticeship when he was 17, 
Cedric has been a member long before he started working at his current company:  
I actually remember the day I joined. It was at this great construction site that I really 
enjoyed working on. Then one day a union organizer came by and asked me if I 
wanted to join the union. The other workers in my crew told me it was a good thing, that 
as a construction worker you should be part of the union. So I joined. And I’ve been a 
member ever since. And today I also tell the apprentices that work under me that they 
should join the union too, because it’s about their future, about the future of their job 
and their lives. 
Like many other of today’s activists, in the first years as a member, Cedric did not 
immediately become active. This was also due to the fact that he was away in the 
military for a year and was otherwise jobbing as a temporary worker from firm to firm. 
After having settled in the company he is today, he slowly began wading into union 
activism. 
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I did not really need to be convinced. I am behind the union one hundred percent and I 
support what they do. I think the point where I really started to become active though 
was in 2013. An organizer was visiting our site and was talking about how even though 
the construction economy was booming, we still had not gotten a decent pay raise in a 
long time. Some of the other workers were interrupting her and so I told them to shut 
up and they did. After that, I met up with the organizer for a drink after work and we 
discussed the whole thing a bit deeper. That’s when I said I wanted to become active. 
Like Leotrim above, while Cedric already identified with the union as an organization 
and with its goals, his conviction was further cemented by the concrete experiences 
he made during collective actions. Whether during the pay-raise campaign in 2014 or 
the larger CLA-renewal campaign of 2015:  
Those actions have just really left an impression on me. Marching together, chanting 
together, fighting together! Just really good Stimmung [atmosphere] and a feeling that 
you are achieving something together. Really doing something together. No matter if 
that’s for a pay raise or defending early retirement. It’s just a really good feeling, really 
inspiring. Flags everywhere, banners, and all that stuff the union organizes, like people 
abseiling off of buildings and that “60” statue they made for the protest day. It just 
makes you understand that there is really something behind the slogan of “together we 
are strong”. The support the union has is just really on display and it’s massive. 
Besides underlining his personal experiences, Cedric’s words again point to the 
double role of protest performances (Tarrow 2011: 99), i.e. the visible expression of 
collective action. On the one hand such animations can be used as an instrument to 
raise and publically present pressure in a difficult bargaining situation and on the 
other hand they can add “amusement or excitement to public politics” as well as 
forging the collective identity of the participants and “helping solidarity to grow 
through the interaction of the “performers” in protest actions.“ (ibid). 
Yet just as such successful collective experiences can be inspiring and 
strengthening, setbacks and feelings of being “let down” by one’s peers who are less 
active can be just as disappointing and frustrating: 
Something that I will never forget is when a crew I was working with said they would 
participate in an action the union had planned. They were all “yeah, we are up for it”. 
But when the bosses started to put pressure on them, they all backed down and got 
scared. And then when the union bus came to pick us all up for the action, just as we 
had told them to do, the boys hid in the cellar of the construction site! Because they 
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were too ashamed to even admit they weren’t coming. Can you believe that?! That’s 
when I got really mad and just really disappointed. I told them: ‘Do you want to stand 
up for yourselves or do you want to be slaves? Because we can all go back to being 
slaves if you want!’ 
Both the positive as well as the negative experiences Cedric has made seem to have 
shaped his view not only of the union, but of life in general. According to Cedric, it 
has made him more aware of the fact that “While not everybody has to be active in 
the same way, what we as individuals do actually matters.”: 
Especially since that experience I have started to take a more active role when it 
comes to talking to other people about the union. Sometimes people say ‘Ah it 
doesn’t matter, in ten years we will be working ‘til 70 anyway!’ And it’s then that I tell 
them: ‘You know what, maybe we will. But whether or not we do is up to us. It 
depends on whether we stand together and fight or just simply accept our destiny like 
pawns on a chessboard.’ 
Our third protagonist is the newly graduated foreman Toni. With a sharp smile and a 
laugh that screams mischief, Toni, in his own words, enjoys “standing out in the 
crowd”. An almost fairytale success story of rising to the top from humble beginnings, 
31-year old Toni is a passionate construction worker in every sense of the term:  
I live for construction. You know what I mean? I couldn’t work in an office and I 
certainly couldn’t do what the organizers do, talking, talking, talking all of the time. I 
need to be outside, moving, working, building, creating stuff. It’s hard work, but I love 
going home after a hard day’s work, knowing that I really created something that day. 
That I worked this or that project, building something that’s going to stand there for 
years to come. I really like working on big projects and I envy the guys that get to do 
that all the time.  
Growing up in Switzerland but of Macedonian origin, Toni emphasizes that “I’m just a 
guy, I’m not a nationality. I hate that question.” Long knowing that he wanted to work 
construction and someday “pull towers out of the ground”, Toni began his 
apprenticeship to become a qualified Maurer (bricklayer) after finishing obligatory 
school. “I had some difficulties in the theoretical, schooling part of it, but the problems 
I had there I was able to compensate through working hard and doing a good job in 
the practical part of it, you know on the sites.” 
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After completing his apprenticeship, Toni knew that he wanted to someday become a 
foreman, so after a couple of years he took the next logical step and completed his 
training as a squad leader. Working as such for a number of years, his dream to work 
on some of the largest, often most impressive building sites in the entire country 
indeed started to become true: huge housing developments in urban centers, 
prestigious museum building annexes, colossal new office buildings, etc. Soon after 
graduating to squad leader, Toni got the permission as well as encouragement of his 
company to start training to become a foreman. Ambitious and proud of what 
promised to be a bright career future, he commenced the roughly one and a half year 
long foreman-program alongside his work as a squad leader. Studying hard, he 
passed the exam to become a foreman on his second try: “Even though I was at the 
time working under the craziest foreman alive and worked overtime like crazy!” 
Besides this deep passion and identification with his job, his motivation to become a 
foreman was also linked to income. “Damn, I am seriously looking forward to getting 
a higher wage”, he confessed to me on the night of his graduation ceremony. “I 
mean, salaries in construction aren’t bad if you work at a decent company, but it’s not 
easy with three kids. My wife and I just had our third a couple of months back. As a 
foreman I can really start making a wage with which I don’t have to be worried all of 
the time.” Indeed, a successful foreman at a large company can receive a relatively 
decent wage, particularly when compared to the average construction worker. 
Joining the union just after he finished his apprenticeship, Toni was for a long time 
not an active member. “I mean, come on! I was young, crazy and had a lot of other 
things on my mind!”, he laughed. After “settling down a little”, he began his “parallel 
career” as a union activist around the time the region had started to develop its 
leaders concept: 
I’ve always had clear and strong views about things like justice, but I guess it all really 
started to become real after I met one of the union organizers during a lunch break one 
day. It was during a kind of low-scale campaign for a pay raise in 2013 and after the 
organizer had given a short speech to our crew telling us about the situation, I asked a 
few more detailed questions because I was interested. We exchanged telephone 
numbers and a few weeks later he actually called me. So we met up and he just 
opened up this huge plan to me. That they wanted to get more people involved, that 
they wanted more active workers, that they wanted to get stronger. I remember I was 
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actually pretty surprised and had to laugh: ‘What you guys want to get even stronger 
than you already are?!’ 
So, he started to draw this diagram of lots of little groups of people, different 
construction crews. He said that when all of them stand together, we can achieve 
almost anything. But that we have to work for that. Then he circled one or two people 
from each group and said: ‘And to do so, we need the important people in the groups. 
The people everybody respects.’ He then asked me if I wanted to get involved in that, 
explained that it meant investing time and effort, and I said I did. And that’s how it all 
began. 
Taking a day off work for a two-day training course with other worker activists, one on 
a Friday and the other on a Saturday, Toni began his steep “career” as a union 
activist with the same passion he has dedicated to his professional vocation. “It was 
interesting, those two days, what I really liked is that I could tell these people had 
really done some thinking. They were critical too and really had a plan in their head 
and wanted to make it real.” It did not take long for Toni to translate the ideas he and 
the other worker activists and organizers had discussed into reality. 
Reflecting his broader taste “to stand out in the crowd”, I remember first meeting Toni 
during a protest break at the end of 2014, as part of a more intense campaign for a 
pay raise and simultaneously serving as a kind of warm up for the upcoming 2015 
CLA-renewal campaign. Having blocked a traffic junction with other workers as part 
of the union’s protest, Toni posed and smiled broadly for the cameras of the small 
army of journalists present. While there were hundreds of workers participating, Toni 
had also convinced a large number of his own colleagues to take part. The union had 
placed a long, symbolic “negotiating table” with a throne for the employers in the 
middle of the blocked traffic junction, criticizing the employers for having broken off 
wage-negotiations, and Toni and his colleagues spent at least ten minutes taking 
selfies of themselves sitting at the table and on the throne. Relatively unafraid, Toni 
commented how: “I am a qualified bricklayer who works his ass off – firing me would 
be the dumbest thing they could do.” Well captured in this seemingly brash sentence 
is the fact that besides their social skills and standing allowing them to act as 
successful workplace leaders, due to their often high skills and experience level, 
these workers are also less vulnerable to threats of dismissal and can thus be 
particularly effective union activists. 
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A couple of weeks later, Toni took a leading role in an even more confrontational 
action. After it had become clear that the employers would not negotiate with the 
union over a pay raise that year, the union concluded its campaign by holding a 
delegates assembly in Zurich and then marching with all of the delegates, around 
200 plus a number of organizers, through the city and up to the office of the 
construction employers association. At the same place they would deposit the large 
“60” statue almost exactly a year later, a well-briefed team of activists and organizers 
– surrounded by the large group of delegates as well as by a number of journalists – 
commenced to build a brick wall in front of the entrance to the building. In the thick of 
the action was, of course, Toni, who demonstrated not only his skills as an 
impressively speedy bricklayer that day, but also an activist with a clear taste for 
some of the more unconventional actions. In the weeks following, Toni proudly 
commemorated that day by making one of the press photos – with him in the center – 
the profile picture of his social media accounts. 
When asked about what motivates him, Toni replies that: 
What I like about the union is that it allows normal people to take their destiny into their 
own hands. That’s why I am active. I could just lay back and do my thing, but that’s not 
my style. And you know what? It sure beats being a nobody and doing nothing that 
really matters in life! 
Taken together with the scenes described above, Toni’s statements again point to 
the insight that while material interests such as wages and even early retirement are 
an important motivation behind contentious collective action, they are not the only 
ones. In the words of Tarrow, besides attempting to collectively reach one’s material 
goals as a movement, “the offer of an exciting, risky, and possibly beneficial 
campaign of collective action may be an incentive in itself.“ (2011: 29). Yet besides 
the thrill and excitement of contentious collective action, a sense of agency, of taking 
one’s destiny into one’s own hands, can be a strong motor behind the urge to 
participate in collective action. 
That being said, while Toni may be correct that his skills, qualifications and “working 
his ass off” protect him from more direct repression in the sense of being laid off, the 
closer Toni travelled down the path of becoming a foreman, the more pressure his 
superiors placed on him to distance himself from the union. This particularly 
increased once he had passed his final exam. 
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“They tell me I’m Kader [higher up, part of site-management] now and that I don’t 
belong in the union anymore. That now I have to represent the company and that I 
am the extended arm of the boss.” While Toni explicitly recognizes this as a targeted 
attempt by his employers to “split the workers”, as he puts it, he is equally ardent in 
his view that the union needs to “do more to show that it is also the organization for 
foremen”: 
That means really showing that the union understands the construction world. Pay-
raises, benefits and all that are important – no doubt about that – but what we need to 
do is also show critical foremen, those who don’t give a damn about pay raises 
because they themselves get them anyway, that not only is the union there for them 
and their particular problems, but also actually understands their reality. Their 
everyday-reality! 
That means talking about demands that are important for foremen, like ways to reduce 
stress and overtime. But it also means having a different way of approaching them. 
Like for example the magazine Der Polier that you guys make. There is lots of stuff on 
construction, new techniques and nice reports about cool construction sites – and not 
just information on the union’s campaigns, which – let’s face it – are always kind of the 
same story. It’s especially important because it shows that the union is really interested 
in workers’ daily lives. And that it respects their work as a construction worker. 
 
Figure 12: Foremen magazine “Der Polier”, September 2015 edition 
Source: Unia 
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While the portraits above are far from complete depictions of the three activists 
themselves and much less of the broader group of other activists who are gradually 
becoming socialized in a more participatory style of trade unionism, they nonetheless 
point to at least three things. 
First of all, people’s motivations to actually take an active role in the labor movement 
are not only different and heterogeneous in comparison to one another, but also 
represent a blend of different factors for each individual in itself. Besides pursuing 
material interests and the more explicit goals of the union, questions of justice, 
agency, excitement and identity can be just as important as well as coexistent.  
Secondly, workers can and in fact often do tend to be passive union members for 
even a number of years before making the sometimes conscious, sometimes more 
gradual decision to become an active union member. At the same time, while the 
degree of their activism may and usually does develop over time, the decision in itself 
is not one made in an ivory tower, but often initiated through very concrete 
discussions as well as experiences with other actors, often union organizers. 
Third of all, and this is perhaps the most decisive as well as inspiring insight for the 
union itself, while it may be challenging and represent both a change as well as 
balancing act to its hitherto functioning, the systematic recruitment, training and 
active role taken by workplace leaders is something that can be achieved. Not only 
that, this approach has also produced fruitful results in areas of activism and 
mobilizing and points to the real-existing opportunity of rebuilding a more 
participatory and social movement-oriented labor union – one encouraging workers 
to take their destinies into their own hands. 
Between Mobilizing and Empowering: Challenges and Open Questions 
Despite the progress made by the union, the odyssey of transforming the 
organization towards a more social movement-oriented one involves, as emphasized 
by Pedrina (2009), a fundamentally new orientation. As such, it must be understood 
as a cyclical process taking at least “fifteen years” if not more (ibid: 5) – a process of 
learning, experimenting and developing. This time span is probably a rather 
conservative guess. For not only does this transformation process involve acquiring, 
testing and refining new and innovative strategies, methods and skills – from the 
perspective of organizers didactical skills and from that of worker activists 
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mobilization skills – but it also means changing decade-old habits, even an entire 
culture of how the union is supposed to work. And in the particular case of 
construction, it means doing so in a balanced negotiation with current more staff-
driven mobilization models in order not to jeopardize today’s established mobilization 
level, which would in turn endanger the union’s capability to defend workers’ working 
conditions, wages and benefits. 
As noted by numerous other scholars of the subject (Voss and Sherman 2000; Lopez 
2004; Dörre et al. 2009), even when the abstract notion of a more grassroots-
oriented and participatory union is something most members and staff agree upon as 
absolutely necessary for the movement’s future, actually translating that into reality is 
far more complex. From the perspective of the union’s members, this means taking 
over serious responsibility for things which were previously done (or not done) by 
union staff for decades, but also simultaneously taking on greater risks by individually 
exposing themselves as union activists. From the perspective of union staff, this 
means widening their repertoire from one of a persuader and problem-solver to one 
of an empowering coach – a not necessarily simple task as it is often “easier to solve 
problems for workers than to teach them how to solve them on their own.“ (Lopez 
2004: 18f.).  
In the words of one union organizer, it also means “emancipating ourselves [staff] 
from the trap of acting as a social worker wanting to do everything for other people, 
instead of a labor organizer building self-acting structures and encouraging real 
activism”. As the former organizer turned academic Jane McAlevey puts it, referring 
to “Advice to Rookie Organizers” provided by a US union: „Don’t do for the workers 
what they can do. […] Don’t be afraid to ask workers to build their own union. Don’t 
be afraid to confront them when they don’t.“ ( 2016: 90). 
While such a transformation is a challenge for all unions taking this approach, in the 
specific case of Swiss construction, the process of shifting from a more staff-driven 
union to one built on members taking on a more active and participatory role can be 
articulated, among other places, along three concrete obstacles. 
First of all, not only is this process of change one that will take a long period of time, 
as Pedrina suggested above, but it is also one requiring a high volume of time. For 
while in the long run building a more participatory labor movement based on active 
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members will ultimately relieve organizers of certain tasks so they can concentrate 
more on organizing the unorganized, before this goal is reached, it simply means 
double the work. Let me clarify what I mean by this. If more workplace leaders are 
able to independently inform, actively mobilize their crews and stand up to employer 
pressure themselves, such as Leotrim did above, then this gives union organizers 
more time to dedicate to less organized and active construction sites, ones where 
workers are either still unconvinced or too intimidated by employer pressure. 
However, until “more Leotrims” are actually recruited, trained and have gathered 
some experience, it means doing both at the same time: mobilizing both more 
organized as well as unorganized sites and at the same time pursuing the still novel 
tasks of systematically recruiting, training and coaching workplace leaders. 
And while both the complexity of the latter as well as the time-consuming aspect 
thereof is one thing, given the limited resources of the union, it can and to a certain 
extent always does compete with the time and resources organizers need to 
guarantee a certain turnout by mobilizing themselves. It is in this sense that the 
relationship between the systematic phase model and the empowering leaders 
concept is an ambiguous one. While it can and does indeed go hand in hand in some 
situations, the relationship is not always harmonious. 
Commenting on this general dilemma, one organizer describes the situation as 
follows: 
Compared to other industries, we can and do mobilize rather high numbers of workers 
for actions, demonstrations and strikes. This is not only something we can be proud of, 
but something that is also absolutely decisive when it comes to preventing employers 
from taking away workers’ rights, let alone to us gaining new ones. Yet it is because of 
this high mobilizing intensity that there is little room to fail. We have to succeed if we 
want to protect early retirement for example, and that means mobilizing high numbers 
of workers into industrial action. So not only does that mean less time to experiment, 
but also less room to experiment. 
Let me give you an example. At the beginning of 2015, we were doing role plays with 
workplace leaders all the time and one-on-one coaching sessions on a weekly basis. 
The closer we got to the protest day in November though, the more the Alltagsstress 
[everyday stress] and pressure of directly mobilizing ourselves took up space. Because 
we knew we had to make sure people turned out. And we knew we did not have 
enough workplace leaders yet and the ones we did have were not experienced enough 
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to really place all of our bets on that card. So in the end, we kind of fell back on old 
patterns and did a lot of the mobilizing ourselves. 
While these obstacles are not necessarily fatal, they do suggest two things. If the 
union is serious about creating a more participatory union in which workers take on 
more operative tasks, while at the same time maintaining or even raising its 
mobilizing capacity, then this will probably entail a long journey of gradually shifting 
more and more responsibility onto workplace activists. And in the beginning it will 
definitely also involve channeling additional resources, i.e. more organizers, into 
membership activation so as not to jeopardize the union’s current level of 
mobilization. Furthermore and on the other hand, while “placing all bets” on 
workplace activists to rather suddenly take over responsibilities carried by union staff 
for decades would indeed be naïve and even reckless, even a more gradual journey 
will nonetheless inevitably involve taking certain risks in order to allow workplace 
activists to even gain the experience necessary for them to actually take on more 
responsibilities in the future. And this will probably mean failing on certain 
construction sites from time to time. 
The second specifically construction-oriented challenge posing itself to the union in 
its efforts to recruit the alpha dogs of the sites is a rather paradox one. It is paradox, 
because on the one hand it points to the success of union organizers in identifying 
workplace leaders and on the other hand produces an obstacle towards keeping 
them active. This paradox is rooted in the very logic of the concept and its application 
in the construction industry. For given that the concept is based on activating and 
integrating workplace leaders due to their natural leadership and the respect they 
enjoy by both other workers as well as superiors, the same individuals are often 
simultaneously identified by their employers as natural leaders. And just as these 
characteristics are the ones of efficient and successful union activists, they are also 
the features of good squad leaders and foremen. In other words, the very people the 
union identifies as leaders are often the same workers who at one point or another 
will be offered promotions and further professional training. While this can in some 
cases be aimed against the union, as described in the previous chapter, more often 
than not it is simply because many companies have a severe thirst for good squad 
leaders and foremen. 
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This challenge too is not necessarily fatal, yet it also means that even some of the 
most committed activists can find themselves in a kind of inner conundrum at a 
certain point in time. As one organizer aptly described it: 
It’s like an inner conflict. On the one hand they [workplace activists] are loyal to the 
union and to their own colleagues in the sense of “I’m one of them.” But on the other 
hand, it simply can be more difficult for them to take a confrontational stance and say to 
the same guy that just promoted you or let you go to a training course that “We are 
going to go on strike on this or that day and we don’t give a damn what you say.” This 
does not mean that these activists are suddenly going to leave the union or even stop 
being active, but it does often lead to the question of how and in what way they will be 
active and what confrontations they are willing to risk. 
Besides this inner conflict stemming from metaphorically biting the hand that feeds 
you, when workers do in fact get promoted to being a squad leader or foreman, 
employers will indeed often point to as well as actively construct a Kader-identity as a 
supposed reason for those employees not to be active in the union. This is a 
phenomenon described in the previous chapter, but also in the case of Toni, our third 
protagonist described above. And while the union is developing more target-group-
specific material and approaches towards activating foremen and squad leaders, this 
structural challenge stemming from Kader-workers’ “sandwich position” between the 
wider workforce and management is not something that will suddenly disappear. It 
will require the union to not only continue to develop new and innovative ways of 
communication, such as the (for union standards) unconventional magazine Der 
Polier, which places a high emphasis on technical work issues instead of exclusively 
political topics, but above all it will again require time, effort as well as open and 
honest discussions and one-on-one conversations – as well as the dialectic insight 
that there are perhaps some contradictions that are not entirely curable. 
And finally, a third challenge for the union in developing a more participatory modus 
operandi is not actually located in the intensity of exciting and often nerve-wrecking 
campaigns, demonstrations and protest days, but in the spaces in which these are in 
fact glaringly absent. In other words, how can participatory activism be kept alive in 
between campaigns? 
Considering that for one the union has the opportunity to carry out a campaign at 
least every three years when the industry’s CLA is renewed and secondly that many 
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people do not necessarily want to sacrifice large portions of their free time at the 
costs of their friends and family but are willing to do so during concrete campaigns, 
this is to a certain extent a luxury problem. On the other hand, if the union truly aims 
to construct a grassroots-oriented and participatory union, this will involve more than 
simply “taking activists out of the refrigerator each time they are needed”, as one 
worker activist critically put it, but introducing a continuity of participation from one 
campaign to the next, as well as in the liminal spaces in-between each of these. 
There is no easy answer to this and as Dörre et al. (2009: 49) point out, when it 
comes to “[sustaining] a participation-oriented style of politics […] in the long run“:  
[…] it is not only difficult but downright impossible to sustain a high level of participation 
by the members over longer periods of time. Both old and new members can only 
engage in participatory work for a certain amount of time and connected to specific 
issues and projects; but they do this when there are critical decisions to be made, not 
merely to pay service to participation rituals. Thus, even the most intelligent ‘organising’ 
approaches will always be confronted with the problem that participatory and 
representative approaches must alternate and complement each other. In other words, 
membership participation, or even membership control of the organisation, are not 
possible without strategic planning and intelligent leadership of the trade unions 
(Crosby 2005). (Dörre et al. 2009: 49) 
As such, this “strategic planning and intelligent leadership of the trade unions” will 
probably have to accept that the answer to this dilemma will inevitably involve a mix 
of indeed sometimes having less intense and thus to a certain extent less 
participatory time spaces, but also channeling the energy of at least some of the 
workplace leaders active during mobilizations into the more formal and structural 
roles of membership participation – such as those noted in the beginning of this 
chapter. And while delegates assemblies and sometimes seemingly ritualistic voting 
procedures may not necessarily fulfill the more exciting and agency-reinforcing 
functions guaranteed by collective actions during campaigns, they may raise activists 
identification with the movement in a sense of “the union – that’s us!” And last but 
definitely not least, the integration of more and new worker activists in the decision-
making structures of the union is a central pillar for ensuring that the future of the 
labor movement is not only one in which workers are the “protagonists” of industrial 
action (Pedrina 2009: 3), but also a democratic future in which workers remain the 
decision makers of the movement itself. 
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7. Organized Labor between Changing Structures, 
History and Strategic Choice 
„First comes the nervousness, then – perhaps – the celebration.” This description of 
the atmosphere by one of the seasoned worker activists present indeed summed up 
the mood at the union delegates assembly rather well – and would also prove to be a 
correct prediction of the day as a whole. For on this day, a cold December morning at 
the end of 2015, the construction worker delegates of Unia would decide the fate of 
their CLA and early retirement. 
Not even a year after the launching of their campaign at the beginning of 2015, a 
scene described in the introduction to this thesis, a negotiation result was on the 
table. Considering that up until mid-November the employers had even refused to 
negotiate at all, this potential breakthrough came as quite a surprise to many. While 
many observers as well as participants expected some kind of a compromise at 
some point in time, few had expected it so soon. Even the construction leadership of 
the union itself had already drawn up plans for strikes at the beginning of the year in 
anticipation of a contractless period as the CLA would have expired by then. 
Of course, what was on the table had not been produced in a vacuum and was also 
not simply due to the “good negotiating skills” of the union’s negotiating committee, 
as one union leader emphasized. To the pride of the organizers involved and 
especially the thousands of worker activists who had played their part in some way or 
another, the campaign in 2015 had seen the largest worker mobilizations of any 
single industry since the strike for early retirement in 2002. Besides worker 
assemblies after hours as well as daily encounters and actions on the construction 
sites, the mass demonstration in June involving 15’000 workers, the protest breaks in 
September and October and finally the work stoppages by 10’000 workers on the 
protest days in November represented the pinnacles of the campaign. Accompanied 
by intense media work and the glaring threat of the CLA expiring at the end of the 
year – something no side necessarily longed for – these mobilizations had a visible 
effect. “They [the employers] went from explicitly saying they would not change a 
thing on FAR [early retirement] to offering us exactly what we wanted!” as one activist 
cheerfully summarized it. 
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On this day, an exceptionally convened worker delegates assembly was being held 
at which the delegates would vote on whether to ratify or reject the “CLA-package” 
that the union’s negotiating committee, together with the smaller Christian union 
Syna, had negotiated with the Swiss Construction Employers Association. The 
proposed agreement was as simple as it was significant. In what had astonished 
many onlookers, the construction employers association had given in to the union’s 
demands concerning early retirement. The employers agreed to pay 1,5 percent 
more (in total 5,5 wage-percent) and employees were to pay 0,5 percent more (in 
total 1,5 wage-percent). The financial future of early retirement at 60 would thus be 
secure and without the reduction of any benefits whatsoever. 
However, as agreements seldom are, it was not one covering all of the union’s 
demands. While a new clause forbidding wages to be paid out in cash would be 
introduced as a measure against wage-dumping and the employers conceded one 
more franc daily lunch pay (from fifteen to sixteen francs) as of 2017, otherwise the 
CLA remained rather unchanged. This meant on the one hand that no concessions 
whatsoever had to be made to the employers, but also that the union would have to 
wait for clearer criteria to stop work during bad weather and also for more significant 
measures against wage dumping. There was, however, a clause in the agreement 
seeing that these points would continue to be negotiated in the summer of 2016. 
So, while many of the delegates seemed to so far be rather pleased with the result, 
there was nonetheless opposition. In the debate part of the assembly, opinions of 
both strands were expressed and articulated in a variety of ways, always very 
emotionally, by speaker after speaker. While one worker would take to the stage and 
declare that “We got exactly what we wanted. We fought and we won!”, another 
would complain that “This only covers a part of what we wanted!” And while one 
would emphasize that “Defending early retirement was by far the most important of 
our demands and we all know that!”, another would again counter that “Yes, but we 
can keep fighting to get the rest!” And then another “Yes, but we will do that – we are 
negotiating next summer again!” and so on, and so on. 
Finally, after a seemingly endless debate on the subject, it came to a vote. In the 
end, 88 of the worker delegates voted for the package and 11 against with 8 
abstentions. For the most part, an emotional mix of relief, pride, joy and sense of 
achievement exploded in the room and most of the delegates present began to clap 
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and smile. People started hugging each other and at least one wiped tears from his 
eyes. Even many of those more critical of the result smiled and gently clapped. 
Afterwards, during a round of drinks following the formal part of the delegates 
meeting, where most of the participants were chatting in groups and watching 
pictures and videos of the now concluded campaign, the national leader of the 
construction sector again addressed the crowd:  
Colleagues, one last thing. When you go home today, please feel free to take one or 
more of the chocolate bars laying in the boxes at the exit. Since we truly did not expect 
to get a result so quickly, we already ordered 10’000 chocolate bars with our logo on 
them for the strikes in April. And now we don’t know what to do with them! 
The room burst into laughter, reflecting the emotional blend of joy, relief and pride. 
While bad weather protections and more stringent measures against wage dumping 
indeed remained so far unachieved, the defense of retirement age 60 without the 
reduction of any benefits was remarkable, in particular considering the wider political 
atmosphere of the time. Besides the fact that employers had long stated that they 
would not even consider exclusively raising the retirement institution’s dues, even 
suggesting that on national television just a month before the breakthrough, there 
was also a high amount of pressure on them not to do so from the employers of other 
industries and conservative political actors. Less than a week before the negotiation 
result was forged, the right wing magazine Die Weltwoche devoted an entire article to 
the subject and enthusiastically lobbied against giving in to the unions: 
The union is trying to pass on the repair costs to the employers: Higher contributions 
largely from the companies are supposed to close the [finance] gap. […] The impact 
of such a negotiation result would be explosive for the rest of the economy and 
politics as well: A union victory would be the signal that raising the working lifetime in 
dialogue with the social partners is chanceless. That would be poison for the 
upcoming debate in parliament about raising the general retirement reference age 
[…]“ (Gygi 2015: 40) 
Not least considering this loaded political context, union activists’ and leaders’ 
satisfaction with the negotiation result is understandable. In the months following, 
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union organizers toured the construction sites throughout the country, informing 
workers of the “victory of saving retirement age 60”. 15 
And just as the union’s campaign for a new CLA and the defense of early retirement 
is now concluded, so now do we arrive at the conclusion of our social scientific 
exploration thereof. When thinking back to our main research question as to how the 
union is coping with the multiple challenges arising from the context of a changing 
and increasingly hostile Swiss construction industry and how is it seeking to enhance 
its power as a collective agent shaping industrial relations, the answer reveals itself 
as an undoubtedly complex one. Representing a blend of historical legacies, 
changing political economic structures and the union’s specific agency itself, it is 
perhaps best explained starting with the result of the negotiations. 
Looking back at the Jena Power Approach as well as at Jack Knight’s thoughts on 
how social institutions are born and shaped, it seems safe to say that the conditions 
and developments leading to the negotiation result were based on a complex 
interplay of the different power relations at play. On the one hand, today’s rather 
established institutions of social partnership in construction have played and continue 
to play an important role in cementing the general idea of a collective labor 
agreement as something in the interest of both labor and to a certain extent also 
capital. While born out of conflict in the pre-war era and at first something vehemently 
resisted by the construction employers association, in time many employers began to 
perceive the industry’s CLA as a stabilizing instrument solving their own collective 
action problems – especially in the domestic market of construction with today’s 
extreme time and price pressure and the threat of “wild” competition in an open 
European market. As such, considering that the CLA was to expire at the end of the 
year, this mix of structural and institutional power placed a certain amount of 
pressure on capital to find some kind of a solution sooner rather. 
That being said, as already described in the chapters above, while this interplay 
between structural and institutional power played into the union’s hands, it only set 
the stage for having a CLA and not one defining what exactly that CLA entailed or 
what the fate of early retirement was to be. This is particularly the case today, as the 
                                               
15 In 2016 and 2017, the unions and employers continued negotiations concerning the “open points” 
not yet settled in the 2015 agreement. While bad weather protections were still not achieved, the union 
managed to negotiate a number of substantial and long demanded improvements in the industry’s 
collective labor agreement. 
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“golden age” of welfare capitalism has passed (Deppe 2012: 23) and many 
employers are no longer willing to provide significant concessions if not in some way 
pressured to do so. In other words, in construction the necessity of rules of the game 
seems to be agreed upon, which represents in itself a favorable starting point, but 
which rules exactly remains an open question. This was a lesson the Swiss labor 
movement, as well as unions across the globe, had been forced to learn the hard 
way not too long ago. 
It is here that the union’s other power resources come into play. In a sense of 
societal power, the union accompanied its campaign on the construction sites with 
very public efforts to highlight the defense of construction workers’ early retirement in 
the media and thus in the wider public sphere. This included press conferences, 
press releases, interviews with both union activists and leaders and so on. That 
being said, while these narratives were indeed taken up by the media, the latter was 
(unsurprisingly) particularly interested in and reported on the collective protest 
actions organized by the union. 
This in turn leads us to the union’s most vital power resource: its associational power. 
Besides representing to a high extent the key to accessing structural, institutional and 
societal power in the first place, the importance of associational power is emphasized 
by both the Jena scholars (Arbeitskreis Strategic Unionism 2013) as well as by the 
original thoughts of Marx himself (1969) and even by Jack Knight (1992). This 
importance is derived from the fact that since workers’ labor power represents the 
key ingredient for capital accumulation, as the production process is completely 
dependent on it, workers are in a position of a high amount of potential bargaining 
power – if they can organize collectively to use it. Thus, the workers’ demonstration 
in June, the protest breaks in September and October and the full work stoppages in 
November played a pivotal role in shaping the ultimate negotiation result. 
Of course, accessing this associational power by organizing and activating 
individuals to collectively pursue their interests does not come automatically, even 
when recognized grievances exist (Thompson 1971; Kelly 1998; Tilly and Tarrow 
2007; Tarrow 2011). For it requires having a membership not only willing to pay 
dues, but one also willing to act (Arbeitskreis Strategic Unionism 2013: 354). Besides 
the financial and time costs involved in this, in the realm of contentious collective 
action in industrial relations, this also carries with it very real risks as well. 
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Furthermore, building associational power means overcoming both more universal as 
well as more industry-particular obstacles to collective action. For not only has the 
world of industrial relations in Swiss construction gone through a significant process 
of change, moving away from welfare capitalism and towards a more neoliberally 
oriented one, the “recommodification of labor“ (Standing 2007) this transformation 
has brought with it has also created a more precarious and fragmented workforce 
that is more difficult to organize and activate. Furthermore, employer pressure aimed 
at stifling the union’s collective activities has grown significantly – something visible 
throughout the sphere of neoliberal capitalism. And finally, taking the union’s own 
history into account, after decades of industrial peace and a more corporatistic form 
of social partnership, assuming a more confrontational approach under these 
conditions has come to represent a process akin to “relearning to walk”. 
And it is here that our main research question becomes prominent.  
From an empirical standpoint, it has become clear that the union is attempting to 
revitalize itself by developing new and innovative strategies of worker mobilization in 
order to strengthen its associational power. Focusing our view on one of the union’s 
most innovative local units, region Mittelland, we saw organizers develop an 
approach based on both highly systematic methods joined by a creative model of 
collective action frames. On an organizational level, this meant radically changing the 
structures and modus operandi of the region’s staff. On a strategic level, this 
approach meant graduating from a gut-level mobilizing approach to a process-
oriented one based on systematic, strategic and goal-oriented methods.  
Besides strict mathematical planning and essentially ethnographic mappings, this 
has involved placing a strong focus on the micro-mechanisms of collective action and 
developing a model based on the ideal typical phases of a mobilization process. 
Filling this model with collective action frames appropriate to the campaign at hand, 
organizers develop escalating narratives seeking not only to persuade workers of the 
moral justness of the cause (Thompson 1966; 1971) but also of the rational utility of 
collective action (Klandermans 1984; Tarrow 2011). While this phase model has not 
and cannot fully do away with both universal collective action problems as well as 
those stemming from the particular developments in the Swiss construction industry 
today, it has provided organizers with a fruitful base to enhance the union’s 
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mobilizing capacities by taking a more systematic and process-oriented approach in 
an otherwise chaotic and fragmented setting.  
That being said, with the pressure from employer interventions growing and the 
fragmentation of the construction sites intensifying, this staff-driven approach can 
only go so far. It is in this sense that the union has sought to simultaneously 
introduce a more emancipatory and grassroots approach seeking to empower and 
delegate more tasks to workplace activists themselves. Besides a political claim 
towards democratizing the labor movement, union leaders are equally convinced that 
such a “rank-and-file-intensive“ (Bronfenbrenner and Juravich 1995) approach is key 
to a long-term stabilization and enhancement of the organization’s mobilizing 
capacity in today’s more difficult environment. For not only does it have the long-term 
potential to increase the union’s total resources through passing on certain tasks to 
worker activists, but through emphasizing that the union belongs to the workers 
themselves and not to some distant third-party bureaucracy, such an approach can, if 
successful, significantly increase the union’s rooting and organic strength. 
However, just like collective action in general, the realization of such a dream does 
not come free either. And it is here, in fact, that the union’s own history plays an 
ambiguous role. During the years of welfare capitalism, when unions took on a more 
corporatistic role and largely confined their activities to representing and negotiating 
for workers and providing them with individual legal advice, the role of the fulltime 
professional staff grew significantly. This was, however, done at the cost of worker 
involvement and activism. And while the union has meanwhile slowly been able to 
regain a more confrontational approach and bring effective workplace mobilizations 
back into the game, it has done so with “a crucial limitation: the steps in this direction 
have mainly been realized by paid union staff.“ (Pedrina 2009). It is for this reason 
that such an approach of Unia Forte, seeking to build a more grassroots-carried 
union, requires a fundamental rethinking and “directional change for our culture and 
current practice“ (ibid) – both on the part of union organizers as well as on that of the 
members themselves. 
In Region Mittelland, organizers have taken an equally novel and systematic 
approach in this realm as they have in that of (staff-driven) mobilizations. This has 
involved developing, testing and refining new and innovative strategies, methods and 
skills not only encouraging workers to participate in the democratic decision-making 
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process of the union, but also activating them to take on more operative roles in the 
organizing and mobilizing process for industrial action as well. Derived from breaking 
down and analyzing organizers’ own experiences of the social dynamics on the 
construction sites as well as borrowing innovative ideas from other unions in different 
countries, the construction team of region Mittelland designed a so-called leaders 
concept aimed at identifying, recruiting, training and empowering workplace leaders 
to take on more concrete responsibilities in the realm of activism and mobilizing. 
While the union is far from where it one day hopes to be, organizers’ and activists’ 
experiences in this area point to the high potential of such an approach. 
Yet besides the fact that such an approach means developing new skills and 
changing decade-old habits for both staff and activists alike, thus demanding an 
organizational as well as cultural process of change, the relationship between this 
leaders concept and the systematic staff-driven mobilizing model described above is 
not free from contradictions. While the two can and sometimes do go hand in hand, 
their relationship is not always harmonious, thus leading to a complex balancing act 
for the union. This concerns on the one hand time and on the other hand risk. For 
given that the identification, recruitment, training and coaching of workplace leaders 
is a particularly time-intensive and delicate undertaking, this can compete with the 
resources staff organizers need to guarantee a maximum turnout by mobilizing 
directly themselves. Furthermore, due to the often uncertain outcome and various 
factors involved in this new endeavor, especially considering the deep cultural and 
methodological changes in question, organizers are often wary of giving up too much 
operative responsibility too quickly in order not to jeopardize the union’s current 
mobilization level, which would in turn endanger its capability to defend workers’ 
working conditions, wages and benefits. This caution is paradoxically intensified by 
the fact that the union already has a comparatively high level of mobilization in 
construction, thereby setting a relatively high benchmark and providing “little room to 
fail” or “experiment”, as we heard one organizer put it. 
While these obstacles are not necessarily fatal, they do suggest two things. If the 
union is serious about creating a more participatory organization where workers take 
on more operative tasks while at the same time maintaining or even raising its 
mobilizing capacity, then this will entail a gradual journey of continuously and 
delicately shifting more and more responsibility onto workplace activists. In the 
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beginning, this will no doubt involve channeling additional personnel resources, i.e. 
more organizers, into worker activation so as not to compete with the currently for the 
most part functioning phase model and thus jeopardize the union’s current level of 
mobilization. On the other hand, while placing all bets on workplace activists to 
suddenly assume all of the mobilization tasks that were for years carried out by union 
staff would indeed be naïve and even reckless, even a more gradual change will 
nonetheless involve taking risks. For only through experience and practice will 
organizers gain the know-how they need in this still novel realm and only then will the 
workplace activists themselves build the skills necessary for them to truly take on 
more responsibilities in the future. And this will probably involve swallowing setbacks 
from time to time. 
In the end, it will be decisive that organizers not only themselves learn to let go to a 
certain extent, but that they do so by actually empowering worker activists through 
concrete training and “on the job” coaching. Furthermore, by involving workers in the 
decision-making process during and particularly in-between campaigns, not only can 
gaps of non-mobilization be filled and key activists kept active, but workers’ 
identification with the labor movement can grow and the protagonists of collective 
action can simultaneously be the decision makers of the movement itself. So, while 
the union’s strategy and dream of a labor movement in which workplace activists 
take on greater roles no doubt hold great promise – especially considering the 
growing challenges to collective action in Swiss construction – it is at the same time 
clear that this represents a long process of change. As McAlevey puts it, when it 
comes to organizing and empowering workers to take their destinies into their own 
hands, there are “no shortcuts“ (2016). 
From a theoretical standpoint, a number of insights have also become apparent. First 
of all, we can confirm the emphasis placed by our theoretical inspirations on the 
importance of organized labor’s associational power and the ability of carrying out 
collective action as a means to pursuing workers’ collective interests. For as we have 
been able to witness throughout this thesis, while the union has other power 
resources available to it and can and should use them, such as institutional and 
societal power, not only are the latter often highly dependent on outside factors, such 
as the wider political debate on the bilateral agreements with the EU, but even they 
are ultimately only accessible through associational power. Furthermore and more 
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fundamentally, in more tense times of a neoliberally oriented political economy, 
organized labor has far less societal and institutional opportunities as it may have 
had in the more quiet times of post-war welfare capitalism. Thus, the question of 
“who will control the revenues of the firm’s production process and how they will be 
distributed“ (Knight 1992: 195) is directly dependent on the “relative bargaining power 
of workers“ (ibid: 197) and their “ability to organize and act collectively.“ (ibid). 
Of course, as equally pointed out by a number of our theoretical pillars, this means 
that the “fundamental task for workers in the market is to resolve the collective action 
problem vis-à-vis firms.“ (Knight 1992: 197). While this may not be an easy task, the 
thesis at hand points to a case in which collective action is neither pessimistically 
improbable, as Olson suggests, nor optimistically given, as some of the more 
orthodox Marxists seem to assume. Instead, concerted action in pursuit of collective 
interests is actively constructed in a complex and processual dialogue between the 
structures of a changing political economic and institutional environment, the 
historical development of industrial relations and the union’s own specific agency in 
the form of innovative and effective strategies of union renewal. So, while some of 
the general and universal obstacles to collective action as depicted by Olson and his 
methodological individualist followers are not necessarily wrong per se, they are only 
one fragment of the entire field and demand a more holistic picture. 
On the one hand this means expanding our scope from universal obstacles to 
collective action to one asking how the particular structural challenges stemming 
from the political economic, institutional and historical conditions of the particular 
setting shape and influence collective action. As we saw in our empirical exploration 
of the subject, such a task involves looking at the barriers (and occasional incentives) 
presented by the institutions of the industry, such as the CLA and the paritarian 
funds, as well as at those born out of the structural changes in the organization of the 
labor world, such as the recommodification of labor and the fragmentation of the 
workforce resulting therefrom. As Durrenberger and Reichart  remind us, collective 
action must be seen not simply as some natural process unfolding in a social 
vacuum, but as one embedded in historical, cultural and political matters (2010: 6). 
On the other hand, this means shifting our angle from structure to agency itself and 
studying the very specific choices actors and organizations make and how they 
strategically act in their particular environment – both coping with obstacles and 
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exploiting opportunities. Like Lopez who was inspired by Melucci, we are thus 
encouraged to think of collective action not as a causal effect of something, but far 
more as an accomplishment achieved by meaningful actors (Lopez 2004: 217f.). And 
just like Burawoy, the Analytical Marxists and the institutional theory of Jack Knight 
encourage us as social scientists to focus on the micro-mechanisms of collective 
action, so too must the actors seeking to unleash collective action themselves 
analyze, understand and sharpen their own micro-level interactions. This involves, as 
we were able to see, a high amount of learning capacity, organizational flexibility and 
also framing skills, as emphasized by the Jena scholars (Arbeitskreis Strategic 
Unionism 2013). Far from any purely intellectual exercise, however, understanding 
and developing such micro-methods are further embedded both in actors’ concrete 
experiences and practice as well as in the fact that “People do not simply “act 
collectively.” […] contentious politics is not born out of organizers’ heads but is 
culturally inscribed and socially communicated.“ (Tarrow 2011: 29). 
Bringing these two points together, it becomes clear that while social actors pursuing 
collective action have a large amount of agency and strategic choice, they do not act 
in a voluntaristic way free from universal and (industry-)particular obstacles and also 
do not act independently of their own historical legacies. The latter was vividly on 
display first as the union sought to reestablish its conflict ability at the dawn of a more 
neoliberally dominated political economy and then sought to consolidate and 
strengthen that stance through empowering worker activists themselves. While both 
shifts are necessary if organized labor is to remain a relevant actor in industrial 
relations, they have collided with decade-old habits and ingrained modi operandi. It is 
in this sense that we can only confirm Marx’s famous proclamation that social actors 
“make their own history, […] but under circumstances existing already, given and 
transmitted from the past.“ (Marx 1999). And while these circumstances are, as 
Rothstein pointed out from an institutionalist perspective, not necessarily of their own 
choosing, they may well be of their own making (Rothstein in Dörre et al. 2009: 38). 
Furthermore, it becomes evident that when theorizing labor renewal and the building 
of a union’s associational power, it is important to look at this not as something either 
exclusively achieved or not, but as a multilinear journey. Consisting of interdependent 
developments of interest sensitization, collective identification, mobilization and 
demobilization, the collective action involved in this journey reveals itself more as a 
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social process than as any absolutistic state. For while each event and action must 
be constructed and organized on its own, past experiences of successful collective 
action can serve as an incentive for and reinforcement of collective action in the 
future. Representing “embodiment[s] of oppositional practices and meaning“ 
(Fantasia 1988: 17), collective protests thus do not only serve as a bargaining tool 
vis-à-vis capital, but also as a subjective tool creating “cultures of solidarity“ (ibid) that 
can serve as the basis for future actions. Or in the words of the two Swiss labor 
veterans Pedrina and Hartmann: 
[…] strikes are more than just a show-down in poker for this or the other piece of the 
pie. Strikes are also intensive collective learning processes exercising long-term 
influence on the Handlungsperspektive [perspective of agency] of societal forces in 
social conflicts. (2007: 89) 
Finally, as emphasized by the Analytical Marxists, we must remember that collective 
action in industrial relations is neither exclusively collective nor completely made up 
of disconnected individuals. As discussed in the theory chapter of this thesis and 
seen later on in the empirical section thereof, collective action demands to be treated 
as a process involving individuals and their (often different) rational calculations, but 
also as one in which these individuals act embedded in dynamic social relations with 
others. As Przeworski points out: “The appropriate view [of collective class conflict] is 
neither one of two ready-to-act classes nor of abstract individuals, but of individuals 
who are embedded in different types of relations with other individuals within a 
multidimensionally described social structure.“ (1985: 393). Thus, as elaborated upon 
by Klandermans (1984) and reinforced by the empirical episodes in this ethnography, 
potential collective action participants make their calculations based on individual and 
collective material interests as well as on positive and negative social motives. 
Coming to our theoretical conclusion, when looking back at our scientific mission as 
encouraged by Burawoy’s thoughts on the extended case method, urging us to not 
only use theory as an explanatory instrument but also as a broader scientific platform 
upon which to debate our empirical findings, we can establish that our study does not 
unmitigatedly confirm or negate specific theories, but highlights the acute strengths 
and weaknesses in a set of relevant theories. It thus points to the decisive necessity 
of bringing different theoretical schools into active debate and discussion with one 
another. Far from an exercise in incoherent eclecticism, however, we have attempted 
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to construct adequate theory networks (Bollig and Finke 2014) as an innovative way 
to explain complex and multilayered social phenomena. While probably helpful for a 
wide range of social scientific questions, the assembly of such broad theoretical 
toolboxes are a particularly fruitful and necessary undertaking when it comes to 
organized labor. For as Durrenberger points out,  unions “as social, political, cultural, 
and economic phenomena“ (2007: 75) demand a particularly comprehensive 
theoretical approach touching upon a wide range of social questions. 
While our own ethnographic study is now concluded, the work does not stop for the 
actors we explored. As witnessed throughout this thesis, union revitalization is a 
many-layered, experimental and practice-oriented journey, one ideally accompanied 
by a constant learning process. As such, the union must continue to sharpen both its 
tools of systematic mass mobilization and of worker activist empowerment and 
interweave the two in the most mutually reinforcing way possible – while at the same 
time recognizing and dealing with the inevitable contradictions entangled in such an 
endeavor. Furthermore, following the mundane truism that the only constant is 
change, the union will have to incessantly keep track, study and analyze the 
changing labor world and the shifting power asymmetries involved so as to not only 
be able to better cope with today’s obstacles to concerted action, but also to 
anticipate future ones so as to not again be “caught off-guard“ (Oesch 2011) as it 
was during the dissolution of the “golden age“ (Deppe 2012: 23) of welfare-
capitalism. 
In a similar sense, the work of social scientists studying the phenomena involved in 
this attempted labor revitalization must also continue. Not only do such studies 
provide us with a rewarding stage upon which to explore and debate the complex 
relationships between political economic upheavals and strategic actors’ choices and 
actions, thus furthering scientific knowledge in general, but in the turbulent era in 
which we live today it is our duty to do so. As pointed out in the introduction, in the 
uncertain and often worrying times in which we live, developing a better 
understanding of our changing political economy as well as of the everyday lives, 
hopes, fears and dreams of the actors within is essential. For while each and every 
scientific contribution will not in itself “defend the interests of humanity” as proposed 
by Burawoy (2005b), as a whole the social sciences can and must play an important 
role in at least providing the knowledge necessary to try. 
 - 280 - 
References 
Acheson, James M. (2003) Capturing the Commons. Devising Institutions to Manage 
the Maine Lobster Industry. Lebanon NH: University Press of New England. 
Alleva, Vania (2014) Unia Forte. Strategie der Verwurzelung. In: Unia (ed.) 
Gewerkschaft in Bewegung. 10 Jahre Unia. Zürich, Rotpunktverlag: 24 – 33. 
Ariovich, Laura (2010) Organizing the Organized. Trade Union Renewal, 
Organizational Change and Worker Activism in Metropolitan America. Bern: Peter 
Lang. 
Arbeitskreis Strategic Unionism (2013) Jenaer Machtressourcenansatz 2.0. In: 
Stefan Schmalz and Klaus Dörre (eds.) Comeback der Gewerkschaften? 
Machtressourcen, innovative Praktiken, internationale Perspektiven. Frankfurt and 
New York, Campus Verlag: 345 – 375. 
Atkinson, Paul and Hammersley, Martyn (1994) Ethnography and Participant 
Observation. In: Denzin, N.K. and Lincoln, Y.S. (eds.) Handbook of Qualitative 
Research. Thousand Oaks, CA, Sage: 248 – 260. 
Barker, Colin (2013) Class Struggle and Social Movements. In: Barker, Colin et al. 
(eds.) Marxism and Social Movements. Leiden and Boston, Brill: 41 – 62. 
Baumann, Beat (2015) Vorstudie zu Entwicklungen in der Bauwirtschaft. Internal 
Unia document. Gewerkschaft Unia. 
Betram, Christopher and Carling, Alan (1998) Stumbling into Revolution: Analytical 
Marxism, Rationality and Collective Action. In: Panasiuk, Ryszard and Nowak, 
Leszek (eds.) Marx’s Theories Today. Amsterdam and Atlanta GA, Rodopi Bv 
Editions: 277 – 298. 
Bloch, Maurice (1983) Marxism and Anthropology. The History of a Relationship. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Bollig, Michael and Finke, Peter (2014) Explanatory Models in Anthropology. 
Methodological Refinements, Cross-Cultural Comparison and Theoretical 
Developments. In: Zeitschrift für Ethnologie 139 (1): 39 – 54.  
 - 281 - 
Boltanski, Luc (1982) Les Cadres. La formation d'un groupe social. Paris: Les 
Editions de Minuit. 
Boltanski, Luc and Chiapello, Eve (2003) Der neue Geist des Kapitalismus. 
Konstanz: UVK Verlag. 
Atilio Boron (2010) Den Sozialismus neu denken. Hamburg: VSA-Verlag. 
Bosch, Gerhard and Zühlke-Robinet, Klaus (2000) Der Bauarbeitsmarkt. Soziologie 
und Ökonomie einer Branche. Frankfurt/Main: Campus. 
Bourdieu, Pierre (1998) Prekarität ist überall. In: Bourdieu, Pierre (ed.) Gegenfeuer. 
Wortmeldungen im Dienste des Widerstands gegen die neoliberale Invasion. 
Konstanz, UVK: 96 – 102. 
Bourdieu, Pierre (2002) The Forms of Capital. In: Biggart, Nicole Woolsey (ed.) 
Readings in Economic Sociology. Malden and Oxford, Blackwell Publishers: 280 – 
291. 
Bremme, Peter; Ulrike Fürniss; Ulrich Meinicke (eds.) (2007) Never Work Alone. 
Organizing – ein Zukunftsmodell für Gewerkschaften. Berlin: VSA. 
Brinkmann, Ulrich, Hae-Lin Choi, Richard Detje, Klaus Dörre, Hajo Holst, Serhat 
Karakayali, Catharina Schmalstieg (2008) Strategic Unionism. Aus der Krise zur 
Erneuerung? Umrisse eines Forschungsprogramms. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für 
Sozialwissenschaften.  
Brinkmann, Ulrich and Nachtwey, Oliver (2010) Krise und strategische 
Neuorientierung der Gewerkschaften. In: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte APuZ 13/14: 
21 – 29. 
Brodkin, Karen (1988) Caring By the Hour. Women, Work, and Organizing at Duke 
Medical Center. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. 
Bronfenbrenner, Kate (1993) Seeds of Resurgence. Successful Union Strategies for 
Winning Certification Elections and First Contracts in the 1980s and Beyond. PhD 
dissertation. Cornell University. 
 - 282 - 
Bronfenbrenner, K. and Juravich, T. (1995) Union tactics matter. The impact of union 
tactics on certification elections, first contracts and membership rates. Silver Spring, 
MD: Institute for the Study of Labor Organizations. 
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1157andcontext=wor
kingpapers (4.3.2017). 
Bronfenbrenner, Kate, Sheldon Friedman, Richard W. Hurd, Rudolph A. Oswald, 
Ronald L. Seeber (eds.) (1998) Organizing to Win. New Research on Union 
Strategies. Ithaca and London: ILR Press. 
Bugra, Ayse and Agartan, Kaan (eds.) (2007) Reading Karl Polanyi for the Twenty-
First Century. New York and Houndmills, Palgrave MacMillan. 
Burawoy, Michael (1979) Manufacturing Consent. Changes in the Labor Process 
Under Monopoly Capitalism. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press. 
Burawoy, Michael (1991) The Extended Case Method. In: Burawoy, Michael (ed.) 
Ethnography Unbound. Power and Resistance in the Modern Metropolis. Berkeley 
and Los Angeles, University of California Press: 271 – 287. 
Burawoy, Michael (1996) From Capitalism to Capitalism via Socialism: The Odyssey 
of a Marxist Ethnographer, 1975 – 1995. In: International Labor and Working Class 
History 50: 77-99. 
Burawoy, Michael (1998) The Extended Case Method. In: Sociological Theory 16 (1): 
4 – 33. 
Burawoy, Michael (2005a) The Critical Turn to Public Sociology. In: Critical Sociology 
31 (3): 313 – 326. 
Burawoy, Michael (2005b) For Public Sociology. Presidential Address 2004. In: 
American Sociological Review 70: 4 – 28.   
Burawoy, Michael (2009) The Extended Case Method. Four Countries, Four 
Decades, Four Transformations, and One Theoretical Tradition. Berkeley and Los 
Angeles: University of California Press. 
 - 283 - 
Burawoy, Michael (2014) Marxism after Polanyi. In: Williams, Michelle and Satgar, 
Vishwas (eds.) Marxisms in the 21st Century. Democratic Marxism Series. 
Johannesburg, Wits University Press: 34 – 52. 
Burton, Alice (1991) Dividing Up the Struggle. The Consequences of “Split” Welfare 
Work for Union Activism. In: Burawoy, Michael (ed.) Ethnography Unbound. Power 
and Resistance in the Modern Metropolis. Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of 
California Press: 85 – 107. 
Conzett, Anja (2016) Lohndumping. Eine Spurensuche auf dem Bau. Zürich: 
Rotpunktverlag. 
Conzett, Anja and Gruhnwald, Sylke (2017) Tatort Baustelle. In: Beobachter 
23.06.2017:  14 – 23.   
Coppola, Maurizio (2012) Industrielle Beziehungen zwischen Konflikt und Stabilität. 
Eine qualitative Studie über den Arbeitskonflikt um den Landesmantelvertrag im 




Crosby, Michael (2009) Power at Work. Die Rückgewinnung gewerkschaftlicher 
Macht am Beispiel Australiens. Hamburg: VSA Verlag. 
Degen, Bernard (1987) Der Arbeitsfrieden zwischen Mythos und Realität. In: Degen, 
Bernhard, Peter Farago, Giaco Schiesser, Urs Sekinger, Jakob Tanner (eds.) 
Widerspruch Sonderband. Arbeitsfrieden. Realität eines Mythos. 
Gewerkschaftspolitik und Kampf um Arbeit. Geschichte, Krise, Perspektiven. Zürich, 
Widerspruch: 11 – 30. 
Degen, Bernard (2000) Starre Strukturen im wirtschaftlichen und sozialen Wandel. 
Die schweizerische Gewerkschaftsbewegung in der zweiten Hälfte des 20. 
Jahrhunderts. In: Armingeon, Klaus and Geissbühler, Simon (eds.) Gewerkschaften 
in der Schweiz. Herausforderungen und Optionen. Zürich, Seismo: 11 – 38. 
Degen, Bernard (2014) Arbeiterbewegung. In: Historisches Lexikon der Schweiz, 
Bern. http://www.hls-dhs-dss.ch/textes/d/D16479.php (15.3.2017). 
 - 284 - 
Deppe, Frank (2012) Gewerkschaften in der Grossen Transformation. Von den 
1970er Jahren bis heute. Eine Einführung. Köln: PapyRossa Verlag. 
Deslippe, Dennis A., Eric Fure-Slocum, John W. McKerley (eds.) (2016) Civic Labors. 
Scholar Activism and Working-Class Studies. Urbana, Chicago and Springfield: 
University of Illinois Press. 
Disney, Richard (1990) Explanations of the Decline in Trade Union Density In Britain. 
An Appraisal. In: British Journal of Employment Relations 28 (2): 165 – 177. 
Dörre, Klaus (2010) Überbetriebliche Regulierung von Arbeitsbeziehungen. In: Böhle, 
Fritz; G. Günter Voss, Günther Wachtler (eds.) Handbuch Arbeitssoziologie. 
Wiesbaden, VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften: 873 – 912.  
Dörre, Klaus; Hajo Holst, Oliver Nachtwey (2009) Organising. A Strategic Option for 
Trade Union Renewal? In: International Journal of Action Research 5 (1): 33 – 67. 
Dörre, Klaus, Anja Hänel, Hajo Holst, Ingo Matuschek (2011) Guter Betrieb, 
schlechte Gesellschaft? Arbeits- und Gesellschaftsbewusstsein im Prozess 
kapitalistischer Landnahme. In: Koppetsch, C. (ed.) Nachrichten aus den Innenwelten 
des Kapitalismus. Wiesbaden, VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften: 21 – 49. 
Dörre, Klaus and Schmalz, Stefan (2013) Einleitung. Comeback der 
Gewerkschaften? Eine machtsoziologische Forschungsperspektive. In: Schmalz, 
Stefan and Dörre, Klaus (eds.) Comeback der Gewerkschaften? Machtressourcen, 
innovative Praktiken, internationale Perspektiven. Frankfurt and New York, Campus 
Verlag: 13 – 38. 
Durrenberger, E. Paul (2005) Labour. In: Carrier, James (ed.) A Handbook of 
Economic Anthropology. Cheltenham and Northampton, Edward Elgar Publishing: 
125 – 140. 
Durrenberger, E. Paul (2007) The Anthropology of Organized Labor in the United 
States. In: Annual Review of Anthropology 36: 73 – 88. 
Durrenberger, E. Paul (2009) The Last Wall to Fall. The Anthropology of Collective 
Action in the Global System. In: Journal of Anthropological Research 65 (1): 9 – 26. 
Durrenberger, E. Paul (ed.) (2017) Uncertain Times. Anthropological Approaches to 
 - 285 - 
Labor in a Neoliberal World. Boulder: University Press of Colorado. 
Durrenberger, E. Paul and Erem, Suzan (2005) Class Acts. An Anthropology of 
Service Workers and Their Union. Boulder, Colorado: Paradigm Publishers. 
Durrenberger, E. Paul and Marti, Judith (2006) Introduction. In: Durrenberger, E. Paul 
and Marti, Judith (eds.) Labor in Cross-Cultural Perspective. Lanham, MD: AltaMira 
Press: 1 – 26. 
Durrenberger, E. Paul and Reichart, Karaleah S. (eds.) (2010) The Anthropology of 
Labor Unions. Boulder: University Press of Colorado. 
Durrenberger, E. Paul and Reichart, Karaleah S. (2010) Introduction. In: 
Durrenberger, E. Paul and Reichart, Karaleah S. (eds.) The Anthropology of Labor 
Unions. Boulder, University Press of Colorado: 1 – 15. 
Eagleton, Terry (2011) Why Marx was right. New Haven CT: Yale University Press. 
Elster, John (1986a) Three challenges to class. In: Roemer, John (ed.) Analytical 
Marxism. Cambridge, New York and Paris, Maison des Sciences de l’Homme and 
Cambridge University Press: 141 – 161. 
Elster, John (1986b) Further thoughts on Marxism, functionalism and game theory. 
In: Roemer, John (ed.) Analytical Marxism. Cambridge, New York and Paris, Maison 
des Sciences de l’Homme and Cambridge University Press: 202 – 220. 
Fagetti, Andreas (2015) Mafiamethoden auf Schweizer Baustellen. In: Die 
Wochenzeitung 47/2015. http://www.woz.ch/1547/lohndumping-als-
geschaeftsmodell/mafiamethoden-auf-schweizer-baustellen (27.5.2017). 
Fantasia, Rick (1988) Cultures of Solidarity. Consciousness, Action, and 
Contemporary American Workers. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California 
Press. 
Fibbi, Rosita, Claudio Bolzman, Antonio Fernandez, Andrés Gomensoro, Bülent 
Kaya, Christelle Maire, Clémence Merçay, Marco Pecoraro, Philippe Wanner (2010) 
Die portugiesische Bevölkerung in der Schweiz. Bern: Bundesamt für Migration. 
https://www.sem.admin.ch/dam/data/sem/publiservice/publikationen/diaspora/diaspor
astudie-portugal-d.pdf (29.5.2017). 
 - 286 - 
Form, William (1985) Divided We Stand. Working-Class Stratification in America. 
Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press. 
Frege, Carola and Kelly, John (2004) Varieties of Unionism. Strategies for Union 
Revitalization in a Globalizing Economy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Frigerio, Marina and Merhar, Susanne (2004) “Und es kamen Menschen”. Die 
Schweiz der Italiener. Zürich: Rotpunktverlag. 
Geertz, Clifford (1973) The Interpretation of Cultures. Selected Essays. New York: 
Basic Books. 
Gemperli, Simon (2015) Konfliktive Partnerin. In: Neue Zürcher Zeitung 13.06.2015: 
13. 
Getman, Julius G. (2010) Restoring the Power of Unions. It Takes a Movement. New 
Haven and London: Yale University Press. 
Güntner, Joachim (2015) Geschichte des Streiks. In: Neue Zürcher Zeitung 
30.4.2015. https://www.nzz.ch/feuilleton/ohne-ihn-waeren-arbeitskaempfe-
kollektives-betteln-1.18532399 (25.5.2017). 
Gurley, John G. (1987) Marx and the Critique of Capitalism. In: Albelda, Randy, 
Christopher Gunn, William Waller (eds.) Alternatives to Economic Orthodoxy. New 
York: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 273 – 296. 
Gygi, Beat (2014) Treue Ausländer als Stütze der Bauwirtschaft. In: Neue Zürcher 
Zeitung 13.3.2014. https://www.nzz.ch/wirtschaft/treue-auslaender-als-stuetze-der-
bauwirtschaft-1.18261760 (27.5.2017). 
Gygi, Beat (2015) Wackliger Bau. In: Die Weltwoche 3.12.2015: 40. 
Halcli, Abigail (2000) Chapter 32. Social Movements. In: Browning, Gary, Abigail 
Halcli, Frank Webster (eds.) Understanding Contemporary Society. Theories of The 
Present. London: Sage Publications, 463 – 475. 
Hälker, Juri and Vellay, Claudius (eds.) (2006) Union Renewal – Gewerkschaften in 
Veränderung. Texte aus der aktuellen internationalen Gewerkschaftsforschung. 
Düsseldorf: Hans-Böckler-Stiftung. 
 - 287 - 
Hann, Chris and Hart, Keith (2011) Economic Anthropology. Cambridge and Malden, 
MA: Polity Press. 
Harvey, David (2005) A Brief History of Neoliberalism. Oxford and New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Harvey, David (2010) A Companion to Marx’s Capital. London and New York: Verso. 
Harvey, David (2011) The Enigma of Capital and The Crises of Capitalism. London: 
Profile Books. 
Kasmir, Sharryn (2005) Activism and Class Identity. The Saturn Auto Factory Case. 
In: Nash, June (ed.) Social Movements. An Anthropological Reader. Malden, MA, 
Blackwell Publishing: 78 – 95. 
Kasmir, Sharryn (2009) Toward an Anthropology of Labor. In: City and Society 21 (1) 
11 – 15. 
Kasmir, Sharryn and Carbonella, August (eds.) (2014) Blood and Fire. Toward a 
Global Anthropology of Labor. New York and Oxford: Berghan. 
Kelley, Christopher (2012) Uniting the Wild West? Union Organization in the 
Changing Swiss Construction Branch. Master thesis. University of Zurich. 
Kelley, Christopher (2014a) Wie Milano um Zwölf. Der Wandel im Bauhauptgewerbe 
und was das für die Gewerkschaft bedeutet. In: Widerspruch 64: 159 – 168. 
Kelley, Christopher (2014b) Sweating and Struggling in the ‘Wild West’. Rebuilding 
Power in Construction. In: CLR News 3/2014. European Institute for Construction 
Labour Research: 6 – 13. 
Kelley, Christopher (2017) Trade Unions, Labor Conflict, and Contested Institutions 
in the Swiss Construction Industry. In: Durrenberger, E. Paul (ed.) Uncertain Times. 
Anthropological Approaches to Labor in a Neoliberal World. Boulder, University 
Press of Colorado: 87 – 110. 
Kelly, John (1998) Rethinking Industrial Relations. Mobilization, Collectivism and 
Long Waves. Abingdon, Oxon and New York: Routledge. 
 - 288 - 
Klandermans, Bert (1984) Mobilization and Participation. Social-Psychological 
Expansions of Resource Mobilization Theory. In: American Sociological Review 49 
(5): 583 – 600. 
Knight, Jack (1992) Institutions and Social Conflict. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Lapides, Kenneth (ed.) (1990) Marx and Engels on Trade Unions. New York: Praeger 
Publishers. 
Leins, Stefan (2015) Cockpits of Capitalism. An Ethnography of Financial Analysis. 
PhD dissertation. University of Zurich. 
Lévesque, Christian and Murray, Gregor (2010) Understanding union power. 
Resources and capabilities for renewing union capacity. In: Transfer 16(3): 333 – 
350. 
Lopez, Steven (2004) Reorganizing the Rust Belt. An Inside Study of the American 
Labor Movement. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Mach, André and Oesch, Daniel (2003) Collective Bargaining between 
Decentralization and Stability. A Sectoral Model Explaining the Swiss Experience 
during the 1990s. In: Industrielle Beziehungen 10: 160 – 182. 
Madden, Raymond (2010) Being Ethnographic. A Guide to Theory and Practice of 
Ethnography. London: Sage. 
Mäder, Ueli and Schmassmann, Hector (2013) Zur Dynamik der Erwerbsarbeit. In: 
Gurny, Ruth and Tecklenburg, Ueli (eds.): Arbeit ohne Knechtschaft. Zürich, Edition 
8: 112 – 125. 
Marti, Michael; Stephan Osterwald; André Müller (2003) Prekäre Arbeitsverhältnisse 
in der Schweiz. Studie im Auftrag der Aufsichtskommission für den Ausgleichsfonds 
der Arbeitslosenversicherung. Bern & Altdorf: Ecoplan. 
Marx, Karl (1955) The Poverty of Philosophy. Moscow: Progress Publishers. 
https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1847/poverty-philosophy/ (25.5.2017). 
 - 289 - 
Marx, Karl (1959) Capital. Volume III. New York: International Publishers. 
https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1894-c3/ (25.5.2017). 
Marx, Karl (1969) Value, Price and Profit. New York: International Co. 
https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1865/value-price-profit/ (25.5.2017). 
Marx, Karl (1970) Critique of the Gotha Programme. Moscow: Progress Publishers. 
https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1875/gotha/ (25.5.2017). 
Marx, Karl (1990) Capital. A Critique of Political Economy. Volume One. London et 
al.: Penguin Books. 
Marx, Karl (1999) The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte. 
https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1852/18th-brumaire/ (25.5.2017). 




Marx, Karl & Engels, Frederick (1974) The German Ideology. (Edited and introduced 
by C.J. Arthur) London: Lawrence and Wishart. 
McAdam, David (1988) Micromobilization Contexts and Recruitment to Activism. In: 
International Social Movement Research 1: 125 – 154. 
McAlevey, Jane F. (2016) No Shortcuts. Organizing for Power in the New Gilded 
Age. New York: Oxford University Press.  
Merkt, Anita (2016) Wilder Osten auf Zürichs Baustellen. In: Tagesanzeiger 
22.01.2016: 18. 
Milkman, Ruth and Voss, Kim (eds.) (2004) Rebuilding Labor. Organizing and 
Organizers in the New Union Movement. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Müller-Jentsch, Walther (2006) Kapitalismus ohne Gewerkschaften? In: Blätter für 
deutsche und internationale Politik 10: 1234 – 1243. 
Nachtwey, Oliver and Wolf, Luigi (2013) Strategisches Handlungsvermögen und 
gewerkschaftliche Erneuerung im Dienstleistungssektor. In: Schmalz, Stefan and 
 - 290 - 
Dörre, Klaus (eds.) Comeback der Gewerkschaften? Machtressourcen, innovative 
Praktiken, internationale Perspektive. Frankfurt and New York, Campus Verlag: 179 
– 198. 
Niggli, Marcel (2014) Gutachten betreffend Hausverbote und gewerkschaftliche 
Tätigkeit. Im Auftrag des Schweizerischen Gewerkschaftsbundes. 
http://www.unia.ch/uploads/tx_news/news-20140916-Gutachten-Hausverbot.pdf 
(20.4.2017). 
Oesch, Daniel (2008) Organisationen im Umbruch. Die Gewerkschaften in der 
Schweiz von 1990 bis 2006. In: Rieger, Andreas, Renzo Ambrosetti, Renatus Beck 
(eds.) Gewerkschaften im Umbruch. Eine Analyse der Fusion zur Grossgewerkschaft 
Unia. Zürich, 23 – 49. 
Oesch, Daniel (2011) Swiss Trade Unions and Industrial Relations after 1990. A 
History of Decline and Renewal. In: Trampusch, Christine and Mach, André (eds.) 
Switzerland in Europe. Continuity and Change in the Swiss Political Economy. 
Abingdon and New York, Routledge: 82 – 102. 
Olson, Mancur (1977) The Logic of Collective Action. Public Goods and the Theory of 
Groups. Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press.  
Ortner, Sherry B. (1984) Theory in Anthropology since the Sixties. In: Comparative 
Studies in Society and History 26 (1): 126 – 166. 
Ostrom, Elinor (2000) Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms. In: The 
Journal of Economic Perspectives 14(3): 137 – 158. 
Pedrina, Vasco and Hartmann, Hans (2007) Streiks und soziale Kämpfe in der 
Schweiz. Bilanz und Perspektiven. In: Widerspruch 52: 85 – 96. 
Pedrina, Vasco (2009) Die Gewerkschaft in Tiefe und Breite verwurzeln! Internal 
Unia document. Gewerkschaft Unia. 
Pedrina, Vasco (2012) Rank and File Participation and International Union 
Democracy. In: Global Labour Column. Global Labour University. 
http://column.global-labour-university.org/2012/09/rank-file-participation-and.html. 
(19.3.2017). 
 - 291 - 
Pelizzari, Allesandro and Schief, Sebastian (2007) ‚Fake Corporatism’. Industrial 
Relations in Switzerland. Work, Employment and Society Conference 2007, 
University of Aberdeen. 
Pelizzari, Alessandro (2009) Dynamiken der Prekarisierung. Atypische 
Erwerbsverhältnisse und milieuspezifische Unsicherheitsbewältigung. Konstanz: 
UVK. 
Pelizzari, Alessandro (2010) Konkurrenz und Solidarität auf der Baustelle. In: 
Schultheiss, Franz, Berthold Vogel, Michael Gemperle (eds.) Ein halbes Leben. 
Biographische Zeugnisse aus einer Arbeitswelt in Umbruch. Konstanz: UVK: 171 – 
192. 
Pfister, Pascal (2010) Die Renaissance des Streiks. Arbeitskonflikte im Lichte der 
schweizerischen Streikstatistik. In: Widerspruch 58: 203 – 210. 
Piore, Michael J. (1979) Birds of Passage. Migrant Labor and Industrial Societies. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Przeworski, Adam (1985) Marxism and Rational Choice. In: Politics and Society 14: 
379 – 409. 
Przeworski, Adam (1986) Material interests, class compromise, and the transition to 
socialism. In: Analytical Marxism. Cambridge, New York and Paris, Maison des 
Sciences de l’Homme and Cambridge University Press: 162 – 188. 
Rahm, Peter (2016a) Die Temporärarbeit im Schweizer Bauhauptgewerbe. In: Die 
Baustellen 01/16: 52 – 53. 
Rahm, Peter (2016b) Die Akkordarbeiten im Bauhauptgewerbe. In: Die Baustellen 
01/16: 54 – 56. 
Rieger, Andreas (2010) Gesamtarbeitsverträge in der Schweiz. Entwicklung, aktuelle 
Situation und Bedeutung. In: Der Gesamtarbeitsvertrag. Ein Arbeitsbuch zum 
Kollektivarbeitsvertragsrecht. Bern, Movendo: 7 – 22. 
Rieger, Andreas (2014) Gewerkschaftslandschaft umgepflügt. In: Unia (ed.) 
Gewerkschaft in Bewegung. 10 Jahre Unia. Zürich, Rotpunktverlag: 10 – 23. 
 - 292 - 
Rieger, Andreas (2016) Die neue Etappe. Internal Unia document. Gewerkschaft 
Unia. 
Rieger, Andreas (2017) Zur Renaissance des Streiks in der Schweiz. Häufigkeiten 
und Charakteristiken alter und neuer Arbeitskämpfe. In: Widerspruch 69: 115 – 125. 
Rieger, Andreas, Pascal Pfister, Vania Alleva (2012) Verkannte Arbeit. 
Dienstleistungsangestelle in der Schweiz. Zürich: Rotpunktverlag. 
Rieger, Andreas, Nadja Olloz, Colette Kalt, Kurt O. Regotz, Monika Rüeger, Myra 
Fischer-Rosinger, Tommy Hofmann (2016) Sozialpartnerschaft. Zusammenarbeit 
zwischen Arbeitgebenden und Arbeitnehmenden bzw. deren Verbände. HRM-
Dossier 71. Zürich: SPEKTRAmedia. 
Roemer, John (ed.) (1986) Analytical Marxism. New York: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Roemer, John (1986a) Introduction. In: Roemer, John (ed.) Analytical Marxism. 
Cambridge, New York and Paris, Maison des Sciences de l’Homme and Cambridge 
University Press: 3 – 8. 
Roemer, John (1986b) Should Marxists be interested in exploitation? In: Roemer, 
John (ed.) Analytical Marxism. Cambridge, New York and Paris, Maison des 
Sciences de l’Homme and Cambridge University Press: 260 – 282. 
Roseberry, William (1997) Marx and Anthropology. In: Annual Review of 
Anthropology 26: 25 – 46. 
Schiavi, Rita and Brassel, Ruedi (1987) Kämpfend in den Arbeitsfrieden. Zur 
Streikwelle in der unmittelbaren Nachkriegszeit. In: Degen, Bernhard, Peter Farago, 
Giaco Schiesser, Urs Sekinger, Jakob Tanner (eds.) Widerspruch Sonderband. 
Arbeitsfrieden. Realität eines Mythos. Gewerkschaftspolitik und Kampf um Arbeit. 
Geschichte, Krise, Perspektiven. Zürich, Widerspruch: 57 – 81. 
Schmalz, Stefan and Dörre, Klaus (eds.) (2013) Comeback der Gewerkschaften? 
Machtressourcen, innovative Praktiken, internationale Perspektive. Frankfurt and 
New York: Campus Verlag. 
 - 293 - 
Scholz, Jendrik (2013) Krise des korporatistischen Arrangements und 
gewerkschaftliche Revitalisierungsansätze im Handwerk. In: Schmalz, Stefan and 
Dörre, Klaus (eds.) Comeback der Gewerkschaften? Machtressourcen, innovative 
Praktiken, internationale Perspektive. Frankfurt and New York, Campus Verlag: 199 
– 212. 
Schweizerischer Arbeitgeberverband (2009a) 100 Jahre Schweizerischer 
Arbeitgeberverband. Teil 4 seiner Chronik: 1946 bis 1954. Zürich, Schweizerischer 
Arbeitgeberverband: 148 – 151. http://www.arbeitgeber.ch/wp-
content/uploads/2015/05/2008_SAV-Chronik-1946-1954.pdf (16.3.2017). 
Schweizerischer Arbeitgeberverband (2009b) 100 Jahre Schweizerischer 
Arbeitgeberverband. Teil 9 seiner Chronik: Von 1989 bis 1992. Zürich, 
Schweizerischer Arbeitgeberverband: 170 – 173. http://www.arbeitgeber.ch/wp-
content/uploads/2015/05/2008_SAV-Chronik-1989-1992.pdf (17.3.2017). 
Schweizerischer Baumeisterverband (2015) Weisungen für das Verhalten bei 
Arbeitskonflikten. Zürich: Schweizerischer Baumeisterverband. 
Schweizerischer Baumeisterverband (2016) Zahlen und Fakten 2015. Zürich: 
Schweizerischer Baumeisterverband. http://www.baumeister.ch/de/politik-
wirtschaft/publikationen/zahlen-und-fakten (16.5.2017). 
Scott, John (2000) Chapter 9. Rational Choice Theory. In: Browning, Gary, Abigail 
Halcli, Frank Webster (eds.) Understanding Contemporary Society. Theories of The 
Present. London: Sage Publications, 126 – 138. 
Silver, Beverly J. (2003) Forces of Labor. Workers’ Movements and Globalization 
since 1870. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Slichter, Sumner, James J. Healy, E. Robert Livernash (1960) The Impact of 
Collective Bargaining on Management. Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution.  
Smith, Sharon (2011) Marxism, Unions, and Class Struggle. In: International Socialist 
Review 78. http://isreview.org/issue/78/marxism-unions-and-class-struggle 
(20.12.2014). 
 - 294 - 
Standing, Guy (2007) Labor Recommodification in the Global Transformation. In: 
Ayse Bugra and Kaan Agartan (eds.) Reading Karl Polanyi for the Twenty-First 
Century. New York and Houndmills, Palgrave MacMillan: 67 – 93. 
Spyridakis, Manos (2013) The Liminal Worker. An Ethnography of Work, 
Unemployment and Precariousness in Contemporary Greece. Burlington, VT: 
Ashgate. 
Steinauer, Jean and Von Allmen, Malik (2000) Weg mit den Baracken! Die 
Immigranten in den schweizerischen Gewerkschaften 1945 – 2000. Lausanne: 
Editions d’en bas. 
Stiglitz, D. Joseph (2009) Moving Beyond Market Fundamentalism to a More 
Balanced Economy. In: Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics 80 (3): 345 – 
360. 
Studer, Rahel, Stefan Scholz-Odermatt, Bruno Lanfranconi (2009) Unfallrisiken und 
Schadenverlauf im Personalverleih. Eine wissenschaftliche Analyse der SSUV im 
Auftrag der EKAS zur Optimierung der Unfallprävention für Leiharbeiter. Luzern: 
Sammelstelle für die Statistik der Unfallversicherung UVG. 
http://www.ekas.admin.ch/download.php?id=1169 (17.4.2017). 
Tarrow, Sidney. (2011) Power in movement. New York: Cambridge University Press.  
Thompson, E.P. (1966) The Making of the English Working Class. New York: Vintage 
Books. 
Thompson, E.P. (1971) The moral economy of the English crowd in the eighteenth 
century. In: Past and Present 50 (1): 76 –136. 
Tilly, Charles and Tarrow, Sidney (2007) Contentious Politics. Boulder: Paradigm 
Publishers. 
Turner, Lowell (2004) Why Revitalize? Labour’s Urgent Mission in a Contested 
Global Economy. In: Frege, Carola and Kelly, John (eds.) Varieties of Unionism: 
Strategies for Union Revitalization in a Globalizing Economy. New York, Oxford 
University Press: 1 – 10. 
 - 295 - 
Turner, L. and Hurd, R. (2001) Building Social Movement Unionism. The 
Transformation of the American Labor Movement. In: L. Turner, H. Katz and R. Hurd 
(eds.) Rekindling the movement: Labor’s quest for relevance in the 21st century. 
Ithaca: Cornell University Press.  
Urban, Hans-Jürgen (2008) Vorwort. In: Brinkmann, Ulrich; Hae-Lin Choi, Richard 
Detje, Klaus Dörre, Hajo Holst, Serhat Karakayali, Catharina Schmalstieg (eds.) 
Strategic Unionism. Aus der Krise zur Erneuerung? Umrisse eines 
Forschungsprogramms. Wiesbaden, VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften: 7 – 14. 
Vatter, Adrian (2016) Das politische System der Schweiz. Baden-Baden: Nomos 
Verlagsgesellschaft. 
Vuattolo, August (1953 – 1955) Geschichte des Schweizerischen Bau- und 
Holzarbeitsverbandes, 1873 – 1953. Zürich: Schweizerischer Bau- und 
Holzarbeiterverband. 
Voss, Kim and Sherman, Rachel (2000) Breaking the Iron Law of Oligarchy. Union 
Revitalization in the American Labor Movement. In: American Journal of Sociology 
106 (2): 303 – 349.  
Wacquant, Loïc (2008) Urban Outcasts. A Comparative Sociology of Advanced 
Marginality. Cambridge: Polity Press.  
Wills, Jane (2009) Subcontracted Employment and its Challenge to Labor. In: Labor 
Studies Journal 34 (4): 441 – 460. 
Wolf, Eric (1999) Envisioning Power. Ideologies of Dominance and Crisis. Berkeley: 
University of California Press. 
Wright, Erik Olin (1994) Chapter 8. What is Analytical Marxism? In: Wright, Erik Olin 
(ed.) Interrogating Inequality: Essays on Class Analysis, Socialism and Marxism. 
London and New York, Verso: 178 – 198. 
Wright, Erik O. (2000) Working Class Power, Capitalist Class Interests and Class 
Compromise. In: American Journal of Sociology 105 (4): 957 – 1002. 
Wyler, Rebekka (2012) Schweizer Gewerkschaften und Europa. Münster: 
Westfälisches Dampfboot. 
 - 296 - 
Zlolniski, Christian (2010) Janitors, Street Vendors and Activists. The Lives of 
Mexican Immigrants in Silicon Valley. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of 
California Press. 
